IRENA-綠色氫拍賣：設(shè)計指南 Green hydrogen auctions A guide to design

Greenhydrogenauctions

Aguidetodesign

?IRENA2024

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ISBN:978-92-9260-617-6

Citation:IRENA(2024),Greenhydrogenauctions:Aguidetodesign,InternationalRenewableEnergyAgency,AbuDhabi

AboutIRENA

TheInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA)servesastheprincipalplatformforinternationalco-operation,acentreofexcellence,arepositoryofpolicy,technology,resourceandfinancialknowledge,andadriverofactiononthegroundtoadvancethetransformationoftheglobalenergysystem.Anintergovernmentalorganisationestablishedin2011,IRENApromotesthewidespreadadoptionandsustainableuseofallformsofrenewableenergy,includingbioenergy,geothermal,hydropower,ocean,solarandwindenergy,inthepursuitofsustainabledevelopment,energyaccess,energysecurityandlow-carboneconomicgrowthandprosperity.

Acknowledgements

ThisreportwasdevelopedundertheguidanceofRaulAlfaroPelico(Director,IRENAKnowledge,PolicyandFinanceCentre),UteCollier(IRENA)andRabiaFerroukhi(ex-IRENA).ItwasauthoredbyDialaHawila,EmanueleBiancoandAbdullahFahad(IRENA);VasiliosAnatolitis(IRENAconsultant)andFabianWigand(Tetratech).

IRENAcolleaguesAnn-KathrinLipponer,ArnovandenBos,JamesWalkerandPatriciaWildprovidedvaluablecontributions.

Inputswerealsoprovidedby:CristianCarraetto(EBRD),JosephCordonnier(OECD),JazaeerDawody(Energimyndigheten),PabloDelRioGonzalez(IRENAconsultant),DanieleDiNepi(DESNZ),JavierGarcíaFernández(EuropeanCommission),DolfGielen(WorldBank),MichelleHallack(WorldBank),EmanuelHenrich(H2Global),LeandroJanke(AgoraEnergiewende),JanKlenke(H2Global),PaulKomor(IRENATechnicalReviewer),YuryMelnikov(Mylonastar),SusanaMoreira(H2Global),RolandSchulze(EIB),EisukeTachibana(AfDB),MoeketsiThobela(AfDB)andMiguelVazquez(Bocconi).

PublicationandeditorialsupportwasprovidedbyFrancisFieldandStephanieClarke.ThereportwaseditedbyErinCrum,withdesignbyStrategicAgenda.

Forfurtherinformationortoprovidefeedback:publications@Thisreportisavailablefordownload:

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Disclaimer

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TheinformationcontainedhereindoesnotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofallMembersofIRENA.ThementionofspecificcompaniesorcertainprojectsorproductsdoesnotimplythattheyareendorsedorrecommendedbyIRENAinpreferencetoothersofasimilarnaturethatarenotmentioned.ThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofmaterialhereindonotimplytheexpressionofanyopiniononthepartofIRENAconcerningthelegalstatusofanyregion,country,territory,cityorareaorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationoffrontiersorboundaries.

