會計穩(wěn)健性的第一篇：解釋和意義

1、內(nèi)容提要：本文是會計穩(wěn)健性兩篇文章中的第一篇。第一篇對穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行了 解釋以及探討了穩(wěn)健性對會計監(jiān)督的影響。第二篇總結(jié)了穩(wěn)健性的實驗證據(jù)及對 穩(wěn)健性的解釋，并提出未來研究方向。文章證明了穩(wěn)健性的存在，對不同程度下 的穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行了不同的解釋。會計穩(wěn)健性的定義是指要求對收益與損失的不對稱確認(rèn)，其極端形式下傳統(tǒng) 的穩(wěn)健性定義為“不預(yù)期收益，但預(yù)期所有的損失”。盡管有人指責(zé)會計穩(wěn)健性， 但是穩(wěn)健性已經(jīng)存在了幾個世紀(jì)，并在近30年中有所加強(qiáng)。支持穩(wěn)健性的一種理論解釋是：契約理論、股東訴訟理論、稅收理論和會計 管制理論。在文章的第二篇中用證據(jù)表明契約和股東訴訟是最重要的因素，證據(jù) 表明稅收和會計管制相對比較

2、弱，盈余管理也可能產(chǎn)生穩(wěn)健性，但這不能成為主 要的因素。對穩(wěn)健性的解釋和證明對會計管理機(jī)制有著重要的影響。財務(wù)會計委員會曾 試圖禁止會計穩(wěn)健性，以實現(xiàn)“信息中立”而忽略穩(wěn)健性長期存在的原因，這種 意圖可能會失敗并產(chǎn)生意想不到的后果。消除會計穩(wěn)健性將會改變會計管理行為， 并且會增大經(jīng)濟(jì)上的費(fèi)用。同樣的，研究人員和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)考慮把未來現(xiàn)金流量列 入財務(wù)報表，其產(chǎn)生的成本會對會計管理行為存在影響。本文是會計穩(wěn)健性性研究的第一篇，研究的目的主要是：1、對會計穩(wěn)健性的解釋2、對財務(wù)法規(guī)和準(zhǔn)則的設(shè)置文章的第二篇的研究目的是：1、總結(jié)穩(wěn)健性存在的證據(jù)2、對證據(jù)進(jìn)行評估去辨別不同穩(wěn)健性的解釋3、對證據(jù)進(jìn)行評估去

3、辨別穩(wěn)健性與非穩(wěn)健性對會計穩(wěn)健性解釋的討論是大多是基于利用現(xiàn)有的文獻(xiàn)。然而，本文是立足 于契約觀，包括了債務(wù)合同的約束的解釋(Watts 1993),以及與其使用的其他合 同，如管理薪酬契約也會產(chǎn)生影響。本文也提供了新的論點(diǎn)，即使不考慮契約， 一旦信息成本變化后管理層的行為也會產(chǎn)生會計穩(wěn)健性的現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行了介紹。穩(wěn)健性的定義傳統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)健性定義是“不預(yù)期收益，但預(yù)期所有的損失”(Bliss 1924)。預(yù) 期收益是指所承認(rèn)的收益是通過法律允許的，是可以被證實前的收益。穩(wěn)健性原 則并不意味著所有的收入現(xiàn)金流應(yīng)該在收入確認(rèn)前收到一一賒賬銷售是被認(rèn)可 的一一但那些現(xiàn)金流應(yīng)該是可以被證實的。在實證文獻(xiàn)中穩(wěn)健性

4、的概念被解釋為 “相比確認(rèn)壞消息而言，會計人員傾向于尋找更多證據(jù)支持好消息的確認(rèn)。” (Basu 1997,7 )穩(wěn)健性是對收益和損失的不對稱確認(rèn)。這種解釋下收益與損失確 認(rèn)差異越大，穩(wěn)健性程度也就越大，本文采用的就是這種“差異化驗證”解釋的 穩(wěn)健性。穩(wěn)健性的一個重要結(jié)果就是不對稱地處理收益與損失，其后果是持續(xù)低估凈 資產(chǎn)值。有些資本市場監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、準(zhǔn)則制定者以及學(xué)者批評穩(wěn)健性，因為當(dāng)前的 低估收益會導(dǎo)致未來收入的夸大。例如會計研究公報(ARB)21美國注冊會計師協(xié) 會1939年規(guī)定：穩(wěn)健性在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中如果不確定性影響到了利潤表，這就是 很重要的。穩(wěn)健性主義來描述利潤表對某一特定時期的影響，這

