全球宏觀數(shù)據(jù)觀察：亞洲

1、Global Data Watch: AsiaUS-China trade tensions ratchet up againIn the past couple of weeks, China raised its tariffs on US imports to 10% from 5% on US$75bn of goods, effective on September 1, and re-imposed 25% and 5% tariffs on auto and auto parts imported from the US, effective December 15. The U

2、S responded with 5% additional tariffs on approximately US$550 billion worth of Chinese imports. For the existing 25% tariffs on ap- proximately US$250 billion worth of Chinese imports, the US will begin the process of increasing the tariff rate to 30%, effective October 1 following a notice and com

3、ment period. For the remaining 10% tariffs on approximately US$300 billion worth of Chinese imports announced earlier this month, the tariffs will now be raised to 15%, effective on the already scheduled dates: September 1 for list 4.A products with estimated import value of US$129bn, and December 1

4、5 for the rest. If all these newly announced tariff are imple- mented, the average US tariff on Chinese imports will increase by another 4.9%-pts to 21.7% from 16.8% and the average China tariff on US imports will increase by another 3.6%-pts to 18.8% from 15.2%.While the growth impact for 2019 like

5、ly will be limited given that the tariffs on US$300 billion of exports will only be implemented at year-end, the im- pact on growth next year will be more noticeable. We thus maintain our 2019 GDP forecast at 6.2%y/y, but lower our 2020 growth forecast to 5.8% from 6.0%. Chinas policy reaction likel

6、y will not deviate from our current fore- casts: (i) modest fiscal expansion, with the augmented fiscal deficit increasing by 0.8%-pt in 2019 and 0.4%-pt in 2020; (ii) two more RRR cuts and 10bp OMO policy rate cuts, with TSF growth increasing marginally to 11%-12%;(iii) the USD/CNY exchange rate to

7、 reach 7.35 at end-2019 and 7.40 in mid- 2020. The new interest rate reform could foster monetary policy transmission and opens the door for lower bank lending rates, but the adjustment likely will be gradual in the near term. In a risk scenario that the trade war further esca- lates and broadens wi

8、th a more substantial knock-on to growth, the govern- ment likely will deploy more policy stimulus in 2020, including additional RRR cuts or rate cuts, accelerating infrastructure investment, and subsidies to consumers, while the CNY would depreciate further.A temporary lull in trade flows, policy p

9、reemptsDespite the negative headlines on tariffs, EM Asias recent trade data paint a more benign picture. Exports look to have bottomed in late 2Q19, juxtaposed against weakening capital goods demand, and we also expect the August manufacturing PMIs in China, Korea, and Taiwan, due next week, to sta

10、bilize (Figure 1). However, the recent swings in regional exports likely owe largely to the impact of the tariffs, with front-loading of tariffed exports followed bya drop after the imposition of tariffs skewing the export data (Figures 2 and 3). We expect that tariff-related shocks will dominate EM

11、 Asia trade flows again through the rest of the year, especially if the US tariffs on US$300 billion in imports from China, effective September 1 and December 15, remain in place. This could again lead to front-loading of exports followed by a contraction over late 3Q19 and late 4Q19 and 1Q20. Howev

12、er, if and when the dust around tariffs settles, we do not expect the underlying macro environment to be conducive to a sustained capex revival, especially if HYPERLINK /research/content/GPS-3097995-0 corporate profits come HYPERLINK /research/content/GPS-3097995-0 under pressure, with a knock-on to

13、 EM Asiasexports.Economic Research September 2, 2019Australian labor supply: Demographic lags andNAIRUdrags1714Australian labor supply: Demographic lags andNAIRUdrags1714India: An implicit fiscal stimulusUS-China will weigh more on Japans growththan US-Japan6Debt crises in Asia and their lessonsforC

14、hina10Data Watches HYPERLINK l _TOC_250004 Japan19 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250003 Australia andNewZealand23China, Hong Kong,and Taiwan25 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250002 Korea28 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250001 ASEAN30 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250000 India34Asia focus36RegionalDataCalendars37Sin Beng Ong(65) 6882-1623 HYPERLINK mai

15、lto:sinbeng.ong sinbeng.ongJPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Singapore Branch HYPERLINK / This latter consideration likely has prompted policy to turn more supportive. In Korea, the government announced an expansionary 2020 budget plan this week, proposing 9.3%y/y growth in spending compared with the origi

16、nal 2019 budget (or 8.0% com- pared with the supplementary 2019 budget) after 9.9% growth in 2019. As we expect revenue growth to slow materially, we now see the fiscal balance falling to a deficit of 0.9% of GDP after a 0.6% surplus in 2019, buffering the downside risk from rising trade tensions. W

