比較商事組織法

1、12 Any Textbooks you studied before A research paper on any Corporate Law issues Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law公司法基礎(chǔ)公司法基礎(chǔ)(影印本影印本), 法律法律出版社出版社,北京北京,2005年年3月第一版月第一版. Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation林華林華偉偉 等譯等譯,法律出版社法律出版社, 北京北京,2001年年4月第一版月第一版.3Theory of the

2、 Firm and Capital Market Legal Characteristics of the Corporation: Limited Liability The Production and Structure of Corporation Laws Financing the Corporation Internal Governance Structures External Governance Structures: The Market for Corporate Control Securities Regulation4Class presentation and

3、 discussionClass presentation and discussionOff-class Preview and ReviewOff-class Preview and ReviewOpen-mindedOpen-minded5 (2010-(2010-2020)2020)公開征求意見稿公開征求意見稿 豐田汽車召回豐田汽車召回香港華懋集團(tuán)前董事局主席龔如心遺產(chǎn)案香港華懋集團(tuán)前董事局主席龔如心遺產(chǎn)案AVATARAVATAR6 為什么有企業(yè)/廠商?交易市場(chǎng)和企業(yè)/廠商 它們?cè)谫Y本市場(chǎng)的地位和作用 代理成本和交易成本(為什么代理成本在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Me

4、ans的調(diào)查表明,當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)200個(gè)最大的公司中,88個(gè)是由管理人員控制的. Berle和Means認(rèn)為,股東對(duì)于代理成本的監(jiān)督是無(wú)能為力的,你是否同意這一看法? 授權(quán)機(jī)制的優(yōu)勢(shì)和弊端7 為什么股東被稱為 “剩余財(cái)產(chǎn)的所有者” (Residual Owners)? 股東表決權(quán)-集體行為-監(jiān)督成本-信息取得的代價(jià) (在股權(quán)分散的情況下,為什么股東都愿意做消極股東,搭便車-Free Riders 會(huì)很普遍?) 如何約束代理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為?(代理成本是所有和控制分離的代價(jià),第7頁(yè))8 股價(jià)能否反映公司管理人員的懈怠或其他機(jī)會(huì)主義行為? 監(jiān)督機(jī)制包括哪些方面?9 經(jīng)理和股東存在利益沖突,代理成本不可能

5、為零;所有者是代理成本的最終承擔(dān)者,增加代理成本則可以使經(jīng)理單方面受益,這里就出現(xiàn)了需要法律敢于的現(xiàn)象-成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干預(yù)的目標(biāo)-減少代理成本.因此,檢驗(yàn)公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否減少了代理成本. 方流芳:序言,第3頁(yè).Jensen & Meckling ！結(jié)合我國(guó)結(jié)合我國(guó),你如何理解我國(guó)法律是否你如何理解我國(guó)法律是否減少了代理成本減少了代理成本,請(qǐng)舉例說明請(qǐng)舉例說明.10 企業(yè)正是針對(duì)機(jī)會(huì)主義交易成本和合同不完備的回應(yīng)(p.10).當(dāng)合同一方是 “交易專用財(cái)產(chǎn)”(trade-specific assets)的所有者時(shí),交易雙方組建企業(yè)比簽定合同

6、更有效率(pp.11-15) Oliver Williamson11 Henry Hansmann-權(quán)衡締約成本和所有權(quán)成本 企業(yè)所有權(quán)類型和所有權(quán)成本存在相關(guān)性.投資者所有雇員所有所有者缺位 當(dāng)所有權(quán)成本過高的時(shí)候,沒有所有者比 “產(chǎn)權(quán)清晰”更重要.12 以保險(xiǎn)公司與投保人的關(guān)系為例,說明公司股東與管理者的關(guān)系. Sole Ownership-Partial Ownership Pecuniary Benefits-Non-pecuniary Benefits13 在了解代理成本的存在之后,你的投資選擇是什么? 在放棄全部所有權(quán)歸自己所有的企業(yè)形式后,投資者會(huì)面臨哪些合同關(guān)系?Nexus o

