世界經(jīng)濟(jì)千年史

1、91/92世界經(jīng)濟(jì)千年史2004年第54期（總第470期）2004年9月28日荷蘭格羅寧根大學(xué)教授、世界經(jīng)濟(jì)千年史作者M(jìn)addison先生在中國經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中心萬眾樓做了題為“世界經(jīng)濟(jì)千年史”的講座，集中討論了宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)計量歷史研究的進(jìn)展進(jìn)程。下面是他報告的要緊內(nèi)容。宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)計量歷史的進(jìn)展經(jīng)歷了三個歷史時期：20世紀(jì)50年代以來的“收入和財寶國際研究協(xié)會時期”即IARIW時期（International Association for Research in Income and Wealth）；18201950年的庫茲涅斯研究為代表的時期或“Kuznetsian時期”；15001820年商人資本主

2、義年代。50年代以來，宏觀計量的要緊目的是提供可能的政策選擇以改善國家的增長表現(xiàn)以及進(jìn)行國家間差異分析。我們現(xiàn)在有50年代以來世界大部分國家的增長和收入的官方可能。而在Kuznetsian時代，數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)史學(xué)家在測量世界經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和量化增長因素方面取得了巨大進(jìn)展。盡管仍有一些領(lǐng)域需要改進(jìn)，但對那個時期經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)展大致輪廓沒有實(shí)質(zhì)爭議。相反，關(guān)于商人資本主義年代的世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的描述則存在專門大分歧，作為代表的是亞當(dāng)、斯密的樂觀看法和馬爾薩斯的悲觀論。20世紀(jì)50年代以來的IARIW時代盡管50年代以來標(biāo)準(zhǔn)國民經(jīng)濟(jì)核算體系逐漸被采納，然而現(xiàn)存可能中仍有專門多問題。使用蘇聯(lián)MPS體系（material prod

3、uction system）的國家增長被高估，需要做大量調(diào)整。非洲許多新生國家缺少必要的技術(shù)和資金進(jìn)行國民收入增長核算，盡管國際組織工作在一定程度上彌補(bǔ)了這種不足，然而非洲數(shù)據(jù)也需要做大量調(diào)整。還有1995年以來一些高收入國家開始引入享樂指數(shù)（hedonic index）來反映產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的改善，然而這么做并沒有充分的依照同時會高估經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，比如美國用新的計量技術(shù)重新進(jìn)行19291950年國民經(jīng)濟(jì)核算，結(jié)果使國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的增長率由2.6%增加到3.5%。最后關(guān)于教育和知識的計量也還沒有成熟理論。另一問題是購買力平價轉(zhuǎn)換與國家間GDP水平比較。政府統(tǒng)計官員會提供真實(shí)價格計算的總產(chǎn)出和總支出

4、數(shù)據(jù)，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、新聞記者和官員們都將其作為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和波動的要緊指標(biāo)。購買力平價方法與用真實(shí)價格計量的目的是一樣的，即修正價格差異使真實(shí)產(chǎn)出和支出水平的有效比較成為可能。以匯率轉(zhuǎn)換的GDP與以購買力平價轉(zhuǎn)換的GDP區(qū)不特不大。以購買力平價計算的進(jìn)展中國家的GDP要大大高于以匯率轉(zhuǎn)換的GDP，差距可能達(dá)到3-5倍。同時發(fā)達(dá)國家GDP以匯率計算則容易被高估。更為明顯的一個例子是1950年中國和印度以匯率計算人均GDP分不是$85和$175（1990年價格），這兩個數(shù)據(jù)低得讓人難以置信。那么為何匯率轉(zhuǎn)換還如此經(jīng)常的被使用呢？一方面出于無知和支持自己觀點(diǎn)的需要，另一方面許多進(jìn)展國家不情愿同意購買力平價方

