【深度報告】中國電力行業(yè)低碳轉(zhuǎn)型評估（英文）-牛津大學(xué)

AssessingChina’spowersectCHINAENERGYTRANSITIONThecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibilityiThecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudiesoranyofitsmembers.Copyright?2023OxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies(RegisteredCharity,No.286084)Thispublicationmaybereproducedinpartforeducationalornon-profitpurposeswithoutspecialpermissionfromthecopyrightholder,providedacknowledgmentofthesourceismade.NouseofthispublicationmaybemadeforresaleorforanyothercommercialpurposewhatsoeverwithoutpriorpermissioninwritingfromtheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies.ISBN978-1-78467-218-8Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibilityAcknowledgmentsTheauthorwouldliketothankGarySipengXieforassistancewithresearchinthepreparationofthispaper,aswellasDavidRobinson,PhilipAndrews-Speed,andMichalMeidanforreviewingandprovidinghelpfulcomments.Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibilityChina’slow-carbonenergytransitiondependsonthepowersectortakingthelead.Inthisassessment,weseektoanswerthreequestionsaboutChina’spowersectortransformation:1.Isthepowersectortransitionontrack,intermsofnon-fossilandrenewablecapacityandoutput?Overall,hydro,wind,solar,andnucleararescalingupcapacityataspeedexceedingwhatwouldbenecessarytopeakpowersectorcarbonemissionsbefore2030anddecarbonizetheelectricitysectorby2050.Renewableintegrationwillbemoreofachallenge,andtosomeextentmaydependonmarketreforms(seeitem2below).TechnologiessuchasCCUSandhydrogenforseasonalenergystoragefacehighuncertainty.2.AremarketreformsinthepowersectoraprerequisiteforChina’slow-carbontransition?Whilethereformeffortremainsapriorityofthegovernment,withstatedaimsofefficiencyandfacilitatingthelow-carbontransition,notonlyisprogressslow,butthelong-termdirectionofpowermarketinstitutionsremainsorientedtowardsadministrativemeasures,withcommand-and-controlpoliciesretainingtheupperhandovermarketforces.Notonlydoessecurityremainahigherprioritythanmarketreform,butreformsmayseekto“checktheboxes”ratherthanallowingsupplyanddemandtoplayadecisiveroleintheelectricitysector.Marketreformsmaybemoreaccuratelydescribedas“market-orientedexperiments”andeventhoughmorethoroughmarketreformscouldincentivizeinvestmentsanddispatchthatwouldacceleratethelow-carbontransitionandreduceitscost,administrativepoliciescanalsokeeptheenergytransitionontrack.3.AsChinapursuesthelow-carbontransitionandpowermarketreforms,doeffortsatinternationalexperiencesharingandtopicsofcooperativeresearchrequireadjustment?Todate,internationalcooperationonpowersectorcooperationhasfocusedonevaluatingthepotentialbenefitsofatargetmarketmodelinChina.ThisapproachisreflectedbothinpowersectormodellingofChina,aswellasinreportsonbestpracticesabroad.However,effortstohighlightprogressintechnologyorpolicy–bothinsideandoutsideChina–mayhavegreaterimpactonfuturepolicydiscussions.Withthisinmind,theconcludingsectionofthepapersketchesafewpotentialresearchtopicsonpowersectortechnologyandpolicy,includingstudiesongreenenergytrading,cleanheatingwithdistributedPV,andEVcharging.Theserepresentjustsomeofthepromisingtopicsforbothmodellingandcomparativepolicyresearchthatneednotdependonprogresswithpowermarketreforms.SuchresearchcanserveasareferenceforinternationalexchangesaimedatreducingcarbonemissionsandforfirmsseekingtounderstandChina’scleanenergydevelopmentThecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibilityAcknowledgments ExecutiveSummary Contents Figures Tables 1.Introduction:Renewablesandelectrificationarerecognizedaskey 12.Arerenewablesandelectrificationontrackformeetingthe2030–2060goals? 33.Areenergyandpowermarketreformsontrack?Thisislessclear 44.Whatisthetargetmarketmodel? 