土地開發(fā)型國有企業(yè)會計核算的思考

1、土地開發(fā)型國有企業(yè)會計核算的思考近來，為加快地區(qū)發(fā)展，更好地引進企業(yè)項目，帶 動地方經(jīng)濟，各地紛紛成立土地開發(fā)型國有企業(yè) （以下簡稱土地開發(fā) 企業(yè)）。該企業(yè)主要任務(wù)是以接受政府委托，代理開發(fā)在開發(fā)區(qū)內(nèi)的 大面積土地，同時進行相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)， 為土地掛牌出讓及引 進企業(yè)項目做好前期開發(fā)準備。該企業(yè)具有以下特點：（一）企業(yè)行業(yè)性質(zhì)難以確定。土地出讓主要以政府掛牌形式，企 業(yè)不具有出讓國有土地的資質(zhì)，故企業(yè)不能劃分為房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)行業(yè)。 同樣，企業(yè)資金主要來源于政府政策性扶持，而非企業(yè)本身服務(wù)收入， 劃為服務(wù)型行業(yè)也有所牽強。（二）企業(yè)財務(wù)核算無參考標準?；谛袠I(yè)性質(zhì)難以確定，故企業(yè)財務(wù)核算無法規(guī)

2、范，同時國家也無明確文件規(guī)定，企業(yè)財務(wù)通則和企業(yè)會計制度亦未涉及相應具體內(nèi)容。財務(wù)核算爭議較大，有 的企業(yè)按房地產(chǎn)會計進行財務(wù)核算，也有企業(yè)按服務(wù)業(yè)會計進行財務(wù) 核算，財務(wù)核算缺少統(tǒng)一標準。（三）企業(yè)政策性因素影響較大。企業(yè)受政府委托代理開發(fā)土地和 進行基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)，均嚴格按照政府規(guī)劃和相關(guān)政策進行， 企業(yè) 的資金來源除一部分自身注冊資金外，均來自政府政策性扶持。因此，針對土地開發(fā)行業(yè)，建立規(guī)范的財務(wù)核算就顯得尤為重要。 筆者結(jié)合工作實踐，探索了一套核算方法，以便與大家共同探討。一、土地開發(fā)企業(yè)開發(fā)建設(shè)核算（一）企業(yè)開發(fā)建設(shè)需按區(qū)域規(guī)劃，根據(jù)企業(yè)實際開發(fā)面積和財務(wù) 核算需要，可人為劃分核算

3、區(qū)域。企業(yè)開發(fā)區(qū)域面積較大，可劃分為 若干個較小區(qū)域以方便核算；若開發(fā)區(qū)域事先未明確以后需逐年擴大 增加面積的，也可事先確定部分區(qū)域面積，以后增加部分，則按實際 面積成為新區(qū)域，以此類推，方便財務(wù)核算。（二）企業(yè)投入建設(shè)主要通過“開發(fā)成本”科目核算?！伴_發(fā)成本”賬戶按企業(yè)區(qū)域劃分二級明細，并根據(jù)企業(yè)實際投入需要設(shè)置以 下明細：1 .“土地征用及拆遷補償”：該細目主要核算企業(yè)土地開發(fā)前期 的征用補償、拆遷安置、植被補償和耕地占用稅等直接開發(fā)成本，并 明確記載土地征用數(shù)量。2 .“基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)”：該細目主要核算企業(yè)道路、河流、橋 梁、綠化、污水處理以及通電、通水、通信“三通”等基礎(chǔ)性公共配 套

4、設(shè)施建設(shè)。3 .“資本化利息”：該細目主要核算企業(yè)為土地開發(fā)向銀行或者 其他金融機構(gòu)等借入資金而發(fā)生的符合資本化條件的利息費用。4 .“其他開發(fā)費”：該細目主要核算除上述細目外的其他相關(guān)的 開發(fā)費用。5 .“轉(zhuǎn)入開發(fā)產(chǎn)品”：該細目主要核算土地開發(fā)完工結(jié)轉(zhuǎn)的開發(fā) 成本，通常以紅字記載，除沖減“開發(fā)成本”外，同時轉(zhuǎn)出對應完工 土地數(shù)量。（三）土地征用及拆遷后，可采用自建或招標出包的方式進行項目 施工和基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)。1 .米用自行建造方式企業(yè)自行進行項目施工和基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)， 按企業(yè)實際發(fā)生的物 資成本、人工成本、交納的相關(guān)稅費等其他相關(guān)成本歸集企業(yè)“開發(fā) 成本”賬戶。相關(guān)會計分錄如下：借：開