5、法，因?yàn)閾?dān)心這會不利于他們申請世行的優(yōu)惠貸款和資助。這導(dǎo)致了經(jīng)濟(jì)間比較分析的明顯錯誤，媒體經(jīng)常稱日本是世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)盡管其GDP還不到中國的60，英國的政客們也始終相信英國的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模比中國大。18201950年的Kuznetsian時代Simon Kuznets教授對現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的研究成果，使能夠數(shù)量化研究的時刻界限從20世紀(jì)50年代推進(jìn)到19世紀(jì)20年代。關(guān)于這段時期我們現(xiàn)有的幾個結(jié)論是：加速的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長始于1820年而非Kuznets認(rèn)為的1760年；經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對西歐各國研究表明西歐的崛起是同時而非交錯發(fā)生的；這段時期快速進(jìn)展加大了西方與其他國家的差距；Kuznets研究推翻了Kondrati

6、eff長期循環(huán)的講法和Schumpeter循環(huán)進(jìn)展論點(diǎn)。事實(shí)上1820年以來的技術(shù)變革不是浪潮式的而是連續(xù)推進(jìn)的，目前有足夠證據(jù)把18202001這段時刻劃分為5個不同的進(jìn)展時期。其中19501973年是一個無可比擬的繁榮的黃金時代，那個時期世界GDP年均增長5，世界貿(mào)易年均增長8，人均收入有明顯趨同趨勢，大部分地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長都快于美國。1973年以后，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)增長明顯下降，各地區(qū)的差異加大，然而基于世界的角度，最近那個時期仍然是增長表現(xiàn)名列第二的時期。區(qū)分領(lǐng)導(dǎo)國家和跟隨國家關(guān)于研究技術(shù)的動態(tài)傳播和趕超過程是特不重要的，“領(lǐng)導(dǎo)”國家指那些處于技術(shù)前沿的國家，而“跟隨”國家指勞動生產(chǎn)率較低的國家。

7、1500年以來共有4個領(lǐng)導(dǎo)國家，16世紀(jì)的意大利，16世紀(jì)至拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭時期的荷蘭，此后的英國和1890年后的美國。對1820年以來英國、美國和日本的增長分析，最早考慮的是勞動力投入和生產(chǎn)率，戰(zhàn)后資本成了一個特不重要的增長因素，之后又有觀點(diǎn)將“人力資本”看作生產(chǎn)要素。Denison擴(kuò)展增長分析方法指出1820年以來英國、美國和日本經(jīng)濟(jì)增長表現(xiàn)出以下一些顯著特點(diǎn)：物質(zhì)資本大量增長，非居住建筑和機(jī)器設(shè)備增加特不明顯，伴隨在機(jī)器設(shè)備中加速的技術(shù)進(jìn)步。教育水平大大提高，英國提高了8倍，美國和日本11倍。人均勞動投入在英國和日本下降了40，在美國下降了20。對外貿(mào)易占GDP的比重在英國由3增至25，日本0

8、.2至13，美國2至10。自然資源的缺乏對增長并不構(gòu)成限制，人均土地在美國下降了14倍，英國和日本下降了4倍。能源的投入增長比較和氣，美國人均增長了3倍，英國6倍，日本8倍。15001820年的商人資本主義年代關(guān)于商人資本主義年代（15001820）經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，在18世紀(jì)末就差不多存在兩種不同的解釋。亞當(dāng)、斯密樂觀地認(rèn)為，美洲大陸和新航線的發(fā)覺給大型經(jīng)濟(jì)，國際貿(mào)易和專業(yè)化的進(jìn)展制造了新的機(jī)會，盡管因?yàn)閷Q(mào)易的共同限制，這些機(jī)會不能被充分利用。馬爾薩斯則悲觀論則認(rèn)為，經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)取決于人口增長和固定的土地供給間的平衡，技術(shù)進(jìn)步、資本形成和國際貿(mào)易專業(yè)化的因素被忽略，因此只有通過災(zāi)難（戰(zhàn)爭、饑餓、疾病）