115.Willthetargetmodelwork? 136.Theresearchgap,andsuggestionsforfillingit 15Figure1:2020–2060electricitycapacitybysourceunderCETOCarbonNeutralScenario(CNS) 1Figure2:Chinanewenergyvehiclesales(NEV),2017–2022 4Figure3:2021–2022wholesaleelectricpowertradingshares 8Figure4:2021electricpowersalesbygeographyoftrading 8Figure5:StateGridEnergyResearchInstitutemapofdesertlocationsfornewcleanenergybases12Figure6:Mapof2021PVadditionsbyprovince(GW) 13Table1:Chinagenerationmix,2015–2021,andincrementalincreaseinwindandsolarshare 3Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility1China’spowersectordecarbonizationiscriticaltopeakingcarbonemissionsandachievingcarbonneutrality.Analystsconsiderdecarbonizingthepowersectorasbeingrelativelystraightforwardwhencomparedtothedecarbonizationofbuildings,industry,andtransportation–andmuchmoresothanthehardest-to-abateindustriessuchasaviationorlong-distanceheavy-dutytrucking.ManyareconcernedthatChina’scontinuedconstructionofcoalplantswilllockinhighemissions,delayingdecarbonizationofthepowersector.Topleadersrefertocoalasthefoundationor“ballaststone”oftheenergysystem,1whilesuggestingitsrolewillchange,especiallyinthepowersector.FollowingPresidentXiJinping’sSeptember2020announcementthatChinawouldpeakcarbonemissionsbefore2030andstriveforcarbonneutralityby2060,2severalfurtherannouncementshavehighlightedtheroleofthepowersectorforachievingthisvision.Inlate2021,thedirectorofChina’sNationalEnergyAdministrationcalledcoalthe“ballaststone”ofChina’senergysystem,essentialformaintainingenergysecurityevenduringalow-carbontransition.Oncoal,roughlyhalfofwhichisusedtogenerateelectricity,inApril2021PresidentXistatedthatChinawouldstrictlycontrolcoalpowerthrough2025andbegintophaseoutcoalthereafter3–alleviatingfearsthatarapidbuild-outofcoalpowermightleadtoanemissionspeaksubstantiallyabovepresentlevels,duetoananticipatorycoalrushtolockincoalplantinvestmentsbeforeacut-off.NotonlydoesChinacontinuetobuildcoalplants,butseveralinfluentialgovernmentbodies,suchastheChinaElectricityCouncilandtheElectricPowerPlanningandEngineeringInstitute,continuetoenvisionamajorcoalbuild-outtomeetgrowingelectricitydemand.4However,variousChinesegovernmentdocumentsspecifythatnewcoalplants,andeventuallyallcoalplants,shouldtransitiontoplayabalancingroleinthepowersystem,ratherthanbeingmainlyabaseloadpowersource,5thoughusingcoalplantsforrampingorpeakingcarriessignificantcostsintermsofenergyefficiencyandmaintenance.Theroleofcoalasabalancingresourcerepresentsanongoingareaofpotentialresearchthatcouldhelpclarifytheneedforcoal,givenrapidchangesincleanenergytechnologies.MajormodellingstudiesalsosuggestthatChinawillseektodecarbonizethepowersectorfirst.Accordingtoaprominentlow-carbondevelopmentpathwaystudypublishedbyTsinghuaUniversity’sInstituteofClimateChangeandSustainableDevelopment(ICCSD)immediatelyfollowingPresidentXi’s2030–2060announcement,non-fossilenergywouldaccountforroughly80percentofenergyby2050,theelectricitysectorwouldobtain90percentofenergyfromnon-fossilsources,whiletheelectricityshareinend-useenergyconsumptionwouldriseto55percent.6Similarly,theChinaEnergyTransformationOutlook,publishedbytheNationalDevelopmentandReformCommissionEnergyResearchInstitute(NDRCERI),anticipatesachievinganelectrificationrateof74percentinacarbon-neutralscenariofor2060,with95percentofelectricityobtainedfromrenewablesources.Electricityconsumptionwouldmorethandoubleunderthisscenario.7Figure1:2020–2060electricitycapacity(GW)bysourceunderCETOCarbonNeutralScenario(CNS)Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility2Thevisionofrenewablesscale-upandelectrificationastheprimarypathstodecarbonizationalignswithanalysisfrominternationalorganizationsandNGOsworkingonmodellingChina’slow-carbonenergytransition.TheInternationalEnergyAgencyanticipatesthatrenewables–especiallysolarphotovoltaics–willprovidethelargestcontributiontodecarbonizationunderanadvancedpoliciesscenario.Underthisscenario,Chinawouldhave4.5TWofPVand1.5TWofwindby2060.TheIEAexpectsthatelectrificationandenergyefficiencywillplaythelargestroleinindustry,whileelectrificationofbuildingsandtransportiscriticaltothosetwosectors.UndertheIEA’sAnnouncedPledgesScenario(APS),electricityaccountsfor50percentofChina’sfinalenergydemandin2060,comparedto25percenttoday.Electrificationaccountsfor60percentoftransportcarbonreduction,comparedto5percenthydrogenunderthisscenario.Itanticipateselectricitydemandwouldroughlydoubleby2060.9Othermodelspresentsimilarfindings.Inits2018ReinventingFire:China,Low-CarbonScenario,publishedbytheRockyMountainInstitute,LawrenceBerkeleyNationalLaboratory,andtheNDRCERI,electricitywouldaccountfor41percentofend-usedemandin2050,12percentagepointshigherthaninthereferencecase,with82percentofelectricitycomingfromnon-fossilenergy.10Similarly,theEnergyFoundationChinaandUniversityofMaryland’s2022SynthesisReportontheeffectofElectrificationonChina’sCarbonNeutralityPathwaysnotesthat“electrificationisacorepartofChina’spathwaytocarbonneutrality,”andthisrequires“simultaneoustransitionsofelectrifyingend-usesectorswhiledecarbonizingtheelectricitysector.”Thereportspecificallytargetselectrificationofbuildingheating,EVsforpassengervehiclesandheavy-dutytrucks,andheatpumpsandelectricitydemand-sideflexibilityfromindustry.11ThereportdrawsonearlierworkfromtheUniversityofMarylandoncoalphase-outthatincorporatesassumptionsonincreasedelectricitydemandfromelectrificationofend-usedemand.12BackgroundonChina’spowersector:Ownershipandoperationofelectricitygridandpowergenerationassets:China’selectricitysectorisdominatedbystate-ownedenterprises(SOEs).Thetransmissionanddistributiongridsareownedbytwomaingridcompanies:StateGridCorporationofChina,whichrunsthegridinmostofChinaandisoneoftheworld’slargestfirms;andChinaSouthernGrid,whichrunsthegridinfivesouthernprovinces.FiveSOEgenerationcompaniesownapproximately60percentofthecountry’sgenerationassets–bothcoalandrenewables–withtheremainderbeingownedbysmallercompanies,almostallstate-ownedormainlystate-owned.Therearealsotwomajorstate-ownednuclearcompanies.Regulationandplanning:China’snationalenergypolicyissetprimarilybytheNationalDevelopmentandReformCommission,themaineconomicplanningbodyactingundertheStateCouncil,andtheNationalEnergyAdministration,whichisapartoftheNDRC.Provincialofficials,alongwithprovincialofficialsfromthesetwoagencies,havewidelatitudetoplanandmanagetheelectricitysectoratthelocallevel.ThereisnoindependentregulatorofChina’sgridorgenerationcompanies,andSOEpowercompaniesparticipatedirectlyinenergypolicyplanning.Capacityandoutput:Chinahastheworld’slargestelectricitygenerationcapacity,withover2.5TWofcapacityinstalledattheendof2022,ofwhichthermal(mainlycoal)accountedfor1.3TW,hydro413GW,nuclear55GW,wind365GW,andsolar393GW.Coalaccountedfor58.4percentofelectricityproduction,comparedto36.2percentfornon-fossilenergy.13Windandsolarcombinedproduced14percentofelectricityin2022,upfrom12percentthepreviousyear.Wholesaleandretailpricing:Chinahassoughttograduallyintroducemarketreformsinpowerpricing,bothviamid-to-long-term(MLT)bilateralcontracts(generallyfromonemonthtooneyearinduration)andlimitedspotmarkettrading.However,wholesalepricesarestillregulatedonthebasisofabenchmarkcoaltariffandfluctuateaboveandbelowthebenchmarksubjecttocapsandfloors,thoughcertainenergy-intensiveindustriesmaypaypricesabovethecaps.Windandsolarplantstypicallyreceiveeitherafixedfeed-intariffpaymentformostoftheirenergy,orarecontractedunderlonger-termgridparitycontracts,definedasrenewablecontractssetatorbelowthebenchmarkcoaltariff.Carbonemissions:Thepowersectorisresponsibleforapproximately45percentofthecountry’sgreenhousegasemissions,mainlyfromcoal-firedpower.Chinahassetannualtargetsforincreasingtheefficiencyofitscoalfleet–whichisnewerthanthatofmostothercountries–aswellasoveralllong-termtargetsforincreasingthetotalshareofnon-fossilenergy.Furtherresources:Formoreonthepowersector,includingfuelmixandtrendsforcapacityandgeneration,seethe2022“GuidetoChineseClimatePolicy”,whichalsoincludesanupdatedchapteronpowermarketreforms.14Formoreontheinstitutionalgovernanceofthepowersectorandhowitbothhelpsandhindersthelow-carbontransition,seeour2021paper,“Softwareversushardware:howChina’sinstitutionalsettinghelpsandhindersthecleanenergytransition.”15ERR能研微訊聚焦世界能源行業(yè)熱點資訊，發(fā)布最新能源研究摘要、翻譯、編輯和綜述，內(nèi)容版權(quán)遵循Cre知識星球二維碼矩陣資報告號：ERR能研微訊訂閱號二維碼（左）丨行業(yè)咨詢、情報、專家合作：ERR能研君（右)視頻、圖表號、研究成果：能研智庫訂閱號二維碼（左）丨ERR能研微訊頭條號、西瓜視頻（右)能研智庫視頻號（左）丨能研智庫抖音號（右)Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility32.ArerenewablesandelectrificationontrackChinaisleadinginrenewableenergycapacityandgeneration,althoughitsshareintheenergymixremainssmall.Althoughwindandsolarproducedonly12percentofChina’selectricityin2021,16theirsharehasbeenrisingatasteadypaceofover1percentagepointannually.Onwind,Chinanowhasone-thirdofglobalcapacity,andleadstheworldwith37GWofnewinstallationsin2022,reaching365GWintotal.17Insolar,year-endtotalcapacityreached307GW,andChinaadded87GWin2022,upfrom53GWin2021.18ChinaalsodominatesthemanufacturingofbothsolarPVandbatteries.In2020,Chinaaccountedfor76percentofglobalpolysiliconproduction,96percentofPVwaferproduction,78percentofPVcellproduction,and70percentofglobalPVpanelproduction.19AccordingtotheIEA,Chinaproducesthree-quartersofalllithium-ionbatteriesandishometo70percentofproductioncapacityforcathodesand85percentforanodes.20Chinaisalsoinvestingbillionsinrenewableenergyprojectsoverseas,includingincountriesthatarepartoftheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI).21China’scleanenergytransitionisacceleratingrapidly,atleastinthepowersectorandtransportation.Atthepresentrateofannualwindandsolarcapacityadditions,Chinawouldexceedits2030targetof1200GWofwindandsolarbyover300GW,reaching1544GW.22Evenso,windandsolarinstallationsarelikelytocontinuetoincrease:installationlevelsforsolarPVreached87GWforthefirsttimein2022,andprovincialfive-yearplanssuggestthatChinawilladdover800GWofwindandsolarby2025,toppingthe2030targetatleastfiveyearsaheadofschedule.23IntermsofthewindandsolarcapacityneededtoachieveChina’scarbonneutralitygoalsfor2060–estimatedat4–6TWwindandsolarcombined–thiswouldputChinaontracktoachieveathirdorevenhalfofthenecessarytotalcapacityby2030.Asforelectricitygenerationshare,windandsolarhavegrowntheircombinedshareby1.3percentannually,from3.9percentin2015to11.7percentin2021.Simplyextrapolatingthisto2030,andassumingnuclearandhydrosharesremainedconstant,wouldimplyChinawouldroughlymeetitstargetfora39percentnon-fossilelectricityshareby2025.Theactualchangeingenerationsharewilldependoneconomicgrowthandelectricitydemandgrowth,whichhaveshownincreasedvolatilitysincetheonsetoftheCovidpandemicin2020.The39percentnon-fossiltargetmaybeconservative:withrenewablecapacityadditionslikelytogrow,andanaccelerationofnuclearconstruction,China’sgenerationsharetargetscouldwellbeexceededunlesshydrounderperformsduetoclimatefactors.Table1:Chinagenerationmix,2015–2021,andincrementalincreaseinwindandsolarshare 