7、f Contracts 作為投資者,你希望公司法或者公司章程加入企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的內(nèi)容嗎?14 Question 8 at pp.24-25. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economics 386, 1937. 中文譯本?15 在交易成本為零的條件下,制度的選擇不會(huì)影響經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的最終效益.在交易成本不為零的現(xiàn)實(shí)世界里,制度的安排會(huì)在不同程度上影響交易的效益. 郁光華:,法律出版社2006年版,第38頁(yè). Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economic

8、s 1, 1960.16 Roberta Romano, pp.26-60.17 What features a corporation? Please provide your understanding and observations.18 Limited Liability and the Corporation Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts19 Limited Liability for Investors F

9、ree Transferability of Shares Perpetual Life Centralized ManagementSee the Textbook20 Why is Limited Liability crucial to a modern corporation?Limited liabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor21 代表性論文如下： *Paul L. Davis, Gower and Davis Principles of Modern Company Law, 40-46 (6th Ed, 1997). *Phillip B

10、lumburg, Limited Liability and Corporate Group, 11 Journal of Corporate Law 573 (1986).22 公司法人人格-積極的資產(chǎn)區(qū)分/公司財(cái)產(chǎn)成為公司債權(quán)人的擔(dān)保財(cái)產(chǎn)，為公司債權(quán)人設(shè)定優(yōu)先于股東或者公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者的債權(quán)人受償?shù)母?dòng)擔(dān)保（floating charge），公司債權(quán)人在評(píng)估公司財(cái)產(chǎn)時(shí)具有比較優(yōu)勢(shì) 股東有限責(zé)任-消極的資產(chǎn)區(qū)分/股東的個(gè)人財(cái)產(chǎn)成為股東的債權(quán)人的擔(dān)保財(cái)產(chǎn)，降低了公司破產(chǎn)時(shí)的債權(quán)追討成本，簡(jiǎn)化并實(shí)質(zhì)性地穩(wěn)定了股票的定價(jià)過程 總體意義-便利交易另一方明確交易對(duì)象，區(qū)分公司與其股東，公司及其股東的總體融資

11、成本得以降低23 共擔(dān)和轉(zhuǎn)嫁交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)-債權(quán)人參與監(jiān)督公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者 隔離公司的不同經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)與監(jiān)督成本的增加信息不對(duì)稱（Information Asymmetry）參見：Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale Law Journal 387 (2000).24 Do you agree that Limited Liability eliminates the risk of business failure? -作為有限責(zé)任的對(duì)價(jià),應(yīng)當(dāng)要求公司服從政府管制為顧

12、客,雇員和相鄰社區(qū)的利益考慮而決策和行事. What does “externalization of risk” mean in the context of Limited Liability?25 Limited Liability and Theory of Firms Limited Liability and Corporate Capital Information and Costs Insurance: A Substitute26 “We know from the survival of large corporations that the costs generate

13、d by agency relations are outweighed by the gains from separation and specialization of function. Limited liability reduces the costs of this separation and specialization.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 University of Chicago Law Review, 89,

14、1985, See the Textbook p. 63.27 How to reduce the costs of moral hazard? Frank H. Easterbrook (美國(guó)第七巡回上訴法院法官) & Daniel R. Fischel (芝加哥大學(xué)法學(xué)院教授), The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (公司法的經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)-張建偉 & 羅培新 譯), Law Press, 2005, pp.66-69.28 法院為了平衡有限責(zé)任的成本和收益的嘗試29 Piercing the Corporate Veil: An al

15、ternative for reducing the costs of moral hazard. -Piercing the Corporate Veil -Minimum Registered Capital -Mandatory Insurance -Duties of Management -External Regulation (from the government) 請(qǐng)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的方法分析上述各種方法的效率請(qǐng)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的方法分析上述各種方法的效率. .30 Close Corporations v. Public Corporations Corporate Sharehold

16、ers v. Personal Shareholders Contracts v. Torts Voluntary Creditors v. Involuntary Creditors (See the above topic) Inadequate Capital Investment31 Piercing the Corporate VeilSee the Note No.7, Textbook, pp.80-8132 Roberta Romano, State Competition for Corporate Charters Jonathan R. Mace & Geoffr

17、ey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory /Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Rol

18、e33 Federalism? Mandatory? + Enabling? + Default Rules?34 All participants in the debate believe that the income produced by the chartering business spurs states to enact laws that firms desire. How do principles -the shareholders-ensure that their agents-the managers-behave faithfully?35 Carys Argu

