上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)(文檔含中英文對(duì)照即英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：InvestorpricingofCEOequityincentivesJeffP.BooneInderK.KhuranaK.K.RamanAbstractThemainpurposeofthispaperistoexploreCEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions.TheobjectiveofCEOcompensationistobetteralignCEO-shareholderinterestsbyinducingCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions.However,recentresearchsuggeststhattheseincentiveshaveasignificantdown-side(i.e.,theymotivateexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningsandlowerinformationquality).GiventheconflictbetweenthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.WeexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarepricedinthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremiumoverthe1992–2007timeperiod.Ouranalysiscontrolsfortwopotentialstructuralchangesoverthistimeperiod.Thefirstisthe1995DelawareSupremeCourtrulingwhichincreasedprotectionfromtakeovers(anddecreasedrisk)forDelawareincorporatedfirms.Thesecondisthe2002Sarbanes–OxleyActwhichimpactedcorporaterisktaking,equityincentives,andearningsmanagement.Collectively,ourfindingssuggestthatCEOequityincentives,despitebeingassociatedwithlowerinformationquality,increasefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.Keywords：CEOequityincentives，Informationquality，CostofequitycapitalIntroductionInthisstudy,weinvestigateinvestorpricingofCEOequityincentivesforalargesampleofUSfirmsovertheperiod1992–2007.BecauseincentivesembeddedinCEOcompensationcontractsmaybeexpectedtoinfluencepolicychoicesatthefirmlevel,ourobjectiveistoexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesinfluencefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.Priorresearch(e.g.,Jensenetal.2004;JensenandMurphy1990)suggeststhatequity-basedcompensation,i.e.,CEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions,providestheCEOapowerfulinducementtotakeactionstoincreaseshareholdervalue(byinvestinginmoreriskybutpositivenetpresentvalueprojects).Putdifferently,equityincentivesareexpectedtohelpmitigateagencycostsbyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders,andotherwisehelpcommunicatetoinvestorstheimportantideathatthefirm’sobjectiveistomaximizeshareholderwealth(HallandMurphy2003).However,recentresearchcontendsthatequityincentivesalsohaveaperverseordysfunctionaldownside.Inparticular,equity-basedcompensationmakesmanagersmoresensitivetothefirm’sstockprice,andincreasestheirincentivetomanipulatereportedearnings—i.e.,tocreatetheappearanceofmeetingorbeatingearningsbenchmarks(suchasanalysts’forecasts)—inanattempttobolsterthestockpriceandtheirpersonalwealthinvestedinthefirm’sstockandoptions(BergstresserandPhilippon2006;BurnsandKedia2006;ChengandWarfield2005).Statedinanotherway,CEOequityincentivescanhaveanadverseeffectonthequalityofreportedaccountinginformation.AsnotedbyBebchukandFried(2003)andJensenetal.(2004),bypromotingperversefinancialreportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformation,equity-basedcompensationcanbeasourceof,ratherthanasolutionfor,theagencyproblem.Despitetheseargumentsabouttheputativeilleffectsofequityincentives,equity-basedcompensationcontinuestobeasalientcomponentofthetotalpaypackagesforCEOs.Still,giventheconflictbetweenthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.Toourknowledge,priorresearchprovidesmixedevidenceonthisissue.Forexample,Mehran(1995)examines1979–1980compensationdataandfindsthatequity-basedcompensationispositivelyrelatedtothefirm’sTobin’sQ.Bycontrast,Aboody(1996)examinescompensationdataforasampleoffirmsforyears1980through1990,andfindsanegativecorrelationbetweenthevalueofoutstandingoptionsandthefirm’sshareprice,suggestingthatthedilutioneffectdominatestheoptions’incentivealignmenteffect.Moreover,boththesestudiesarebasedondated(i.e.,pre-1991)data.Inourstudy,weexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarerelatedtothefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium,i.e.,theexcessofthefirm’sexantecostofequitycapitalovertherisk-freeinterestrate(ametricdiscussedbyDhaliwaletal.2006).ConsistentwithCoreandGuay(2002),wemeasureCEOequityincentivesasthesensitivityoftheCEO’sstockandoptionportfoliotoa1percentchangeinthestockprice.Basedonasampleof16,502firm-yearobservationsovera16yearperiod(1992–2007),wefindCEOequityincentivestobenegativelyrelatedtothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,suggestingthatthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectdominatesthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality.Inotheranalysis,weattempttocontrolfortworegulatory(structural)changesthatoccurredduringthe1992–2007timeperiodofourstudy.AspointedoutbyDaines(2001),regulatorychangescanhaveanimpactonfirmvaluesandreturnsaswellasthestructureofexecutivecompensation.First,Low(2009)findsthatfollowingthe95DelawareSupremeCourtrulingthatresultedingreatertakeoverprotection,managersreducedfirmriskbyturningdownrisk-increasing(albeitpositiveNPV)projects.Inresponse,firmsincreasedCEOequityincentivestomitigatetheriskaversion.Potentially,theimpactoftheDelawarerulingonmanagers’riskaversionandthefollow-upincreaseinequityincentives(tomitigatetheincreaseinmanagers’riskaversionfollowingtheruling)mayhaveresultedinastructuralchangeinoursampleatleastforfirmsincorporatedinDelaware.Tocontrolforthispotentialstructuralimpact,weperformouranalysisforDelawareincorporatedfirmsfor1996–2007separately.OurresultssuggestthatthefavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium)issimilarforDelawarefirmsandotherfirms.Second,anumberofstudies(e.g.,Cohenetal.2007,2008;Lietal.2008)indicatethatthe2002Sarbanes–OxleyAct(SOX)loweredequityincentives(i.e.,reducedtheproportionofequityincentivestototalcompensationpost-SOX),reducedmanagerialrisktaking,decreasedspendingonR&Dandcapitalexpenditures,andreducedaccruals-basedearningsmanagementwhileincreasingrealearningsmanagement.Sincerealearningsmanagementispotentiallymoredifficultforinvestorstodetectthanaccruals-basedearningsmanagement,apossibleconsequenceofSOXcouldbeanincreaseinagencycostssince2002.TocontrolforthepotentialstructuralchangesimposedbySOXbothintermsofexpectedreturnsandthelevelofequityincentives,weperformouranalysisforthepre-SOXandpost-SOXtimeperiodsseparately.Foreachofthetwotimeperiods,ourresultssuggestafavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium),althoughtheeffectappearstobestrongerinthepost-SOXperiod.Ourstudycontributestotheliteratureonthevaluationofequityincentives.Weprovide(toourknowledge)first-timeevidenceontherelationbetweenCEOequityincentivesandtheexantecostofequitycapital.Priorresearchhasfocusedbyandlargeontheconsequencesofmanagerialequityincentivesforfirmperformance(Mehran1995;Hanlonetal.2003)andrisktaking(RajgopalandShevlin2002;Colesetal.2006;Hanlonetal.2004)ratherthanonvaluationperse.Asnotedpreviously,toourknowledgeonlytwopriorstudies(Aboody1996andMehran1995,bothbasedonpre-1991data)haveexaminedthepricingofmanagerialequityincentives,withmixedresults.Inourstudy,weprovideevidenceonthevaluationeffectsofCEOequityincentivesbasedonmorerecent(1992–2007)data.Byfocusingonmorerecentdata,ourfindingsrelatetoagrowinglineofresearchontheassociationbetweenequity-basedcompensationandaccountinginformationquality.Specifically,Coffee(2004)suggeststhatthe$1millionlimitonthetaxdeductibilityofcashcompensationforseniorexecutivesimposedbyCongressin1993motivatedfirmstomakegreateruseofequitycompensationwhich,inturn,increasedthesensitivityofmanagerstothefirm’sstockprice.BergstresserandPhilippon(2006)andChengandWarfield(2005)provideevidencewhichsuggeststhatequityincentivesarepositivelyrelatedtothemagnitudeofaccruals-basedearningsmanagement.Similarly,BurnsandKedia(2006)andEfendietal.(2007)reportCEOequityincentivestobepositivelyrelatedtoaccountingirregularitiesandthesubsequentrestatementofpreviouslyissuedfinancialstatements.Thus,priorresearchsuggeststhatequity-basedcompensationhasanegativeeffectonthequalityofearningsreportedbyfirms.Consistentwithseveralpublishedempiricalstudiesthatsupportthenotionthatlowerinformationqualityispricedinahighercostofequitycapital(e.g.,Bhattacharyaetal.2003;Francisetal.2005),CEOequityincentivescouldpotentiallylowerfirmvaluebyincreasingthefirm-specificequityriskpremium.Asnotedpreviously,wedocumentthatCEOequityincentives(despitetheassociatedlowerinformationquality)arerelatednegativelytothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,implyingthatequityincentivesincreasefirmvaluebyloweringthefirm’scostofequitycapital.Thus,ourfindingssuggestthatthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwithequityincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect.Since1992,theSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)hasmandatedthepublicdisclosureofexecutivecompensationdatatopromoteinformeddecisionmakingbyinvestors.Our?ndingsprovidefurtherevidencethatthesedisclosuresincreasetheinformativenessofstockpricesincompetitivesecuritiesmarkets.Collectively,giventhatCEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterest(Jensenetal.2004;Reich2007),our?ndingsindicatethatCEOequityincentivesin?uence?rmvaluefavorablythroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.ConcludingremarksPriorresearch(e.g.,GoldmanandSlezak2006;Jensenetal.2004)suggeststhatCEOequityincentivescanbeadouble-edgedsword.Ontheonehand,theseincentivescanmitigatetheagencyproblembyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders(i.e.,byinducingCEOstoprefermoreoptimal,albeitrisky,investmentchoices).Ontheotherhand,theseincentivescanleadtoexcessivesensitivitytosharepriceperformanceandinduceexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningswithaneyeonthestockprice.Inotherwords,bypromotingperversereportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformationpertinenttoinvestorpricingdecisions,CEOequityincentivescanpotentiallybeapartof,notaremedyfor,theagencyproblem.However,toourknowledgethereislittletonopriorevidencetosuggestwhicheffect—thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectortheperverseinformationqualityeffect—dominates.Wecontributetotheliteratureinseveralways.First,weshowthatCEOequityincentivesarenegativelyrelatedtothefirm-specificequityriskpremium,i.e.,thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwiththeseincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffectinthepricingofthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium.Second,sinceequityincentivesareintendedtoinduceCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions,theeffectoftheseincentivesonshareholderwealthinthepost-SOXtimeperiodisofparticularinterest.Ourresultssuggestthattheeconomicsignificanceoftheseincentives(i.e.,thepayoffforshareholdersintermsofalowerexanteequityriskpremiumandahigherfirmvalue)wasinfacthigherinthepost-SOXtimeperiod.Finally,ourfindingsprovidefurtherevidencethattheSECmandateddisclosures(since1992)ofexecutivecompensationdataincreasestheinformativenessofstockpriceswithrespecttothepotentialimplicationsofCEOequityincentivesforthecostofequitycapitalandfirmvalue.Atthistime,CEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterestforregulatorsandinvestors(Jensenetal.2004;Reich2007).Collectively,ourfindingscomplementandextendpriorresearchonequityincentives.TheyarepotentiallyusefulinbetterinformingregulatorsandinvestorsfacedwithquestionsaboutthepossibleconsequencesofCEOequityincentivesforshareholderwealth.譯文：總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)的投資者定價(jià)JeffP.BooneInderK.KhuranaK.K.Raman摘要本論文的主要目的是探討首席執(zhí)行官以股票和期權(quán)形式的報(bào)酬問題。首席執(zhí)行官報(bào)酬調(diào)整的目的是通過優(yōu)化調(diào)整首席執(zhí)行官作為股東的利益，使首席執(zhí)行官做出更多的投資決策（盡管有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)）。然而，最近的研究表明，這些激勵(lì)措施有重大弊端（例如，他們鼓動(dòng)高管操縱對(duì)外公開的業(yè)績，降低會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量）。鑒于積極的總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)和不良的信息質(zhì)量效果之間的沖突，“CEO股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否增加公司價(jià)值”便成了一個(gè)開放的實(shí)證問題的。我們看看，在1992年至2007年間，總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否在公司發(fā)生特定事前，其定價(jià)高于股票風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)。在這一時(shí)期，我們的分析控制在兩個(gè)潛在的結(jié)構(gòu)變化之中。首先是1995年美國特拉華州最高法院的裁決，它增加了在美國特拉華州注冊(cè)成立的公司在收購方面的保護(hù)（降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)）。第二個(gè)是2002年頒布的薩班斯-奧克斯利法案，它影響著企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的承擔(dān)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)和盈余管理。總的來說，我們的研究結(jié)果表明，總裁的股權(quán)激勵(lì)盡管是低信息質(zhì)量的，但是它通過調(diào)整股權(quán)資本成本，提高了公司的價(jià)值。關(guān)鍵詞：總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)，信息質(zhì)量，股權(quán)資本成本介紹在這項(xiàng)研究中，在這項(xiàng)研究中，我們通過調(diào)研美國企業(yè)在1992年至2007年期間的一個(gè)龐大的樣本，調(diào)查了美國企業(yè)對(duì)總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)的投資者定價(jià)。因?yàn)槭紫瘓?zhí)行官的薪酬激勵(lì)是要嵌入到他們的薪酬補(bǔ)償合同中的，因此預(yù)期可能影響在企業(yè)層面的政策選擇。我們的目標(biāo)是，審查總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否會(huì)通過股權(quán)資本成本這一渠道，從而影響公司價(jià)值。以前的研究（例如，延森等人在2004年的研究;詹森和墨菲在1990年的研究）認(rèn)為，基于股權(quán)的補(bǔ)償，即以股票和期權(quán)的形式的總裁薪酬補(bǔ)償，為首席執(zhí)行官提供了強(qiáng)大的動(dòng)力，誘導(dǎo)他們采取行動(dòng)，提高股東利益（通過投資更多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大，但凈現(xiàn)值高的項(xiàng)目這種方式）。換句話說，股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度將有助于通過調(diào)整總裁與其他股東的利益，減少代理成本，除此之外，還有助于與投資者溝通，向他們闡述公司的目標(biāo)是股東財(cái)富最大化這一重要理念（霍爾和墨菲在2003的研究）。然而，最近的研究聲稱，股權(quán)激勵(lì)也有倒行逆施的一面，或者說，也有不良的弊端。特別是，以股權(quán)激勵(lì)為基礎(chǔ)的薪酬補(bǔ)償，使管理人員對(duì)該公司的股票價(jià)格更敏感，并可能為了提高他們的收益而去操縱公布的業(yè)績，例如創(chuàng)建名義會(huì)議或歪曲收益基準(zhǔn)（如分析師的預(yù)測(cè)），企圖提高股票價(jià)格，以及他們的個(gè)人財(cái)富——投資于該公司的股票和期權(quán)（博格斯和菲利在2006年的研究；伯恩斯和凱迪亞2006年的研究，程沃菲爾德在2005年的研究）。