GREENHYDROGENAUCTIONS|2

Contents

Figures4

Tables4

Boxes5

Abbreviations6

Executivesummary7

1Introduction12

2Greenhydrogen:Status,barriersandsupportinstruments14

2.1Hydrogenproductionanduse14

2.2Barrierstogreenhydrogenuptake16

3Auctionstosupportgreenhydrogendevelopmentanddeployment20

3.1Strengthsandweaknessesofauctionsasasupportschemeforgreenhydrogen22

3.2Typesofauctionsforthesupportofhydrogen26

4Designelementsofauctionstosupportgreenhydrogen33

4.1Auctiondemand35

4.2Qualificationrequirementsanddocumentation43

4.3Location,technologyandprojectspecifications48

4.4Winnerselection54

4.5Riskallocationandremunerationofsellers58

5Maintakeawaysandconclusions71

6Casestudies74

6.2Denmark75

6.3EuropeanUnion76

6.4Germany78

6.5India79

6.6Netherlands81

6.7UnitedKingdom82

References84

3|AGUIDETODESIGN

Figures

Figure1Selectedcolour-codedtypologyofhydrogenproduction15

Figure2Mainusesofhydrogenin202215

Figure3Illustrativeset-upofasupply-sideauctionforgreenhydrogen26

Figure4Illustrativeset-upofademand-sideauctionforgreenhydrogen27

Figure5Illustrativeset-upofadouble-sidedauctionforgreenhydrogen29

Figure6Illustrativeset-upofjointsupply-anddemand-sideauctionsforgreenhydrogen31

Figure7Frameworkforthedesignelementsofauctionsforgreenhydrogen34

Figure8Hydrogenvaluechainandrisksthatneedtobeallocatedtothedifferentplayersinthe

auctiondesign58

Figure9Hydrogenvaluechainwithgovernmentassumingelectricitypricerisk59

Figure10Hydrogenvaluechainwithgovernmentassuminghydrogenoff-takepricerisk60

Figure11Hydrogenvaluechainwithgovernmentassuminghydrogenoff-takepricerisk,infrastructure

riskandhydrogenoff-takerisk(e.g.throughagovernmentGHPA)60

Figure12ResultsoftheDanishauction75

Figure13IllustrationofpotentialaverageETSpriceandCCfDsubsidyatstrikepriceofUSD65/tCO278

Figure14CapacityandrequestedpremiumofthewinningbidsinIndia80

Tables

Table1Mainbarrierstogreenhydrogenuptake16

Table2Strengthsoftariff-basedsupportschemes(includingauctions)forgreenhydrogen22

Table3Strengthsofauctionsforgreenhydrogen23

Table4Policyobjectivesforgreenhydrogenthatcanbetargetedthroughauctiondesign24

Table5Trade-offstoconsiderwhendeterminingtheauctionedproduct35

Table6Optionstodefinetheauctionedvolume38

Table7Optionsonhowtoauctionthetotalvolume39

Table8Trade-offsconcerningtheauctionperiodicity40

Table9Optionsregardingphysicalrequirementsofelectricitysourcing41

GREENHYDROGENAUCTIONS|4

Table10Optionsregardingcontractualarrangementsofelectricitysourcing42

Table11Optionsforthechoiceofgreenhydrogenoff-taker43

Table12Implicationsofstrictdocumentationrequirements4

5

Table13Stageoftheprojectdevelopmentprocesswhentheauctiontakesplacee46

Table14Implicationsoflocalcontentrequirements47

Table15Optionsforthelocationspecificityofgreenhydrogenauctions49

Table16Implicationsoftechnology-neutralauctionsforemissionsreduction50

Table17Optionsfortechnology-specificgreenhydrogenauctions51

Table18Implicationsofsector-specificoff-takeingreenhydrogenauctions51

Table19Considerationswhilesettingminimumandmaximumgreenhydrogenproductionamounts52