17、hile we had expected a preemptive Bank of Korea easing in August as a close call, the MPC chose to wait and hint at near-term action. That is, two dovish members dissented for a cut, and the governor highlighted uncertainty on the growth path and downside risk to the inflation outlook. Thus we conti

18、nue to expect two more easing actions by 1H20. The timing is fluid, yet disappointing inflation pressure likely would lead to a 25bp cut in October. We maintain a follow-up cut in 1Q20 but as a closer call given the BoKs cautious stance, and depending on incoming data and the impact from trade tensi

19、ons.Indias growth woes worsen; fiscal and monetary policy to act in tandemIndias growth woes worsened with 2Q GDP printing at just 5%oya, much below ex- pectations (J.P. Morgan and consensus: 5.7% oya). Unsurprisingly, private consump- tionwhich has been the linchpin of Indias growth in recent years

20、collapsed in 2Q, reflecting tighter financial conditions in the shadow-banking system, a struggling auto sector, and adverse agrarian terms-of-trade that are depressing rural purchasing power. Thus far, monetary policy has borne the brunt of the policy response with policy rates being eased by 110bp

21、 in 2019. Fridays downside surprise to GDP increases our con- viction of more easing, and we expect another 25bp at the October review. By contrast, policymakers have struggled to find fiscal policy space because total public sector bor- rowing is already consuming all household financial savings. T

22、herefore, the finance minister studiously eschewed a fiscal stimulus when announcing a series of sector- specific measures last week. However, authorities caught a break this week. The RBI Board accepted an expert committees recommendation to transfer “surplus capital” from the RBIs balance to fisca

23、l authorities to the tune of 0.3% of GDP. This is tanta- mount to an asset sale on the Budget but because asset sales are counted above the line in India, this will effectively translate into a fiscal impulse of 0.3% of GDP this year ( HYPERLINK /research/content/GPS-3110318-0 India: An implicit fis

24、cal stimulus). Fiscal and monetary policy acting in tandem should buffer the downside risks to our full-year growth forecast of 6.4%, which is already below consensus.Regional Economic Outlook in Summary2018 Nominal GDP, US$billionregioncapita2017billionregioncapita201720182019f201720182019fJapan4,9

25、71n.a39,280.51.00.4Australia1,432n.a57,30New Zealand205n.a41,96Emerging Asia21,504100.06,492.02.32.3ex China and India5,16924.09,172.12.01.4China13,60863.39,77Hong Kong SAR, China3631.748,7173.83.02.5India2,72612.72,0Indonesia1,0424.83,89Korea1,6197.531,36Malay sia3541.611,233.81.00.8Philippines3311

26、.53,10Singapore3641.764,58Taiw an, China5902.725,0Thailand5052.37,2744.04.13.0Current account balance20172018201720182019f201720182019f201720182019fJapann.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Australian.an.an.a-2.6-2.0-1.8n.a.n.a.n.a.New Zealandn.a.n.a.n.a.-2.9-3.7-3.7n.a.n.a.n.a.Emerging Asia369.0208.60.954845421

27、5548ex China and India253.4215.6189.85.04.03.6194419962048China164.90.40.5314030403080Hong Kong SAR, China1.82.81.8422462492India-49.3-56.1-66.3-1.9-2.1-2.3399385420Indonesia-17.3-31.1-28.6-1.7-3.0-2.6130114109Korea79.769.93.5373376379Malay sia9.48.312.83.02.33.4107109106Philippines-2.4-8.0-7.5-0.8-

28、2.4-2.2727174Singapore55.465.168.816.417.919.8192200206Taiw an, China82.868.862.514.411.710.7451459467Thailand44.132.43.1197204215External debt% of GDP, end of periodReal GDP% y ear-on-y earCurrent account% of GDPShort-term foreign debtUS$ billion, end ofperiodConsumer prices% y ear-on-y earForeign

29、reservesUS$ billionGovernment balance% of GDP, end of period201720182019f20172018f2019f201720182019fJapann.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.-3.0-2.7-2.5Australian.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.-1.6-0.5-0.1New Zealandn.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.China491.8461.8431.8-3.0-2.6-2.8Hong Kong SAR, Chinan.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Ind

30、ia19.420.319.690.797.7104.7-6.6-6.3-6.2Indonesia27.626.725.278.878.878.8-2.7-2.2-1.9Korea24.824.324.8120.3123.30.6Malay sia65.257.855.1103.5103.5103.5-3.0-3.7-3.4Philippines23.121.319.8-2.6-3.2-2.7Singaporen.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.an.an.aTaiw an, China30.030.632.2155.0163.0171.0-1.2-1.5-1.6Thailand

31、28.826.626.353.453.453.4-3.4-3.3-3.6Source: National statistics authorities and J.P. MorganKey economic statistics201720182019f1Q182Q183Q184Q181Q192Q193Q19f4Q19fReal GDP, %-ch over 1 quarter, saarJapan-0.31.6-1.80.2-2.0Australia2.63.8New Zealand2.82.4Emerging Asia5.25.2ex China and India4.93.0China5