9、才能實(shí)現(xiàn)平衡。這兩種觀點(diǎn)對立一直存在。此外悲觀的看法有了一些其他的支持，LeRoy Ladurie認(rèn)為法國13001720年的經(jīng)濟(jì)是停滯的，真實(shí)工資論者則更加悲觀他們有人認(rèn)為英國1820年的生活水平比1500年下降了44等等。關(guān)于15001820不同國家和地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，Kuznets在1965年提出了關(guān)于西歐人口率和人均GDP增長的一個特不有阻礙的假講，認(rèn)為西歐發(fā)達(dá)國家15001750年可能的（同時或許是最大的）長期人均產(chǎn)出年均增長率為0.2%。對上述假講驗(yàn)證表明，西歐15001820年人均年增長率為0.14，顯著小于Kuznets可能，美洲國家整體而言人均GDP增長快于西歐，非洲南部和北部

10、的進(jìn)展差異比較明顯，亞洲國家整體而言收入水平是停滯的，日本的人均表現(xiàn)要好于中國和印度，然而特不明顯中國那個時期有著廣泛的增長，它在人口大量增長的情況下生活水平并沒有下降同時GDP的增長與西歐一樣顯著。在分析商人資本主義時代的增長時，增長分析的方法就不再適用了。研究表明，人均勞動投入、資本和人力資本、知識在那個時期都有增加，然而特不明顯的是全球化在那個時期起到了比以往更加重要的作用，相對來講全球化在這段時期的作用比在20世紀(jì)還要重要。西方造船業(yè)和航海的巨大進(jìn)展，使世界貿(mào)易在15001820年增長了20倍。歐洲國家還從殖民地，非洲奴隸貿(mào)易中獵取了專門多利益。美洲國家則經(jīng)歷了生態(tài)、技術(shù)和人口的轉(zhuǎn)型。

11、引進(jìn)新的農(nóng)作物提高了糧食的產(chǎn)量；馬和其他牲畜的引入則改善了交通條件；歐洲各種技術(shù)的引入也有助于經(jīng)濟(jì)的進(jìn)展；歐洲疾病使2/3土著居民死亡，加上歐洲人和非洲奴隸大量涌入，改變了美洲的人口結(jié)構(gòu)。非洲和亞洲國家也引入了美洲農(nóng)作物。此外還存在大陸間的技術(shù)傳遞，歐洲向美洲輸出武器、工具、車輛、船和造船技術(shù)、印刷、文字、教育和政治經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)，歐洲采礦技術(shù)在美洲應(yīng)用生產(chǎn)出大量金銀供歐洲與亞洲進(jìn)行貿(mào)易，同時期歐洲從亞洲引入了紡織和陶瓷技術(shù)。與亞當(dāng)斯密和馬爾薩斯關(guān)于商人資本主義的對立解釋相對應(yīng)，關(guān)于現(xiàn)代化的根源有特不不同的看法。有一個學(xué)派認(rèn)為現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)增長源于工業(yè)革命，而之前則是幾個世紀(jì)的馬爾薩斯停滯。專門多人支持那

12、個觀點(diǎn)，然而這些觀點(diǎn)在全然上是錯誤的。事實(shí)上向現(xiàn)代資本主義過渡經(jīng)歷了長時刻的預(yù)備。首先是教育和知識的傳播由于印刷術(shù)的發(fā)明和推廣而變革；其次造船業(yè)和航海業(yè)到1820年也發(fā)生了變革，船只的設(shè)計、裝備和天文知識都大大改善，有了精確的航海指導(dǎo)等等。這些進(jìn)展差不多上科研努力的結(jié)果。無疑，歐洲的這些進(jìn)展是19和20世紀(jì)經(jīng)濟(jì)更快進(jìn)展的前奏，歐洲的現(xiàn)代化不是一蹴而就的。（任麗達(dá)、盧鋒整理） 發(fā)貼時刻： 2004-10-17 2:28:56 218.31.*.* errantking 等級：貧農(nóng)財產(chǎn)：經(jīng)驗(yàn)：魅力： 注冊：2003-9-7 文章：55 鑒定：保密 Measuring and Interpretin

13、g World Economic Performance 1500-2001*Angus MaddisonThis is a suitable occasion for surveying the progress achieved, in the past 60 years, in quantifying world economic development, and analysing the causal influences which determine the pace and pattern of growth. This was a major objective of the

