2025新能源車出海策略

好的，我將對挪威（及其他北歐國家Theglobalelectricvehicle(EV)landscapehasevolvedrapidlyinthepastthreeyears(2022–2024).Countriesworldwide–fromtheenvironmentallyprogressiveNordicstoemergingmarketsinAsia-Pacific–haveupdatedimportpolicies,adjustedsubsidies,tightenedenvironmentalstandards,revisedmarketentryrules,andclarifiedtimelinestophaseoutinternalcombustionengine(ICE)vehicles.Thisreportexaminessevenkeymarkets–Norway(andotherNordiccountries),Russia,Philippines,Mexico,Indonesia,Australia,andNewZealand–andanalyzeshowrecentpolicychangesaffectthecompetitivenessofChina’snewenergyvehicles(NEVs).WethenprovidestrategicrecommendationsforChineseEVlookingtoenterthesemarketsin2025–2027.Keyfocusareas Importtariffsandduties:Whetherimporttaxeshavebeenloweredorraised,andifanyspecialrulesapplytoChineseEVs. Subsidyandincentivechanges:UpdatestofinancialincentivesforEVs,notinganydiscriminatorymeasuresorspecialsupportaffectingChinesebrands. Environmentalandtechnicalstandards:Newrequirementsonemissions,batteryrecycling,orotherregulationsthatimpactmarketentry. Marketaccessandcertification:Thedifficultyofenteringandselling–fromhomologation(vehiclecertification)processestoanysalesordistribution ICEphase-outtimelines:ChangesinfuelvehiclebanschedulesandtheirinfluenceonEVadoptionrates.Bycomparingeachcountry’spolicytrajectoryandmarketconditions,weassessopportunitiesandchallengesforChineseNEVs.Datatablesareprovidedtosummarizeandcontrastthepolicychangesacrossthesemarkets.Finally,weoutlinestrategicrecommendations–includingprioritymarketstotarget,riskmitigationtactics,andapproachestocompetingwithlocalandglobalbrands–toguideChineseEVmanufacturersinthenextthreeyears.NorwayandNordicImportTariffs:NorwaystandsoutasanopenmarketwithnoimporttariffsonEVs,includingthosefromChina.UnliketheEUandUS,whichbeganimposingsteepdutiesonChineseEVsin2024,Norway(notanEUmember)optednottofollowtheseprotectionistmeasures.Asaresult,ChinesebrandslikeSAIC(MG),BYD,andXPenghaveexpandedrapidly–reachingacombined8.8%marketshareofNorway’snewcarsalesin2024,upfrom4.1%in2021.OtherNordicmarkets(Sweden,Denmark,Finland)applytheEU’scommon10%importtariffoncars,butnoadditionalChina-specificduties.Infact,Norway’sFinanceMinistryexplicitlystatedit“treat[s]allcountriesalike,”choosingnottoraiseEVimporttaxes.SubsidiesandIncentives:NorwayfordecadesledwithgenerousEVincentives,thoughthesehavebeguntoscaleback.In2022,Parliamentapprovedintroducing25%VATontheportionofanEV’spriceaboveNOK500,000(€47,000)fromJanuary2023.Previously,allEVswerefullyVAT-exempt;nowonlythefirstNOK500kofthepriceisexempt,makingexpensivemodelspricier.Norwayalsoaddedanewweight-basedregistrationtaxin2023,endingthetotalexemptionforEVs.Still,coreperksremain:EVspayminimalroadtaxandwerelongexemptfromtollsandparkingfees(thoughsomelocalconcessionsarephasingout).Sweden,bycontrast,abruptlyabolisheditsEVpurchasesubsidy(“climatebonus”)inNov2022,citingthatEVshadbecomecost-competitive.Untilthatcut,SwedishbuyersgotuptoSEK50,000(€4,600)foranewBEV.Itsremoval–withjustoneday’snotice–wasjustifiedbythegovernmentbecauseEVs~50%ofnewsales,aleveldeemedself-sustaining .DenmarkhasnodirectpurchasesubsidybuthasataxexemptiononEVregistrationtaxesuptoacertainnumberofcarseachyear(andplanstograduallynormalizeEVtaxes).Finlandoffereda€2,000EVrebate(2018–2021)butshiftedtosupportingcharginginfrastructure;by2022–2023FinlandalignedincentiveswithEUGreenDealfunding.Importantly,noneoftheseNordicincentivechangesdiscriminateagainstChinesebrands–allautomakersandbuyersaretreatedequallyundertaxrules.Forexample,whenSwedenremovedsubsidies,itimpactedallEVsregardlessoforigin.Theprimaryeffectofreducingincentivesisaslightlyhigherpricepoint,whichcanchallengenewcomers(includingChinesemodels)thatcompeteheavilyonEnvironmentalStandards:Nordiccountrieshavestringentenvironmentalrequirements.BeingintheEuropeanEconomicArea,NorwayfollowsEUvehiclestandardsforsafetyandemissions(Euro6/VIstandardsforICEvehicles).ForEVs,emergingEUbatteryregulations(onrecyclabilityandsupplychainduediligence)willapply.NorwayadditionallyleadsincharginginfrastructureandencouragesbatteryrecyclingprogramsgivenitshighEVusage.Sweden,Denmark,FinlandadheretoEUregulationsaswell,meaningChineseEVsmustobtainEUtypeapproval(athoroughcertificationofsafety,electrics,emissionscompliance,etc.)tobesold.ThisisahighstandardbutonethatleadingChineseOEMshavebeenabletomeetforentryintoWesternEurope.Carbonemissionrules(EUfleetaverageCO?limits)indirectlypressureallautomakerstosellmoreEVs–benefitingcompliantEV-onlyimporters.NouniquebatterydisposallawsbeyondEU-wideruleswereintroduced2022–2024,butallthesecountriesstressextendedproducerresponsibilityforbatteryrecyclinginprinciple.Inshort,ChineseNEVsfacehighbutuniformenvironmentalbenchmarksinNordics,withnoextrahurdlesbeyondwhatEuropeananddomesticbrandsface.MarketAccessandCertification:MarketentryintheNordicsisrelativelystraightforwardforthosemeetingEU/EEAstandards.Norway’smarketisverycompetitiveandsaturated–describedas“oneofthetoughestintheworld”duetofiercecompetitionandaveryinformedconsumerbase.Chinesebrandsovercameinitialskepticism(“unfamiliarbrands”concern)byofferingvalueformoneyandoftenmorefeatures.Salesmainlyoccurthroughlocaldistributorsorsettinguplocalsubsidiaries(e.g.MGEurope).Noexplicitsaleschannelrestrictionsexist,butbuildingafter-salesservicenetworksandbrandtrustiscrucial.Certification:asnoted,EUtype-approvalismandatory;therearenoadditionallocalhomologationtestsinNorway/Swedenbeyondthat.TechnicalstandardslikechargingplugsaretheType2/CCS2Europeanstandard,whichChineseEVsadaptedto.Insum,theNordicspresentalevelplayingfield;thechallengesforChineseentrantsarecommercial(brand,distribution,competition)ratherthanregulatory.FuelCarBanTimeline:TheNordicshavesomeofthemostaggressiveICEphase-out Norwayaimsfor100%zero-emissionnewcarsalesby2025,agoalsetbyitsparliamentin2017 .Thisisnotanoutrightlegalban,buta Swedenannouncedin2019aplantobannewpetrolanddieselcarsalesby2030.ThiscommitmentwasmadeunderthepreviousgovernmentandalignswithitsclimateandthoseofneighboringDenmark.WhileSwedenmustcoordinatewithEUrules,itsignaledstrongintentfor2030.(Notably,theEUhassincemandated100%zero-emissionnewcarsalesby2035,whichwouldsupersedenationallaws.)ThecurrentSwedishadministration(asof2023)hasnotreversedthe2030ambition,buttheendofsubsidiesindicatesarelianceonEU-widepolicy. Denmarklikewiseplanneda2030banonnewICEcarsales(and2035 ,pendingEUapproval.DenmarkspearheadedaninitiativewithotherEUstatestoallowearliernationalbansifdesired. FinlandsupportstheEU’s2035banandtargetsa50%reductionintransportemissionsby2030,buthasnotsetaseparatenationalICEbandate.Thesetimelinessendaclearsignal:by2030inScandinavia,thevastmajorityofnewcarswillbeelectric.ThisacceleratesEVmarketpenetration–benefitingthosealreadyestablished.ChineseEVmakersinNorway(andNordicsgenerally)thushaveafavorablerunway,asICEcompetitionwillfadefasterherethanalmostanywhereelse.However,withincentivestapering,themarketisshiftingfromsubsidy-driventomarket-driven,whichmeansChinesebrandsmustcompeteonproductmeritandpriceinamatureEVmarket.ImportTariffsandDuties:Russia’sEVpolicytookaprotectionistturninthewakeofgeopoliticalshifts.In2020–2021,Russiahadzeroimportdutyonelectricvehiclestoencourageadoption,butthischangedattheendof2021.EffectiveJanuary1,2022,Russiareinstateda15%importtariffonEVs,scrappingthepreviouszero-dutypolicy.TheEurasianEconomicUnion(EAEU)followedsuit,aligningmemberstates(Kazakhstan,Belarus,etc.)withasimilarduty.Moscowrejectedproposalstoextendtheduty-freeperiod,arguingitwouldimpedethedevelopmentofadomesticEVmanufacturing .Additionally,Russialeviesa“utilization(recycling)fee”onimportedvehicles–aone-timechargemeantforfuturedisposalcosts.Inmid-2024,amidasurgeofChinesecarimports,thegovernmentThisfeefunctionsasahiddentariff,sincedomesticproducersmeetinglocalizationtargetsgetitreimbursed.ForChineseexporters,thecombinedcostissignificant:starting2025,anaverageChinesepetrolSUV(~1.5Lengine)willface>$7,000inextrafeesontopofthe15%scalewithenginesize),butEVsarenotexempt–thefeeappliestoallvehicles.TherearenoChina-specificduties(RussiawelcomesChineseinvestment),buttheoverallimportcostforanyfullybuiltimportedvehiclehasrisensharply.Tobypasssomecosts,manyChineseautomakersshiftedtosemi-knockdown(SKD)assemblyinRussia,usinglocalpartnerplantstoassemblekitsandqualifyforreducedtariffs.However,recentrulesremovedrecyclingfeerebatesevenforSKD,equalizingcosts.SubsidiesandIncentives:Russia’sdirectconsumerincentivesforEVsremainlimited.Apilotprogramin2021offeredmodestsubsidiestoEVbuyersincertainregions,butuptakewassmall.Thefocusinsteadisonsupply-sideincentives:Russia’s“ConceptforDevelopmentofElectricTransportto2030”settargets(25,000EVsproduceddomesticallyby2024,10%ofallvehicleoutputby2030)andofferedincentivestomanufacturers(e.g.subsidiesforcharginginfrastructure,taxbreaksforlocalizedEVproduction).Forconsumers,EVswereexemptedfromvehicleimportVATandannualtransporttaxinsomeareas,butthosebenefitswereuneven.Inthepastthreeyears,nomajornationwidepurchasesubsidyexisted,especiallyaseconomicstrainsandsanctionsreorientedfiscalpriorities.Instead,RussiatriedtoenticelocalEVproductionbyshieldingitfromimportcompetition(asdescribedabove).ChineseEVbrands,therefore,donotfacediscriminatorysubsidypoliciesperse(thereisnolocalEVindustryyettofavor),buttheydofacehigherrelativepricesEnvironmentalStandards:RussiahasrelativelylaxenvironmentalstandardsforvehiclescomparedtoEurope.IttraditionallyfollowedEuro-5emissionsstandards(andpostponedEuro-6adoption).TherearenospecificcarbonemissiontargetsorZEVmandatespushingEVadoption.Infact,post-2022,someregulationswererelaxedtoallowproductionofsimpler,lower-techcarsdomestically.EV-relatedstandardsinRussiafocusonsafetycertification(vehiclesmustgetOTTScertification,analogoustoEUtypeapprovalbutgenerallylessstringent).Thereareemergingbatteryrecyclingregulationsbeingdiscussed,butnothingcomprehensiveenactedyet.AsEVadoptionwaslow(~9,000EVsonRussianroadsin2022),environmentalregulationofEVsisminimal.However,ChineseEVsmayhavetonavigatebureaucraticapprovalprocessesandhomologationtoRussianGOSTstandards.NouniquerequirementsliketelematicsorsoftwarelocalizationhavebeenreportedforEVs(thoughbroaderdigitalservicelawsexist).Ifanything,Russia’schallengeismoreaboutsanctionscompliance–ensuringnosanctionedcomponentsortechnologiesareinthevehicle–ratherthandomesticenvironmentalrules.Overall,environmentalbarriersarelow;themainhurdlesareeconomicandpolitical.MarketAccessandDistribution:SincetheUkraineconflict(2022),Russia’sautomarkethastransformed:WesternandJapaneseautomakersexited,andChineseautomakersfilledthevoid,reachingover60%marketshareofnewcarsalesby2023.ChinesebrandslikeChery,Haval(GWM),andGeelynowdominatealongsidethelonedomesticmakerAvtoVAZ(Lada).Theregulatoryclimateencouragesforeignpartnerstolocalizeproduction.PresidentPutinin2024explicitlyurgedmorejointproductionwithChinesefirmsinRussia.Companiesthatinvest(likeGreatWallMotor,whichownsaplantinTularegion)havegovernmentgoodwill;thoseonlyexportingmayfacepressure.MarketaccesscanalsobehamperedbyRussia’s“opaquebureaucracyandentrenchedinterests,”whichcanmakeoperationschallenging.Chinesefirmshavebeencautious:concernsaboutsanctionsandlong-termstabilitymakethemhesitanttoinvestdeeply.Saleschannels:manyChinesebrandsoperatethroughRussianpartnerdistributorsoracquireddealernetworksfromexitingEuropean/Japanesebrands.Thispatchworkdistributioncanbeachallengefornewentrants.Thatsaid,therearenoformalrestrictionsonChinesecompanies–indeed,theyarewelcomedtoreplaceWesterncompanies,aslongastheynavigateinformalhurdles.Forexample,aplannedJVbetweenChina’sFAWandRussia’sSollerswasdroppedafterSollersfellundersanctions,illustratingthegeopoliticalrisk.Insummary,Russiaisahigh-risk,high-rewardscenario:thedemandgapleftbyWesternautomakersgivesChineseEVsahugeopening,buttradebarriers(tariffs/fees)increasecostsandthevolatilebusinessenvironmentposesstrategicFuelCarBanTimeline:RussiahasnoICEbanonthehorizon.Thegovernmenthasnotcommittedtoanyphase-outofpetrolordieselvehicles;onthecontrary,fossilfuelindustriesremainapillaroftheeconomy.EVsrepresentedwellunder1%ofsalesthrough2024,andpolicyfocusesongradualelectrification(the2030targetof10%ofproductionbeingEVshintsataveryslowtransition).Localauthoritiesinafewcitieshavediscussedlonger-termrestrictions(e.g.Moscow’scleanairinitiatives),butnationally,theideaofbanningICEcarsisnotunderseriousconsideration.Ifanything,Russia’spoliciesaimtoprolongthelifeofICEvehicles(especiallygivensurplusChineseICEimports)whilebuildingnascentEVcapacity.ForChineseNEVs,thismeansRussia’sEVmarketgrowthwilldependlessonpolicypushandmoreonmarketfactors(fuelprices,consumerinterestinnewtech,etc.).Ineffect,EVpenetrationwillremainlowinthenearterm,limitingthesizeoftheprizeforChineseImportTariffs:ThePhilippineshastakennotablestepstomakeEVimportsmoreaffordable.InJanuary2023,PresidentFerdinandMarcosJr.issuedanexecutiveordercuttingtheMostFavouredNation(MFN)importtariffonarangeofEVs–includingcars,buses,vans,trucks,motorcycles,andbicycles–to0%forfiveyears.Previously,theseEVsfacedtariffsbetween5%and30%dependingonvehicletype.InMay2024,thiszero-tariffpolicywasextendedthrough2028,andevenexpandedtocoverhybridelectricvehicles,e-motorcycles,ande-bicycles(whichinitiallywereexcludedfromthe2023order).ThismeansnoimportdutyforEVsfortherestofthedecade,reflectingManila’sstrategytoreducerelianceonimportedoilandencourageEVadoption.It’satemporarymeasure,tobereviewedannually,butsignalsastrongpro-EVstance.TherearenospecialtariffstargetingChineseEVs;infact,ChineseautomakersstandtobenefitsincemanyaffordablypricedEVs(e.g.smallcitycars,e-motorbikes)aremadeinChina.ThePhilippinesdoesmaintainnon-tariffrequirements,suchasvehiclesneedingtoberight-handdrive(Philippinesisleft-handdrivecountry,sothat’snotanissueforChineseexports,whicharemostlyLHD).Also,vehiclesmustcomplywithlocalstandards(whichoftenmirrorUN/ECEregulations).Overall,importbarriersforEVshavedroppedsignificantlyin2022–2024,makingthePhilippinesoneofthemoreopenmarketsinASEANforEVimports.SubsidiesandIncentives:In2022,thePhilippinesenactedtheElectricVehicleIndustryDevelopmentAct(EVIDA),acomprehensivelawtospurEVadoption.EVIDAanditsimplementingroadmap(CREVI)introducedfiscalandnon-fiscalincentives:Taxincentives:EVsaregrantedfullexemptionsoncertaintaxes.Notably,RepublicAct11697(EVIDA)provideszeroexcisetax(100%exemption)forpurelyelectricvehicles,comparedtotheusualexcisetaxonICEcars.Hybridvehiclesgeta50%excisetaxreduction.Additionally,EVsenjoya50%reductioninvehicleregistrationfeesandareexemptfromthe“number-coding”trafficscheme(amajorperkincongestedcities).ImportedEVchargingequipmentalsohas0%dutiesforaperiodof8Non-fiscalincentives:EVsreceivepriorityregistrationandlicensing,specialEVlicenseplates,andareexemptfromcertainroaduserestrictions(liketheUnifiedVehicularVolumeReductionProgram).Governmentfleetsaremandatedtoincorporateatleast5%EVs,creatingdemand.EVIDAalsostreamlinespermittingforchargingstationsandrequiresparkingfacilitiestoallocateEVspaces,buildingtheecosystem.Chargingandmanufacturingsupport:ThegovernmentoffersincentivesforlocalEVmanufacturingandassembly,suchasduty-freeimportofparts,taxholidays,andsupportforestablishingbatteryrecyclingandcharginginfrastructure.Crucially,theseincentivesapplyequallytodomesticandforeign-brandEVs–there’snodiscriminationagainstChinesebrands.Infact,giventhenascentlocalEVindustry,thePhilippineswelcomesforeignEVstokick-startmarketuptake.By2024,however,uptakewasstilllow(EVsandhybrids<1%ofnewsales),sothegovernmentandevenlegislatorsarepushingforpossiblymoreincentives(e.g.billsforfurthertaxbreakswerediscussed).ForChineseNEVs,thePhilippineincentivelandscapeisveryfavorable:zeroimporttaxandzeroexcisetaxsignificantlylowertheretailprice,enhancingcompetitiveness.EnvironmentalStandards:ThePhilippinesalignswithglobalstandardsinsomeareasbutisstilldevelopingacomprehensiveEVregulatoryframework.IthasadoptedEuro4emissionsstandardsfornewICEvehiclesinrecentyearstoaddressairquality.ForEVs,EVIDAmandatedtheformulationofEVsafetystandardsandchargingstandards(likelyaligningwithIECandSAEstandardsforchargers).AnEVclassificationsystemwasintroducedtoformalizewhatcountsasanEV,hybrid,etc..Batteryrecyclinganddisposalarerecognizedasimportantinthelaw–requiringforthcomingregulationstoensuremanufacturersorimportershaveend-of-lifesolutions–butdetailedrulesarestillpending.Furthermore,toensurequality,theDepartmentofTradeandIndustry(DTI)andDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)maintainalistofrecognizedEVmodelsthatmeetsafetyandperformancecriteria.ThiseffectivelymeansChineseEVexportersmustprovidecertifications(e.g.UNECEconformityorequivalent)tobeeligiblefortheincentivesandtobesold.ThefocusonenvironmentalpolicyinthePhilippinesispartlyonenergysecurity–EVsareseenasreducingfuelimportsandemissions.Thecountrycommittedtoa75%greenhousegasemissionreductionby2030(conditionalonaid),andpromotingEVsisonestrategy.ForChinesemanufacturers,meetingPhilippinestandardsisusuallyachievablebyleveragingEuropeanorChinesedomesticstandards(whichareoftenstricter).Therearen’tuniquelocalemissionstestsforEVs(sincetheyhavenone),butcompliancewithbatterysafetyandpossiblyarequirementforbatteryrecyclingplanscouldemergeasthemarketgrows.Asof2024,environmentalregulationsaresupportiveratherthanrestrictiveforEVsinthePhilippines.MarketAccessandCertification:ThePhilippinesmarketcanbecomplexduetogovernanceandinfrastructure,butthegovernmentisactivelyloweringbarriersforEVentry.Certification:VehiclesmustpassthroughthePhilippinesBureauofStandardsandtheLandTransportationOfficeforroad-worthiness.IfaChineseEValreadyhasEU,US,orUNcertifications,approvalsareusuallystraightforward.EVIDAevencallsforexpeditedcustomsprocessingforEVimports,whichhelpsimporters.Marketaccess:Onechallengeisdevelopingcharginginfrastructure–thegovernmentispushingit,butasof2023therewereonlyafewhundredchargingstationsnationwide.Companiesenteringmustoftenpartnerwithlocaldistributorsduetofranchisingrules.ChineseautomakerslikeBYDandCheryarealreadypresent(BYDhasadealerinManilasincemid-2010s;SAIC’sMG(thoughmostlysellingICE)ispopular).TherearenoforeignequityrestrictionsspecifictoEVimportation–100%foreign-owneddistributorscanoperate,thoughmanychooselocalpartnersfornetworkandregulatorynavigation.Salesandafter-sales:EnsuringpartsandservicefornewEVbrandswillbekeyinbuildingreputationamongFilipinoconsumers,whoarebrand-consciousandvalueaftersalessupport(Japanesebrandsdominatelargelyduetotrustandservice).ChineseEVentrantsneedtoovercomethisbyofferingwarranty,servicecenters,andperhapsuniquefinancingorbatteryleasingschemestolowertheupfrontcost.Insummary,regulatoryaccessisimproving(fast-trackprocesses,notariffs),butpracticalaccess(charging,consumeracceptance)willrequirestrategiceffort.FuelCarBanTimeline:ThePhilippineshasnotsetafirmtimelinetobanICEvehicles.Giventhecountry’sstageofdevelopment,policyiscurrentlycarrot-based(incentives)ratherthanstick-based(bansorpunitivetaxes).Thatsaid,thegovernmentshowsintenttotransitionoverthelongterm.UnderEVIDA,largeprivateandgovernmentfleetsmuststartintegratingEVs(ademand-sidemandate),andtherewereproposalsthatby2040asignificantpercentageofvehiclesshouldbeelectric.Butnolawyetprohibitsgasolinecarsalesbyacertaindate.ThePhilippinesisasignatorytotheCOP26ZEVdeclaration(viaacollectiveASEANstandpoint)andthushasexpressedaspirationthatleadingmarketsachieveallZEVsalesby2035andothersby2040.Wecaninterpretthatby2040thePhilippinesaimsformostnewvehiclestobezero-emission,thoughthisisnotabindingcommitment.In2023,somelegislatorsandthink-tankssuggestedaphase-outofnewICEcarimportsbetween,butthisremainsatthediscussionstage.Thelackofanear-termICEbanmeansEVpenetrationwilldependonincentivesandfuelpricedynamicsalternativesincostandperformance.Onthepositiveside,continuedpolicysupportandrisingclimateawarenesscouldacceleratevoluntaryEVuptakewellbeforeanyofficialban.ImportTariffs:Mexicohasbeenanuancedcaseduetotradeagreements.Inlate2020,MexicotemporarilyeliminatedimporttariffsonEVsfromallcountriesuntiltheendof2024.ThismeantEVsimportedfromnationswithoutafreetradeagreement(FTA)–includingChina–couldenterduty-free(otherwisethey’dfacethestandard20–25%tarifffornon-FTAautos).ThispolicygreatlybenefitedChineseEVexportersandothers,asitleveledthefieldwithvehiclesfromtheUSorEurope.Chinesebrandsseizedtheopportunity