32、.95.6Hong Kong SAR, China3.83.00.37.8-1.20.4-2.05.3-1.6-2.00.0Taiw an, China1.31.4Korea3.8-2.0India7.07.6Indonesia5.15.05.04.74.8Malay sia3.03.8Philippines5.65.6Singapore-0.83.8-Thailand4.04.13.07.84.4-Consumer prices, %oya, averageJapan0.51.0Australia1.51.4New Zealand0.91.2Emerging Asia2.02.6ex Chi

33、na and India2.12.02.12.01.5China2.72.8Hong Kong SAR, China2.83.0Taiw an, China1.01.9Korea0.20.5India3.03.5Indonesia3.02.8Malay sia3.81.00.50.3-1.2Philippines1.81.5Singapore1.41.6Thailand0.71.0201720182019f2Q183Q184Q181Q192Q19Current3Q19f4Q19fOfficial interestrates, % p.a., end-periodUnited StatesFed

34、 funds rate1.752.502.002.002.252.502.502.502.252.002.00JapanOv ernight call rate-0.10-0.10-0.30-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.30-0.30AustraliaCash rate1.501.501.001.501.501.501.501.251.001.001.00New ZealandCash rate1.751.750.751.751.751.751.751.501.001.000.75China1-y ear w orking capital4.354.354.

35、354.354.354.354.354.354.354.354.35Taiw an, ChinaOfficial discount rate1.381.381.251.381.381.381.381.381.381.381.25KoreaBase rate1.501.751.251.501.501.751.751.751.501.501.25IndiaRepo rate6.006.504.906.256.506.506.255.755.405.404.90Indonesia1BI rate4.256.005.005.255.756.006.006.005.505.255.00Malay sia

36、Ov ernight policy rate53.253.003.002.752.75Philippines2Rev erse repo rate3.004.754.003.504.504.754.754.500Thailand1-day repo rate1.501.751.501.501.501.751.751.751.501.501.50Exchange rates, end-periodJapanUSD/JPY112.6110.0104.0111.0113.6110.0110.5107.7106.2106.0104.0AustraliaAUD/USD0.780.700.660.760.

37、720.700.710.700.670.670.66New ZealandNZD/USD0.710.670.630.700.660.670.680.670.630.640.63ChinaUSD/CNY6.516.887.356.366.876.886.716.85Hong Kong SAR, ChinUSD/HKD7.817.837.857.847.837.837.857.817.847.857.85Taiw an, ChinaUSD/TWD29.6630.6032.2029.7030.4930.6030.8431.0031.3331.8032.20KoreaUSD/KRW1069111512

38、5510751110111511351157120912301255IndiaUSD/INR63.8469.7873.5067.2572.5069.7869.0068.9571.4672.0073.50IndonesiaUSD/IDR1356814380148001390014902143801417014128141851460014800Malay siaUSD/MYR4.054.134.303.924.30PhilippinesUSD/PHP49.9652.5052.7552.5053.9952.5052.6751.2452.1252.2552.75SingaporeUSD/SGD1.3

39、41.361.411.331.371.361.351.351.391.401.41ThailandUSD/THB32.5832.3831.5031.9032.3332.3831.6330.6830.6231.3031.50VietnamUSD/VND2271023300234502290023000233002320023305231862345023450BI e BSP a e Source: National statistics authorities and J.P. MorganEconomic Research NoteUS-China will weigh more on Ja

40、pans growth than US-JapanImpact of US-Japan trade negotiations on Japanese economy will besmallTariffs on agricultural goods declined to the level of TPP11, no further impact than that of originalTPP12Lower risk for Japan of currencyclauseRe-escalation of US-China trade war could damage Japanese eco

41、nomy more than US-Japan tradedisputeAt their August 25 meeting, President Trump and Prime Min- ister Abe reached basic agreement on the main points of the US-Japan bilateral trade negotiations, and indicated that they will seek to conclude talks at a summit meeting at the end of September. If this m

42、aterializes, the new trade agreement like- ly will become effective by the end of this year.Although the US strongly argued for its trade deficit (almost JPY6.5tn) with Japan to be reduced, and Japans autos and parts comprise almost two-thirds of the deficit, there has not been much discussion of ho

43、w to reduce Japans auto trade surplus (Figure 1). Rather, the discussion has focused moreon lowering the Japans taxes on agricultural products, which is politically important for the US administration. The basic agreement reduces Japans tariff on US meats to the level agreed by TPP11, and postpones

44、the abolition of the US tariff on Japans autos Japan hadrequested.Figure1: Trade surplus of Japan against the USances that the US will not impose Section 232 tariffs on Ja- pans autos, a good sign.In sum, Japan made concessions to the US, but avoided a sig- nificant negative impact on Japans economy