Table20Considerationswhilesettingminimumandmaximumprojectsizerequirements54

Table21Trade-offstoconsiderregardingprice-onlyormulti-criteriaauctions55

Table22Implicationsofintroducingsellerconcentrationrules56

Table23Implicationsofintroducingfloorandceilingprices57

Table24Optionsofownershipmodel

62

Table25Typesofremuneration64

Table26Optionsfordefiningthecontractduration65

Table27Considerationswhiledecidingonthecurrencydenominationofthecontract

66

Table28Optionsandconsiderationsforcontractindexation

68

Table29Implicationsofstringentorlenientcompliancerules

69

Table30Optionstoallocatetheresponsibilityoftransportofgreenhydrogen70

Boxes

Box1Thelevelisedcostofhydrogen17

Box2InflationReductionActintheUnitedStates20

Box3Doubled-sidedauctions–theH2Globalinstrument30

Box4Indianauctionsforelectrolysermanufacturing

36

Box5The“Auctions-as-a-Service”mechanism

77

5|AGUIDETODESIGN

Abbreviations

AaaSAuctions-as-a-Service

BOObuild-own-operate

BOOTbuild-own-operate-transfer

CAPEXcapitalexpenditures

CfDcontractfordifference

CO2eq/kgcarbondioxideequivalentperkilogram

COP2828thConferenceoftheParties

DBFOMdesign-build-finance-operate-maintain

DKKDanishkroner

EHBEuropeanHydrogenBank

EPCengineering,procurementandconstruction

ESIAenvironmentalandsocialimpact

assessment

ETSemissionstradingsystem

EUEuropeanUnion

FIDfinalinvestmentdecision

GHGgreenhousegas

GHPAgreenhydrogenpurchaseagreements

GJgigajouleGWgigawattH2hydrogen

HAR1HydrogenAllocationRound

HBPMHydrogenBusinessProductionModel

HPAhydrogenpurchaseagreementHSAhydrogensaleagreement

IGHPindependentgreenhydrogenproducer

IMFInternationalMonetaryFundINRIndianrupees

IRA

IRENAITC

kg

kt

LCOELCOHLCR

Mt

MW

NZHFOPEXPEM

PPA

PTC

PV

R&D

RES

SDE++

OWE

SIGHT

TSOUAEUKUS

VRE

InflationReductionAct

InternationalRenewableEnergyAgencyinvestmenttaxcredits

kilogramkilotonne

levelisedcostofelectricitylevelisedcostofhydrogenlocalcontentrequirementmilliontonnes

megawatt

NetZeroHydrogenFundoperatingexpenses

polymerelectrolytemembranepowerpurchaseagreement

productiontaxcredit

photovoltaic

researchanddevelopmentrenewableenergysource

StimulationofSustainableEnergyProductionandClimateTransition

SubsidieregelingOpschalingvolledighernieuwbarewaterstofproductieviaelektrolyse

StrategicInterventionsforGreenHydrogenTransition

transmissionsystemoperator

UnitedArabEmiratesUnitedKingdom

UnitedStates

variablerenewableenergy

GREENHYDROGENAUCTIONS|6

Executivesummary

Greenhydrogenwillplayabigpartindecarbonisinghard-to-abatesectors,butitsdeploymentanddevelopmentrequirepolicysupport.Competition-basedtariffs,orauctions,canbeconsidered,takinginto

accounttheirstrengthsandlimitations.

Cleanhydrogen1accountsforabout12%ofgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsabatementin2050undertheInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency’s(IRENA’s)1.5°CScenariotodecarbonisehard-to-abatesectorsandtobeusedasfeedstockforindustrialapplications.ThebenefitsofgreenhydrogengobeyondreducingGHGemissions.Greenhydrogencanenablegreenindustrialisation,energyindependence,increasedparticipationinglobaltradeandmarkets,andjobcreation.Drivenbythesepotentialbenefits,policymakersareincreasinglyembarkingonambitiousplanstosupportthedevelopmentofgreenhydrogenintheirjurisdictions.AsofMay2024,52countrieshadahydrogenstrategyorroadmapinplace,52%ofwhichareemerginganddevelopingeconomies.

Competitivepublicprocurement–orauctions–isemergingasatooltopromotegreenhydrogenproductionanduse.Auctions–likealltariff-basedsupportschemes–offerlong-termrevenuecertainty,allowforlong-termbudgetaryplanningandenablemovingforwardonthetechnologylearningcurve.Inaddition,thecompetitivenatureofauctionscanenabletruepricediscoveryandtherevelationofafeasibleremunerationfortheproducersandthewillingnesstopayoftheconsumers,therebyminimisingtheoverallcostofpublicsupport.Auctionsalsoprovideaclearpipelineoffutureprojects,providetransparencyintheselectionofprojectsandthelevelof

supporttheyreceive;theycanensuretimelydeliveryofwhatispromisedinthebids,andtheycanbedesignedtoachievebroaderpolicyobjectivesforgreenhydrogendeploymentortoaddressspecificbarriers.

1Forthepurposeofthisreport,“cleanhydrogen”referstoboth“blue”and“green”hydrogen.Forthecolor-codingmeaning,pleaserefertoFigure1

7|AGUIDETODESIGN

However,auctionsaresuccessfulinbringingdownpricesonlyifthereissufficientcompetition.Inaddition,thepricepressureresultingfromauctionscanleadtoprojectsnotbeingrealised,thesectorbeingcompressed,andpotentiallyaninabilitytoinvestininnovationandtechnologicalimprovement.Forsmallerproducers,theupfrontresourcesneededtotakepartintheauctionwithouttheguaranteeofwinningacontractmaydetertheirparticipation,reducingcompetitionandposingdisadvantagesforsmallandmedium-sizedbusinesses,whichimpactsthemarketliquidityandgoalofdevelopinganupstreamhydrogensectorwhensuchagoalisset.Thesenegativerepercussionscanbeavoidedthroughtailoredauctiondesign.