5、發(fā)成本一一#園區(qū)（1） * 基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)貸：原材料應付職工薪酬應交稅費等注：*表示因#園區(qū)開發(fā)規(guī)模較大而在其內(nèi)部人為劃分若干個較小 的開發(fā)區(qū)域，以方便財務(wù)核算。（1）為#園區(qū)內(nèi)的1號子區(qū)域，以下 相同。2 .米用招標出包方式企業(yè)采用招標出包方式進行項目施工和基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)， 根據(jù)與 中標施工企業(yè)合同中列明的工程款支付日期及工程進度支付款項。 相 關(guān)會計分錄如下：借：預付賬款貸：銀行存款待施工企業(yè)項目和基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)完工后， 轉(zhuǎn)入“開發(fā)成本”賬 戶。借：開發(fā)成本一一#園區(qū)（1）基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施建設(shè)貸：預付賬款二、土地開發(fā)企業(yè)資金來源核算土地開發(fā)企業(yè)資金主要來源于政府政策性扶持，該款項主要用于

6、土 地開發(fā)園區(qū)的開發(fā)建設(shè)，具有?？顚Ｓ玫男再|(zhì)，因此需要通過“專項 應付款”科目進行財務(wù)核算。該科目應按對應開發(fā)區(qū)域設(shè)置二級明 細。土地開發(fā)期間，資金的撥入，應增加“專項應付款”貸方賬戶； 土地開發(fā)完成，完工結(jié)算后，沖減“專項應付款”貸方賬戶。三、土地開發(fā)企業(yè)完工結(jié)算核算土地開發(fā)完工，由政府收回掛牌出讓前，相應結(jié)轉(zhuǎn)土地開發(fā)成本。 完工成品土地通過“開發(fā)產(chǎn)品”科目核算， 并按開發(fā)區(qū)域設(shè)置二級明 細，同時記載轉(zhuǎn)入的成品土地數(shù)量。開發(fā)區(qū)域內(nèi)結(jié)轉(zhuǎn)的計劃開發(fā)成本， 可按企業(yè)預計區(qū)域總成本除以征用土地數(shù)量計算，公共基礎(chǔ)配套設(shè)施 投入，也按受益原則相應分配。完工成品土地按上述計算的計劃成本 和對應數(shù)量，由“開

7、發(fā)成本”貸方賬戶轉(zhuǎn)入“開發(fā)產(chǎn)品”借方賬戶。 待政府收回后，轉(zhuǎn)入的“開發(fā)產(chǎn)品”沖減對應“專項應付款”二級區(qū) 域明細。具體分錄如下：借：開發(fā)產(chǎn)品一一#園區(qū)（1）貸：開發(fā)成本一一#園區(qū)（1）轉(zhuǎn)入開發(fā)產(chǎn)品待政府收回后：借：專項應付款一一#園區(qū)（1）貸：開發(fā)產(chǎn)品一一#園區(qū)（1）如上例至整個#園區(qū)內(nèi)所有開發(fā)土地全部完工結(jié)算，“開發(fā)成本” 的賬戶仍有余額，為企業(yè)實際結(jié)轉(zhuǎn)成本與計劃結(jié)轉(zhuǎn)成本的差異數(shù)， 應 調(diào)整“開發(fā)產(chǎn)品”賬戶，并相應調(diào)整該區(qū)域內(nèi)“專項應付款”賬戶余 額。調(diào)整完畢，“專項應付款”賬戶仍有貸方余額，應確認收入，如 為借方余額，確認當期損失。四、資產(chǎn)負債表列示（一）“開發(fā)成本”的列示：根據(jù)該賬戶的借

8、方余額，列示于資產(chǎn) 負債表“存貨”賬戶，表明企業(yè)在開發(fā)進程中尚未完工土地的各項開 發(fā)成本。（二）“開發(fā)產(chǎn)品”的列示：根據(jù)該賬戶的借方余額，列示于資產(chǎn) 負債表“存貨”賬戶，表明企業(yè)已辦理完工結(jié)算，政府尚未收回掛牌 出讓的成品土地。（三）“專項應付款”的列示：根據(jù)該賬戶的貸方余額暫列于“專 項應付款”賬戶，表明企業(yè)區(qū)域開發(fā)尚未完結(jié)時政府扶持資金撥入數(shù)，該科目待區(qū)域開發(fā)完結(jié)后仍有貸方余額， 應確認收入；借方余額， 確認當期損失。以前只聽人說過享有“天下第一村”美譽的華西村，前幾天街道組織參觀了華西村使我對華西村有了一個全新的認識。一是堅持解放思想、實事求是。吳仁寶帶領(lǐng)華西村的干部群眾把貫徹黨的路線方