45、 because its agri- cultural industry is small and the tariffs have been reduced to the same level agreed under TPP11. This outcome is more positive for Japan than we had originally expected.the US-Japan: Agricultural product tariff low- ered to TPP11 level, with little impactAt the meeting with the

46、US during the G-7 summit, Japan agreed in principle to lower tariffs on US beef and pork grad- ually to the level agreed in TPP11 (Table 1), as Japans tariff rates on agricultural products are high on average, in contrast with those on industrial products (Table 2). This concession aims to compensat

47、e for the impact on US farms from the US withdrawal from TPP. And other actions on dairy products, wheat, and corn will follow (see box below). For its part, the US agreed to abolish tariffs on a wide range of industrial goods, but not on Japans autos (currently 2.5% on passenger cars and 25% on tru

48、cks). Japan had strongly requested the abolition of the tariffs on autos, but the US wants to protect US automakers. The discussion about tariffs on autos will continue in September.Table 1: Main points of US-Japan trade negotiationsReduction of tariff on US beef from 38.5% to 9% even-billion yen, n

49、sa2400AutosGeneralmachinery ElectricmachineryTradesurplusJapans imports from UStuallyRelaxation of criteria for triggering safeguard about imports of US beefReduction of tariff on US low-price pork from 48218001200 JPY/kg to 50 JPYeventuallyPostponement of abolition of tariff on Japan autos (discuss

50、ion will continue in September)0US imports from JapanSource: J.P. MorganAbolition of tariffs on wide range of other industrial goods except for autosIntroduction of no tariff on Japans beef up to 3,000 tons0009121518Source: MoF, BoJ, J.P. MorganThe risks have lessened that the US will insist on a cu

51、rrency clause in the agreement or impose export volume restrictions on Japanese autos, but it remains a risk at the negotiations in September. At least both Trump and Abe have made assur-Since TPP11 became effective in December 2018 and the EU- Japan EPA in February 2019, Japans imports of meats (be

52、ef and pork) and dairy products from the US were depressed compared to imports from the EU and Australia and New Zealand because of lower tariffs and non-tariff limits on those areas (Figures 2 and 3). This has been the main incentive for the US to urge Japan to lower tariffs on those products.Table

53、 2: Simple average tariff rate (2018) Most Favored Nation applied,% AllproductsAgriculturalproductsAustralia2.51.2US3.45.3Canada4.015.9Japan4.415.7EU5.212.0China9.815.6Source: WTOFigure 2: Japans nominal imports of meatsexpect it will exceed 1% once again to avoid reducing defense spending compared

54、to FY2019 (Figure 4). But a JPY1tn in- crease in spending in FY2020, which would reduce the trade surplus with the US by 15%, would raise defense spending to 1.3% of GDP, which we believe is unlikely to be realized.Even if the Japanese government buys JPY1-2tn of defense goods, we expect it to sprea

55、d purchases over two to three years, or reduce other military spending to remain close to the 1% ceiling.Figure 4: Defense expenditure%oyaUSOceaniaEU40USOceaniaEU3020100-10-20-30TPP11EU-J EPA%, FY2019 is JPMs estimation (both scales)Defense-to-General acct expenditureDefense-to- Nominal GDP+1tn JPY-

56、600bn JPYDefense-to-General acct expenditureDefense-to- Nominal GDP+1tn JPY-600bn JPY5.15.0%1.00.90.820162017201820192020Source: MoFFigure 3: Japans nominal imports of dairy productsyaTPP11 EU-JEPAeffective effectiveyaTPP11 EU-JEPAeffective effectiveOceaniaEUUS806040200-4020162017201820192020Source:

57、 MoFHowever, the import volumes of agricultural products are so small that the economic growth impact of Japan reducing its tariffs on imports from the US will be negligible.Purchase of defense goods may not drasti- cally reduce trade surplusAnother, less explicit issue is the Japanese governments s

58、iz- able purchases of defense goods from the US. Trumps past comments suggest the Japanese government may purchase more. This would buoy the US defense industry, but whether it would reduce Japans trade surplus with the US by much is questionable.Japans government has a self-imposed 1% of GDP ceilin

59、g on defense spending. Since 1990 defense spending has exceeded 1% of nominal GDP only once, in FY2010. In FY2020 we10111314151618192021Source: MoD, MoF, J.P. MorganPotential risk: currency clauseThere remains a risk that the Trump administration eventually will complain that the trade deficit with

60、Japan has not nar- rowed, and choose to include a currency clause in the US- Japan trade agreement, although the risk has eased since the August 25 Trump-Abe meeting. The respective finance minis- ters have not discussed this issue. Japan has continued to in- sist that discussion of exchange rate po