農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全論文基于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制的進(jìn)化博弈分析

農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全論文基于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制的進(jìn)化博弈分析【中文摘要】農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全不僅關(guān)系到人們的軀體健康、生命安全,也關(guān)系到國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)展、社會穩(wěn)固,各國政府都專門重視農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全咨詢題。但近年來,從三聚氰胺到地溝油再到瘦肉精,安全事件的多次發(fā)生反映了農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全的形勢相當(dāng)嚴(yán)肅。一邊是國家有關(guān)法律法規(guī)的持續(xù)出臺,多個部門的聯(lián)合監(jiān)管,對農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全的高度重視,一邊是層出不窮的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品(食品)安全事件,講明生產(chǎn)者沒有盡到社會責(zé)任,監(jiān)管者沒有做好本職工作,講明現(xiàn)有的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全監(jiān)管體系還不夠完善,需要改進(jìn)。農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是政府履行農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全監(jiān)督治理職能的基礎(chǔ),是農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營者自控的準(zhǔn)繩,是判定農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全的依據(jù),是開展農(nóng)產(chǎn)品產(chǎn)地認(rèn)定和產(chǎn)品認(rèn)證的依據(jù),更是各級政府部門開展例行監(jiān)測和市場監(jiān)督抽查的依據(jù)。本文以農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的約束為前提,作為管制的依據(jù),研究什么樣的市場環(huán)境造成農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)者群體與政府監(jiān)管部門的現(xiàn)狀,什么樣的市場鼓舞能夠促使生產(chǎn)者更好的遵循農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。本文的主體內(nèi)容有三個部分：(1)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制的理論依據(jù)；(2)通過進(jìn)化博弈分析研究促使農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)者和政府監(jiān)管部門向主動方向演化的阻礙因素；(3)通過案例分析研究發(fā)生農(nóng)產(chǎn)品(食品)安全事件的緣故。通過分析得到如下結(jié)論：(1)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)者方面,減少生產(chǎn)者執(zhí)行農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時的成本,加大監(jiān)管力度,加大對消極執(zhí)行農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)企業(yè)的懲處力度,增加顯現(xiàn)安全事故時企業(yè)的處罰額度、賠付額度,將有利于企業(yè)向主動執(zhí)行農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)方向演化。(2)監(jiān)管部門方面,加大對消極監(jiān)管的監(jiān)管人員的處罰力度,減少主動監(jiān)管時的成本費(fèi)用,有助于監(jiān)管部門向主動監(jiān)管部門方向演化。管制的是通過改變農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)者和政府監(jiān)管部門的成本收益比進(jìn)而改變兩者關(guān)于執(zhí)行農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和監(jiān)管的主觀態(tài)度,促使他們向社會期望的方向轉(zhuǎn)化。在上述分析和已得結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了完善我國農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全監(jiān)管體系的計(jì)策建議,要緊包括四個方面：一是降低生產(chǎn)者主動執(zhí)行農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的成本；二是完善農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)體系和檢測體系；三是如何對監(jiān)管者進(jìn)行監(jiān)管；四是給予消費(fèi)者監(jiān)督足夠的重視。【英文摘要】Agriculturalproductsqualitysafetytowhichgovernmentshaveattachedgreatimportancenotonlyrelatedtopeople’shealth,lifesafety,butalsotothecountry’seconomicdevelopment,socialstability.Butinrecentyears,fromthemelaminetothewasteoilandthentoclenbuterol,therepeatedoccurrenceofsecurityincidentsreflectsthesituationofagriculturalproductsqualitysafetyisquitegrim.Therelevantlawsandregulationsrollingout,thejointsupervisionofseveraldepartments,greatimportanceattachedtoagriculturalproductsthequalitysafety;whiletheendlessstreamofagriculturalproducts(food)securityevents,indicatesthatproducersarenotdoingsocialresponsibility,regulatorsdidnotdotheirjob,thatexistingagriculturalproductsqualitysafetysupervisionsystemisnotperfect,needsimprovement.AgriculturalproductqualitysafetystandardsisthefoundationoftheGovernmenttofulfillthefunctionsofagriculturalproductqualitysafetysupervisionandmanagement,isthecriterionofself-controlofproducersandoperatorsofagricultural,abasisforjudgingthequalityandsafetyofagriculturalproducts,basistocarryoutagriculturalproducecertificationandproductcertification,evenmorebasisforgovernmentdepartmentsatalllevelstocarryoutroutinemonitoringandmarketsupervisionandinspection.Thispaper,withtheconstraintsofagriculturalproductsqualityandsafetystandardsasaprecondition,astheregulationbasis,researcheswhatkindofmarketenvironmentcausingthesituationofagriculturalandgovernmentregulators,whatkindofmarketincentivestoencourageproducerstobetterfollowagriculturalproductqualitysafetystandardsMaincontentofthisarticlehasthreeparts:(1)thetheoreticalbasisofagriculturalproductqualitysafetyregulation;(2)Byevolutionarygameanalysisresearchtheinfluencefactorstopromoteagriculturalproducersandgovernmentregulatorsevolvedtothepositivedirection;(3)Throughcasestudiesthecausesofagriculturalproducts(food)securityincidents.Thefollowingconclusionsbyanalyzing:(1)Onagriculturalproducers,toreducethecostsoftheproducersimplementingqualityandsafetystandardsofagriculturalproducts,tostrengthensupervisionandtoincreasethepunishmentofnegativeimplementationofagriculturalproductqualitysafetystandards,toincreasethepenaltyamountandcompensationamountofenterpriseswhensecurityaccident,,willhelpenterprisestoevolvetothedirectionofactivelyimplementingagriculturalproductqualitysafetystandards.(2)Onregulators,toincreasethepunishmentofthenegativeregulators,toreducethecostofactivemonitoring,willhelpregulatorstoevolvetothedirectionofactivelymonitoring.Purposeofregulationisbychangingthecostbenefitratiooftheagriculturalproducersandgovernmentregulatorsthustochangethesubjectiveattitudefortheimplementationofagriculturalproductsqualitysafetystandardsandregulation,urgingtheirconversiontothedirectionofsocialexpectations.Inthebasisofaboveanalysisandresults,putsforwardthecountermeasuresandsuggestionsforsupervisionsystemofagriculturalproductsqualitysafety,mainlyincludingfouraspects:reducecostsofproducersactivelyexecutivestandardofproducequalitysafety;perfectstandardsystemandinspectionsystemofproducequalitysafety;howtomonitorregulator;givesconsumerssupervisionandenoughattention.【關(guān)鍵詞】農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)化博弈【英文關(guān)鍵詞】AgriculturalproductsqualitysafetyRegulationStandardEvolutionaryGame【名目】基于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制的進(jìn)化博弈分析

