南非國(guó)際事務(wù)研究所（SAIIA）：非洲的新冠肺炎疫情宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策應(yīng)對(duì)系列23：貝寧和多哥的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)韌性

COVID-19

MACROECONOMIC

POLICYRESPONSES

INAFRICA

23

MacroeconomicResilience

inBeninandTogo

lanHeffernan&SalaviComlanApollinaire-Fabrice

IDRC·CRDI

Canada

AboutCoMPRA

TheCOVID-19MacroeconomicPolicyResponseinAfrica(CoMPRA)projectwas

developedfollowingacallforrapidresponsepolicyresearchintotheCOVID-19

pandemicbytheIDRC.Theproject’soverallgoalistoinformmacroeconomicpolicy

developmentinresponsetotheCOVID-19pandemicbylowandmiddle-income

countries(LMICs)anddevelopmentpartnersthatresultsinmoreinclusive,climate-

resilient,effectiveandgender-responsivemeasuresthroughevidence-basedresearch.

ThiswillhelptomitigateCOVID-19’ssocialandeconomicimpact,promoterecovery

fromthepandemicintheshorttermandpositionLMICsinthelongertermfora

moreclimate-resilient,sustainableandstablefuture.TheCoMPRAprojectwillfocus

broadlyonAfricancountriesandspecificallyonsixcountries(Benin,Senegal,Tanzania,

Uganda,NigeriaandSouthAfrica).SAIIAandCSEA,astheleadimplementing

partnersforthisproject,alsoworkwiththinktankpartnersinthesecountries.

OurDonor

ThisprojectissupportedbytheInternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre(IDRC).TheIDRCisaCanadianfederalCrowncorporation.ItispartofCanada’sforeign

affairsanddevelopmenteffortsandinvestsinknowledge,innovation,andsolutionstoimprovethelivesofpeopleinthedevelopingworld.

Recommendations

Benin

?Beninshouldcloselymonitorandsignificantlyreduceitsdebt-to-GDPlevelsduringthenext

periodofsustainedeconomicgrowth.Althoughthislevelofdebtmaybeacceptableatthe

presenttime,loweringthedebt-to-GDPratiowillallowthegovernmenttoborrowmoreeasilyandatalowerratetofinancespendingduringfuturecrises.

?Beninshouldworktowardsincreasingitstaxbasebyincentivisingfirmstomoveintotheformalsector.Thiswouldallowthegovernmenttousefiscalpolicymoreefficientlyduringcrisesandalsoreducedebtduringperiodsofeconomicgrowth.

?Benin’straderelationswithNigeriashouldbeimproved.Thiscanbeaccomplishedby

improvingmonitoringofgoodsandservicescrossinglandborderswiththespecificaimofreducingre-exports.

Togo

?Togoshouldimplementgovernancereforms.AllofthenationalcrisesinTogohavebeen

associatedwithuncertaintyregardingthecountry’spoliticalinstitutionsanditisdifficultto

implementcounter-cyclicalpoliciestooffsetthenegativeimpactofgovernancecrisesonGDP.

?Creatingmoreinclusivepoliticalandeconomicinstitutionscouldhelptopreventpoliticalcrisesfromarising.

?Togoshouldcloselymonitorinflationandmaintainalowgrowthrateinthemoneysupply.Contractionarypolicymayberequiredtopreventfurtherincreasesininflation.

Executivesummary

ThispolicybriefingprovidesacomparativeanalysisofthemacroeconomicresilienceofBenin

andTogotoendogenousandexogenousshocksoveratwenty-yearperiodfrom2000to2020.Bothcountrieshaveexperiencednumerousshocksoverthisperiod;however,asmallselectionofshocksineachcountryhaveindeedresultedinnegativegrowth.Theoverridingreasonfor

analysingtheimpactoftheseshocksistoprovideinsightstopolicymakersonhowbestto

enhanceresilienceinthetwocountries.TogoandBeninarecomparedastheyareneighbouringfrancophonecountriesofasimilarsizewedgedbetweenAnglophoneregionalpowerhouses

GhanaandNigeriainWestAfrica.BothcountriesarealsomembersofECOWASandWAEMU.Togohasbeenbesetbygovernancecrisesformostoftheperiod,whereasBeninhasenjoyedamuchgreaterlevelofpoliticalandeconomicstability.Nonetheless,itisinterestingtonotethatBenin,becauseofitsgreaterintegrationwiththeregionalandglobaleconomy,hasbeenmoresignificantlyimpactedbyshocksasdemonstratedbyitsvolatileGDPgrowthperformance.