20152016201720182019202020212022Hydropower19.4%19.5%18.6%17.6%17.8%17.8%16.0%15.6%Thermalpower73.7%71.8%71.0%70.4%68.9%67.9%67.4%65.8%Nuclearpower3.0%3.5%3.7%4.2%4.8%4.8%4.9%4.8%Windpower3.2%3.8%4.7%5.2%5.5%6.1%7.8%8.8%Solarpower0.7%1.1%1.8%2.5%3.0%3.4%3.9%4.9% Non-fossilshare26.3%28.2%29.0%29.6%31.1%32.1%32.6%34.2% Windandsolarshare3.9%4.9%6.5%7.8%8.6%9.5%11.7%13.7% Incrementalwindandsolar1.0%1.6%1.2%0.8%1.0%2.2%2.0%Source:DataadaptedfForelectrification,thesituationismorecomplexduetothenumberofsectorsandtechnologiesneeded.Fortransportationelectrification,Chinaisagainfaraheadofitstargets.Chinahasanofficialtargetfornewenergyvehicles(batteryelectricvehicles,plug-inhybrids,andfuelcellvehicles)toachievea20percentshareofnewvehiclesalesby2025,butthe2022marketsharesurpassed25percent,upfromjust5percentin2020.24WhilemineralandbatterysupplyconstraintsarelikelytoslowthegrowthofEVadoption,atleastinthenearterm,25electrificationoftransportisstillvastlyexceedingexpectations.Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility4Figure2:Chinanewenergyvehiclesales(NEV),2017–20228,000,0007,000,0006,000,0005,000,0004,000,0003,000,0002,000,0001,000,000-25.6% 4.5%4.7%5.4%201720182019202020212022Todate,therapidincreaseinelectricvehiclesishavingonlyaminorimpactoncarbonemissions.ThoughChinahadover10millionEVsontheroadinmid-2022,gasoline(usedbyalmostallpassengercars)accountsforjust27percentofChina’soilconsumption,anddieselafurther26percent,mostlyforfreightbutalsoforsomeindustrialuses.26BloombergNewEnergyFinanceestimatesthatEVsarealreadysaving1.5millionbarrelsperdayofglobaloildemand,andtheInternationalEnergyAgencyin2021estimatedthatChinawillaccountforatleasthalftheoildisplacementfromEVadoptionin2030.27Onalife-cyclebasis,withthepresentelectricitymix,ChineseEVsofferemissionsthatare40–60percentlowerthaninternalcombustionvehiclesinallregionsofChina.28Basedonthisestimate,typicalvehicleusage,andanassuming15millionEVsontheroadinChinaattheendof2022,EVswouldreduceannualtransportationCO2emissionsbyanet29milliontons,versusroughly784milliontonsofannualtransportationCO2emissionsin2019.29AssumingEVsreachwellover50percentmarketsharebylaterthisdecade,theywillgraduallybegintodisplacegasolinedemand–althoughrisingcarownershipandlongvehiclelifetimesinChinawillattenuatethisshift.Accordingtoonestudy,replacing60percentofthefossilvehiclefleetwithEVswouldraiseelectricityconsumptionby410TWhin2050,or4.5percent.30ChangesindieseldemandfortruckingaremoreuncertaingiventhelowerpenetrationofEVtrucksinlong-haulshipping,buthereaswellChinaismakingprogresswithelectrification.IfChinaisexceedingexpectationsinrenewableadditionsandelectricvehicles,isthatsufficient?Orareadditionalreformsneededtomeetthecountry’sdecarbonizationgoals?AnalystsassumepowersectordecarbonizationwillbemostefficientifChina’spowersectoradoptspracticesusedinothermajorpowermarkets,whilelearningfromtheirpastmistakes.Inthis,variousexpertshaveadvocatedforChinatoadoptliquid,high-volumespotpowermarketscoveringalargegeographicalarea,pricingelectricityonthebasisofshorttimeintervalstoencouragedemandflexibility,andencouragingtheparticipationofdistributedgenerationandstorage.31Chinesedocumentsalsoemphasizetheneedformajorreformsinthepowersector,speakingofa“revolutioninenergyproductionandconsumption,”the“decisiverole”ofmarketsinsettingprices,and“marketleading”theenergytransition.32Furthermore,Chinesepolicydocuments,includingthe14thFive-YearPlan,emphasizeinternationalcooperationasanimportantpillarofthetransition.ThestatedgoalsofChina’spowermarketreformsincorporatebothdecarbonizationaswellasefficientpricesignalstoimproveeconomicefficiencyofthepowersector,includingeffectiveintegrationofcleanenergy.ANovember2022spotmarketpolicydraftissuedbytheNEAsummarizes:“Thegoalofbuildinganelectricpowerspotmarketistoformelectricitypricesignalsthatreflecttimeandspatialcharacteristicsandreflectchangesinmarketsupplyanddemand,andplayadecisiveroleintheallocationofelectricpowerresources;toimprovetheregulationcapacityofThecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility5thepowersystem,promotetheconsumptionofrenewableenergy;ensurethesafeandreliablesupplyofpower;guidethelong-termplanningandinvestmentofpower;andpromotethetransformationofthepowersystemtoonethatisclean,low-carbon,secureandefficient.”Thislistofgoalsismorespecificthanthelistofprinciplesinthe2015DocumentNo.9onDeepeningReforminthePowerSector,whichincludedmaintainingenergysecurityandreliability,promotingcompetition,maintainingthepeople’slivelihood(includinglowpricesforresidentialconsumers),energyconservationandemissionsreduction,promotingtechnologyinnovation,andadheringtoscientificmanagementprinciples.33Notunreasonably,Chinahasmovedcautiouslyinadoptingreforms,pilotingeachelementinturn,usuallyatasmallscale.Analystshavenotedthatevenaftermarketinstrumentsareadopted,majorobstaclestomarketsplayingasupportingroleremain.Evenasmoremarketinstrumentscomeintoplay,thegovernmentcontinuestointroducenewadministrativecontrols,enhancingtheroleofplanningovermarkets,whileemphasizingthemarketelementsrhetorically.Provincialandotherstateactorshavewide-rangingabilitiestodesignmarketsandinterveneintheiroperationsinwaysthathindertheemergenceofshort-orlong-termpricesignals.34IfChinacontinuestopursuepowermarketreformsthatneverreachthismarketmodel,canthecountryreachahighpenetrationofrenewableenergyby2030andfullpowersectordecarbonizationby2060?Toanswerthisquestion,itisusefultoconsiderhowthegovernmenthasframedmarketreformovertime,andwhetherthishaschanged.(Foramorecompletetimelineofelectricpowermarketreforms,seethe“GuidetoChineseClimatePolicy”,chapter8.35)Overall,high-levelframingcontinuestoempWhilethepresentphaseofelectricpowermarketreformkickedoffin2015,severalimportantvisionsformarketreformsintheenergysectorprecededpowermarketreforms.ThecommuniqueissuedaftertheThirdPlenarySessionofthe18thCPCCentralCommitteeinNovember2013statedthatmarketsshouldplaya“decisiverole”intheallocationofenergyandenvironmentalresources,36settingthestageforfuturereformsinthepowersector,aswellasforcoal,oil,andgas.Marketreformsandenvironmentalpolicyshouldreinforceoneanother.In2014,XiJinpingdeliveredhis“energyrevolution”speech,inwhichhelisted“fourrevolutionsandonecooperation”:37●Arevolutioninenergyconsumption,includingcontrolsonenergyconsumption,energyefficiencyinindustry,shiftingtheeconomicstructureinanenergy-efficientdirection,andpromotingthriftyenergyconsumptionthroughoutsociety.●Arevolutioninenergysupply,includingcleanandefficientcoal;integrationofcoal,nuclear,andrenewables;andstrongerpowergrids.●Arevolutioninenergytechnology,promotinglow-carbonenergytechnologies,andpursuinginnovationintechnology,businessmodels,andintegrationofenergywithotherfields.●Arevolutioninenergymarkets,“unswervingly”promotingmarketreforms,treatingenergyasatradeablecommodity,buildingacompetitivemarketstructure,determiningpricesmainlythroughthemarket,changingthewaythegovernmentsupervisesthemarket,andimprovingthelegalstructure.●Cooperationwithothercountriesontheenergyrevolution“toachieveenergysecurityunderopenconditions,”whilerelyingmainlyondomesticenergysourcesforconsumption.Giventhisoverallguidance,relevantgovernmentbodiesmovedquicklytoinstitutereforms,particularlyinthepowersector.The2015publicationofDocumentNo.9onDeepeningReforminthePowerSectorpresentedalistofpowermarketreformswhichChinawouldeventuallyadopt–includingspotmarketsandancillaryservicesmarkets–withoutacleartimelineforadoptingthesereforms.38Ingeneral,marketreformshavemademostprogressinadoptingmid-to-long-termbilateralpowercontractsbetweenlargeconsumersandgenerators,generallyforperiodsofonemonthoroneyear.Pricingoftransmissionanddistributionhasalsobeenreformed.SpotmarketsareatthepilotphaseinroughlyhalfofC