9、針政策的堅定性與因地制宜發(fā)展的創(chuàng)造性高 度統(tǒng)一，40多年來，他們解放思想，與時俱進，不唯書，不唯上， 從本村實際出發(fā)，用科學的態(tài)度、獨特的理念、創(chuàng)新的思路，弓I導華 西的改革和發(fā)展，表現(xiàn)出了共產(chǎn)黨員敢為人先、敢于超越的創(chuàng)新勇氣。 華西村搞“一村兩制”，村民既可以搞集體，也可以從事個體，但干 部不得搞“一家兩制”，更不允許搞“一人兩制”。華西村走出了一 條以集體經(jīng)濟為主，多種經(jīng)濟成分并存的多元化、混合型經(jīng)濟發(fā)展新 路子。華西人堅持實事求是的堅定性令人嘆服。二是堅持制度創(chuàng)新。他們從華西實際出發(fā)，制定了一整套具有華 西特色的管理制度和分配制度，創(chuàng)造性地提出了“企業(yè)合作制、 廠長 負責制、經(jīng)理監(jiān)管制、

10、工代議事制”，對員工實行“首位高工資、末 位淘汰制、違章辭退制”。在分配機制上，他堅持“少分配，多積累； 少拿現(xiàn)金，多入股”。吳仁寶認為，農(nóng)民辦企業(yè)要發(fā)展，要壯大，只 能靠自我積累，增強自身的造血功能。2001年6月以來，吳仁寶創(chuàng) 造性地提出“一分五統(tǒng)”（即村企分開，經(jīng)濟統(tǒng)一管理、干部統(tǒng)一使 用、勞動力統(tǒng)一安排、福利統(tǒng)一發(fā)放、村建統(tǒng)一規(guī)劃）的發(fā)展建設(shè)大 華西的新舉措，這些創(chuàng)新理念和舉措，吸引了大批有識之士，來這里 創(chuàng)業(yè)，使華西村獲得了源源不斷的發(fā)展動力，華西經(jīng)濟如滾雪球一般 越來越大。三是堅持科學發(fā)展。華西村始終把率先發(fā)展、協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的科學發(fā) 展觀放在首位，構(gòu)建和諧、文明、宜人的社會主義新農(nóng)村。

11、華西村從 創(chuàng)業(yè)初期開始，一直把率先發(fā)展、科學發(fā)展、和諧發(fā)展貫穿始終，成 為全國通過IS014001國際環(huán)境質(zhì)量管理體系認證的第一個村莊。華 西村提出要倡導綠色文明，實施綠色發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略，追求經(jīng)濟與環(huán)境的協(xié) 調(diào)發(fā)展。先后投資數(shù)億元，綜合治理工業(yè)區(qū)環(huán)境，使工廠變成了花園。 大力發(fā)展循環(huán)經(jīng)濟和生態(tài)經(jīng)濟，目前，華西村已基本實現(xiàn)了“三廢” 資源化管理，對高爐、電爐、軋鋼生產(chǎn)的煤氣、工業(yè)廢水等進行分類 安置，實行綜合利用。還投資近 1000萬元美化生活區(qū)，全村的綠化 覆蓋率超過40%，被評為“全國造林綠化先進村”。四是堅持兩手抓?！拔镔|(zhì)精神雙富有，才是真正的富有”。吳仁 寶始終堅持以人為本，一手抓經(jīng)濟發(fā)展，一

12、手抓以德依法治村，讓村 民“既富口袋，又富腦袋”。目前，華西村里有書場、球場、溜冰場， 有歌廳、舞廳、影劇院，各種文化娛樂設(shè)施配套齊全，村民的業(yè)余文 化生活豐富多彩，全村上下始終保持勤于開拓、勇于創(chuàng)新、不甘守舊、 奮發(fā)進取的精神狀態(tài)。六是堅持德孝為先。華西村人重“孝”。早在20世紀80年代初，電熱毯剛面世，吳仁寶和村干部就把它鋪到 了華西老人的床上：每年村里生產(chǎn)的瓜果蔬菜要讓老人先嘗鮮； 看戲 老人坐前排，看電影老人坐中間。從 1979年起，華西村就逐步探索 農(nóng)村養(yǎng)老制度，目前凡年滿55歲的婦女和60歲以上的男子，每月都 能領(lǐng)到村里發(fā)的退休金。華西村還規(guī)定，家中如有老人活到100歲，獎勵所有直