14、 founding fathers of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW). The initiative for creating an association including both academics and official statisticians came from Simon Kuznets (1901-85), the pioneer of quantitative economic history. Milton Gilbert (1909-79) and R

15、ichard Stone (1913-1991) were strategic partners with enormous international leverage in creating and diffusing standard procedures for construction of comparable national accounts by official statistical offices.This paper analyses the development of macro-measurement in three epochs:a) for the IAR

16、IW epoch, back to 1950, the main purpose has been to illuminate policy options to improve growth performance at the national level and to analyse inter-country divergence in real income levels to help devise policies for catch-up. We now have official estimates of growth and levels for the vast bulk

17、 of the world economy from 1950 onwards.b) For the Kuznetsian epoch of “modern economic growth” back to 1820, quantitative economic historians have made great progress in measuring world economic growth and in quantifying the forces determining performance. There is scope for further research to fil

18、l gaps and crosscheck existing estimates, but the broad contours of development in this period are not under serious challenge.c) for the “merchant capitalist” epoch, 1500-1820, there are sharply divergent interpretations about world, and particularly European performance. The dichotomy between posi

19、tive and negative assessments started with Adam Smith and Malthus at the end of the 18th century. In my view, the evidence for the Malthusian view is shoddy.Historians usually start at the beginning of their chronology. Quantitative economic historians have to work backwards from the present, procee

20、ding from what is known and accepted, to earlier epochs where evidence is weaker and there is greater reliance on clues and conjecture. *This is the first Ruggles Lecture, delivered at the 28th IARIW General Conference, Cork, Ireland August 2004I(i) Standardised Estimates of GDP Growth for 1950 onwa

21、rdsThe standardised accounts provide a coherent macroeconomic framework covering the whole economy, crosschecked in three ways. From the income side, they are the total of wages, rents and profits. On the demand side, they are the sum of final expenditures by consumers, investors and government. Fro

22、m the production side, the sum of value added in different sectors-agriculture, industry and services, net of duplication.Milton Gilbert had been responsible for the official US accounts during the war and from 1950 to 1961 was head of statistics and national accounts in OEEC. The Marshall Plan requ

23、ired criteria for aid allocation, and NATO needed them for its burden-sharing exercises. Gilbert met these requirements by pushing official statistical offices of the 16 OEEC member countries to adopt the standardised system of accounts designed by Richard Stone. Stone set up a programme in Cambridg

24、e to train official European statisticians to implement the standardised system. A set of national handbooks was prepared to explain the problems of adjustment to the standardised system, and a first comparative set of accounts for the 16 countries for 1938 and 1947-52 was published by OEEC in 1954,

25、 with extensive notes explaining the adjustments which had been made to achieve comparability.In 1953, Stone became chairman of a United Nations commission which established a system of accounts for worldwide application. The UN could not exert as much leverage on its member countries to conform as

26、was possible in OEEC. The communist countries used the Soviet SMS (system of material accounts) which had a narrower definition of productive activity (excluding many service activities), involved serious double counting (measuring gross output without deducting inter-sector transfers of inputs) and

27、 exaggerated economic growth. The price system and tax-structures were different from those in capitalist countries, and measurement conventions gave incentives to exaggerate quality change when new products were introduced. Abram Bergson (1914-2003) pioneered procedures for re-estimation of Soviet

28、GDP on a basis corresponding approximately to Western conceptions in coverage, with elimination of double-counting, and repricing on an “adjusted factor cost” basis with imputation for capital costs which were not considered in Soviet accounting. These corrective procedures were applied to Soviet st

29、atistics by a team of CIA Sovietologists in Washington. In New York, Thad Alton and his colleagues did the same for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. This work was financed for intelligence purposes, but was publicly available in annual reports to the US Congres

30、s (see Maddison 1998b).In the 1990s most of these countries adopted the standardised SNA system in principle, but implementation was complicated by the massive change in ownership, in the level and structure of prices, allocation of resources between consumption and investment, and statistical repor

31、ting procedures. It will take some years before these problems can be fully resolved. The IMF continues to use exaggerated measures of GDP growth for these countries. As a result, it shows a growth in world GDP averaging 3.9 percent a year for 1970-200, compared with my estimate of 3.3 percent. For