Togo’seconomicperformance,incomparison,hasbeenlargelyshieldedbyitskeyexport,

phosphates,whichhasstrengtheneditsabilitytoapplycounter-cyclicalpoliciestosmooththeimpactofshocksonitseconomicperformance.

3MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

Introduction

Togoisclassifiedasalow-incomecountry.Itisoneofthepoorestcountriesintheworld,ranked195thof214countrieswithaGDPpercapitaof$918.4in2022.1Benin,incontrast,wasreclassified

asalower-middle-incomecountryin2019fromitsformerlow-incomestatusbytheWorldBankandhadaGDPpercapitaof$1,303.2in2022.2Figure1displaystherelativesizeofthetwo

countriesintermsoftheirpopulationandGDPin2020.Beninisslightlybigger,bothinterms

ofpopulationandGDP,butgeographicallyalmosttwicethesizeofTogo.WhenconsideringthecompositionofGDPinthetwocountries,weseeinFigure2thatbotharenetimportersandthecountrieshavesimilarratiosofconsumption,governmentspendingandinvestmenttoGDP.

Inbothcountries,theservicesectorisbyfarthelargestsectorandrepresentedapproximately

50%ofdomesticproductionin2022.3Bothcountries’exportsarenotverydiversified.Togo’s

largestexportsaremineralsandrepresentapproximately50%ofexports.4Benin’slargestexportiscotton,whichrepresentsapproximately65%ofexports.5Bothcountrieshavehighlevelsof

povertywith38%ofthepopulationofBeninand45%ofTogo’spopulationlivinginpovertyin2018.6

Figure1PopulationandGDPinBeninandTogo

Togo4201539

Togo

8442580

GDP

2020($)

Population

2020

Benin

8705923

Benin

12643123

Sources:TheWorldBank,/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BJ-TG;TheInternationalMonetaryFund,https://data.imf.org/?sk=4c514d48-b6ba-49ed-8ab9-52b0c1a0179b

1TheWorldBank,‘GDPpercapita(currentUS$)–Togo,Benin|Data()’,/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=TG-BJ.

2TheWorldBankGDPperCapita;RepublicofBenin,MinistryofEconomyandFinance,Communique,‘Beninisnowamiddleincomecountry’,Benin,7March2020.

3TheCentralBankofWestAfricanStates,‘GDPanditsComponentsatNominalValues’.

4UnitedNations,UNComtradeDatabase,/.

5UnitedNations,UNComtradeDatabase.

6TheWorldBank,‘PovertyHeadcountRatioatNationalPovertyLines(PercentofPopulation)–Togo,Benin’.

4MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

TOGO

Figure2CompositionofGDPinBeninandTogo(2020)

-5%

-485257,58

24%

2297387,56

10%

989055,23

61%

5904737,37

BENIN

-8%

-390000,00

20%

992098,83

11%

570400,00

61%

3029040,17

Consumption

Government

Investment

Netexports

Source:TheInternationalMonetaryFund,/?sk=4c514d48-b6ba-49ed-8ab9-52b0c1a0179b

ThenatureofmacroeconomiccrisesinBeninandTogo

Thispaperdistinguishesbetweennationalcrisesthatoriginatewithinthecountryandregional/globalcrisesthatoriginateoutsidethecountryandaffecttheregionand/ortheworld.Themostprominentregional/globalcrisesobservedinBeninandTogoincludethe2008globalfinancial

crisis,extensivefloodinginWestAfricain2010,theoutbreakofEbolain2014inbothcountries,

andtheglobalCOVID-19crisisof2020.BeninandTogowerenotseverelyaffectedfromahealthperspectivebyeitherCOVID-19orEbola,andneithercountryhadasinglecaseofEbola,butbothcountrieswereaffectedbytheglobaleconomicconsequencesofthepandemics.

NationalcriseswhichaffectedBeninduringthisperiodincludeatradedisputewithNigeria

in2005andpoliticalinstabilityinthecountrysurroundingtheunsuccessfulimpeachmentof

PresidentBoniYayibecauseofhisallegedinvolvementinaPonzischemein2010.7Thetrade

disputewasduetoNigeriaincreasingthenumberofprohibitedgoodsthatcouldbeimportedinanattempttolimittheamountofgoodsbeingreimportedfromBeninintoNigeria.8National

crisesinTogoduringthisperiodwerealmostentirelytheresultofpoliticalinstabilityrelatedto

7Reuters,‘BeninpresidentaccusedofroleinPonzischeme’,/article/benin-swindle-idUSLDE67I1RP20100819/.