13、系親屬每人一萬元，真正實現(xiàn)了老有所養(yǎng)、老有所敬、老 有所樂。華西的老人們都說，“兒好，女好，不如華西好”“凡到華 西工作的，就是華西人”。他們非常關(guān)心外地來華西工作的人，不準 稱他們“打工仔”、“打工妹”。在政治上、經(jīng)濟上把外來職工與華 西人同等對待。這也許是華西人氣汪，事業(yè)興的一個重要方面。這些都值得我街道在建設(shè)社會主義新農(nóng)村的實踐中認真學習借 鑒。更值得我個人在工作學習生活和做人上認真思考學習借鑒。The world is cha nging with really remarkablespeed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you

14、 II seethat in 2025, these GoldmanSachs projectionssuggest that theChi nese economy will be almost the same size as the America n economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it s projected that the Chinese economywill be twice the size of the American economy, and the In dia n economy will be al

15、most the same size as the America n economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projecti ons were draw n up before the Western finan cial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was look ing at the latest projectio n by BNP Paribas for whe n Chi na will have a larger economy tha n theUnitedStates.Go

16、ldman Sachs projected 2027. Thepost- crisis projection is 2020. That s just a decade away.China is going to cha nge the world in two fun dame ntal respects. First of all, it s a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 per

17、ce nt a year.And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the moder n era has the largest economy in the world bee n that of a develop ing coun try, rather tha n adeveloped coun try. Secon dly, for the first time in the moder nera, the dominant country in the w

18、orld - which I think is what Chi na will become - will be not from the West and from very, very differe nt civilizatio nal roots.Now I know it s a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It s an assumption that modernity i s a produc

19、t simply of competiti on, markets and tech no logy. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. Chi na is n ot like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will rema in in very fun dame ntal respects very differe nt. Nowthe big questi on here is obviously, how do we make

20、sense of China? Howdo we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the mome nt by-a nd-large is that the conven ti onal approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. Wecan t. NowI want to offer you three buildingblocksfor tryingto under

21、stand what China is like - just as abegi nning.Nowwhat is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it s sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West

22、, but from the period, if you like, of the civilizati on state.I m thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestralworship, of a very dist in ctive no ti on of the state, likewise, a very dist in ctive no ti on of the family, social relatio nships like gua nxi, Con fucia n values and so on. The

23、se are all things that come from the period of the civilizatio n state. In other words, China, un like the Wester n states and most coun tries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization,its existeneeas a civilizatio n state, rather tha n as a n ati on state. And there s one other thing to

24、add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China s big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a populati on of 1.3 billi on people. What we often aren t really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can t run

25、 a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It s never bee n the case.So this is Chi na, a civilizatio n state, rather tha n a n ati on state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I ll give you two quick ones. The fi

26、rstis that the most importa nt political value for the Chin ese isuni ty, is the maintenance of Chin ese civilizati on. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdow n, the fragme ntati on of the Holy Roman Empire Roman Empire. It divided, and it s remained divided ever since. China, over the sametime

27、 period, went in exactly the opposite directi on, very pain fully holdi ng this huge civilizati on, civilizati on state together.The sec ond is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997?You may remember what the Chin ese con stituti

28、 onal propositi on was. Onecountry, two systems. And I ll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. “Windowdressing. WhenChina gets it s hands on Hong Kong, that won t be the case. ” 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as differe ntno was it was in 1997. Wewer

29、e wrong. Whywere we wrong?We were wrong because we thought, n aturally eno ugh, in n ati on state ways. Thi nk of Germa n uni ficatio n, 1990. What happe ned?Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. Onenation, one system. That is the nation state mentality.But you can trun a country like

30、Chi na, a civilizatio n state, on the basis of one civ ilization, one system. It doesn t work. So actually the response of China to the question of HongKong - as it will be to the questi on of Taiwa n - was a n atural resp on se: onecivilizati on, many systems.Nowthe great advantage of this historic

31、alexperienee has beenthat, without the Han, Chi na could n ever have held together.The Han identityhas been the cement which has held this countrytogether. The great disadva ntage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural differenee. They really believe in their own superiority,

