外文翻譯--港口集群治理

1、.Governance In Seaport Clusters Peter W. de Erlangen 1. IntroductionApart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance.An analysis of the governance of seaports

2、 has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysin

3、g advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam.First, we briefly discus

4、s the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdams port cluster. We feminality the paper

5、with conclusions.2.The Quality Of Cluster Governance We define cluster governance as the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the scope of

6、coordination beyond price. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance.When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, coord

7、ination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters.2.1Trust In clusters where t

8、he level of trust is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is

9、 influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust is sustained.2.2 IntermediariesThe presence of intermediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination beyond

10、 price, for three related reasons. First, they provide a bridging tie (Weevily and Zachery, 1999) between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they connect cognitions. Intermediaries can bridge cognitive differences between f

11、irms that operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are characterism by a cognitive division of Limbourg (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000). 2.3Leader firmsLeader firms are strategic Centre with superior co

12、ordination skills and the ability to steer change (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995). The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms have both the ability and incentive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We identify th

13、ree investments of leader firms with positive effects (these can be termed leader firm externalities) on other firms in the cluster:· Internationalism;· innovation;· contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971)Thus, leader firms can enable or even enforce cooperati

14、on and for that reason add to the performance of clusters. 2.4Collective action in clustersThe problem of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such co-operation does not (always)

15、develop spontaneously. Different CAPs (Collective Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a relatively stable collaborative agreement that provides actors with the c

16、apacity to overcome collective action problems.3.Port authorities as cluster managersEven though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most central actor. The term cluster manager can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We d

17、iscuss the role of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenue and investment decisions of port authorities. 3.1 The role of a cluster managerA perfect cluster manager would be an galvanization with the following four characteristics.1. A clust

18、er manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The perfect cluster manager would receive a share of the value added generated in the cluster as revenue, for instance through a cluster tax.2. A cluster manager invests in activit

19、ies with cluster benefits (instead of firm specific benefits). Furthermore, the cluster manager aims to invest when cluster benefits exceed costs.3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms that benefit. This involves co-finance arrangements with a specifi

20、c group of beneficiary firms.4. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues.The port authority matches all four criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Fu

21、rthermore, they generally are self-sustaining and invest in the performance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as port expansion, safety and dredging. Given their institutional position, most port authorities are not profit drivenThe port aut

22、hority owns and exploits the port area and benefits when the port cluster is an attractive location because they can lease more land and charge higher prices. Furthermore, port authorities collect port dues. Thus, the more ships call a port the higher the port dues. For these two reasons, port autho

23、rities have a clear incentive to invest in the performance of the port cluster.Thus, port authorities can be regarded as cluster managers.3.2 Revenues of port authorities The port authority has various sources of revenue. The existence and relative importance of various charges differs between ports

24、 (Asar, 2001). In general, port authorities generate revenue from three sources:· charges to shipowners/ ship operators;· charges to tenants in the port, including terminal operators;· charges to cargo-owners.Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed port dues and in most cases

25、 related to the size of vessels. These port dues are justified by investments in dredging, safety systems, and investments in port basins. Charges for tenants are lease charges to firms such as terminal operators and warehousing and production firms. Charges for cargo owners are termed wharfage and

26、are mostly related to cargo volume or to the value of goods. Some port authorities do not have wharfage charges, because cargo owners indirectly pay both other charges as well. In such cases, a part of both other charges can be conceived as pseudo-wharfage. This implies that the port charges do not

27、have to be fully justified on the basis of investments with benefits for either tenants or shipowners. Investments for the benefit of cargo owners, such as investments in hinterland infrastructure, hinterland access or warehousing facilities, can be justified because the cargo owners as users of the

28、 port pay the port charges in the end. Therefore, investments with benefits for these cargo owners are justified, even if port charges are paid only by tenants and shipping firms.3.3 Investment decisions of port authoritiesThe port charges have to be justified by investments of the port authority. I

29、nvestment appraisal on the basis of which criteria do port authorities decide to invest- is therefore a central issue for port authorities. We claim that the following simple rule is a guideline for investment appraisal of port cluster managers: benefits for the cluster of an investment should excee