:by2023,~38%ofEVssoldinMexicowereofChineseorigin(brandslikeBYD,MG(SAIC),JAC,andothers).However,facingpressurefromtheUnitedStatesaboutpotentialtransshipmentofChinesecarsintotheU.S.viaMexico,theMexicangovernmentdecidedtoendthistariffexemptiononnon-FTAEVsfromOct1,2024.StartingQ42024,anyEVimportedfromacountrywithoutanFTA(e.g.China,whichhasnoFTAwithMexico)issubjectagaintoa20%importduty.Theendofthissupport“willraisethefinalpriceforconsumers,limitbrandoptions,andcouldnegativelyaffecteffortstoreduceurbanpollution,”accordingtoMexico’sElectromobilityAssociation .It’sclearthismovewasinfluencedbyNAFTA/USMCAdynamics–theU.S.hasa100%tariffonChinesevehiclesanddidnotwantaloopholethroughMexico.Notably,MexicostillhasnoChina-specifictariffbeyondthis;it’sablanketpolicyforallnon-FTAcountries.ChineseautomakerscanmitigateitbylocalizingproductionorassemblyinMexico(thusqualifyingunderUSMCArules)–indeed,somelikeJACalreadyassembleEVsinMexicoinpartnershipwithlocalfirms.Asof2024,importingcompleteEVsfromChinanowincursasignificantduty,soChineseOEMsmustfactorthatintopricingoradjustsupplychains.Meanwhile,EVsimportedfromtheUS,Europe,SouthKorea,andJapan(allwithFTAs)continuetoenjoySubsidiesandIncentives:MexicohasnotofferedfederalconsumercashrebatesforEVpurchasesassomecountriesdo.Instead,incentivesaremostlytax-basedandstate-levelTaxdeductions:IndividualsorcompaniespurchasingEVscandeductalargeramountfromtaxableincome(uptoMXN250,000,aboutUS$12,500).EVsarealsoexemptfromthenewvehicleacquisitiontax(ISAN) ,whichlowerstheireffectivecost. Localincentives:Manystates,includingMexicoCity,grantexemptionfromtheannualvehicularownershiptax(tenencia)andexemptionfrommandatoryemissionsverificationforEVs .Theseexemptionscansave Infrastructureandindustrialincentives:Thegovernmenthasaprogramtoexpandcharginginfrastructure(thoughprogressisslow),andattheindustriallevel,EVmanufacturingprojectsreceivestrongsupport.Forexample,NuevoLeónstategaveTesla~$153millioninincentivesforanewfactory,andotherstatescompetetoattractChineseandUSEVinvestmentswithtaxbreaks,trainingsubsidies,etc.. Noexplicitdiscriminationispresentintheseincentives–Chinesebrands’customersbenefitjustthesame.However,onechallengeiseligibilityfortaxperksoftenrequiresthevehicletobecertifiedandsoldthroughofficialchannels;someChineseEVsinitiallyenteredasgreyimports,whichwouldn’tqualify.AsChineseOEMsformalizeoperationsinMexico(e.g.,BYDlaunchedofficialsalesin2023),theirbuyerscanfullyaccesstheseincentives.During2022–2024,policydiscussioninMexicoturnedtoaugmentingincentives:theElectromobilityAssociationproposeddirectsubsidiesordifferentiatedincentivesfavoringBEVsoverhybrids,notingcurrentincentivesmightbeinsufficienttohitMexico’sambitiousEVtargets.By2024,nofederalsubsidyhadbeenenacted,partlyduetobudgetconstraintsandthefocusonindustrialpolicy.Still,thecombinationoftariff-free(until2024)andtax-freetreatmentmadeEVsrelativelymoreattractive.Withtariffsreturning,MexicanstakeholdersarguethatnewincentiveswillbeneededtokeepEVadoptionontrack–otherwise,EVs(includingChinesemodelsknownforaffordability)couldseeslowersales.ForChineseNEVs,thekeyisthatMexico’smarketdoesn’tgivefavoritismtodomesticbrands(therearenoneinEVspace)butissensitivetoU.S.influenceontradepolicy.EnvironmentalStandards:Mexicohasbeentighteningvehicleemissionsandefficiencystandards,albeitgradually.In2022,Mexicoupdateditsvoluntaryfueleconomygoalsandby2023w