換句話說，總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)可以對(duì)公開列報(bào)的會(huì)計(jì)信息的質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。正如別布丘克和弗瑞得（2003）和詹森等人（2004）所指出的那樣，通過助長不正當(dāng)?shù)呢?cái)務(wù)報(bào)告激勵(lì)措施和降低會(huì)計(jì)信息的質(zhì)量，以股權(quán)為基礎(chǔ)的薪酬制度是產(chǎn)生代理問題的來源，而不是一種解決方案。盡管存在由股權(quán)激勵(lì)而推斷出的這些不良影響，以股權(quán)為基礎(chǔ)的薪酬制度仍然在總裁們的薪酬總額占重要份額。不過，考慮到積極的總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)和不良的會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量效果之間的沖突，總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度是否能增加公司價(jià)值，成為一個(gè)開放的實(shí)證問題。據(jù)我們所知，以前的研究提供了有關(guān)該問題的不同方面的證據(jù)。例如，邁赫蘭（1995）研究1979年至1980年的薪酬數(shù)據(jù)，并認(rèn)為股權(quán)報(bào)酬與公司的托賓Q指數(shù)呈正相關(guān)。與此相反，阿布德（1996）研究了某公司從1980年到1990年有關(guān)薪酬的樣本數(shù)據(jù)，并發(fā)現(xiàn)尚未行使購股權(quán)價(jià)值和公司的股價(jià)呈負(fù)相關(guān)。這表明稀釋效應(yīng)在股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)效果中占主導(dǎo)地位。此外，這兩個(gè)研究都基于以前（即1991年之前）的數(shù)據(jù)。在我們的研究中，我們研究是否總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)與該公司特定的事前股權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)，即該公司超額的事前無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)利率權(quán)益資本（達(dá)利瓦等人在2006年研究的一種度量）有關(guān)。與考爾和瓜伊（2002）一致，我們計(jì)算總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)在股票和期權(quán)的投資組合中，股票價(jià)格每變動(dòng)百分之一的敏感性。以某公司觀察期超過16年（1992-2007）的樣本為基礎(chǔ)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司的事前股權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)呈負(fù)相關(guān)，這由此表明了積極的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果主導(dǎo)了較低的信息質(zhì)量這一不良影響。在其他的分析中，我們?cè)噲D控制為兩個(gè)常規(guī)（結(jié)構(gòu)方面）的變化，這些變化在我們1992年至2007年的研究期間發(fā)生過。正如戴恩斯（2001）指出的那樣，結(jié)構(gòu)變化可能對(duì)公司價(jià)值、回報(bào)，以及行政補(bǔ)償?shù)慕Y(jié)構(gòu)有影響。首先，勞爾（2009）發(fā)現(xiàn)，繼1995年特拉華州最高法院的裁決造成了更大的收購保護(hù)以來，經(jīng)理用拒絕高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的投資項(xiàng)目（雖然凈現(xiàn)值是正的）這種方式來降低公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。相應(yīng)的，公司增加總裁的股權(quán)激勵(lì)，以減輕風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避。也許，特拉華州最高法院的關(guān)于經(jīng)理人風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的裁決而產(chǎn)生的影響，和后續(xù)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的增加（目的是減輕經(jīng)理人風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的可能性）可能導(dǎo)致我們研究的樣本中的企業(yè)，至少在特拉華州的企業(yè)的結(jié)構(gòu)變革。為了控制這種潛在的結(jié)構(gòu)方面的影響，我們分別根據(jù)1996年至2007年在美國??特拉華州注冊(cè)成立的公司做研究分析。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司價(jià)值（如在事前降低股權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)時(shí)反映）產(chǎn)生的有利影響與特拉華州的公司以及其他公司相似。其次，許多研究（例如，科恩等人在2007年和2008年的研究;李等人在2008年的研究）表明，2002年頒布的薩班斯-奧克斯利法案降低了股權(quán)激勵(lì)（即降低了股權(quán)激勵(lì)占報(bào)酬總額的比例），降低了管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)，降低研發(fā)支出和資本支出，以及降低應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理，同時(shí)提高實(shí)際盈余管理。由于實(shí)際盈余管理對(duì)投資者來說可能比權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制基礎(chǔ)下盈余管理更為困難，薩班斯法案的一個(gè)可能產(chǎn)生的后果就是自2002年以來，代理成本增加。為了控制由薩班斯法案帶來的，無論在預(yù)期收益方面，還是股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平方面表現(xiàn)出的潛在的結(jié)構(gòu)變化，我們分別對(duì)薩班斯法案頒布前和頒布后的時(shí)間段做了分析。通過對(duì)這兩個(gè)時(shí)間段的分析，我們的結(jié)果證明了，對(duì)的總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度對(duì)公司價(jià)值（如在事前降低股權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)時(shí)反映）有積極的影響，但這積極作用似乎是在薩班斯法案頒布后發(fā)揮得更強(qiáng)。我們的研究對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)估值方面的著