5、并不符合穩(wěn)健性的定義。 穩(wěn)健性是自公司營運(yùn)開始在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的累計收入或盈利。會計核算中穩(wěn)健性的影響既長遠(yuǎn)又有意義Basu(1997,8)認(rèn)為穩(wěn)健性的影響 至少有500年了。最近的實證研究表明在過去的30年會計核算變得越來越穩(wěn)健。 鑒于許多資本市場的監(jiān)管機(jī)制、準(zhǔn)則制定方和學(xué)者對穩(wěn)健性的口誅筆伐，結(jié)果是 令人吃驚的，穩(wěn)健性長期存在卻又遭受很多的批評1。對穩(wěn)健性的批評者忽視了 穩(wěn)健性存在的巨大利益，如果他們不理解穩(wěn)健性原則的好處而由此產(chǎn)生的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)， 很可能會嚴(yán)重?fù)p害財務(wù)報表。穩(wěn)健性原則的解釋與概述研究人員提出很多對穩(wěn)健性報告的解釋，所有的題提議都是穩(wěn)健性原則應(yīng)是 使用戶收益的公司會計報表。有一種解釋是

6、穩(wěn)健性的產(chǎn)生是因為它的一部分是有 效的技術(shù)應(yīng)用于組織公司和與各方簽訂的合同契約。在這種契約觀的解釋下，穩(wěn) 健性意味著是一種道德風(fēng)險，是化解契約中由于各方報酬不對稱而帶來的道德風(fēng) 險的一種手段。例如，穩(wěn)健性可以包含管理層的機(jī)會主義行為的合同用于會計核1例如監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、準(zhǔn)則制定方、學(xué)院方的觀點(diǎn)見Levitt (1998), FASB (1980, paras. 91-97),和 Devine (1963, 127)。即使把契約和管理會計行為從會計報告中分離，道德風(fēng)險問題仍將存在與財 務(wù)報告中，只要會計管理績效措施告知投資者便會影響資產(chǎn)配置者的投資決策和 管理層的福利。管理層因此會傾向于使用有偏見的計

7、量方法，穩(wěn)健性可以抑制機(jī) 會主義行為，抵消公司管理層的樂觀偏見形成非對稱的管理偏見。在實踐中，穩(wěn)健性大大的抵消了更多的管理層偏見，而且延遲了收入和低估 累計收益及近資產(chǎn)。這些影響在契約中會增加公司的價值，因為它們限制了管理 層中的機(jī)會主義向自己以及其他各方的支付，例如股東。增加的公司價值是雙方 共享的，能提高雙方的福利，在這個意義上說，穩(wěn)健性是一種有效的契約機(jī)制。穩(wěn)健性很可能是一個高效的在契約情況下的財務(wù)報告機(jī)制。下文討論的其他 穩(wěn)健性的解釋，除了穩(wěn)健性是抵消管理層的偏見，非締約雙方也是能約束管理層 和締約方的機(jī)會付款。鑒于此，穩(wěn)健性和它所產(chǎn)生的凈資產(chǎn)偏差也可能是必要的 有效的財務(wù)報表的組成部

8、分，是“好”而不是“壞”的。2股東訴訟是穩(wěn)健性的另一個來源。管理層在高估利潤和資產(chǎn)的時候更容易面 臨訴訟風(fēng)險。通過資產(chǎn)的低估可以降低預(yù)計的訴訟費(fèi)用。通過訴訟成本的不對稱 來限制投機(jī)性支付的風(fēng)險，從這一程度的解釋表明，個人當(dāng)事人以外的公司也是 這樣約束的，用穩(wěn)健性來降低訴訟風(fēng)險。稅收也是穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生的原因之一。對立的和損失進(jìn)行不對稱的確認(rèn)能使企業(yè) 減少稅收的現(xiàn)值，從而提升公司的價值，推遲收入確認(rèn)加快支出確認(rèn)從而推遲納 稅。最后，財務(wù)報告準(zhǔn)則的制定機(jī)構(gòu)和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)也在財務(wù)報告中有運(yùn)用穩(wěn)健性的 動機(jī)。正如類似一個不對稱的訴訟成本，準(zhǔn)則制定機(jī)構(gòu)對會計實務(wù)的規(guī)范成本也 是不對稱的。在會計信息被高估時監(jiān)管方將