32、China it shows growth averaging 8.5 per cent a year, whereas my adjusted measure shows a growth rate of 6.5 per cent (see Maddison, 2003, p. 231).Another area of weakness is Africa, where there was and still is a great shortage of skills and money for such work in a large number of newly created cou

33、ntries. The gap in estimates of GDP growth was filled in substantial degree by the OECD Development Centre which compiled annual estimates of real GDP growth 1950-90 for 51 African countries. The Centre benefited from the expertise of Derek Blades, who had been chief statistician in Malawi for eight

34、 years, and by David Roberts who had similar experience in Gambia. A third problem in the assessment of GDP growth performance in the higher income countries derives from recent changes in measurement conventions from 1995 onwards, involving adoption of hedonic indexes to adjust for assumed changes

35、in quality of product, use of chain indices, and treatment of consumer software as investment. Hedonic indices are perfectly respectable in small doses, but one can be skeptical about the widespread assumption that quality changes have been so large and monotonically positive. In the USA, where the

36、switch to hedonics was most significant, their net impact was to raise the measured rate of growth to a somewhat greater degree than in Western Europe and Japan. US official estimates go back to 1929, and the changes in measurement technique had their biggest impact for 1929-50, raising the GDP grow

37、th rate for that period from 2.6 percent a year to 3.5. There was no counterpart to this long retrospective readjustment in other countries, and I have continued to use the earlier US official measure for 1929-50 (for reasons explained in Maddison, 2001, p. 138, and Maddison, 2003, pp.79-80). More t

38、han 40 years ago, Milton Gilbert warned that such adjustments could open Pandoras box: “In the end, they would make it impossible to construct measures of output and price changes that are useful to the study of economic growth” (Gilbert, 1961, p. 287). The danger which arises from an overdose of he

39、donics is discussed in Appendix 3.Ed Denison (1915-1992) expressed opposition to changes in national accounting which treat accretions of knowledge as investment. He considered this a “misclassification” which made “growth analysis chaotic” (see Denison, 1989, p. 10). A major justification for his c

40、omplaint was that his growth accounts included “human capital”, i.e. increments in the quality of the labour force due to increases in the level of education.In fact, the only form of knowledge which is now treated as investment is computer software. It is odd to treat this rapidly depreciating know

41、ledge as investment, whilst ignoring the more durable influence of books and education.(ii) Purchasing Power Converters for Cross-country Comparison of GDP Levels Once standardised accounts of real GDP growth in national currencies had been established for all OEEC countries, the next step to facili

42、tate inter-country comparison and multi-country aggregation was the development of purchasing power parity converters (PPPs) to measure real GDP levels, rather than relying on exchange rate comparison. The first OEEC study, co-authored by Milton Gilbert and Irving Kravis (1916-92). appeared in 1954,

43、 a second in 1958. They compared real expenditure levels in 8 OEEC countries. A third volume by Paige and Bombach (1959) compared real output levels in the UK and USA. Kravis and his colleagues, Alan Heston and Robert Summers improved the methodology of PPP estimation in their ICP project at the Uni

44、versity of Pennsylvania from 1968 onwards.The OEEC studies were binary comparisons between pairs of countries. The three options were i) a Paasche PPP, with “own-country” quantity weights; ii) a Laspeyres PPP with the quantity weights of the numeraire country-the United States; iii) a compromise geo

45、metric (Fisher) average of the first two measures. The corresponding measures of real expenditure were: i) Laspeyres comparisons of GDP levels based on the prices (unit values) of the numeraire country; ii) Paasche level comparisons based on “own-country” prices (unit values); iii) a Fisher geometri

46、c average of the two measures. Binary comparisons, e.g. Germany/USA and UK/USA, could then be linked with the USA as the star country. Such star comparisons could provide a proxy Germany/UK comparison, but it was not “transitive” (i.e. the result would not be identical to that derived from a direct

47、Germany/UK comparison). This was not a great drawback for OEEC countries where the inter-country deviation in performance levels was not too wide. But Kravis, Heston and Summers were engaged in comparisons over a much wider range of per capita income. They therefore adopted the Geary-Khamis method,

