新興市場經(jīng)濟體的央行數(shù)字貨幣

1、CBDCs in emerging market economiesSally Chen, Tirupam Goel, Han Qiu and Ilhyock ShimIntroductionIn recent years, in both advanced (AEs) and emerging market economies (EMEs), central banks have become increasingly engaged in projects related to central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) ie digital money

2、 that is denominated in the national unit of account and is a liability of the central bank (BIS (2021). However, the stage of engagement research, pilot or launch varies according to the country.All 26 central banks participating in this meeting (Annex Table A1) are active in CBDC research. Several

3、 have progressed to the pilot or proof-of-concept stage (eg Hong Kong SAR, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the United Arab Emiratis (UAE). A few are close to launching (eg Chinas eCNY), while some do not see a pressing need for a CBDC in the near future (eg Poland, Singapore).This paper begins by discussing

4、 the main motivations of EME central banks for CBDC engagement, focusing primarily on the rationale for retail CBDCs. A second section reviews central banks main concerns regarding retail CBDCs, including data privacy and data governance. The third section discusses design choices for retail CBDCs t

5、hat promote central bank objectives while addressing possible concerns. The fourth section discusses the implications of cross-border use of CBDCs and related design considerations. The paper concludes with high-level takeaways. Throughout, the paper draws on survey responses and background papers f

6、rom the central banks participating in the meeting.Motivations for CBDC issuanceThe top motivations for CBDC issuance vary across EMEs, with no single factor dominating, as the survey shows (Graph 1). Providing a cash-like digital means of payment, in light of reduced cash usage and an increase in p

7、rivate digital payment services, is the most common consideration. Boosting financial inclusion also ranks high. Other significant considerations include strengthening competition among payments service providers (PSPs), increasing efficiency and reducing the costs of financial services. Background

8、papers suggest that these motivations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, a majority of central banks consider many of these motivations as jointly important (Annex Table A2 on central bank survey responses).Provide cash in digital formThe digital revolution is changing the payments landscape. As bi

9、g techs and fintech firms move into financial services, payments are no longer a commercial bank monopoly. New forms of digital asset such as cryptocurrencies and stablecoins are also emerging as a potential means of payment. In many EMEs including India, Pakistan, Kenya and Tanzania digital payment

10、s via mobile phone have gained ground. Meanwhile, the cash-to-GDP ratio a proxy for the use of cash in payments has declined in a number of EMEs (CPMI (2021). In China, for example, cash could lose its central role in the not-too-distant future.Motivations for issuing CBDCNumber of central banksGrap

11、h 1Each bar indicates the number of central banks that choose a given motivation as one of its top three motivations. Source: BIS EMDG survey 2022.Against this backdrop, a CBDC could serve as a tangible marker of the trust in money, just as cash does today (BIS (2021). In the same vein, central bank

12、s in Chile and Indonesia noted that CBDCs could also help central banks maintain their role as the issuer of the unit of account and as the anchor of the monetary system.The Reserve Bank of India noted another possible motivation for issuing a CBDC potential savings from reducing cash in circulation

13、. Savings could stem from lower costs related to printing, transporting and storing banknotes and coins. The potential for savings is greater in economies where cash circulation remains high.Enhance financial inclusionPromoting financial inclusion is another common motivation. It is a top considerat

14、ion for Peru, Mexico and South Africa and one of the main considerations for more than half of all central banks (Graph 1).Financial inclusion, broadly defined, means that individuals and businesses can access and use financial services at a low cost. Inclusion across EMEs has improved over time but

15、 is still low in some regions. As of 2017, almost a third of adults in the world had no bank account; this number exceeded a half in Africa and was close to 40% in Latin America and the Caribbean.Financial exclusion can stem from financial market features as well as broader structural factors (Graph

16、 2, left-hand panel). Market features include lack of access points, insufficient ICT infrastructure, high costs and the private sectors unwillingness to serve some segments of the society (eg in rural areas). Peru, for example, stressed limited access to digital infrastructure as a barrier to inclu

17、sion. Broader structural factors include financial or digital illiteracy, lack of funds and limited trust in service providers (Demirgüç-Kunt (2018). Financial illiteracy is a hurdle especially in low-income countries (centre panel) while Hungary stressed digital illiteracy as a critical i

18、ssue for financial inclusion in an increasingly digital world. Relatedly, there are “digital divides” across income, education and age groups, either because of lack of access or differences in preference for use of digital products. For example, in Peru, those in the informal sector roughly 70% of

19、the workforce prefer the anonymity of cash. The use of digital payments by the elderly relative to the young is also low despite financial account ownership that is comparable with that of the young (right-hand panel).While CBDCs might not be able to directly overcome structural barriers to inclusio