30、d costs for the cluster. Cluster benefits are the sum of all benefits of firms in the cluster, cluster costs are the costs of an investment for firms in the cluster. In most cases costs are incurred because port charges are required for cluster investments. Since costs equal revenues, a high investm

31、ent level requires high port charges.4. Cluster governance in the port of RotterdamIn this section we present an empirical case study of the port of Rotterdam. We interviewed 43 port experts in the port of Rotterdam. First, we deal with the importance of cluster governance for the performance of the

32、 cluster. In the next four paragraphs, we discuss the empirical results for the four variables that influence the quality of the cluster governance. Sixth, we briefly discuss the role of the port authority in Rotterdam and end with conclusions.4.1 The importance of cluster governance in Rotterdams s

33、eaport clusterThese results show that cluster governance is less important than the structure of the cluster and the economic development in general, but more important than national and international policies. The experts were also asked to indicate the relative importance of the four variables of

34、cluster governance, also by ranking them.4.2 Trust in Rotterdams port clusterVirtually all cluster experts agree with the proposition that trust is important for the quality of the cluster governance, and as discussed above, argue that trust is the most important governance variable. The cluster exp

35、erts evaluated the port of Rotterdam and its main competitors, Antwerp and Hamburg, with regard to the presence of trust.4.3 Leader firms in Rotterdams port clusterVirtually all cluster experts also agree that the presence of leader firms is an important determinant of the quality of cluster governa

36、nce. The experts evaluate the three competing ports as follows:RotterdamAntwerpHamburgpresence of leader firms2.02.3b1.5b significantly better than in worst portAntwerp is evaluated the most positive, Hamburg has the lowest score. In general the experts indicate that all three ports do score relativ

37、ely good with regard to leader firms.4.4 Intermediaries in Rotterdams port clusterWith regard to intermediaries, a significant majority of the experts agree with the presumed positive effect of intermediaries on cluster governance, but nine out of the 43 disagree.4.5 Solutions for CAPs in Rotterdams

38、 port clusterFinally, we discuss the quality of solutions for collective action problems. Out of the five proposed CAPs in seaports, the cluster experts judged four relevant：IssueCollective action problemRelevantNot relevantTraining and education38a3Marketing and promotion37 a4Hinterland access37 a4

39、Innovation29 a12Internationalism1328 aa significant majority4.6 The role of the port authority in RotterdamThe Rotterdam municipal port authority (RMPM) is a public landlord port. The galvanization formally is a part of the municipality Rotterdam but operates to a large extent autonomous. Currently,

40、 a modification of the institutional structure, to grant the port authority more autonomy, and to change the monitoring and control function from the city council to an independent board of directors is discussed. However, even when the suggested new structure is approved, the municipality will rema

41、in the major shareholder.5. ConclusionsIn this paper we argue that an analysis of the governance in port clusters adds to our understanding port competition, port development and port performance. We have presented an analytic framework for ana lysing (port) cluster governance. The quality of the go

42、vernance of a cluster depends on the level of transaction costs in a cluster and the scope of coordination beyond price. Four variables influence both: the presence of leader firms, the presence of intermediaries, the level of trust and solutions to collective action problems. Cluster governance can

43、 be evaluated by ana lysing those four variables. In this approach, port authorities are no longer Centre stage; they do play an important role in the governance of the cluster, but their role is interrelated with the activities of private firms, associations and public-private organicists. The scop

44、e of activities of the port authority has thus to be ana lysed in this broader framework.港口集群治理Peter W. de Erlangen 1、Introduction引言除了眾所周知的地理因素，如位置、海上交通方便程度和腹地的基礎設施，港口治理是其功能發(fā)揮的決定性因素。作者分析了港口治理大多被限定為港口當局的職能。盡管港口當局在港口中起著核心作用, 但我們認為分析港口治理對港口的作用同時需要關注（私營）企業(yè)。制度經濟文獻分析提供了一個有益的框架，分析優(yōu)點和缺點替代治理機制提供基礎分析港口當局的作用。在