19、ments Winters response Romanos further observation36 Franchise tax revenue Constitutional supermajority requirement Investments in legal capital37 Taxpayers Delaware bar38 The Corporate Code in almost every state is an “enabling” statute.The handiwork of managers is final in all but exceptional or t

20、rivial instances Easterbrook and Fischel, pp.96-97. Do you think it is the investors who choose whether to organize as a corporation, trust, partnership, mutual or cooperative?39 How does the invisible hand take an effect on the self-interested managers?40 Investor Protection Hypothesis Uncertainty

21、Hypothesis Public Good Hypothesis Innovation Hypothesis Opportunistic Amendment Hypothesis41 Judicial Role42 ? ? ?43 Should we expect the emergence of a European “Delaware” with the European Communitys economic integration? Romano, p. 96.44 公司形式的調(diào)整 派生訴訟45 Piercing the Corporate Veil Derivate Suits46

22、 ?47 Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, pp.121-128 Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, pp.128-130 Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs and the Pr

23、ivatization of Bankruptcy, pp.130-13248 William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organization, pp.132-138 Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, pp.138-13949 Issuing Equity Issuing Debt50 Agency cost of outside equity Agency cost of debt51發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期債券可以

24、降低交易成本，但債券期限越長(zhǎng)，代理成本就越高。企業(yè)在發(fā)行新債券時(shí)必須對(duì)交易成本和代理成本進(jìn)行權(quán)衡，尋求最優(yōu)債券期限結(jié)構(gòu)。模型證明，發(fā)行企業(yè)債券時(shí)運(yùn)用提前贖回條款、賣回條款、償債基金條款和轉(zhuǎn)換權(quán)等債券契約條款可以同時(shí)達(dá)到降低發(fā)債總成本和延長(zhǎng)企業(yè)債券融資期限的目的。 Transaction costs associated with bond issues can be reduced by issuing bonds with longer terms to maturity. However, the longer the term to maturity, the higher the ag

25、ency costs associated with the issue. Firms that pursuing optimal bond maturity structure must weigh transaction and agency costs of a new corporate bond issue. Models in the paper indicate that firms can make use of bond covenants such as the call provision, the put provision, the sinking fund prov

26、ision and convertibility to increase the term to maturity of a bond issue and at the same time reduce the aggregate of the agency costs and transaction costs associated with it.Xiao-kun ZHOU(周孝坤), “企業(yè)債券期限結(jié)構(gòu)研究基于交易成本和代理成本視角 ”,2007/01,pp.75-77.52 交易債權(quán)人 機(jī)構(gòu)貸款人 持有公司發(fā)出的付款證明的人53 Example 1-Choice of Sharehol

27、der-Project L Example 2-Choice of Bondholder-Project L Example 3-with Leveraged Effect + Limited Liability Concerned for Shareholder-Project H 54 P.120, Textbook.55 Dividend Payment Claim Dilution Asset Substitution Underinvestment56 Restrictions on the Firms Production/Investment Policy Restricting

28、 the Payment of Dividends Restricting Subsequent Financing Policy Covenants Specify Bonding Activities by the Firm The Role of the Trust Indenture and the Trustee57 Restrictions on Investments Secured Debts Restrictions on Mergers58 Pp.124-12559 Limitations on Debt and Priority Sinking Funds Convert

29、ibility Provisions60 償債基金 為確保債券能干到期日有足夠的資金以償還債權(quán)人的本金，發(fā)行公司于債券未到期前預(yù)先按期提存的基金。償債基金通常是存入選定的一家銀行作為信托管理人，由信托管理人利用這筆基金進(jìn)行各種投資，投資收益則增加償債基金。由此可見，償債基金相當(dāng)于一筆專用基金存款。由于償債基金不在債券發(fā)行公司掌握中，其性質(zhì)是由受托人管理的公司債券持有人的資金，但在實(shí)際償還本金之前，并不抵消債券發(fā)行公司的債務(wù)。 債券發(fā)行公司應(yīng)按券契約的規(guī)定提存償債，每年提存償債基金的終值應(yīng)等于債券的本金。每年年終應(yīng)根據(jù)信托管理人關(guān)于償債基金的收支報(bào)告，確認(rèn)應(yīng)有投資收益或投資損失。如果償債基金不足