20、n, they can mitigate some of the market imperfections inhibiting inclusion. For instance, CBDC issuance can provide an open infrastructure that lays down “rules of the game” for payment service providers. In turn, this could promote effective competition through interoperability and deliver benefits

21、 to consumers (eg UPI in India). Private players could develop services with greater added value through CBDCs. In addition, as a publicly provided digital payment service, a CBDC could inspire greater trust and strengthen financial engagement, especially among those reluctant to use private digital

22、 payment services. Moreover, CBDCs could help cut the cost of payment services (eg a low-fee structure, such as that envisioned by the Bank of Russia for its digital ruble). Finally, CBDCs can facilitate fiscal policy implementation, such as targeted direct transfers to households. That said, CBDCs,

23、 by themselves, might not do much to increase deposits or encourage credit provision.Improve efficiency of domestic paymentsThe potential of CBDCs as a new means of payment and the attendant increase in diversity and competition in payment services are a top motivation for a number of central banks.

24、 The Central Bank of Brazil, for example, noted its focus on technology to foster innovation and enhance financial markets efficiency. The Bank of Russia and the Bank of Thailand, meanwhile, indicated CBDCs potential to better serve customer needs as a key factor.Payment service markets are often ma

25、rked by oligopoly. This is because a few payment service providers (PSPs) can gain and maintain a substantial market share due to network effects (Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004). Concentrated market power has several undesirable implications. One is the high cost of services, as in the case of cre

26、dit card network providers (eg Visa, MasterCard, Amex); even if costs remain low initially (say due to predatory pricing), oligopolists may seek rents later on. Another concern is information-hoarding in an increasingly digitalised world, akin to “walled gardens” where only a few players have access

27、 to detailed user transaction data (eg AliPay and WeChatPay in China, KakaoPay in Korea).The introduction of a CBDC as an alternative means of payment can affect the competitive structure of the underlying payment system. Depending on design, it could improve competition and reduce costs; it could a

28、lso help prevent “walled gardens” (Box A). The Central Bank of Israel raised one specific possibility in economies where a functioning payment ecosystem already exists, a CBDC could benefit from the so-called late-mover advantage and build upon the latest innovations while addressing the weaknesses

29、of existing services. CBDC issuance could also support new digital technologies and their integration with the broader economy such as integrated payment of electricity and phone bills via the CBDC wallet. In Brazil, for example, the Digital Real project is shaping up as the main elementof a platfor

30、m for “smart payments” where the Digital Real system would connect current sources of liquidity to digital asset ecosystems.Barriers to improving financial inclusionIn per centGraph 2Barriers to inclusionLower financial literacy in less developed countries2Despite higher account ownership, digital p

31、ayments usage falls with age1 Lack of credit contracts and procedures suitable for individuals and/or firms with erratic and/or undocumented cash flows. 2 Financial literacy score is a derived value that ranges between 1 and 100. It is calculated following the methodology described in the OECD/INFE

32、Toolkit for Measuring Financial Literacy and Financial Inclusion and the data are from 26 economies.Sources: BIS EMDG 2022 survey. OECD/INFE 2020 International Survey of Adult Financial Literacy. World Bank Global Findex Surveys 2011, 2014, and 2017; A Demirgüç-Kunt, L Klapper, D Singer, S

33、 Ansar and J Hess. The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring financial inclusion and the Fintech revolution, World Bank, 2018. S Doerr, J Frost, L Gambacorta, H Qiu, “Population ageing and the digital divide”, SUERF Policy Note, 2022.Data privacy and governanceBox AData collected as part of the CBD

34、C system and how they are managed can affect consumer privacy as well as the competitiveness of the new digital landscape.Some level of identification is crucial for CBDC design (BIS (2021). Currently payment systems rely on effective identification of users for access and system integrity; CBDCs ar

35、e no different.1A CBDC that is linked to a digital identification system can help standardise usage in a digital payment ecosystem, support the formal economy and help improve financial inclusion. Several countries have introduced digital ID schemes, with specific designs and different roles for the

36、 public and private sectors. In the Philippines, for example, the Philippine Identification System (PhiSys) Act in August 2018 provides consumers with a national ID and thus the means to establish a verifiable digital identity that enables them to open accounts and participate in the financial syste

37、m more easily. Other have different setups for effective ID verification: in Sweden, for example, a consortium of banks developed the BankID Solution under a public-private partnership.Regardless of the structure and the relative role of the public and private sectors in the digital ID system, a key

38、 question is the protection of consumer data. Indeed, payments data eg from credit card usage, CBDCs or retail fast payment systems (FPS) are revealing about consumer behaviour and preferences. Consumer privacy and data governance are, therefore, as the Reserve Bank of India noted, of “prime importa

