市場營銷渠道分析中英文對照外文翻譯文獻

中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯)譯文：營銷渠道的環(huán)境特性摘要：由斯特恩和瑞文(1980)提出的比較分析營銷渠道特性的政治經(jīng)濟學框架主要集中于渠道成員之間的關(guān)系。這篇文章通過指明環(huán)境因素如何影響渠道擴展了政治經(jīng)濟學的框架與斯特恩和瑞文原文結(jié)合，為研究營銷渠道的區(qū)域綜合性基礎(chǔ)理論提供了更為廣泛的基礎(chǔ)。關(guān)鍵詞：營銷渠道，成員，環(huán)境因素根據(jù)比較分析營銷渠道特性的政治經(jīng)濟學框架，我們可以就其內(nèi)部的經(jīng)濟(如內(nèi)部經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)和流程),它的內(nèi)部政治,即內(nèi)部的社會政治結(jié)和過程，內(nèi)部經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)可以說是連接兩個交易渠道成員的交易形式。例如,任何雙邊關(guān)系的垂直經(jīng)濟安排，從市場調(diào)節(jié)到分等級的交易。由內(nèi)部的社會政治結(jié)構(gòu)內(nèi)力確定兩個渠道成員的權(quán)利依賴關(guān)系模式定義，從最小權(quán)利到平衡權(quán)利到不平衡權(quán)利再到集中權(quán)利。內(nèi)部的社會政治過程就主導情緒(例如,合作和/或沖突)進行了描述。就如列出政治經(jīng)濟學框架的文章所說，去完成這個框架的剩下任務(wù)就是去識別交換的內(nèi)部動力以外的變量和影響因素，就是對環(huán)境特征的結(jié)構(gòu)和過程有著最大影響力的因素，并且指出這些外部的因素是如何以理論的形式被組織的。渠道環(huán)境的重要性沒有被研究渠道的理論和研究方法很好的反應(yīng)出來。那些可能影響外部渠道的決定，外部環(huán)境因素已經(jīng)有了相關(guān)參考資料，但是缺乏對外部變量和其影響進行深入調(diào)查。本文提出了環(huán)境的框架可以加上處理框架與地方之間的相互作用。然而在進行下一步之前，一些變量和預覽可以避免讀者理解和欣賞的局限性，我們試圖最大限度的占領(lǐng)所有的關(guān)鍵環(huán)境變量。本文提出了一種框架,而不是一個理論。一個框架可以被看作是第一步在識別主要變量影響社會過程的實體，它主要是試圖把變量和實體互動。所以這個框架不是理論，準確地說，它的目的是幫助個人研究，以便他們能在一個系統(tǒng)和特定的方向出現(xiàn)一個占主導地位的理論。這里將介紹框架之上的六種基本宗旨，(a)雙方或“配對”的交流所代表的事物分析的基本結(jié)構(gòu)單位;(b)環(huán)境感知差距對焦點可以分段在小學和中學的任務(wù)環(huán)境和一個宏觀環(huán)境;(c)小學次要任務(wù)環(huán)境感知差距可以被劃分為輸入、輸出、競爭和監(jiān)管部門;(d)原有政治經(jīng)濟學框架可應(yīng)用于研究焦點之間主要任務(wù)特性環(huán)境的相互作用;(e)次要環(huán)境最能夠描述某些“定性”維度配對如何影響交流;(f)通過發(fā)展自己關(guān)注的焦點和二次任務(wù)的感知差距對環(huán)境描述顯現(xiàn)宏觀環(huán)境的影響。一系列說明性的命題均包括在如何提供一些線索框架可能用來預測的潛在來源。這篇文章一直保持在一個無所不包、范圍極其寬廣的目的框架。雖然犧牲了細節(jié)和一些只有被暗示或引用的概念，但客觀上大功告成。一個環(huán)境不確定性如何在營銷渠道雙邊關(guān)系中影響交易環(huán)境的主張是：P1:營銷渠道雙邊關(guān)系的目標環(huán)境的輸入和輸出的不確定性越高，對于提高調(diào)和雙邊關(guān)系水平所要做出的努力就越大。力量均衡。最初增加了的協(xié)調(diào)性對于渠道成員來說能夠更加有效的應(yīng)對和吸收外部的不確定性。似乎在經(jīng)濟的進程中雙邊調(diào)停在力量均衡的改變上改變了。一個個體在面對高不確定性時會轉(zhuǎn)向依靠能夠有效的應(yīng)對外部不確定性的個體。同樣地，如Pfeffer和Salancik所說，在整個系統(tǒng)中一種資源有效性的評論越多，那種資源供應(yīng)的不確定性越大，限制使用這種資源的可能性也就越大。當對輸入和輸出環(huán)境不能直接控制時，通過精致的信息系統(tǒng)發(fā)展監(jiān)督目標環(huán)境來達到類似的控制效果。這樣一個不確定的輸入和輸出環(huán)境信息系統(tǒng)的成功發(fā)展在組織管理系統(tǒng)時會改變渠道雙邊關(guān)系的權(quán)利結(jié)構(gòu)。P2：較高的不確定性,在輸入或輸出的任務(wù)環(huán)境部門的營銷渠道框架越大,提高水平的垂直全局協(xié)調(diào)差距也越難。權(quán)力平衡。協(xié)調(diào)是提高垂直通道啟動的參與者能應(yīng)付更有效的吸收和控制不確定性(?？松璭tal.1971年)。因此看來,改變力量平衡(政治結(jié)構(gòu))的差距居中調(diào)停,應(yīng)該先于改變經(jīng)濟進程。單位面臨高度不確定性將變得越來越依賴于單元,可以更有效地應(yīng)對不確定性下的焦點。同時,正如普費弗和Salancik(1978)觀察,更重要的是對環(huán)境資源的營銷渠道框架:一個框架有效運作整個系統(tǒng)用于比較分析和更多不確定該資源的供給,更有可能是各國將努力使該資源的可用性控制。當直接控制的輸入或輸出環(huán)境是根本不可能達到的,近似控制可以通過開發(fā)一個精心制作的信息系統(tǒng)來監(jiān)控相關(guān)行業(yè)的任務(wù)環(huán)境。成功開發(fā)這樣一個信息系統(tǒng)對不穩(wěn)定的輸入或輸出的環(huán)境可以改變權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)渠道框架中贊成方的管理系統(tǒng)。P3：根據(jù)環(huán)境的不確定性，方向變化中渠道雙邊的力量平衡是由它的成員是否能夠應(yīng)對資源的不確定性而決定。此外，該方向在力量變化上也決定集中化的方向規(guī)劃、協(xié)調(diào)和決策過程。觀點P1通過P3的探索，投入產(chǎn)出的不確定性會對intradyadic行為產(chǎn)生影響。