Therearedifferenttypesofauctionstosupportgreenhydrogen,withvaryinggeographicreach.

Auctionscanbehelddomestically,i.e.off-takersandproducersarewithinthesamecountryborderssuchasinIndia;regionally,i.e.off-takersandproducersarewithinthesameblocsuchastheEuropeanHydrogenBankauction;andinternationally,i.e.off-takersandproducerscanbeanywherewithinthedesignatedcountriessuchastheH2Globalauction.Therearefourtypesofauctions.

Insupply-sideauctions(subjectofthisreport),thecompetitiontakesplacebetweenhydrogenproducers.Supply-sideauctionsaimatscalingupelectrolysercapacityandtheproductionofgreenhydrogen(oritsderivates).Theyareparticularlysuitableincaseswherethereisgoodpotentialforrenewableenergysourcesandlogisticalcapabilities.Theycanreflectthesettargetsinastraightforwardway.

Indemand-sideauctions,hydrogenconsumerscompeteforsupport.Demand-sideauctionsmaycreateincentivesforhydrogenimports,asthesupportedendusersmayoptforimportinghydrogen(orderivatives)fromothercountriesratherthanfromdomesticproducers.Whilesuchaprocesscouldresultindecarbonisingindustries,itwouldnotdirectlyleadtothedevelopmentofadomesticgreenhydrogensector.Demand-sideauctionsarerelativelyeasytoembedinacountry’sindustrialpolicy,aspolicymakerscantargetspecificend-usesectors.

Double-sidedauctionsandjointsupply-anddemand-sideauctionsaimtosupportboththesupplyanddemandsidesmostlythroughmatchmakingthehydrogenproducerswiththeconsumers.Bycompetitivelyselectingsuppliersofferinggreenhydrogenatthelowestpriceaswellasthoseoff-takerswiththehighestwillingnesstopayfortheproduct,thepricedifferencebetweensupplyanddemandthatneedstobecoveredthroughfundsoftheintermediaryisminimised.Jointsupply-anddemand-sideauctionsareasubsetandsimplificationofthedouble-sidedauctionwherebybidshavetoincludehydrogensupplyandoff-take.Thistypeofauctiontypicallyrequireson-sitehydrogenproductionanddemandconsortiawhichareoftenphysicallyco-locatedorincludethetransportinfrastructure.

GREENHYDROGENAUCTIONS|8

Greenhydrogenauctionsshouldbedesignedinawaythathelpsdeliverthepolicyobjectivespursuedinthenationalgreenhydrogenstrategy.

Drawinguponlessonslearntfromrenewablepowerauctions,2thisreporthasbeendevelopedtoguidepolicymakersinthedesignofauctionstodeploygreenhydrogentoachievedefinedpolicyobjectives,recognisingtheopportunitiesthisinstrumenthasforencouragingprojectdeveloperstosubmithigh-qualitybids,andpromotetransparencyandfaircompetitionintheallocationofsupportorcontracts,whileminimisingtheresourcesusedtosupportdeployment.

Policyobjectivesthatmaybepursuedincludeachievingclimateandenvironmentalgoals;developingalocalgreenhydrogeneconomywithlocalisedvaluechainstoenhanceenergysecurityorparticipateintheinternationaltradeofgreenhydrogenanddiversifyenergyexports;andattractingforeigninvestmentsinenergy-intensiveindustriesandsupportingtheirinternationalcompetitiveness.

Iftheprimaryaimistodecarboniseeconomiesatthelowestprice,countriesorjurisdictionscouldconsiderdesignelementsthataimforlowestpriceandreducedcostofsupportsuchas:technology-neutralauctionsthatfavouronlythelowest-pricetechnologies,winnerselectioncriteriabasedonpriceonly,andtheintroductionofaceilingpriceabovewhichbidswouldnotbeconsidered.SuchapproacheswouldbeunlikelytosupportthedevelopmentoflocalvaluechainsbutcouldsuitcountriessuchasJapanandtheRepublicofKorea,whicharelikelytofocusonimportsratherthanin-countryproduction.