8AfricanDevelopmentBank(AFDB),‘BeninCountryStrategyPaper2005-2009’,/en/documents/document/2005-2009-benin-country-strategy-paper-12963.

5MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

Realgrowthrates

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

thecountry’spoliticalinstitutionsandelectionsoccurringrespectivelyin2000,2004,2010,2012and2020.Politicalinstabilitywasparticularlyevidentfrom2004,priortothedeathofpresidentGnassingbéEyadémain2005,whowascontroversiallysucceededbyhissonFaureGnassingbéEyadémaafterabriefinterregnumfollowinghisfather’sdeath.

Figures3and4plottheevolutionofGDPpercapitagrowthinBeninandTogo.Theredshadedareasrepresentnationalcrisesandtheblueareasrepresentregional/globalcrises.Overall,

Benin’seconomicperformancewasmorevolatileasitwasseeminglymoreexposedtoglobal

andregionalshocksthanTogo’seconomy.Itisnoteworthythatoverthesametimeperiodbotheconomiesappearedtobecomemoreresilienttoexogenousandendogenousshocks.InBenin,theeconomydidnotexperiencenegativegrowthratesafter2014whereasinTogo,thecountrydidnotexperiencegrowthfrom2007to2019.

Figure3Benin:EvolutionofGDPpercapita

0,05

0,04

0,03

0,02

0,01

0

-0,01

-0,02

Crisis3

Natural

disasters

Crisis2

Global

financialcrisis

Crisis1

Monetaryshocks

NATIONALREGIONALREGIONALREGIONALREGIONAL

Crisis6

COVID-19

NATIONAL

Crisis4

Financialcrisis

Crisis5

Ebola

Source:TheCentralBankofWestAfricanStates,GDPanditsComponentsatNominalValues,/rapportPredefini.php

6MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

Realgrowthrates

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Figure4Togo:EvolutionofGDPpercapita

0,06

0,04

0,02

0

-0,02

-0,04

-0,06

NATIONAL

Crisis1

Presidentialelections

NATIONAL

Crisis2

Presidentialelections

REGIONAL

Crisis3

Global

financialcrisis

REGIONAL

Crisis4

Naturaldisasters

NATIONAL

Crisis5

Presidentialelections

REGIONAL

Crisis6

Ebola

REGIONAL

Crisis8

COVID-19

NATIONAL

Crisis7

Presidential

elections

Source:TheCentralBankofWestAfricanStates,GDPanditsComponentsatNominalValues,/rapportPredefini.php

Table1Averagegrowthratesduringcrisisperiods

GDP

Consumption

Government

Investment

Exports

Benin

-0.35%

-1.82%

4.25%

-1.52%

-7.98%

Togo

-0.34%

-1.12%

2.70%

-1.05%

-4.10%

Source:TheCentralBankofWestAfricanStates,GDPanditsComponentsatNominalValues,/rapportPredefini.php

ThecrisesinthetwocountrieshadvaryingimpactsonthecomponentsofGDP.Table1presentstheaveragegrowthrateofthecomponentsofGDPduringtheperiodsofcrisis.InbothBenin

andTogo,consumptionwasnegativelyaffectedduringperiodsofnegativegrowth.ConsumptiondeclinedslightlymoreinBeninthaninTogo(approximately2%and1%respectively).However,

therewasasharpcontrastbetweenthetwocountrieswithrespecttogovernmentspending.ThegrowthrateofgovernmentspendinginBeninwas4.25%duringperiodsofnegativeGDPgrowth.ThiswasconsistentwiththegovernmentofBeninimplementingcounter-cyclicalgovernment

spendingtooffsetthenegativeeffectsofthecrises.InTogo,alowergrowthrateofgovernmentspendingduringtheseperiodswasapparent.Finally,weobservethatinvestmentandexports

weremorenegativelyaffectedinBeninduringperiodsofcrisesthaninTogo.

7MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

Governmentexpenditurepercapita(Growthrate)

Taxrevenuepercapita(Growthrate)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Generalgovernmentnetlending/borrowing(%ofGDP)

Figures5and6showfiscalpolicyresponsetoeconomicfluctuationsinBeninandTogo

respectively.Thefiguresplotthegrowthratesoftaxrevenueperpersonandgovernment

expenditure.Alsoincludedinthefiguresisnetlending/borrowingasapercentageofGDP.In

Benin,taxrevenuetendedtodeclineduringperiodsofcriseswhilegovernmentexpenditure

increasedbeforedecreasingfollowingcrises.Thisreflectsresponsiblefiscalpolicymaking.Also

notethenegativegrowthrateintaxrevenuein2012inBenin.Thiscouldbeexplainedbya

reformtocustomsproceduresatthePortofCotonouthatcauseddiversionsoftradetoports

inneighbouringcountries.9Thereformsincluded‘(i)aone-stopwindowatthePortofCotonou;(ii)anenhancedimport-value-verificationprogram;and(iii)acustoms-valuationsystembasedonactualtransactionalvalues’.10ThegovernmentofBeninrespondedresponsiblybyreducing

expenditureproportionally.Consistentwiththeoverallexpenditurepattern,government

Figure5Benin:Taxrevenue,governmentspendinganddebttoGDP

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

-0,1

-0,2

NATIONAL

Crisis1

Monetaryshocks

REGIONAL

Crisis2

Global

financialcrisis

NATIONAL

Crisis4

Financialcrisis

REGIONAL

Crisis3

Naturaldisasters

REGIONAL

Crisis5

Ebola

REGIONAL

Crisis6

COVID-19

-2

-3

-1

1

0

-4

-5

Taxrevenuepercapita(Growthrate)

Governmentexpenditurepercapita(Growthrate)

Generalgovernmentnetlending/borrowing(%ofGDP)

Sources:InternationalMonetaryFundDatamapper,/external/datamapper/profile/BEN;UnitedNationsGovernmentRevenueDataset,/content/grd-data-download

9InternationalMonetaryFund,‘Benin:ThirdReviewUndertheExtendedCreditFacilityArrangement’,

/view/journals/

002/2012/099/article-A001-en.xml#A01fig02.

10IMF,Benin:ThirdReview.

8MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

Governmentexpenditurepercapita(Growthrate)

Taxrevenuepercapita(Growthrate)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Generalgovernmentnetlending/borrowing(%ofGDP)

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

-7

-8

Figure6Togo:Taxrevenue,governmentspendinganddebttoGDP

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

-0,1

-0,2

-0,3

-0,4

NATIONAL

Crisis2

Presidentialelections

NATIONAL

Crisis1

Presidentialelections

REGIONAL

Crisis3

Global

financialcrisis

REGIONAL

Crisis6

Ebola

REGIONALNATIONAL

Crisis4Crisis5

NaturalPresidential

disasterselections

NATIONAL

Crisis7

Presidential

elections

REGIONAL

Crisis8

COVID-19

Taxrevenuepercapita(Growthrate)

Governmentexpenditurepercapita(Growthrate)

Generalgovernmentnetlending/borrowing(%ofGDP)

Sources:InternationalMonetaryFundDatamapper,/external/datamapper/profile/BEN;UnitedNationsGovernmentRevenueDataset,/content/grd-data-download

netlendingdecreasedduringcrisisperiodsandincreasedafterwards.Thissuggeststhatthe

governmentuseddebttofinancestimulusspendingduringcrisesandactivelyattemptedto

reducethestockafterwards.However,itshouldbenotedthatdebtstockhadsteadilyincreasedfrom2007andacceleratedduringthepandemic.Thiscanbeseenbynetlendingwhichhad

beennegativeforalmosttheentiresampleperiod.Anegativenetlendingpositionimpliesthatthegovernmentisborrowing.However,grossdebtremainedlowfortheregionat52%ofGDPin2023.ItisimportantfortheBeningovernmenttomakesurethatitremainssustainable.11

11InternationalMonetaryFund,‘CentralGovernmentGrossDebt’,/external/datamapper/GGXWDG_NGDP@WEO/BEN?zoom=BEN&highlight=BEN.

9MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

Inflation,consumerprices(Annual%)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Moneysupply(Growthrate)

1,00

0,80

0,60

0,40

0,20

0

-0,20

ForTogo,governmentspendingtendedtobeprocyclicalduringperiodsofnationalcrises.

