德國發(fā)展研究所DIE：貿(mào)易自由化、IMF援助的條件性以及發(fā)展中國家的替代政策

FacultyofManagementresultsshowthatstructuraladjustmeeffectivelyloweredtariffswithouNTMs.Atypicalthree-yearprogramcontainingconditionalitydecreasedtariffreducedNTMinitializationssignifforcountrieswithoutpreviousgreaterglobalizationeffthanbeinga"catalyst"forongoingliberalAcrosstheworld,countrieshaveliberalizedtradepolicyitrieshavedecThisisanopenaccessthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttributreproductioninanymedium,providThisisanopenaccessKyklos.2023;1-29./journal/kykl22ow-andmiddle-incomecountriesreducedaveragetariffperiod.2Whereastariffrateshavecomedowndynamicknownastradepousethemforprotectionistpurposes(Aisbett&PearsAsforthedriversoftradepolicyliberalization,prevfactors.Studiesexamined,forexample,theeffectsofeconomicEasterly,2001;Falveyetal,2012;Pitlik&Wirth,2003),thespreadofpoWeymouth&Macpherson,2012),anddemocetal,2000;Milner&Kubota,2005).Alongstrandofacountry'stradepolicythatcoEsteve-Pérezetal.,2020;Rose,2004;Subramanian&Wei,2007;Tomzetal.,2007),intematiomentsinbilateralorregioWhiletheseextemalfactormechanismsinthefaceofalimitedpolicyspacethroughtarifflple,thatreducingthetariffovappliedMFNtariffrates,increaframeworktoshowthattariffcutsductionofNTMs.ThiswasInparticular,theIMFinccountriesthatwentthroughtimesofeconomiccrisis.Whiletheseprogramsablebalanceofpayments,IMFprogramstypicallyalstheadjustmentprocess.BeforetheIMFstreamlinecalsectorandexternaldebtissareas.Theseprogramsfrequentlyalsocontainedvarioustracountries,theenforcementofpoliciesthatrecipienreceivedmuchcriticismthat,inhaveinvestigatedundesiredsocialoutcomesofSAPs(forexampleetal.,2019;Lang,2021;Reinsbergetal.,2019).Moreover,condimentcanact.Forexample,Reinsbergetshipofimplementedrefetal,2016).Nevertheless,theIMFhascons2Thoughtarifflevelsindevelopingcountri3WeuseGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)andWorldTradeOrganization(WTOreadability,thetermWTOreferstobo4Seealsolrwin(2023)foradisaussionoftherelevanceofthe3BUSSEandVOGEL3Sofar,fourstuditries,theyindludeSAPsasactheSachs-Wameropennessmeasure.Incontrasttodevelopingcountriesto1992-1donotfindasignificantimpactoftheItothispaper'sinvestigatioimportflows.However,theeffectsarehighlydependentont1990s.Theauthorsmakeuseoftquatelypredicttheprogram,however,theandsafeguards.TheyconcludethattheIndiangobeenexhaustive.Firstly,incontrasttostudiesthatimpactofIMFtariffcondit(HS-6-digit)ontrade,tariffs,andNTMinitializationtoinvestigatNTMsinacross-countrytime-seriesdimensionatahighlydisaggregatedproductlevRegardingtheoutcomeopingcountries,eventhpartofSAPsanddiscusstriesinoursampleweresubject4tariffconditionswerespecified.InSection3,weexplainourempiricalidentificationstrategyquentchapters,namely,thePartlyduetoseveretradedeficits,negativeterms1970sand1980s,manydevexchangecontrolsormultipleexchangerates,andexchangerateovervaluations.Ifsuchaprogconditionality,thecountrycouldreducetariffsandNTMswithoutwoness.TheFund,therefore,(indirectly)contributedtotradeliberalgramsincludedconditionalitydeinoursamplebecauseofmorefrequentgapsinthdynamicforoverallconditionalityandconsider1993-2007asthemoconditionalityin2