外文翻譯-小額信貸-其他專業(yè)

1、2021屆畢業(yè)生畢業(yè)論文外文 翻譯姓 名： 院系： 專業(yè)班級：學 號：指導老師： 成 績: 小額信貸是否幫助窮人？孟加拉國旗艦方案所帶來的新證據 摘要：小額信貸運動使金融中介機構得到了創(chuàng)新，同樣使貧困家庭減少了貸款的本錢和風險。孟加拉國鄉(xiāng)村銀行的小額信貸機制已經在全世界得到推廣。雖然小額貸款機制的目的是為客戶帶來社會和經濟效益， 但是通過其獲得一定量的利益的嘗試已經開始實施了。本文借鑒一個新調查來研究小額信貸是是否真正的幫助窮人，該調查覆蓋面近1800個家庭，其中局部家庭獲得了孟加拉鄉(xiāng)村銀行的貸款，而另一局部那么沒有參與到小額貸款運動中。有資格獲得貸款的家庭，他們的消費水平低于平均消費水平，這

2、種家庭中，絕大局部的孩子不可能上得起學，男子也往往會有更多的工作壓力，而女子沒有工作。更明顯的，相對于對照組，符合貸款資格的家庭在消費上的變化很小以及可以常年提供勞動力的特點。最重要的潛在影響不是貧窮本身，而是因而最重要是減少相關的家庭漏洞。似乎導致消費平滑主要原因是收入平滑，而不是借款和貸款。 評論家有大量的關于低收入國家的其他方案的研究經驗。雖然通常人們都是使用固定效力評估來控制與安置方案有關的不易觀察的變量，但是使用固定效力評估會加劇偏見的影響，就如同本方案在較大的社區(qū)里特定人群的方案。 關鍵詞：小額信貸，工程評估，鄉(xiāng)村銀行，孟加拉 1 介紹 小額信貸在很多人的腦海里是用來減少貧困。前提

3、是操作簡單。小額信貸提供小額貸款，以促進小規(guī)模的創(chuàng)業(yè)活動，而不是向貧困家庭提供救濟。這種信貸除非放債人收取非常高的利率(往往收費高達每月10%)，否那么不會發(fā)生。放債運作缺乏競爭，因為潛在的進入者很快發(fā)現，借款人通常不能提供任何形式的抵押品，這就使貸款存在高本錢和該風險。(拉希德和湯森，1993)。 然而，體制創(chuàng)新下的小額信貸運動似乎大大降低了風險和提供金融效勞和為貧困家庭提供效勞的費用。創(chuàng)新包括借款合同、給予獎勵、配出不良信用風險和連帶借款人的活動，要求每周或每半周還款(Morduch,1997)。2005年該運動已經在世界銀行，聯合國領導人，以及其他已參加的國際組織的推動下成為聯系100萬

4、家庭的全球性的運動(小額信貸首腦會議，1997)。該運動在美國還得到相當多的支持(包括錢第一夫人希拉里克林頓)，現在該方案在美國有300個經營點(經濟學家，1997)。紐約時報(1997)還發(fā)表?慶祝這個“繼續(xù)的反貧窮方案的革命 ?文章呼吁支持。 但是，小額貸款到底給貧困家庭帶來了怎樣的巨大的影響？ 雖然小額貸款確實做到了減少貧困，但只有極少數研究使用相當大的樣本和適當的治療/控制框架來研究這個問題。本研究調查了1800戶家庭在19911992年間的孟加拉國格拉名銀行的小額信貸工程，孟加拉國農村開展委員會(BRAC)，和孟加拉國農村開展委員會(BRDB)，本案例還包括了一組沒有任何小額貸款工程

5、效勞地區(qū)的家庭。這里考慮的這三個貸款方案在孟加拉國一共超過了400萬貧困客戶，它們的作用是非常廣泛的。格拉米銀行的國際小額信貸旗艦運動，其模式已經被四大洲所復制，包括在美國的阿肯色州和內城芝加哥都取得明顯成就。從其帶來的影響我們可以簡單得出小額信貸所帶來的成就。例如，如果享受鄉(xiāng)村銀行效勞的家庭按照從小額信貸工程貸款的總數來安排，那么前四分之一的家庭享有人均消費相較于在底層四分之一的家庭要高出十五個百分點。另外， 62%的從鄉(xiāng)村銀行貸款的家庭的男孩可以上學，而34%的上學的男孩的家庭沒有貸款。而女孩的比例分別是55%對40%。然而， 這些簡單的比擬，大局部是由于選擇偏差造成的。一旦，對照組坐出了