9、面臨更多的指責(zé)，所以穩(wěn)健的會計信 息可以降低政治成本。政治成本的不對稱就如不對稱的訴訟成本時是一致的，非 契約方謹(jǐn)慎的制約了管理層和其他各方的投機(jī)付款行為。在對穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行了解釋，正如我們所見穩(wěn)健性原則通過契約、訴訟、稅收、 會計管制來約束管理層和其他各方的投機(jī)付款行為。最近的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)表明會計穩(wěn)健性存在上升的趨勢，以不同的程度體現(xiàn)在四個 信息觀點(diǎn)的支持者沒有看到穩(wěn)健性的好處，因為他們對信息不對稱所造成的結(jié)果 和影響以及對信息投資者成本與效益的分析具有局限性。穩(wěn)健性的解釋中。然而文中的第二篇中一些證據(jù)與兩種解釋一致并不意味著穩(wěn)健 性。這些解釋之一是通過盈余管理來低估資產(chǎn)，承擔(dān)額外的費(fèi)用和過度的沖銷

10、， 以夸大未來收益(Hanna 2002)另一種解釋是管理層選擇放棄盈利(Hayn 1995)。 而這些解釋可以解釋公司屬性所產(chǎn)生的保守主義，如暫時的損失。它們無法共同 或單獨(dú)解釋凈資產(chǎn)，只是標(biāo)志性地描述了穩(wěn)健性原則。文章的第二篇用各種各樣對穩(wěn)健性的解釋來證明穩(wěn)健性在財務(wù)報告中向資 本市場的投資者提供信息的建設(shè)性作用。這意味著會計監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和準(zhǔn)則制定方都 應(yīng)反思其反對穩(wěn)健性的行為。契約觀對穩(wěn)健性的解釋對穩(wěn)健性的四個解釋中，筆者認(rèn)為契約觀是最詳盡的解釋，因為它是穩(wěn)健性 的來源以及它的論點(diǎn)更有發(fā)展的空間。越來越多的論點(diǎn)的解釋都只是從信息質(zhì)量 的角度看問題的。此外，契約觀的解釋強(qiáng)調(diào)正式的契約，如債務(wù)契

11、約和合同管理 層的報酬，它們擴(kuò)大到了包括管理會計和管理系統(tǒng)的公司的組織安排，即使是稅 收觀的解釋也是屬于契約觀的解釋之中。會計中使用契約是非常那個古老的做法，跨越了幾個世紀(jì)公司都在采用 (Watts 和 Zimmerman 1983)，用來進(jìn)行管理控制(De Ste Croix 1956 和 Chadwick 1992) o研究者提出，這種長期過程中影響了當(dāng)代會計和財務(wù)報告，導(dǎo) 致穩(wěn)健性傾向于使用偏見的計量方法(Watts and Zimmennan1986; Watts 1993; Basu1995)。相比之下，其它穩(wěn)健性的解釋是最近一段時間才出現(xiàn)的。股東訴訟的出現(xiàn)是 在美國20世紀(jì)60年代

12、，并隨著其發(fā)展而成為穩(wěn)健性的解釋之一，稅收系統(tǒng)影響 財務(wù)報告的會計處理方法，是一種近期出現(xiàn)的解釋，可追溯到1909年。一些謹(jǐn) 慎的會計管制機(jī)構(gòu)的財務(wù)報告，它們的歷史可以回溯到1933年和1934年。契約的解釋包含了三種屬性：及時性、可核性、不對稱性的可驗證性。在債 務(wù)、賠償和其他契約解釋中穩(wěn)健性成為了一個有效的契約機(jī)制，因為它對契約的 性能測試中要求使對收益的確認(rèn)比損失的確認(rèn)有更嚴(yán)格的核查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。一如既往， 由于不對稱的確認(rèn)導(dǎo)致收益的確認(rèn)比損失延遲，其結(jié)果是凈資產(chǎn)和累計收益不太 可能被夸大，降低了違反契約的可能性。出處： Watts R L. Conservatism in accounting

13、 part lexplanations and implication J.Accounting Horizons,2003,(3):207-221.原文：Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations andImplicationsWatts R L. Accounting Horizons,2003SYNOPSIS: This paper is the first in a two-part series on conservatism in accounting. Part I examines alternative explanatio

14、ns for conservatism in accounting and their implications for accounting regulators. Part II summarizes the empirical evidence on conservatism, its consistency with alternative explanations, and opportunities for future research. The evidence is consistent with conservatisms existence and, in varying

15、 degrees, the various explanations.Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses. Its extreme form is the traditional conservatism adage: anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses. Despite criticism, conservatism has survived in acc

16、ounting for many centuries and appears to have increased in the last 30 years.The alternative explanations for conservatism are contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation. The evidence in Part II suggests the contracting and shareholder litigation explanations are most

17、important. Evidence on the effects of taxation and regulation is weaker, but consistent with those explanations playing a role. Earnings management could produce some of the evidence on conservatism, but cannot be the prime explanation.The explanations and evidence have important implications for ac

18、counting regulators. FASB attempts to ban conservatism in order to achieve neutrality of information without understanding the reasons conservatism existed and prospered for so long are likely to fail and produce unintended consequences. Successful elimination of conservatism will change managerial

19、behavior and impose significant costs on investors and the economy in general. Similarly, researchers and regulators who propose the inclusion of capitalized unverifiable future cash flows in financial reports should consider the costs generated by their proposals effect on managerial behavior.INTRO

20、DUCTIONThis paper is Part I in a two-part series on conservatism in accounting. The objectives of this paper are to:Discuss the explanations for conservatism; andDraw implications for regulation and standard setting.The objectives of Part II in the series are to:Summarize the evidence on conservatis

21、ms existence;Evaluate the evidences ability to discriminate among conservatism explanations; andEvaluate the evidences ability to discriminate between conservatism and non-conservatism explanations.The explanations discussion draws on existing literature. However, this paper develops a general contr

22、acting explanation for conservatism that encompasses the existing debt contract dividend constraint explanation (Watts 1993) and predicts that other contracts employed within the firm, such as managerial compensation contracts, will also generate conservatism. The paper also offers a new argument th

23、at, even without contracting considerations, an information perspective produces conservatism once the information costs of changed managerial behavior are introduced.Conservatism DefinedAccounting conservatism is traditionally defined by the adage anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses (Bl

24、iss 1924). Anticipating profits means recognizing profits before there is legal claim to the revenues generating them and that the revenues are verifiable. Conservatism does not imply that all revenue cash flows should be received before profits are recognizedcredit sales are recognizedbut rather th

25、at those cash flows should be verifiable. In the empirical literature the adage is interpreted as representing the accountants tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses (Basu 1997, 7). Conservatism is the asymmetrical ver

26、ification requirements for gains and losses. This interpretation allows for degrees of conservatism: the greater the difference in degree of verification required for gains versus losses, the greater the conservatism. It is this differential verification interpretation of conservatism that is adopte

27、d in this paper.An important consequence of conservatisms asymmetric treatment of gains and losses is the persistent understatement of net asset values. Capital market regulators, standard setters, and academics criticize conservatism because this understatement in the current period can lead to ove

28、rstatement of earnings in future periods by causing an understatement of future expenses. For example Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 2 (AICPA 1939) states:Conservatism in the balance sheet is of dubious value if attained at the expense of conservatism in the income statement, which is far more s

29、ignificant.Using conservatism to describe an income statement effect for a particular period was popularized by conservatisms critics. That usage does not fit with the conservatism definition employed here. Conservatism refers to the cumulative financial effects represented in the balance sheet and

30、to income or earnings cumulated since the firm began operation.Conservatisms influence on accounting practice has been both long and significant. Basu (1997, 8) argues that conservatism has influenced accounting practice for at least 500 years. Sterling (1970, 256) rates conservatism as the most inf

31、luential principle of valuation in accounting .Recent empirical research on conservatism suggests not only that accounting practice is conservative, but also that practice has become more conservative in the last 30 years. These results are surprising given the vocal opposition of many capital marke

32、t regulators, standard setters, and academics to conservatism.1 The long survival of conservatism and its1For examples of the opposition of regulators, standard setters and academies to conservatism see Levitt (1998), FASB (1980, paras. 91-97), and Devine (1963, 127). apparent resilience to criticis

33、m strongly suggests that conservatisms critics overlook its significant benefits. If regulator and standard-setter critics try to eliminate conservatism without understanding its benefits, the resultant standards are likely to be seriously detrimental to financial reporting.Overview of Explanations

34、for ConservatismResearchers advance a number of explanations for conservative reporting; all of them suggest that conservatism benefits users of the firms accounting reports. One explanation is that conservatism arises because it is part of the efficient technology employed in the organization of th

35、e firm and its contracts with various parties. Under this contracting explanation, conservative accounting is a means of addressing moral hazard caused by parties to the firm having asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, limited horizons, and limited liability. For example, conservatism can con

36、tain managements opportunistic behavior in reporting accounting measures used in a contract.Even if one separates contracting and managerial accounting from financial reporting, moral hazard problems will exist in financial reporting as long as the reports accounting measures inform investors about