39、nce” for the success of a CDBC.Credible privacy and data governance frameworks can engender greater trust in a CBDC and encourage its adoption (BIS (2021), Carrière-Swallow et al (2021). Specifically, data collection and storage for CBDCs involve multiple participants, including consumers, fina

40、ncial service providers, data service providers and government entities. Data management would thus need to be interoperable across these participants. Moreover, rules related to storage, ownership and sharing, as well as the governance system would need to be defined and established (Tiwari et al (

41、2022). Such rules can help mitigate privacy and/or misuse risks associated with “walled gardens” (DSilva et al (2019).Globally, many countries have privacy laws that recognise and define the rights individuals have over their data. These laws generally emphasise protecting personal data rights, in p

42、articular control over consent and data portability (see for example, the Personal Information Protection Law in China introduced in 2021 and the European General Data Protection Regulation introduced in 2018).More concretely, CBDC designs can allow for privacy by separating payment services from co

43、ntrol over the resulting data. Such designs could allow anonymity with respect to specific parties, such as PSPs, businesses or public agencies. Like some FPS, CBDCs could give users control over their payments data, which they need only share with PSPs or third parties as they decide (BIS (2021). F

44、or example, with UPI, data ownership and control over their credentials are addressed through application programming interfaces (APIs) that use public key cryptography. For a system that relies on biometric digital ID systems, such as Aadhar in India, the safeguards are even more stringent and cruc

45、ial. Thus, data and privacy management challenges under CBDCs are not new.Concerns related to CBDC issuanceA number of macroeconomic, financial and operational concerns are raised by central bank survey respondents (Graph 3, left-hand panel). A key concern relates to greater operational burdens incl

46、uding maintaining system stability and cyber security, particularly in an increasingly digitalised system that calls for new regulatory and supervisory initiatives for privacy protection and data management (Box A). A majority of survey respondents are also concerned about the possibility of CBDCs1R

47、etail FPS, such as UPI and PIX, and CBDCs have a lot in common: both rest on digital ID and technical standards such as APIs that ensure data privacy.disintermediating banks and the attendant impact on financial stability; these concerns are relevant especially if the take-up of CBDCs is large. At t

48、he same time, central banks are also concerned about possible low user adoption, suggesting some debate regarding the value added by CBDCs to consumers and businesses.Concerns related to CBDC issuanceNumber of central banksGraph 3Concerns related to CBDC issuance1Channels and consequences of bank di

49、sintermediation21 Each bar indicates the number of central banks that choose a given downside as one of its top three concerns. 2 Each bar indicates the number of central banks that choose a given item as one of its top five likely channels and implications of potential bank disintermediation.Source

50、s: BIS EMDG 2022 Survey; authors calculations.Operational concernsA CBDC system must be stable, robust and able to recover from operational disruptions. It is equally important to mitigate any associated credit and liquidity risks. Such disruptions could also have reputational costs. Limiting these

51、operational risks is a dominant consideration for EME central banks (Graph 3, left-hand panel). For instance, these risks materialised on 17 January 2022 for the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) when transactions using DCash the digital currency pilot scheme for the ECCB launched in March 2021

52、were interrupted by an outage at the service provider.A key operational challenge is tackling cyber risk. Cash has sophisticated anti- counterfeiting features and has limited exposure to large-scale operational breakdowns. By contrast, a successful cyber attack on CBDCs could cause widespread and se

53、rious damage. Attacks on the financial system, such as hacks into credit card systems or databases containing consumer credit profiles, offer a glimpse of the threats involved. Defending against such attacks is far more difficult given the multiplicity of linkages with the broader financial and digi

54、tal ecosystem.Another challenge for central banks is the operational burden of maintaining a CBDC. The central banks surveyed highlighted several key issues, including networkresilience, the safety, cost and availability of technologies as well as the scalability and functionality of technologies co

55、nsidered (Graph A2, left-hand panel). The operational cost of a system with such complexity is high. Compared with a direct system where costs associated with user-facing activities rest squarely on the central bank, a two- tier system (see Box B) would reduce the operation burden on central banks a

56、nd thus, the cost to the users (BIS (2021). The Hong Kong Monetary Authority, for example, has noted considerations for the division of labour between the central bank and private sector intermediaries in its CBDC design.Disintermediating banksRoughly half of survey respondents indicated concerns fo

57、r bank disintermediation under tranquil conditions or during crisis times.The specific drivers behind bank disintermediation differ between tranquil and crisis times. During tranquil times, considerations such as renumeration of CBDCs, and possibly safety, could drive bank disintermediation. The safety of an account at the central bank might be attractive, at least for balances at commercial banks above the deposit insurance threshold. Even if there were limits