32、and they are disrespectful of those whoare not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibeta ns.Or let megive you my thirdbuilding block, theChinese state.Nowthe relationship between the state and society in China is very differentfrom that in the West. Now we in the Westoverw

33、helmingly seemto think - inthese days at least - thatthe authority and legitimacy of the state is a fun cti on of democracy. The problem with thispropositi onis that theChinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for

34、 this is because - well, there are two reas on s, I thi nk.And it s obviously got nothing to do with democracy, becau se in our terms the Chinese certainly don t have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is give n a very special -it enjoys a very special sig n

35、i fica neeas the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chi nese civilizatio n, of the civilizatio n state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.And the sec ond reas on is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state s power is continuously challenged- Im

36、eanin the European tradition,historicallyagainst the church,against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on - for 1,000 years, the power of the Chi nese state has not been challenged. It s had no serious rivals. So you cansee that the way in which power has bee n con structed i

37、n China is very differe nt from our experie nee in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chin ese have a very differe nt view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an in truder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chines

38、e don t see the statelike that at all. The Chin ese view the state as an in timate - n ot just as an in timate actually, as a member of the family - n ot just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chi neseview of the state - very,

39、very different to ours. It s embedded in society in a differe nt kind of way to what is the case in the West.And I would suggest to you that actually what we are deali ng with here, in the Chi nese con text, is a new ki nd of paradigm, which is different from anything we ve had to think about inthe

40、past. Knowthat China believes in the market and the state.I mean, Adam Smith, already writ ing in the late 18th cen turysaid, “The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe.” And, apart from theMaoperiod, that has remained more-or-less the case ever s

41、ince. But this is comb ined with an extremely str ong and ubiquitous st ate. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, it s leading firms, many of them are still publicly own ed. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depe nd in many ways on state patr on age. Targets for the economy an

42、d so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows intolots of other areas - as we are familiar with - with something like the the on e-child policy.Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old traditi on of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustrati on of thi

43、s, the Great Wall is one. But this is ano ther, this is the Grand Can al, which was con structed in the first in sta nee in the fifth cen tury B.C. and was fin ally completed in theseve nth cen tury A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, li nking Beiji ngwith Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there s a long history

44、of extraord inary state in frastructural projects in Chi na, whichI suppose helps us to expla in what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Damand many other expressions of statecompete nee withinChi na. So there we have threebuilding blocks for trying to to understand the differene

45、e that is China - the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relati on ship to society.And yet we stillinsist,by-and-large,in thinking that we canunderstand China by simply drawing on Western experienee, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts.

46、If you want to know why we un erri ngly seem to get Chi na wrong -our predictions about what s going to happen to Ch ina arein correct- this is the reas on. Unfortun ately I thi nk, I haveto say that I thi nk attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It s kind of arroga

47、nt. It sarroga nt in the sense that we thi nk that we are best, and therefo re we have the uni versal measure. And sec on dly, it signorant. Werefuse to really address the issue of differenee.You know, there s a very interestingpassage in a book by PaulCohe n, the America n historia n. And Paul Cohe

48、 n argues that theWest thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it s not. In manyways, it s the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it s not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at

49、the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -virtually the rest of the world, in fact - which have bee n in a far weaker position,vis-a-vis the West, have been therebyforced to understand the West, because of the West s presenee in those societies. An

50、d therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolita n in many ways tha n the West.I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. - a third of the world s population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I ll tellyou now, that East Asianers, peo

51、ple from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I m afraid, to the pre sent. Because what s happe ning? Back to that chart at the beg inning -the Goldma n Sachs chart. What is happe ning is that, very rapidly in historic

52、al terms, the world is being drive n and shaped, not by the old developed countries,but by thedeveloping world. We ve seen thisin terms of the G20 - usurp ing very rapidly the positi on of the G7, or the G8. Andthere are two consequences of this. First, the West is rapidly losi ngitsin flue neein th

53、e world. There was a dramaticillustrationof this actually a year ago - Copenhagen, climatecha nge conferen ce. Europe was not at the final n egotiati ng table. Whendid that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future.And the sec o

54、nd implicati on is that the world will in evitably,as a con seque nee, become in creas in glyun familiar to us, becauseit ll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I m afraid - take Europe, America is slightly different -but Europea ns by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are un aware about the way the world is cha nging. Some people -I ve got an English friend in China, and he said,“Thecontinent is sleepwalking into oblivion. ”