005to2009.FollowingtheIMFstreamlinopenedtheireconomiesforinternatio(Broome,2015;KentikelenisetevolutionofappliedMFNtariffshavedecreasedconsidenocleartrendforNTMinitializationsisvisibletthisdescriptiveviewoftariftradepolicysubstitutiononthemicrol6Before1993,disaggregatedtariffandtradedataarenotavaMFendeditslstprogramwithtariffconditions.globaleconomicandfinancialcrisis(Evenett&Fritz,2020).TableA2showsalistofthesecountriesandallcountriesofourIMF(2021b)orthedatasetofK8NotethattheaverageappliedMFNtariffrateforalldevelopingmainreasonforthedeviationisthatnotallcosampletosample.Sinceouran5OYeartotariffconditionalityHowever,weobservesomefirstdeofNTMinitialization.Figure2depictstinitializations,representedbythedashedline,before,(especially)duringSAPtariffconditionality,theevolutionoftheintrodtionsample,asignificantspikWhilemanyIMFprogramswithatariffcomponentlastedabbroadergroups.Wedistinguishbetweenthefollowingcategories:(1)structuraltationofregionalpreferentialtariffagreetariff,(5)reductionsoftariffsforspecificproductsorproductgroups,and(6)unspecstructuraltariffschedulereformsusuallyreferstoconffagreementsaresubjecttoconditnity.InthecaseofBurundiiextemaltariffoftheEastAfricanCommunittection(IMF,2021b).ConditionalityinSAPscomesinthr46735,0Dowtkwedfnmhapsdhmlieluaywlddmikkl1ztsbyCacrechaa,wilyonlntLhharya46735,0Dowtkwedfnmhapsdhmlieluaywlddmikkl1ztsbyCacrechaa,wilyonlntLhharya6NTMinitializationsAvg.appliedMFNFIGURE2Dynamicsoffourprogramyearsbecauseofthelimitedobservaconditionality,andt+irepresentsyearsfollowingtariffconditionality.SeeTableA1fordatasouties.Whilenon-compliamightalsotaketheformofstructuralbenchmarks,whicharetheweakestform.Non-implemferentformsofbindingnessaveragetariffrates,andthenumberoftarifflines.Furthermore,prioractionswethemaximumtariff.PerformancecriteriamainlAsanexampleofSAPwithtariffadjustmentconditions(IMF,2000).TheIMFffsonchemicals,steel/metal,fishery47335,nnownksled47335,nnownksledfmhupxshmlictmyw………126hycàtmahna,wiuymnltnsLay…8022whlsohèTmxandcndíitnthipsytmlinsifhmy.wlym能mmsomwilgyonhctaaryírnktafh0眾d很『以加神火神飛排心的67FIGURE3Frequencyofdifferentconditionalitytsample'sthreeIMFcToanalyzethetradepolicyeffectsofIMFproducts.WeprefertoanalyzetheeffectsoftariffconditionalityotercapturestheimpactofIMFtariffconditionalityandadentificationstrategy,webeginwithaneInitializationkt-1+d'.ATariffut=βo+β?·TCkx+β?·SAPt+β?Initializationkt-1+d'.initializedinaparticularHS-6-digitcountry-product-yearlevel,respoccuratthislevelofdisaggregation(Gawande&Bandyopadhyay,2000;Goldberg88Helpman,1994;Milner&Mukhernegativesign.Thecoefficition,weaccountforindiretion(Dreher,2009).Wecanthusdistinguishtheconditionalityeffectsfromthe“sofbecauseofalackofcomparabltargetedtowardstariffconditionality,whiperiodoftheUruguayround.Duringmtheirtariffrates.However,toaccountforthistypAsforthecountry-produsafety-valvetypeeffects(Moore&ZaNTMsmightalsoinducetarifaswellastimelagsregardingtonlyincludecountriesthathavereportedNTMsatleastonce.Hence,waccountforacountry'spopulationsiincludefour(dummy)variablesonthebalanceofpInthesecondpartofourinvestigation,weexaminetradepolicysubstitutionematealinearprobabilitconditionality