摘要

4-5

Abstract

5-6

1導(dǎo)論

9-16

1.1研究背景與意義

9-11

1.1.1研究背景

9-10

1.1.2研究意義

10-11

1.2研究目的與研究內(nèi)容

11

1.2.1研究目的

11

1.2.2研究內(nèi)容

11

1.3概念界定

11-14

1.3.1標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

11-12

1.3.2農(nóng)產(chǎn)品

12

1.3.3無公害農(nóng)產(chǎn)品、綠色食品、有機(jī)食品

12-13

1.3.4農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

13-14

1.3.5管制

14

1.4研究方法與技術(shù)路線

14-15

1.4.1研究方法

14-15

1.4.2技術(shù)路線

15

1.5可能的創(chuàng)新之處與不足之處

15-16

1.5.1可能的創(chuàng)新之處

15

1.5.2不足之處

15-16

2文獻(xiàn)綜述

16-21

2.1農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)研究

16-17

2.1.1農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)體系研究

16-17

2.1.2具體農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)研究

17

2.2農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全生產(chǎn)者行為研究

17-18

2.3農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全政府行為研究

18-19

2.4博弈及進(jìn)化博弈在管制方面的應(yīng)用

19-20

2.5簡要評述

20-21

3農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制的理論依據(jù)

21-24

3.1信息不對稱理論

21-22

3.1.1理論簡介

21

3.1.2信息不對稱與農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制

21-22

3.2外部性理論

22

3.2.1理論簡介

22

3.2.2外部性與農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制

22

3.3交易成本理論

22-24

3.3.1理論簡介

22-23

3.3.2交易成本與農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全管制

23-24

4農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)者生產(chǎn)行為與政府監(jiān)管行為選擇的博弈機(jī)理

24-27

4.1農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全中生產(chǎn)者現(xiàn)狀與政府監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀

24

4.2農(nóng)戶的生產(chǎn)行為及阻礙因素

24-25

4.3企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)行為及阻礙因素

25

4.4政府的監(jiān)管行為及阻礙因素

25-26

4.5農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)者與政府監(jiān)管部門行為選擇的博弈機(jī)理

26-27

5農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全生產(chǎn)者行為的進(jìn)化博弈分析

27-37

5.1進(jìn)化博弈概述

27-28

5.2農(nóng)戶生產(chǎn)行為的進(jìn)化博弈分析

28-30

5.2.1差不多假設(shè)

28

5.2.2支付分析與穩(wěn)固點(diǎn)分析

28-29

5.2.3小結(jié)

29-30

5.3企業(yè)生產(chǎn)行為的進(jìn)化博弈分析

30-34

5.3.1差不多假設(shè)

30

5.3.2支付分析與穩(wěn)固點(diǎn)分析

30-31

5.3.3考慮賄賂情形下企業(yè)生產(chǎn)行為進(jìn)化博弈分