30、以清償券本金，則就首先從一般存款戶補(bǔ)足，然后作清償全部公司債的會(huì)計(jì)處理。公司償債基金應(yīng)作為一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)期投資反映在年末資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上，償債基金投資收益或損失則應(yīng)作為其他項(xiàng)目列入當(dāng)年的損益表。 61 The Required Purchase of Insurance62 Pp.127-128 信托擔(dān)保協(xié)議 A written agreement between the user of a bond and his/ her bondholders, usually decifying interest rate, maturity date, convertibility, and other ter

31、ms. Also called indenture. 指一張明確記載債券持有人與發(fā)行公司雙方所擁有的權(quán)利和義務(wù)的法律文件。由發(fā)行人和債券所有人達(dá)成的，通常標(biāo)明利率、期日、兌換性和其他項(xiàng)目的書面協(xié)議，也叫契約63 期限 回報(bào) 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)-違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 控制 利益沖突 談判64 Board of Directors Shareholders Voting Rights Fiduciary Duties Executive Compensation Block-holders (Outside Shareholders)65 Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance

32、, pp.148-155. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Boss L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans, pp.155-162. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation? John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Dist

33、inction in American Law, pp. 172-179.66 Main Points in Each Articles67 What is Corporate Governance for? Who are the BOD responsible for? Shareholders and other Constituencies? Outside Shareholders Role? Managers themselves?68 Management Incentives and Corporate Governance: pro or con?69 Derivative

34、Suits: Some Observations with Empirical Studies Plaintiffs counsels as shareholders agents?70 Torts and Criminal Laws: Convergence? Benefits/Advantages v. Disadvantages Why?71 Why Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law? How about normal Contracts? Residual Owners and Marginal Risks 訂立內(nèi)容詳細(xì)的合同意味著極高的成本,信義義務(wù)

35、成為不完備合同的補(bǔ)充規(guī)則.72 Deferential Approach (順從路徑) Incentive-compatible Contracts73 Why and its Role74 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, pp.187-192. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, pp.192-197. John Pound,

36、 Proxy Contexts and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, pp.197-206. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, pp.206-209. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, pp.210-213. Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and the Pr

37、ivatization of Bankruptcy, pp. 213-214.75 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, pp.187-192. Do you think Voting is a key role in corporate governance?76 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, pp.192-197. Why

38、do American Corporations introduce Dual Class Common Stock? How do you comment on its relationship with corporate governance?77 John Pound, Proxy Contexts and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, pp.197-206. What is Proxy Mechanism? Did the author conclude that proxy context facilitated the effi

39、ciency of corporate governance?78 Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, pp.206-209. How would you understand the agency problem in American corporate governance?79 Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, pp.210-213. Who watches

40、Whom?8081 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A. 2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A. 2d 173 (Del.1986). Moran v. Household International. Inc., 500 A. 2d 1346 (Del. Ch. 1988). Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 1049 (Del. 1988).

41、 City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., 551 A. 2d 787(Del. Ch. 1988).82 Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Delawares Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review, 44 Business Lawyer 247 (1989).83 Theories and Evidence 反接管條例: 向底競(jìng)爭(zhēng)還是力爭(zhēng)上游的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)? 接管是最大化了個(gè)人(目標(biāo)公司股東)的權(quán)益,它是否同時(shí)可以最大化社會(huì)效益?84 并購(gòu)是降低代理成本的有效方式?當(dāng)公司的代理成本過高時(shí),要約收購(gòu)行為給股東開除管理層的機(jī)會(huì). 兼并與敵意要約收購(gòu):哪個(gè)成本更大? 公司管理層應(yīng)當(dāng)聽任股東和相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的要約收購(gòu)者對(duì)投標(biāo)行為自由博弈?85 任何人持有公眾公司5%以上的股份時(shí),必須提交報(bào)告,披露其持股比例和意圖;而且,要約收購(gòu)者必須就其財(cái)務(wù)狀況和計(jì)劃，提交更為詳細(xì)的報(bào)告,同時(shí),必須向公眾開放其收購(gòu)要約一個(gè)月. 要約收購(gòu)者在要約期內(nèi)不得向市場(chǎng)另行購(gòu)買股票 ,另外,必須以最高的交割按比例買超額售出的股份.86 H