48、invented by Roy Geary (1896-1983) and Salem Khamis, which multilateralised the results, provided transitivity and other desirable properties. They used it in conjunction with the commodity product dummy method (CPD), invented by Robert Summers, for filling holes in the basic dataset. Their masterpie

49、ce was their third study, the 1982 volume World Product and Income, which contained estimates for 34 countries (in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe) in 1975 prices and international Geary-Khamis dollars. These countries accounted for 64 per cent of world GDP in 2001.Table 1 Nature of PPP Conver

50、ters to Estimate GDP Levels in the Benchmark Year 1990(billion 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars and number of countries)Europe & Latin Asia Africa WorldW. Offshoots America ICP 15,273 (28) 2,131 (18) 8,017 (24) 0 (0) 25,421 (70)PWT 59 (3) 71 (14) 524 (16) 891 (51) 1,516 (84)Proxies 16 (10) 38 (15) 87 (17)

51、14 (6) 155 (48)Total 15,349 (41) 2,240 (47) 8,628 (57) 905 (57) 27,122(202)Source: Maddison (2003), p. 230The UN Statistical Office extended the ICP work and had covered 84 countries by 1985. UNSO then dropped this endeavour, though some of the regional UN bodies continued with it. The OECD recommen

52、ced its comparisons on a regular basis in 1982. Its latest work covered the 28 OECD countries and 20 others (in Eastern Europe, the 15 successor states of the USSR, and Mongolia). Alan Heston and Robert Summers produce short-hand estimates of PPPs and real income levels for countries for which full-

53、scale ICP type measures are not available. As a result, we now have reasonably acceptable PPP adjusted measures available for over 99 percent of world GDP,There were three Eurostat estimates (for 1980, 1985 and 1993) of PPPs for 22 African countries, but the results were erratic, and I preferred to

54、use the more comprehensive and plausible results of the Penn World Tables (see Summers and Heston, October 2002). Table 1 summarises the nature of the PPP estimates I used to create my 1990 benchmark estimates of world GDP.Table 2 Worlds 10 Largest Countries: Comparative Ranking, 1950 & 2001, at con

55、stant1990 prices, using 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP converters and 1990 exchange rates1950 2001 1950 2001GDP $billion, with 1990 PPP conversion $billion, with 1990 exchange rateUSA 1,456 7,966 1,456 7,966China 240 4,570 47 886Japan 161 2,625 206 3,358India 222 2,003 62 558Germany 265 1,537 337 1,951France

56、 221 1,258 261 1,491UK 348 1,202 363 1,253Italy 165 1,101 191 1,272Brazil 89 990 58 638Russia 315 791 154 388GDP per head 1990 PPP $ 1990 ER $ USA 9,561 27,948 9,561 27,948China 439 3,583 85 541Japan 1,921 20,683 2,458 26,466India 619 1,957 172 545Germany 3,881 18,677 4,928 23,717France 5,271 21,092

57、 6,244 24,985UK 6,939 20,127 7,266 20,985Italy 3,502 19,040 4,046 21,996Brazil 1,672 5,570 1,077 3,588Russia 3,086 5,435 1,515 2,669Source:Maddison (2003)Table 2 shows the difference between PPP and exchange rate conversion for the worlds 10 largest economies (which represented 65 percent of world G

58、DP in 2001). The exchange rate conversions on the right hand side show much lower levels for the poorer countries (China, India, Russia and Brazil) and somewhat higher levels for the west European countries and Japan relative to the USA than the PPP converters. In the case of China the deviation the

59、 exchange rate and the PPPs was very large-purchasing power was more than 5 times higher than the exchange rate. In India the ratio was more than 3 times higher, in Russia twice as high and in Brazil more than 50 per cent higher. In Japan and the west European countries, the exchange rate overvalued

60、 the purchasing power relative to the US dollar. In fact the big differential for poorer countries is a fairly systematic outcome in such comparisons. For the west European countries and Japan the differential is smaller and has varied above and below parity in the past two decades. The implausibili