45、本文中,我們處理港口集群治理的問題，闡明我們的方法并分析了鹿特丹港。首先,我們簡要的討論了集群治理概念的理論基礎。其次,我們討論港口當局在港口治理中的作用。第三,我們分析了來自于43位專家對鹿特丹市鹿特丹港口集群治理的一項調查的研究結果。最后完成文章的結論。2、集群治理的質量我們定義集群治理為“混合之間的關系，以及各種機制的協調用于集聚?！奔褐g的治理質量不同。質量取決于協調成本水平和“范圍”的“協調無價”。 低協調成本和多協調成本無價能提高治理質量。當協調的利益分配不均，當（威脅）防止投機行為協調或協調利益不確定時，協調無價不會自發(fā)或立即產生，即使協調收益超過成本。因此一般缺少協調無價。更

46、多的無價協調能改善集群治理的質量。2.1信任在集群中信任水平高，（平均)交易成本則相對較低, 因為低成本指定合同和監(jiān)督成本低。此外,協調成本無價越低，更多的協調無價會因此出現。在一個集群中的信任水平受到聲譽效應的影響。如果聲譽效應強, 濫用信任會產生負面影響，因此信任文化是持續(xù)的。2.2中介機構中介機構存在降低協調成本和擴大協調無價的范圍有三個相關的原因。首先, 他們提供了一個“橋梁紐帶” 在兩個或多個之間否則不能連接交換伙伴(Weevily and Zachery, 1999)。其次，中介機構降低協調成本，因為它們“連接認知”。 企業(yè)之間的橋梁中介機構可以認知不同市場環(huán)境中運作的差異。而連接

47、認知有特別重要的作用在集群中考慮集群實際的特征是“認知分工” (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000)。2.3領導公司領導公司是“具有卓越協調能力和駕馭能力，改變戰(zhàn)略中心” (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995)。領導公司的行為影響整個集群的功能，因為領導企業(yè)有能力和動力投資于一個有競爭力的整體公司網絡。我們確定了三個投資于領導公司的其他公司的積極作用（這些可以被稱為“領導公司外部性”）在集群中:國際化、創(chuàng)新、有助于解決集體行動問題(Olson, 1971)。因此, 領導公司能加強合作,甚至可以增加企業(yè)的業(yè)績。2.4集群中的集體行動集體行動的“問題”在集

48、群中是相關的 (Olson, 1971)。即使在合作的集體利益中實現集體（目標）超過集體成本，這種合作不（總是）自發(fā)發(fā)展的。不同的集體行動問題如教育、培訓和創(chuàng)新是相互聯系的在集群中。對每個集體行動問題會產生相應的管理體制。在這種情形下, 一個管理體制可以被定義為一種“相對穩(wěn)定的合作協議處理克服集體行動問題的能力?！?、港口當局作為集群管理者雖然有各種行為者參與集群治理，但港務局起著最核心的作用?？梢园选凹汗芾碚摺泵枋鰹楦劭诋斁值淖饔?。我們討論集群管理者的一般作用，港務當局所處的位置、收入來源和投資決策。3.1集群管理者的作用一個“完美”的集群管理者將是一個具有以下四個特點的組織：1、集群管理

49、者激勵來投資在產業(yè)集群中，因為它的收入與集群績效有關。一個“完美”的集群管理者將收到一份增值產生的收入在集群中，比如通過“集群稅”。2、集群管理者進行投資活動獲得集群收益（替代公司特殊收益）。此外, 集群管理者的目標是當投資的“集群收益”超過成本。3、集群管理者的目的是把投資成本分配給那些投資獲益的公司。這涉及到一起籌措資金安排于一組特定的受益人公司。4、集群管理者經營達到自給自足：經過一段時間投資等于收入。港務局匹配所有四項標準：它們有動機和資金投資于集群。在港口集群中港口費和租賃向投資提供資金。此外,它們通常自給自足及投資于整個集群的績效。港口當局投資于一般福利活動，例如港口拓展、安全、疏浚?？紤]到制度的關系 ,大多數港口當局沒有利潤的驅動。港務局擁有并開發(fā)港區(qū)而獲得收益，港口集群是一個具有吸引力的位置，因為它們可以出租更多的土地，并且收取更高的價格。此外,港口當局還征收“港口費”。 因此,船只越多的港口會產生較高的港口費?；谏鲜鰞蓚€原因，港口當局有明確鼓勵投資于港口集群的性能。3.2港口當局的收入港口當局有各