Countriesorjurisdictionsthatwanttodecarbonisewhilesimultaneouslyincreasingenergysecuritythroughlocalgreenhydrogenproduction(e.g.China,India)mightconsiderascheduleofauctionstoattractinvestmentsinupstreamactivities,auctionsthataimatdevelopingspecifictechnologies,andwinnerselectioncriteriaandqualificationrequirementsaimedatlocalcontent.Provisionstoavoidmarketconcentrationmayalsobeconsideredtoencouragenewplayersandacceleratehydrogenmarketliquidity.

Countriesorjurisdictionswithamplerenewableenergy,landandwaterresourcesthatwouldliketoengageininternationalhydrogentrade(e.g.Morocco)mightconsiderdesignelementsthataimforcompetitivepriceswhilesupportinginnovationandindustrialdevelopment.Designelementstoconsiderincludedenominatingthecontractsinhardcurrencyorincludingindexationclausestoinflation.

Itshouldbenotedthatdomesticvaluecreation,industriallinkages,technologicallearningandpermanentemploymentaremorelikelytobeachievedwhengreenhydrogenisproducedforlocaluses,i.e.fordecarbonisingthedomesticeconomyandforpromotinggreenindustrialisation,asplannedinNamibia,Türkiye,UruguayandtheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE).Countriesinthiscategorycanbenefitfrombuildingupagreenheavyindustryandexploitingtheirearly-moverpotentialintheinternationaltradeofgreencommodities.Inthiscase,auctionscanbeorganisedforprocuringgreenproducts(e.g.greensteel,greenammonia)tocreatemorevalueindownstreamactivities.

2IRENAhasproducedanextensivebodyofknowledgeonthetopicthatcanbefoundat

/Energy-Transition/Policy/

Renewable-Energy-Auctions

.

9|AGUIDETODESIGN

Auctionsshouldalsobedesignedinawaytoaddresschallengesandbarrierssuchasthoserelatedtosystemintegrationofvariablerenewableenergyandhydrogentransport.

Incountrieswithhighsharesofvariablerenewableenergy(VRE),auctiondesigncanaimatsupportingsystemintegration.Oneexampleissite-specificauctionswherebylocationsareselectedsuchastoavoidelectricitygridconstraintsorthosethatprovideguidanceintheformofincentives/requirementstoguidesitingtoorawayfrompre-determinedzoneswithlowerintegrationcosts.Inliberalisedpowermarkets,selectingprojectsbasedonpriceonlywhileavoidingelectricityprice-basedsupportlevelindexationcanleadtothelowest-priceprojectsbeingdesignedtoproducewhenrenewableelectricityischeapest,leadingtoahighersystemintegration.Settingamaximumamountofannualfull-loadhoursforelectrolysersoramaximumamountofsupporthydrogencanalsobeanoption.

Toaddressbarriersrelatedtogreenhydrogentransport,auctionscanbedesignedtoprocurederivativesorgreenproducts,ortheycanallocatethecostsandrisksassociatedwithtransporttothepublicentityfacilitatingtheauction.

Regardlessofotherpolicypriorities,auctionsshouldbedesignedinawaytoensureenvironmentalandsocialsustainabilityandshouldadheretotheconceptofadditionality.

Underqualificationanddocumentationrequirements,proofofprojectsustainabilityandsocialcontractscanensurethattheprojectsselectedsatisfysocialandenvironmentalsustainabilitycriteria.Theseincludeproofofbalanceduseoflandandwaterresourcesincludingcrediblearrangementstoaccesswaterresourcessustainably,proofofalandleaseagreement,andpassinganenvironmentalandsocialimpactassessment(ESIA).Socialcontractsinthecontextofgreenhydrogenproductionprojectsprimarilyrevolvearoundthewelfareoflocalcommunitiesandcanvarydependingonthespecificcontext,asthoseimplementedinChileandSouthAfrica.Theyincluderevenue-sharingagreements,jobopportunitiesforcommunitymembersandinvestmentsincommunitydevelopment,suchasimprovedhousingandhealthcarefacilitiesforcommunities.Thesecriteria