.Inthiscase,thecoefficientcouldbeinterpret10fweextendthetimespanoftheWTOAccessiondummytofirstthreearfouryears12Moreexplicitly,thecontrolstesteda46735,aDowtkwdedfm46735,aDowtkwdedfmhapsdhmlieluaywlddmikk1ztsbyacrechaa,wilyonlntLaynlawczolsahtTamsncdshmliltay.wlliansonwilgyonhetharyírnktafh;0眾d很『加神利火神公排心的69constantlyusedintheliterature(see,forexample,Oreftationisquitechallengingforthislevelofdisaggregateddata.TheuseoflogisticmodelswouldreduceoffixedeffectsthatcotionthataddressespossibleendogeneityisnoteffectswithfixedeffectsoftePr(NTMInitializationat)=Bo+β?·TCu+β2·SA+β4·△Tariffikt-1+d·Xit+V·Zweffectscausaltotariffcondititionalitydummyitselfshowchangesinaparticulartariffline.Therefore,thiscoefficientwouldcaptbecauseofendogeneity.highertradeprotectiontoaffecttariffconditioinstrumentalvariable(IV)approach.Morespecifically,theappliedshift-shacommonshockmeasureandweightsforthe(Borusyaketal,2022;14still,wetriedtouseallinformationavailableandattem47535,anownksedfomhapsymliethmywlynhkrzmyatmana,wiuymntne47535,anownksedfomhapsymliethmywlynhkrzmyatmana,wiuymntneconsistsoftheIMFliquiditymultiplTheshiftingpartisweightedwiththeexposureshares,whicharetyduringthesampleperiodinthisconoftreatmentwithtariffconditionalityduringthesample.Country-specificcharweightedbytheprobabilityointeractionofanexogenouswithanendogenousvariablegivesforSAPparticipation.ThismeansthatwecanonlyinterprtheinitializationofNTMsascATarifu=Po+β?·FCu+β2·SAPE+β3·NTMInitializotiPr(NTMInitializationt)=β+β·TC×△Tarifft-1+β4·△Tariffkt-1fC=λo+λn(IMFLiquidityt×wherefCatistheinstrumentedvaluefortariffcondiuidliabilitiesforyeart,andTCisthecoWeconstructthetariffconditionalitydummybased15SeealsoStubbsetal.(20forNTMdatalimitations)andthesamplereducesto90developingcBUSSEandVOGELKYKLOS-WILEYaidoutbyGaulierandffs,sinceIMFconditionalityisaimedatthegeneralstructureofacountry'observedvalue.Withoutthisinterpolation,oursample'stotalnLikeallothervariables,ouridentificationappro(Evenett&Fritz,2020)constituteasignificaasearlyasoursample.FutextsinforcegabyGhodsietal.(2017).Thisconsensusthatnon-technicalmeasurescangoods.Ifso,tradeflowscTheTemporaryTradeBarriersDatabasecoverstemporandcountervailingduties.Thewiiwdatasetoffersthizedinourinterpolatedestim8,797toSTCsoftechnicalbarrierstotrade,1,859tosafeguarfewtotariff-ratequotas.NoSPSmeasurewassubjeWhileoursampleperiodcoversaconsiderablenumberofSAPscontainingtaricannotbegeneralizedforthe(1and4)showtheresultsfortheoriginaltariffseri6)refertotheresultsfortheinterpolof0.532percentagepointsperyear(fixed-effectsregrotherindirecteffectsAsfortheIVregressions,wepresetionregardingthetariffconditinstrumentedvariableata10%levelformsiontotheWTO,countrsomewhatsmallerthantariffconditionality,anconsistentwithourexpectatCountry-productandtimefixedeffectscapturingvarioustime-invariantandtime-spectingcomparativeadvantageinaparticulargSincetariffinterpcations.Tocalculatetheoverallimpactofa22Notethatwehavetotaketheresul24Wealsorunregressionswithtradelevels,growthratesasadditionaloraternativeexplanatoryva47335,nnownhdedfmhusmictmyw………12myàtmàhna,wiuymnlnLy…8022whl47335,nnownhdedfmhusmictmyw………12myàtmàhna,wiuymnlnLy…8022whlsohTmxandcndtthhmnchhmywlmwmwàncndihns)mmwiuymninLihryfùrnkxofuw;onaniclsnggvmmdhyhenplkhk公心miwcmmanxuKYKLOS-WILEYsasizablequantitativeeimpactcalculation.FortheIVresultswithouttariffinterpolation(column4),wherebothvarsignificant,wecannotaddthemtogethertocalculatetheirjointcausalimpactontariffreductions.FortSAPvariable.Ofcourse,thisdoesnpreviouscalculationsofthesourcesoftarifflevelreductionsindevetion),GATT/WTOcommitmentregressionwithinterpolatedtariffdata.Butt6-digittarifflinessincetheinteractithecoefficientofSAPparticipationdominatesthetariffconditionalitmustbetakenwithcautionasficientsforthechangeinthetariffvarprobabilityrefertoasingleHS-6-digitline.Calculatisticallysignificant.TheimportandexportsharevariaWeaccountforthisformofpolicyreversalbyexaminingthedynathisisequaltotheusualprogra27NotethattheKleinbergen-PaapFStatisticissignalingaweakinstrumentationfortheIofthefirststageinTableA5(appendix)rejectsthehypothesisofendogeneityfor22Wecalculatethisnumberbymultiplyingthenumberofobservationsubjectto4.Tariffconditionalityandtheinteractionbetweentariffconditionalityandthechangeintar47335,nnownhdedfmhusmictmyw………12myàtmàhna,wiuymnlnLy…8022whlso47335,nnownhdedfmhusmictmyw………12myàtmàhna,wiuymnlnLy…8022whlsohTmxandcndtthhmnchhmywlmwmwàncndihns)mmwiuymninLihryfùrnkxofuw;onaniclsnggvmmdhyhenplkhk公心miwcmmanxuKYKLOS-WILEYObservationsNotes:Timeandcountry-productfixedeffectsarealwaysincl*p<.1,**p<.05,and***p<.01.ikelywiththeincreasednumberofcoefficientstoincludeNTMdata.Forbetterreadabilityofthistableandthefo"wms……………m…………mwisolmr……t………………… "wms……………m…………mwisolmr……t…………………-WILEY-KYKLos-46735,0Dowtkwedfnmhapsdhmlieluay.wl.46735,0Dowtkwedfnmhapsdhmlieluay.wl.TariffInterpolationNotes:Timeandcountry-productfixedeffec*p<.1,**p<.05,and***p<.01.Themostsignificantdifferenceisthcientsfortheinteractionrepresentingdirectpolicysuweexploretheeffectsforthedifferentcategoriesofconditionalitycomesintheformofprioffconditionspecifiedasaperformanofconditionality,prioractionsshowsome0.577percentagepointAsthesecondextension,weinvestigatewhethertariffconditionalit“catalyst”thatacceleratesongoingtradeliberalizationprocesses.WeusedataoanalyzethisquestionbyGyglietal.(2019Wemodelthelatestglobalizationeffortstractthesamplemeanofthechangesinde-factoeconomicglobalizationfromcountries'five-yearchangeaccountingforglobaltrendstowardsfreetrade.Table5showstheresultsforourmainvariablesofint山 *p<.1,**p<.05,and***p<.01.TABLE5Extension-globaliNotes:Timeandcountry-productfixedeffectsandallcon心Wefindnorobustdifferencefortariffchangesofmoreglobalizingcountries.InteresubjecttotariffconditionalityduringanSAP.WeconcludethattariffconditionalitFinally,asrobustnesscTableA6.Wedropthevariableeconomi(Wooldridge,2010).Overall,theloconditionalityonchangesintradepoliingthemainresultsofouranalysis,wefindourresultsregardingtheeffectivenessofinstitutions.ThesecondoneThethirdlimitationreferstothedriversresultsindicatethatteralizationreformswhereuordrivingtradeliberalizationinmanydevelopingcountriiberalizationindeveAsforfutureresearchareas,itwouldbeworthwhiletocomplementourfindingswithccasestudies.WhilethereisagenermantlingvariesconsiderablyatthecoudriversoftradeliberalizThedatathatsupportt/0000-0002-047Abouharb,M.R.,&Cingranelli,D.L.