類似的協(xié)調(diào)可能會發(fā)生在渠道雙邊的邊界。例如，向前或向后縱向協(xié)調(diào)。協(xié)調(diào)行動的方向取決于不確定性出現(xiàn)在哪個部門。P4；營銷渠道的雙邊關(guān)系的輸入或輸出部門的不確定性越高，雙邊關(guān)系和其他渠道成員間建立的聯(lián)系就越緊密。如果不確定性出現(xiàn)在輸入方面，就要嘗試向后縱向協(xié)調(diào)。P4是延伸了湯普森的論點，即組織通過他們最依賴的環(huán)境中的元素找尋力量。外形不確定性可能會減少使用承包、鎮(zhèn)壓或合并，所有這一切會使組織之間加強協(xié)調(diào)。垂直權(quán)利下方。如果級別沖突阻撓有效形成的區(qū)域和extradyadic協(xié)調(diào)機制，并且仍存在不確定性，合體就很可能分散或移動"寬松"的關(guān)系。這通常意味著，分銷商將會減少對最初的雙邊合作伙伴的依賴，生產(chǎn)商也會開始雇傭多個渠道的分銷商來減少他們的依賴性。P5：如果在輸入、輸出部門的不確定性環(huán)境下不能被吸收、協(xié)調(diào)或者應(yīng)對，功能失調(diào)的水平?jīng)_突將會升級，同時雙邊關(guān)系也可能會變?yōu)?寬松"的關(guān)系。不明朗因素所產(chǎn)生的競爭和監(jiān)管部門可能會被認為是側(cè)向力對渠道雙邊產(chǎn)生影響。水平競爭的不確定性可以定義的一些影響列示在圖2中。例如，競爭對手越多，他們的能力越強，競爭越激烈，雙邊關(guān)系競爭部門的不確定性就越高，除此之外，其他條件都是相同的。有關(guān)理論允許微調(diào)投入產(chǎn)出分析中產(chǎn)生的命題的不確定性。例如，P1表明的不確定性因素會增加渠道雙邊關(guān)系的沖突情緒。另一方面，橫向競爭的不確定性實際上可能會為渠道雙邊帶來更少沖突和更多合作的情緒。競爭威脅很可能使渠道雙方將目標轉(zhuǎn)向共同的敵人，從行為科學研究來看他是著名的，是更具凝聚力的。P6：營銷渠道雙邊關(guān)系工作環(huán)境中競爭部門的不確定性越高，雙邊關(guān)系合作的水平就越高。從不同的角度看，處理競爭中的不確定性可以滿足渠道雙邊關(guān)系任務(wù)環(huán)境部門的兩個類型的渠道戰(zhàn)略。一種策略是通過增加垂直整合以滿足競爭的挑戰(zhàn)，至少也能使凝聚力增強。一個行業(yè)中現(xiàn)存的公司可以通過（1）協(xié)調(diào)來控制原材料以減少競爭的不確定性，比如說礦和油；（2）協(xié)調(diào)并提前聯(lián)系零售銷路，比如說選擇加油點；（3）要與營銷渠道的最終消費者緊密相連，比如關(guān)注健康運送系統(tǒng)。另一種可用的策略是競爭者搜尋合作的機會，即使有時公共的政策會束縛競爭者之間合作的實現(xiàn)，有智慧的人也能找到克服這種限制的辦法。然而，后一個策略是更有價值的，因為它提出了以渠道雙方自治的行為標準、規(guī)范來對抗競爭的限制。P7：如果營銷渠道雙邊關(guān)系的工作環(huán)境在競爭部門的不確定性不能被直接協(xié)調(diào)吸收，那每一個渠道水平都應(yīng)該和競爭者建立較緊密的聯(lián)系。輸入、輸出以及競爭部門的不確定性可能會使渠道成員在雙邊交換中采用新的策略來增加他的力量。但是這種力量的相繼使用以及雙邊的教唆也會經(jīng)常受到特殊法律及規(guī)范的約束。一般來說，處理規(guī)范的部門時應(yīng)付不確定性，操控外部的依賴可能在面對渠道雙邊關(guān)系時有一個評論的范圍。在圖表2中來自規(guī)范化的部門的不確定性可以被定義為列示出來的可變性。因此，雙邊環(huán)境中的可變的、集中的、不同的規(guī)范組織越多，規(guī)范環(huán)境的不確定性可能就越大。如果規(guī)范的確定性和不確定性被認定為是規(guī)范能力來規(guī)范和約束它的確切事情，那么不確定性對于雙邊行為的影響很可能在輸入、輸出和競爭部門都是不同的。這是因為環(huán)境壓力對于威脅的協(xié)調(diào)和綜合的回應(yīng)在不遵守事件中可能起到發(fā)現(xiàn)和準許的作用。如果由于不同的和可變的規(guī)范化的環(huán)境成為不確定的，渠道成員在規(guī)范和沖突需求之間最好冒不必要的險。P8：規(guī)范化環(huán)境越確定，回應(yīng)規(guī)范化需求的合作、協(xié)調(diào)、整合雙邊行為的可能性就越大。然而，營銷渠道雙邊關(guān)系不是消極的接受他們工作環(huán)境中的規(guī)范部門的勢力。限制渠道活動的規(guī)范化壓力和行為通常被渠道雙邊關(guān)系的政治行為和政黨聯(lián)合行為反對。規(guī)范化環(huán)境越不確定，有效地橫向協(xié)調(diào)和政治行為的機會就越多。P9：在規(guī)范的不確定性下，營銷渠道雙方會對他們的工作環(huán)境的輸入、輸出和競爭部門漸漸感興趣。工作環(huán)境的一個部門的組織會衍生出工作環(huán)境中其他部門的組織來面對外部的不確定性。這種現(xiàn)象可以解釋為補償力量，但是在那種市場社會化、社會控制政治經(jīng)濟利益的多元論者的社會中也可以被看作是一種正常的現(xiàn)象。當規(guī)范化在性質(zhì)上占主導地位時，以規(guī)范化為目標的成員會通過規(guī)范的交換關(guān)系直接影響規(guī)范機構(gòu)。在大多數(shù)國家中，這種交換關(guān)系似乎越來越普遍了。P10：如果營銷渠道雙邊關(guān)系的工作環(huán)境的規(guī)范化部門的不確定性不能被聯(lián)合行為吸收，營銷渠道雙方就會與規(guī)范化機構(gòu)建立更緊密的聯(lián)系。結(jié)論SternandReve提出的營銷渠道的比較分析政治經(jīng)濟框架是以渠道雙邊關(guān)系的內(nèi)部互動為核心的。在這篇文章中，最初的框架是考慮了環(huán)境因素對雙方的結(jié)構(gòu)和過程的影響。由于與其相關(guān)的一些概念化的和方法論化的難題，尤其是在一些以經(jīng)驗為根據(jù)的研究中，后一話題被大大的忽視了。但令人充滿希望的是，在這篇文章中這個被改進了的框架將會使這個話題更易駕馭、更易理解。在此已提出環(huán)境可分為初級、二級以及宏觀環(huán)境，更進一步可分為輸入、輸出、競爭性的和規(guī)范化的部分。初級環(huán)境中的成員是直接交換的雙方。這種互動形式下，SternandReve的政治經(jīng)濟框架是適用的。