37、managerial performance and affect investors asset allocation decisions and managers welfare. These effects on managers welfare will motivate managers to introduce bias and noise into the same accounting measures that regulators hope will inform investors, just as they motivate managers to introduce

38、bias and noise into contractual accounting measures. Absent constraints on this opportunistic managerial behavior, accounting measures in financial reports that a priori appear neutral will be significantly biased and noisy in practice. Conservatism constrains managerial opportunistic behavior and o

39、ffsets managerial biases with its asymmetrical verifiability requirement.In practice, conservatism more than offsets managerial bias, and on average defers earnings and understates cumulative earnings and net assets. In contracts these effects increase firm value because they constrain managements o

40、pportunistic payments to themselves and other parties, such as shareholders. The increased firm value is shared among all parties to the firm, increasing everyones welfare. In that sense, conservatism is an efficient contracting mechanism. Contracting explains three attributes of accounting measures

41、: timeliness, verifiability, and asymmetric verifiability.Conservatism is likely to be an efficient financial reporting mechanism in the absence of contracting. Other conservatism explanations discussed below suggest that, in addition to conservatism offsetting managerial bias in financial reporting

42、, non-contracting parties in society also value conservatisms constraint on opportunistic payments to managers and other contracting parties.Given that, conservatism and the net asset bias it generates are probably necessary components of efficient financial reporting that are good and not bad as im

43、plied by various statements by accounting regulators and academics.2Shareholder litigation is another source of conservatism in recent years. Litigation also produces asymmetric payoffs in that overstating the firms net assets is more likely to generate litigation costs for the firm than understatin

44、g net assets. By understating net assets, conservatism reduces the firms expected litigation costs. The asymmetry in litigation costs is consistent with the legal system evolving to constrain opportunistic payments to managers and other parties to the firm. To that extent, the litigation explanation

45、 suggests that individuals other than the parties to the firm also value such constraint.The links between taxation and reporting can also generate conservatism in financial reporting. Asymmetric recognition of gains and losses enables managers of profitable firms to reduce the present value of taxe

46、s and increase the value of the firm. Delaying the recognition of revenues and accelerating the recognition of expense defers tax payments.Finally, financial reporting standard setters and regulators have their own incentives to favor conservative accounting and reporting. Just as there is an2The in

47、formation perspectives proponents fail to recognize conservatisms benefits because of their limited analysis of the effects of asymmetric payoffs and limited liability on the costs and benefits of information to investors.asymmetry in litigation costs, there is an asymmetry in regulators costs. Stan

48、dard setters and regulators are likely to face more criticism if firms overstate net assets than if they understate net assets. Conservatism reduces the political costs imposed on standard setters and regulators. This asymmetry in political costs, like the asymmetry in litigation costs, is consisten

49、t with non-contracting parties (such as voters) valuing conservatisms constraint on opportunistic payments to managers and other parties.The commonalities among the four explanations suggest they might be manifestations of a single explanation. As we have seen, conservatism encouraged by contracting

50、, litigation, and political costs.The recent empirical evidence suggesting that accounting conservatism exists and is on the rise in recent years is consistent, in varying degrees, with the four conservatism explanations. That however, some of the evidence examined in Part II is also consistent with

51、 two explanations that do not imply conservatism. One of those explanations involves earnings managementmanagement understates assets by taking excessive charges and excessive write-offs, perhaps in a big bath, in order to overstate earnings in the future (Hanna 2002). The other is that management e

52、lects to abandon operations that are not profitable (Hayn1995). While both of these other explanations can explain firm attributes generated by conservatism such as the transitory nature of losses, they cannot individually or jointly explain the systematic understatement of net assets that is the ha

53、llmark of conservatism.The consistency of the evidence in Part II with the various conservatism explanations implies conservatism has a productive role in financial reports providing information to capital market investors. That implication suggests regulators and standard setters should rethink or

54、redirect their opposition to conservatism.CONTRACTING EXPLANATIONS FOR CONSERVATISMOf the four conservatism explanations, I examine the contracting explanation most exhaustively because it is an early source of conservatism and its arguments are more fully developed. The more developed arguments all

55、ow more complete articulation of the explanations links to the standard setters information perspective. Also, although contracting explanations emphasize formal contracts, such as debt and management compensation contracts, they extend to the firms organizational arrangements including managerial accounting and control systems. Even the tax explanation is linked to the contracting explanation in that the early uses of accounting (and writing) were control of assets and tax collection for the nobility.The contracting use of