Thegrowthratedecreasedduringallnationalcrises.Duringregionalcrises,governmentspendingwaslesspredictable.Theonlyclearexampleofcounter-cyclicalgovernmentspendingduring

regionalcriseswasduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,whichsawalargeincreaseinthegrowthrateofgovernmentspending.Inaddition,taxrevenuetendedtobeaffectedbynationalcrisesmore

thanbyglobal/regionalcrises.Withtheexceptionofthepresidentialelectionsin2018,allnationalcriseswereassociatedwithanegativegrowthrateintaxrevenue.Forglobal/regionalcriseswe

sawanegativegrowthratefortaxrevenueduringthefloodingin2010andduringtheEbolacrisis.

Asfornetlending/borrowing,thisappearstohavebeenrelativelyunrelatedtobothnationalandglobal/regionalcrises.Fortheperiod2008to2016,netlendingdeclineddramatically.

Thisindicatesthatthegovernmentspentmorethantherevenueitgenerated.Netborrowing

increaseddramaticallypriortothe2018nationalcrisis,whichindicatesarelativelybalanced

budgetwithnetlendingbeingclosetozero.Finally,netlendingdecreaseddramaticallyduringtheCOVID-19crisisasaresultofincreaseddebttofinancecounter-cyclicalgovernmentspending.

Figure7Benin:Moneysupply(M1)andinflation

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

REGIONAL

Crisis3

Naturaldisasters

NATIONAL

Crisis1

Monetaryshocks

REGIONAL

Crisis4

Ebola

REGIONAL

Crisis2

Global

financial

crisis

NATIONAL

Crisis4

Financial

Crisis

REGIONAL

Crisis5

COVID-19

Inflation,consumerprices

Moneysupply

Source:AfricanDevelopmentBankSocioEconomicDatabase,1960–2022,/nbyenxf/afdb-socio-economic-database-1960-2022#.

10MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

Inflation,consumerprices(Annual%)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Moneysupply(Growthrate)

0,8

0,7

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

-0,1

Next,weconsiderthemonetarypolicyresponseinthetwocountriesbyexaminingthegrowth

rateofthemoneysupply(M1)andtheinflationrate.InBenin,moneygrowthtendedtoincreaseduringcrises,withtheonlyexceptionbeingthenaturaldisastersin2010wherethemoneysupplydeclined(Figure7).Theexpansionsinthemoneysupplygenerallyinducedlargefluctuationsin

inflationalthough,sincethebeginningof2014,inflationhasbeenmuchmorestable.

InTogo,theresponseofmonetarypolicytocriseswaslessconsistentthanhadbeenthecaseinBenin.Duringthefirst,secondandthirdpresidentialelections,andtheCOVID-19pandemic,monetarypolicywasexpansionary(Figure8).

Figure8Togo:Moneysupply(M2)andinflation

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

REGIONALREGIONALNATIONAL

NATIONAL

Crisis1

Presidentialelections

REGIONAL

Crisis6

Ebola

REGIONAL

Crisis8

NATIONAL

Crisis7

NATIONAL

Crisis3

Global

financialcrisis

Crisis4

Naturaldisasters

Crisis5

Presidentialelections

Crisis2

PresidentialCOVID-19elections

Presidential

elections

Inflation,consumerprices

Moneysupply

Source:AfricanDevelopmentBankSocioEconomicDatabase,1960–2022,/nbyenxf/afdb-socio-economic-database-1960-2022#

Inaddition,thegrowthrateofthemoneysupplywasquitehighduringtheglobalfinancialcrisis.Agrowthrateofapproximately20%from2006to2009wasmaintained.Finally,weobserve

counter-cyclicalmonetarypolicyduringtheEbolacrisis.Followingthesecondcrisisassociatedwiththepresidentialelection,expansionarymonetarypolicycausedlargeincreasesininflation.Duringthefinancialcrisis,alargeincreaseintheinflationratecouldalsobeobserved.Inlateryears,inflationappearstohavebeenbettermanagedwithexpansionarymonetarypolicynot

11MacroeconomicResilienceinBeninandTogo

leadingtolargeincreasesininflation.However,thistrendappearstohavebeenbrokenfollowingtheCOVID-19pandemic(notshowninthefigure).In2022,inflationreached7.6%followingtheexpansionarymonetarypolicyduringtheCOVID-19crisis.12

12InternationalMonetaryFund,‘InflationRate,AverageConsumerPrices’,/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/