6、適當的比擬，不管是受教育的男孩還是受教育的女孩，有權使用小額貸款工程的家庭并沒有明顯提高人均消費水平?？傊?，人均消費水平低于對照組。這一結論是驚人的，關于小額貸款的反對聲音也頻繁的在國際響起。然而，有權獲得工程資助確實使常年勞動力變得多元化。相應的，該方法也降低常年各種各樣的消費，所以，盡管該工程并沒有提高平均消費水平，但他可以通過穩(wěn)定收入的方法使這些家庭穩(wěn)定消費水平。至于在其弱點上的影響，結果突出了小額貸款的優(yōu)勢，這些優(yōu)勢很少被關于小額信貸的文獻所關注除皮特及科韓德科，1998b。該工程得到了一億美金的援助，由此，我們也可以看到它的優(yōu)勢。這一結果同樣證明，評估者很容易誤導工程的成就，而且，他

7、們擁有許多相似評估經驗，這些經驗包括公眾醫(yī)療及其他低收入國家的社會工程。同這里一樣，這些工程經常被限制在特殊的區(qū)域和特殊的目標人群，尤其是貧困家庭。不同于那些富有國家，收入為根底意味著測試似乎從未進行過。反而，例如，孟加拉國鄉(xiāng)村小額貸款工程致力于“無地機能，這條規(guī)定要求貸款的家庭必須有超過半英畝的可耕種土地。如果這條合理要求被強制實施，并且是建立在家庭外因的特殊之上，這條工程規(guī)定將是合理統計的根底。然后，我們就能從參與該工程的家庭組及未參與該工程的家庭組的比擬中得到非常明朗的效果。這一方法是回歸間斷設計的一個形式坎貝爾，1969年，其見解提供了皮特和科韓德科工作1998a和1998 b；在這里

8、，他們用了相同的數據的根底。但是我們不能從這個例子里推出任何有效結論，這個數據說明人們經常違反規(guī)那么。例如，30%的鄉(xiāng)村貸款人擁有遠遠多于半英畝的土地，他們擁有土地所有權的面的有14英畝之大。那些記錄在案有權借款的家庭或有權參與工程的家庭，其中一局部所擁有的土地大概是2英畝，相對的其他那局部要少一點。下面的方法反而通過在鄉(xiāng)村的比擬，運用了測試組及對照組的數據。鄉(xiāng)村中沒有參與工程的組中，其采樣嚴格遵循半英畝規(guī)定。然而，參與工程的村里，同組的不對稱性在這里同樣出現了問題。采樣戰(zhàn)略在一開始就是一個解決方法。采樣是設計好的，這樣，對照組才可以同測試組作比擬。強制要求測試組需要同對照組一樣嚴格按照規(guī)定強

9、制執(zhí)行要求。另外需要關注非隨機安置方案的是，當考慮到地區(qū)固定影響水平或者他們的對等性時例如皮特和科韓德科，1998a。當方案選擇已經完成的好的地區(qū)的時候，出現向上偏差；當工程傾向于不興旺地區(qū)時，那么出現向下偏差。然后，柜員頻繁聲明這并不是解決非隨機安置方案的萬靈藥。實際上，當工程安置被預測到針對目標人群沒有觀察到影響時，包括地區(qū)固定影響水平能使偏差增大。這個數據暗示，這是經常出現的狀況。但是，帶著減少變化和勞動力供給的期待，主要的定性結果對測試組及對照組的不易觀察的鄉(xiāng)村水平是健全的。小額信貸在新興優(yōu)勢突出的成果使得其很少考慮其脆弱性，這些好處應當判斷有數百萬美元支持這些方案。研究結果還說明如何

10、判別簡單的誤導性的指標，他們持有類似的在低收入國家其他社會工程評估如公共健康和低收入的經驗教訓。由于，這些方案往往局限于特定地區(qū)和特定目標群體即典型的貧困家庭，所以，以收入為根底的測試方法幾乎在較富裕的國家從來沒有使用過。Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in BangladeshAbstract The microfinance movement has built on innovations in financial intermediation that reduce

11、the costs and risks of lending to poor households. Replications of the movements flagship, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, have now spread around the world. While programs aim to bring social and economic benefits to clients, few attempts have been made to quantify benefits rigorously. This paper dr

12、aws on a new cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households, some of which are served by the Grameen Bank and two similar programs, and some of which have no access to programs. Households that are eligible to borrow and have access to the programs do not have notably higher consumption levels tha

13、n control households, and, for the most part, their children are no more likely to be in school. Men also tend to work harder, and women less. More favorably, relative to controls, households eligible for programs have substantially (and significantly) lower variation in consumption and labor supply

14、 across seasons. The most important potential impacts are thus associated with the reduction of vulnerability, not of poverty per se. The consumption-smoothing appears to be driven largely by income-smoothing, not by borrowing and lending. The evaluation holds lessons for studies of other programs i

15、n low-income countries. While it is common to use fixed effects estimators to control for unobservable variables correlated with the placement of programs, using fixed effects estimators can exacerbate biases when, as here, programs target their programs to specific populations within larger communi

16、ties. Key words: microfinance, project evaluation, Grameen Bank, Bangladesh 1. Introduction Microfinance has captured the imaginations of many people working to reduce poverty. The premise is simple. Rather than giving handouts to poor households, microfinance programs offer small loans to foster sm

17、all-scale entrepreneurial activities. Such credit would otherwise not be available - or would be only available at the very high interest rates charged by moneylenders (who often charge as much as 10% per month). Moneylenders operate with little competition since potential entrants quickly find that

18、 costs and risks are high - and borrowers are usually unable to offer standard forms of collateral, if any at all (Rashid and Townsend, 1993). However, the emerging microfinance movement demonstrates institutional innovations that appear to greatly reduce the risk and cost of providing financial ser

19、vices to poor households. Innovations include contracts that give borrowers incentives to exclude bad credit risks and monitor other borrowers activities, schedules of loans that increase over time conditional on successful performance, and weekly or semi-weekly loan repayment requirements (Morduch,

20、 1997). The movement is now global, and leaders at the World Bank, United Nations, and other international organizations have joined in pushing to reach 100 million households around the world by the year 2005 (Microfinance Summit, 1997). The movement has also generated considerable support in the U

21、.S. (including the high-profile support of Hillary Rodham Clinton; Buntin, 1997), and small-scale programs now operate in 300 U.S. sites (Economist, 1997). The New York Times (1997) has celebrated this “much-needed revolution in anti-poverty programs and called for enhanced support. But how great is

22、 the ultimate impact on poor households? While strong claims are made for the ability of microfinance to reduce poverty, only a handful of studies use sizeable samples and appropriate treatment/control frameworks to answer the question. The present study investigates a 1991-92 cross-sectional survey

23、 of nearly 1800 households in Bangladesh served by microfinance programs of the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB). The sample also includes a control group of households in areas not served by any microfinance programs.

24、 The three lending programs considered here together serve over four million poor clients in Bangladesh, but their role is much broader. The Grameen Bank is the flagship of the international microfinance movement, and its model has now been replicated on four continents, including sites in the Unite

25、d States as varied as rural Arkansas and inner-city Chicago. Simple estimates of impacts show clear achievements. For example, if households served by the Grameen Bank are ordered by the amounts they have borrowed from the program, the top quarter enjoys 15% higher consumption per capita than househ

26、olds in the bottom quarter. In addition, 62% of the school-age sons of Grameen Bank borrowers are enrolled in school versus 34% of the sons of eligible households that do not borrow. For daughters, the Grameen advantage is 55% versus 40%. These simple comparisons appear to be driven entirely by sele

27、ction biases, however. Once appropriate comparisons with control groups are made, access to the three microfinance programs does not yield meaningful increases in per capita consumption, the education of sons, nor the education of daughters. If anything, the levels are slightly lower than for contro

28、l groups. The results are surprising and contradict frequent claims made about the programs in international discussions of microfinance. Access to the programs does, however, appear to aid the diversification of labor supply across seasons. In turn, access is associated with a reduction in the vari

29、ability of consumption across seasons. Thus, while the programs may not increase consumption on average, they may offer households ways to smooth consumption through smoothing income. In pointing to impacts on vulnerability, the results highlight an advantage that is seldom considered in the emergin

30、g microfinance literature (an exception is Pitt and Khandker, 1998a). These benefits should be judged against the tens of millions of dollars that have supported the programs. The results also demonstrate how misleading simple performance indicators can be, and they hold lessons for evaluations of s

31、imilar public health and other social programs in low-income countries.1 As here, such programs are often limited to particular regions and particular target groups, typically poor households. Unlike in wealthier countries, income-based means tests are almost never used. Instead, for example, the mi

32、crofinance programs in rural Bangladesh focus on the “functionally landless - implemented as a rule barring lending to households owning over a half acre of cultivable land. The program rule can be the basis of a plausible econometric strategy if the eligibility requirement is strictly enforced and

33、built around a feature that is exogenous to the household.Then, clean impacts can be gauged by comparing the status of households clustered just below the arbitrary dividing line to households clustered just above. This approach is a form of regression discontinuity design (Campbell, 1969), and the

34、insights provide the basis of Pitt and Khandkers.1Simple evaluations are subject to multiple selection biases: self-selection into the programs by the most able, non-random program placement, and endogenous determination of the intensity of participation (e.g., the size of loans in microfinance). Th

35、e typical problem stems from the near impossibility of finding good instrumental variables work (1998a and 1998b; they use the same data as used here). But the idea can not be implemented reliably in this sample. The data demonstrate frequent violations of the rules. For example, 30% of Grameen borr

36、owers own more land than the half-acre cut-off, with landholdings as large as fourteen acres. Among households labeled in the survey as “eligible to borrow and with access to programs, the fraction of borrowers is nearly twice as high for those holding over half an acre versus those below (63% versus 34% for the three progr