但由非交換因素引起的外部力量卻需要一個更高水平的理論研究。這篇文章已經(jīng)指出，宏觀組織行為的范例對概念和理論的應(yīng)用在研究其他外部力量對雙邊行為的影響上似乎是有用的。這篇文章以不確定的概念為例，其解說性的主張是先進的。在某種意義上，這篇文章所提出的論題可能不是最新穎的。但期望那些對組織理論熟悉的讀者也能對文章中提出的一些概念和一些無爭議的主張感到熟悉。這個框架的目的不是為了令人大吃一驚，而是將一些相對有進步的觀點與特定的營銷渠道文章緊密的結(jié)合起來并能使其能夠被全面的理解。從這一點來看，在內(nèi)部政治經(jīng)濟框架的交點處應(yīng)該會看到他的初步貢獻。按照其主張，注意力應(yīng)該放在環(huán)境力量對渠道雙邊關(guān)系的結(jié)構(gòu)和進程的影響上，很明顯這是因為通常研究的最終目的是提出更加有效的處理營銷渠道關(guān)系方法。通過對這些關(guān)系的管理，雙邊的能力將會得到提高。這個全面的框架與SternandReve先前提出的相結(jié)合可以用來解決與渠道能力有關(guān)的很多尚未解決的問題。比如說，高水平的環(huán)境不確定性最終導致其協(xié)調(diào)性增加，那么這種協(xié)調(diào)會采取哪種形式，怎么完成這種協(xié)調(diào)才能達到最佳的效果呢？那種力量失衡、沖突頻繁的協(xié)商和討價還價等類似的市場交易會更好嗎？還是說轉(zhuǎn)向那種集權(quán)但沖突會降低的分等級的交易形式比較好呢？同樣地，在看待環(huán)境狀況和管理機制之間的互動上提出的重要問題可以用來控制和管理雙邊關(guān)系中的沖突問題。事實上，一個全面的、錯綜復雜的框架只是一個地圖。它只不過是指出了一個人到達目的地的很多條路線，但是它卻沒說明沿路的一些障礙和不同道路可獲得的一些益處。這就是理論所扮演的角色。但令人充滿希望的是，這個框架以參考和協(xié)調(diào)結(jié)構(gòu)為目的進行了有效的理論考查。因此，這個成果在應(yīng)用框架將結(jié)構(gòu)和進程與能力聯(lián)系起來的做法是一個相對小但卻必要的一步。當然，這個領(lǐng)域還必須繼續(xù)前進，增進其管理適用性，這是一個較有力的挑戰(zhàn)。TheEnvironmentofMarketingChannel:AFrameworkforComparativeAnalysisACCORDINGtothepoliticaleconomyframeworkforthecomparativeanalysisofmarketingchannels(StemandReve1980),amarketingchanneldyadcanbeanalyzedintermsof(1)itsintemaleconomy,i.e.,theintemaleconomicstructureandprocesses,and(2)itsintemalpolity,i.e.,theintemalsociopoliticalstructureandprocesses.Theintemaleconomicstructureisdescribedbythetypeoftransactionalformlinkingtwochannelmembers,i.e.,theverticaleconomicarrangementswithinanygivendyad,rangingfix)mmarketmediatedtohierarchicaltransactions.Theintemaleconomicprocessesrefertothenatureofthedecisionmechanismsemployedtodeterminetermsoftradeamongthemembersofthedyad,coveringimpersonalandroutinedecisionmaking,bargaining,andcentralizedplanningprocesses.RaviSinghAchrolisVisitingAssistantProfessorofMarketing,UniversityofNotreDame,anddoctoralcandidate,NorthwesternUniversity.TorgerandReveisResearchProfessorofOrganizationTheory,NorwegianSchoolofEconomicsandBusinessAdministration,andvisitingscholar,StanfordUniversity.LouisW.SternisA.MontgomeryWardProfessorofMarketing,Northv^resternUniversity.Theauthorsgratefullyacknowledgethecontributionsoftwoanonymousreviewerstothedevelopmentofthisarticle.JournalofMarketingTheEnvironmentofMarketingChannelDyads:AFrameworkforCoitiparativeAnalysis.Theintemalsociopoliticalstructureisdefinedbythepattemofpower-dependencerelationswhichexistbetweenanytwochannelmembers,rangingfromminimalpower,throughbalancedpower,toimbalancedandcentralizedpower..Theintema!sociopoliticalprocessesaredescribedintermsofthedominantsentiments(e.g.,cooperationand/orconflict)withinthedyad.Asindicatedintheoriginalarticleoutliningthepoliticaleconomyframework,thetasksremainingtocompletetheframeworkwere(1)toidentifytheinteractionsandvariablesoutsideoftheintemaldynamicsofdyadicexchange,whichhavethegreatestinfluenceonthestructureandprocessesofadyad,and(2)tosuggesthowtheseextemalfactorsmightbeorganizedintheoreticallyilluminatingways.Thesignificanceofachannel'senvironmentisnotwell-reflectedintheliteratureonchanneltheoryandresearch.Referenceshavebeenmadetoextemalconditionsaspossibledeterminantsofchannelstructure(e.g.,BucklinandCarman1974,Sturdivant1966),butexplicitinvestigationsintothenatureofextemalvariablesandtheirimpactsarelacking.Evenamongthoserareinquiries(e.g.,Etgar1977),thefindingsonlyseemtosharpenconsciousnessofhowfragmentarycurrentknowledgeofenvironmentalimpactsremains.Thisarticlesuggestsanenvironmentalframeworkwhichcanbecoupledwiththeearlierframeworkdealingwithintemalinteractions.Beforeproceeding,however,afewcaveatsandpreviewsmayassistthereaderinmakingsenseandappreciatingthelimitationsofourattempttocaptureallofthecriticalenvironmentalvariableswithintheconfinesofasinglearticleoflimitedlength.1.Thisarticleproposesaframework,notatheory.Aframeworkcanbeviewedasafirststepinthedirectionofidentifyinganddimensionalizingthemajorvariablesinfluencingandorderingthestructureandprocessesofsocialentities.Itisprimarilyanattempttolayoutthevariablesandtochartafieldofinteraction.Assuch,aframeworkmakesnopretensionofbeingatheory.Rather,itspurposeistohelppositionindividualresearchessothattheycanproceedinasystematicandmethodicalfashiontowardtheemergenceofadominanttheoreticalparadigm(seeZaltman,LeMasters,andHeffring1982).2.Theframeworkpresentedhererestsonsixbasictenets;(a)two-partyor"dyadic"exchangerepresentsthefundamentalunitofanalysis;(b)theenvironmentofafocaldyadcanbesectionedintoprimaryandsecondarytaskenvironmentsandamacroenvironment;(c)theprimaryandsecondarytaskenvironmentsofafocaldyadcanbepartitionedintoinput,output,competitive,andregulatorysectors;(d)theoriginalpoliticaleconomyframeworkcanbedirectlyappliedtostudyinginteractionsbetweenfocaldyadsandtheirprimarytaskenvironments;(e)thesecondarytaskenvironmentcanbestbedescribedintermsofcertain"qualitative"dimensionswhichimpactdyadicexchange;and(f)macroenvironmentalinfluencesmanifestthemselvesthroughdevelopmentsinafocaldyad'ssecondarytaskenvironment.3.Aseriesofillustrativepropositionsareincludedtoprovidesomecluesabouthowthisframeworkmightbeusedforpossiblepredictions,andtoindicatepotentialsourcesoftheory.4.Inkeepingwiththeobjectiveofanencompassingframework,therangeofthearticleisextremelybroad.Theobjectivehasbeenaccomplishedattheexpenseofdetail,andsometopicshaveonlybeenhintedatorreferenced.Laterinthisarticle,welayoutthegeneralschematicdimensionsoftheproposedframeworkandthedefmitionsonwhichitsstructurerests.ThenwediscussthevariabledimensionsweproposeasmostuseAnillustrativepropositionofhowenvironmentaluncertaintytendstoinfluencethetransactionclimateorsentimentswithinmarketingchanneldyadsis;P1：Thehighertheuncertaintyintheinputoroutputsectorsofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thehigheristhelevelofconflictwithinthedyad.Coordination.Whiledyadsentimentsmayregisterthefirsteffects,thenextmostlikelyeffectwouldbetoalterthewayinwhichdyadrelationshipsareorganized.Marketingchanneldyads,likeorganizations(cf.Thompson1967),tendtoprotectthemselvesfromextemaluncertainty.Onewayofbeingbetterabletohandleextemaluncertaintyisbybeingbetterorganized.Thesituationofhighextemaluncertaintyismetbybetterplanning,morecoordinatedactions,andhighercompetitivestrength.Intermsofadynamic,itwouldbepredictedthatasuncertaintyincreased,effortstowardsincreasingthelevelofverticalcoordinationwouldbemadebyoneorbothparties.Sucheffortsmightbereflectedintermsofthefrequencyandintensityofinteraction,andthedegreeofformalization/standardizationofdyadicprocedures,etc.P2：Thehighertheuncertaintyintheinputoroutputsectorsofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thegreatertheeffortstowardsincreasingthelevelofverticalcoordinationwithinthedyad.PowerBalances.Increasedverticalcoordinationisinitiatedbythechannelactorthatisabletocopemoreeffectivelywithorabsorbtheextemaluncertainty(Hicksonetal.1971).Thusitseemsthatchangesinthepowerbalances(politicalstructure)ofthedyadmediate(and,therefore,shouldprecede)changesineconomicprocesses.Theunitfacingahighdegreeofuncertaintywillbecomeincreasinglydependentontheunitthatcanmoreeffectivelycopewiththeextemaluncertaintyunderfocus.Also,asPfefferandSalancik(1978)observe,themorecriticalaresourceistotheEnvironmentofMarketingChannelDyads:AFrameworkforComparativeAnalysis/63effectivefunctioningoftheentiresystem,andthemoreuncertainthesupplyofthatresource,themorelikelythateffortswillbemadetocontroltheavailabilityofthatresource.Whendirectcontroloftheinputoroutputenvironmentisimpossibletoattain,approximationtocontrolcanbeachievedthroughthedevelopmentofanelaborateinformationsystemtomonitortherelevantsectorsofthetaskenvironment.Thesuccessfuldevelopmentofsuchaninformationsystemaboutuncertaininputoroutputenvironmentscanalterthepowerstructureinchanneldyadsinfavorofthepartyadministeringthesystem.P3：Underenvironmentaluncertainty,thedirectionofthechangeinthepowerbalanceofchanneldyadsisdeterminedbywhichmemberisabletocopewiththesourcesofuncertainty(thusabsorbingitonbehalfoftheother).Further,thedirectionofchangeinpoweralsodeterminesthedirectionofcentralizationofplanning,coordination,anddecisionprocesses(economicprocesses).ExtradyadicCoordination.PropositionsP,throughP3exploretheeffectsofuncertaintyininput-outputsectorsonintradyadicbehaviors.Similarcoordinativeactionsmaytakeplaceatthechanneldyadboundaries,i.e.,forwardorbackwardverticalcoordination.Thedirectionofthecoordinativeactionsdepends,itissuggested,onthesectorinwhichthecriticaluncertaintyarises.P4：Thehighertheuncertaintyintheinputoroutputsectorsofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thecloseraretheverticallinkagesestablishedbetweenthedyadandotherchannelactors.Ifuncertaintyarisesintheinputsector,backwardverticalcoordinationisattempted.Ifuncertaintyarisesintheoutputsector,forwardverticalcoordinationisattempted.TherationalebehindpropositionP4isgivenbyextendingThompson's(1967)argumentsthatorganizationsseekpoweroverthoseelementsintheirtaskenvironmentonwhichtheyaremostdependent.Extemaluncertaintymaybereducedthroughtheuseofcontracting,co-opting,orcoalescing,allresultinginincreasedcoordinationbetweenorganizations.VerticalDecentralization.Ifthelevelofconflict(oropportunisticbehavior;seeWilliamson1975)thwartseffectiveformationofintra-andextradyadiccoordinatingmechanisms,andifuncertaintycontinues,thenthedyadislikelytodecentralizeormoveto"looser"relationships.Thistypicallymeansthatdistributors(wholesalers,retailers)willbegintowidenanddifferentiatethemselves(throughtheadditionordeletionofproducts,services,andgeographicterritories),therebyreducingtheirdependenceontheoriginaldyadicpartner,andthatproducerswillbegintoemploymultiplechannels,comprisedofavarietyofdistributors,soastoreducetheirdependencyaswell.P5：Ifuncertaintyininput-outputsectorsoftheenvironmentcannotbeabsorbedbyverticalintegration/coordinationor"coping"strategies,thelevelofdysfunctionalconflictwillescalate,andthedyadislikelytomovetoa"looser"relationship.IllustrativePropositions:CompetitiveandRegulatorySectorsUncertaintiesemanatingfromthecompetitiveandregulatorysectorsmaybethoughtofaslateralforcesimpactingthechanneldyad.ThelevelofcompetitiveuncertaintycanbedefinedintermsofsomeofthedimensionslistedinFigure2.Forexample,themoreheterogeneousthecompetitorsandthegreatertheircapacity(sizeandresources),andthemoreintermediatethelevelofcompetitiveconcentration(seePfefferandSalancik1978,p.124),thehighertheuncertaintygeneratedbythecompetitivesectorofadyad'snvironment,allotherthingsbeingequal.Theorypertainingtothesedimensionspermitsfinetuningthebasicpropositionsthatariseoutofanalysisofinput-outputuncertainties.Forexample,propositionPjsuggeststhatverticaluncertaintiesincreaseconflictivesentimentsinchanneldyads.Ontheotherhand,lateralcompetitiveuncertaintiesmayinfactleadtolessconflictiveandmorecooperativesentimentswithinthechanneldyad.Competitivethreatsarelikelytomakethechanneldyadmorecooperativebecausesuchthreatsareusuallyperceivedasmovesfromacommonenemy.Itisawell-knownfindingfrombehavioralscienceresearchthatthemorestressfultheintergroupconflict,themorecohesiveandintegratedthein-groupsbecome.P6：Thehighertheuncertaintyinthecompetitivesectorofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thehigheristhelevelofcooperationwithinthedyad.Dealingwithincreaseduncertaintyincompetitivesectorsofthetaskenvironmentcanbemetbytwotypesofchannelstrategies,asseenfromtheviewpointofchanneldyads.Onestrategyistomeetcompetitivechallengesthroughincreasedverticalintegrationor,atleast,betterverticalcohesion.Existingfirmsinanindustrycansubstantiallydecreasecompetitiveuncertaintyby(1)coordinatingorintegratingbackwardstocontrolsourcesofrawmaterials,suchasmineralsandoil;(2)coordinatingorintegratingfor64/JournalofMarketing,Fall1983wardtotieupretailoutlets,suchasbuyingupofchoicegasolinesites;and(3)linkingfmalcustomersmoretightlytothemarketingchannel,suchasinhealthcaredeliverysystems(Aldrich1979,Scherer1980).Theotherstrategyavailableistoforgecooperativearrangementswithcompetitors.Eventhoughpublicpolicymaysometimesbeimplementedtorestraincooperativeeffortsamongcompetitors,intelligentactorswillalwaysfindwaystopartlyovercometherestrictionsimposed.Thelatterstrategyis,however,seenasmorecostly,giventhedrivetowardchanneldyadautonomyandtheprevailingnormsandregulationsagainstrestrictionsofcompetition,atleastintheU.S.P7：Iftheuncertaintyinthecompetitivesectorofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyadscannotbeabsorbedbyverticalcoordination,closerlinkagesareestablishedwithcompetitorsateachchannellevel.Uncertaintiesintheinput,output,andcompetitivesectorsmayleadachannelactortodevisestrategiestoenhanceitspowerindyadicexchanges.Butthesubsequentuseofthispoweranddyadicsubordinationtoitareoftencircumscribedbyregulationintheformofspecificlawsand/ornormativeconstraints.Ingeneral,indealingwiththeregulatorysector,copingwithuncertaintyandhandlingexternaldependenciesare,onceagain,likelytobecriticaldimensionsconfrontingchanneldyads.TheuncertaintyemanatingfromtheregulatorysectorcanbedefinedintermsofsomeofthevariableslistedinFigure1.Thus,themorevariable,concentrated,andheterogeneoustheregulatoryorganizationsinadyad'senvironment,themoreuncertaintheregulatoryenvironmentislikelytobe.Ifregulatorycertainty-uncertaintyisdefinedintermsofcertaintyandclarityoftheregulator'sabilitytoimposetheregulationandpoliceit,theeffectsofuncertaintyondyadicbehaviorarelikelytobedifferentfromthoseproposedfortheinput,output,andcompetitivesectors.Thisisbecausetheenvironmentalpressureforverticallycoordinatedandintegratedresponsetoregulatorythreatislikelytobeadirectfunctionofthecertaintyofdiscoveryandsanctionintheeventofnoncompliance.Iftheregulatoryenvironmentisuncertainbecauseofheterogeneousandvariableregulators,channelmemberscanbetterrisknoncomplianceaswellasdefendthemselvesbytradingoffbetweenregulatorsandtheirconflictingdemands.P8：Themorecertaintheregulatoryenvironment,themorecooperative,coordinated,andintegrateddyadbehaviorbecomesinresponsetoregulatorydemands.However,marketingchanneldyadsarenotpassiverecipientsofforcesintheregulatorysectoroftheirtaskenvironment.Regulatorypressureandactionswhichrestrictchannelactivity(cfMitnick1980)areusuallycounteredbypoliticalactionsandcoalitionbehaviorbychanneldyads.Themoreuncertaintheregulatoryenvironment,themoreopportunitythereisforeffectivehorizontalcoordinationandpoliticalaction.P9：Underregulatoryuncertainty,marketingchanneldyadstendtoenterintointerestcoalitionswithactorsintheinput,output,andcompetitivesectorsoftheirtaskenvironment,tocounteruncertaintyintheregulatorysector.Organizationinonesectorofthetaskenvironment(e.g.,actionsintheregulatorysector)breedsorganizationinothersectorsofthetaskenvironment(e.g.,formationoftradeassociationsandlobbyinggroups),tocountertheexternaluncertaintyfaced.Thephenomenoncanbeinterpretedintermsofcountervailingpower,butcanalsobeseenasanormalphenomenoninapluralistsociety,withmarketsforsocial,political,andeconomicinterestscorrespondingtoapolyarchiestructuralcontextofsocialcontrol(Zald1978).Whentheregulatorycontextispredominantlypolyarchieinnature,itfollowsthatactorswhoaretargetsofregulationmayalsotrytoinfluenceregulatoryagentsdirectlybyenteringintoexchangerelationshipswiththeregulators.Suchexchangerelationshipsseemtobemoreandmorecommon(seeAmdt1979)inmostcountries.P10：Iftheuncertaintyintheregulatorysectorofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyadscannotbeabsorbedbycoalitionbehavior,marketingchanneldyadstendtoestablishcloserlinkageswiththeregulatoryagents.ThepoliticaleconomyframeworkforthecomparativeanalysisofmarketingchannelsproposedbyStemandReve(1980)focusedoninteractionsinternaltochanneldyads.Inthisarticle,theoriginalframeworkisextendedtoaccountfortheimpactofenvironmentalforcesondyadicstructureandprocesses.Todate,thelattertopichaslargelybeenignored,especiallyinempiricalstudies,becauseoftheconceptualandmethodologicaldifficultiesassociatedwithit.Hopefully,theframeworkadvancedinthispaperwillmakethetopicmoretractable.Ithasbeensuggestedherethattheenvironmentbedisaggregatedintoprimary,secondary,andmacroenvironments,andfurtherintoinput,output,competi-TheEnuirnnmontofMarketingChannelDyads;Ativeandregulatorysectors.Actorsintheprimaryenvironmentarethosewithwhichthedyadmaintainsdirectexchange.Forsuchinteractions,theStem-Reve(1980)politicaleconomyframeworkisapplicable.Forextemalforcesgeneratedbynonexchangefactors,ahigherlevelofdimensionalizingandtheoryinductioniscalledfor.Inthisarticle,ithasbeensuggestedthattheapplicationofconstructsandtheoriesrepresentingthemajorparadigmsinthefieldofmacroorganizationbehaviorislikelytobeusefulforstudyingtheeffectsoftheseotherextemalforcesondyadicbehavior.Inthiscontext,theconstructofuncertaintywasemployedasanexample,andillustrativepropositionswereadvanced.Toasignificantextent,thetopicsaddressedinthisarticlearenotradicallynew.Itistobeexpectedthatthereaderfamiliarwithorganizationtheorywillalsobefamiliarwithmanyoftheconceptsraisedhere,andsomeofthepropositionsappearnoncontroversial.Thepurposeoftheframeworkisnottoastound,butrathertobringsomerelativelydevelopedorganizationalinsightsintoamoretightlyknitandcomprehensiblewholeinthespecificcontextsofmarketingchannels.Inthislight,itsprimarycontributionshouldbefoundinitsintersectionwiththeintemalpoliticaleconomyframework.Astheillustrativepropositionsindicate,attentionshouldfocusontheeffectofenvironmentalforcesonthestructureandprocessesofchanneldyads,becauseobviously,theeventualgoalofresearchinthistraditionmustbetosuggestmoreeffectivewaystomanagemarketingchannelrelationships.Itisthroughthemanagementoftheserelationshipsthatenhanceddyadi