(byWTOmembers.CrawfordSchoolResearchPapersNo.12-13.AustralianNationalUniversity./10.2139/Aisbett,E.,&Silberberger,M.(2021).Tariffliberalizationandproductstandards:RegRegulation&Governance,15(3),987-1006./10Allee,T.L.,&Scalera,J.E.(2012).ThedivergenteffectsofjoininginternatioWTOaccession.InternationalOrganization,66(2),243-276./10.1017/S0020818312000082Ballard-Rosa,C.,Carnegie,A.,&Gaikwad,N.(2018).EcoScience,48(3),713-748./10.1017/S00071234Barari,S.,&Kim,I.S.(2022).Democracyandtradepolicyatthe/insong/www/pdf/poltrade.pdfBeghin,J.C.,Disdier,A.-C.,&Marette,S.(2015)tonon-tariffmeasures.CanadianJournalofEconomics,48(4),1513-1Beverelli,C.,Boffa,M.,&Keck,A.(2019).Tradepolicysubstitution:TheoryandevidenceBiersteker,T.J.(1995).regionalresponse:Thenewinternationalconteorg/10.1017/CBO97811391Boockmann,B.,&Dreher,A.(20nalofPoliticalEconomy,19(3),633-649./10.1016/S0Borusyak,K.,Hull,P.,&Jaravel,X.(2022).Quasi-experimentalshift-shareresearchdesign89(1),181-213./10.1093/restBown,C.P.(2016).TemporarytradebarriersdatabasBown,C.P.,&Tovar,P.(2011).Tradeliberalization,antidumping,aBroome,A.(2015).Backtobasics:Thegreatrecession/10.11tion,26(1),169-196./10.11130/jei.201CEPII.(2021).BAClTradeDataset.CEPII.Retrievedfromhttp://www.cepiiChang,P.-L.,&Lee,M.-J.WTOtradeeffect.JournalofInternationalEconomics,85(1),53-71Chang,P.-L.,&Lee,M.-J.Coate,S.,&Morris,S.(2006).Policyconditionality.InG.Ranis,J.R.Vreeland,&S.Kosack(Eds.),RRoutledge./10.4324/9780203323Cruz-Gonzalez,M.,Fernández-Val,l.,&Weidner,M.(2017).Biascorrectionsforprobitandlogitmodeffects.StataJournal,17(3),517-545./10.1177/153Disdier,A.-C.,&Fugazza,M.(2020).Aprac/10.18356Drazen,A,&Easterly,W.(2001).Docrisesinducereform?SimpleemPolitics,13(2),129-157./10.1111/1468-0343.Dreher,A.(2009).IMFconditionality:Theoryandevidence.PublicChoice,141(1-Esteve-Pérez,S.Gil-Pareja,S.,&Llorca-Vivero,R.(2020).DoestheGATT/WTOpEvenett,S.J.,&Fritz,J.(2020).Theglobaltradealertdatabasehandboo/Uploads/web/GTA%2BhanFalvey,R.,Foster,N.&Greenaway,D.(2012).Tradeliberalization,economiccr2177-2193./10.1016/j.worlddev.20Feinberg,R.M.,&Reynolds,K.M.(2007).Tariffliberalisationandquo.TheWorldEconomy,30(6),948-961./10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.0Forster,T.,Kentikelenis,A.E,Reinsberg,B.,Stubbs,T.H.,&King,L.P.(2019).Howstructuraladjustmentproginequality:AdisaggregatedanalysisofIMFconditionality,1980-2014.SocialScienceResearch/10.1016/jssresearcGaulier,G,&Zignago,S.(2010).BACl:Internationaltradedatabaseattheproduct-lWorkingPaper2010-23./10.2139/ssrn.1994500Gawande,K,&Bandyopadhyay,U.(2000).Isprotectionforsale?Evidencenousprotection.ReviewofEconomicsandStatistics,82(Ghodsi,M.,Grübler,J.,Reiter,O.,&Stehrer,R.(2017).Theevol1155./10.1Goldsmith-Pinkham,P.,Sorkin,I,&Swift,H.(Review,110(8),2586-2624./10.1257/aer.20Greene,W.H.(2012).Econometricanalysis((7thed.)Review,84(4),833-850.ofReview,84(4),833-850.ofPdliticalEconomy,68(uGründler,K,&Hillman,A.L(2021).Ambiguousprotection.European/10.1016/j.ejpolecGygli,S.,Haelg,F.,Potrafke,N.,&Sturm,J.-E.(2019).TheKOFglobalisationindex-Organiz