基金管理中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

基金管理中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)基金管理中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)(文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯)大量資金的投入真的就好嗎？新的證據(jù)表明了關(guān)于共同基金流量，基金管理者的行為，業(yè)績的持續(xù)性三者之間的關(guān)系。摘要在堅(jiān)持了很長的時(shí)間后，共同基金帶回了豐厚的利潤——這就是這篇文章想要的核心結(jié)果.此外，消費(fèi)者行為和基金經(jīng)理在解釋這些長期持續(xù)的伙伴關(guān)系上發(fā)揮了很大的作用。消費(fèi)者們用去年贏得的基金去做大量的投資，而這些成功的基金管理者們?cè)偻顿Y這些流動(dòng)股票想著要再創(chuàng)新高，根據(jù)今年的排名情況，至少得到2年以后去了。相比之下，失去了基金的管理者們，他們似乎不愿意賣出他們虧損的股票去買那些漲勢(shì)好的股票，也許是因?yàn)殄e(cuò)置效應(yīng)吧。這樣一來，漲勢(shì)好的仍在繼續(xù)，成功盈利的管理者們和那些虧損的管理者們也在繼續(xù)拉開離，直至一個(gè)比以前研究的還要長的時(shí)期。更令人驚訝的是，基金長期盈利所反映的不是都能用動(dòng)量來解釋，我們找到了強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù)表明，與流相關(guān)的購買，尤其是成長型基金，推動(dòng)了股票的價(jià)格。特別的是，用贏回的基金拿去購買的響應(yīng)著持續(xù)性流動(dòng)性的股票已經(jīng)撼動(dòng)了他們的大小，市場和一個(gè)為期四年的每年百分之二到百分之三的動(dòng)量基準(zhǔn)。根據(jù)橫截面分析表明，這些異常的回報(bào)與資金的流入密切相關(guān)，但卻不是因?yàn)檫^去段時(shí)間資金的表現(xiàn)，因此，對(duì)于研究表明的長期堅(jiān)持的經(jīng)理人在選擇股票上是有才能的。最后，在風(fēng)格調(diào)整后的凈收益水平，我們并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)他的持久性，與以往的研究結(jié)果一致。總的來說，在成功的經(jīng)理人的帶領(lǐng)下的巨富是非常明智的，但是用跟風(fēng)模仿策略來贏得股票基金與流相關(guān)的回報(bào)來交易似乎是最明智的策略。八百零八萬人現(xiàn)在在美國持有投資的共同基金，同那些超過百分之九十的這些投資基金的價(jià)值被作為活動(dòng)管理資金。此外，積極管理的股票基金獲得了如預(yù)算所言的消費(fèi)者流入量-新資金的凈流入量在2000年的時(shí)候?yàn)?09000000000美元，這些資金所持有的能推動(dòng)資金的總價(jià)值在2000年底將近4億美元。雖然，大多數(shù)的個(gè)人投資者是充分相信那些活躍投資者的職業(yè)道德的，一般來說，很多人對(duì)那些具有投資天賦的人具有偏執(zhí)的信任，他們更愿意相信，在管理者們的活動(dòng)領(lǐng)域，更高級(jí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)管理人的存在能夠長時(shí)間的占領(lǐng)市場。特別是，晨星和理鉑的的激烈競爭正在靠提供定期基金排名來積極爭取他們的客戶，然而像金錢雜志封面上的共同基金經(jīng)理人也成為了一種潮流。此外，投資美元的人并沒有很快放棄之前虧損的基金轉(zhuǎn)而去瘋狂的去追逐那些成功的基金管理人。這些性質(zhì)是在浪費(fèi)他們的金錢和時(shí)間還是這些金主們真的很聰明呢？在過去有很多的論文試圖解決這些問題，然后產(chǎn)生了各種各樣的結(jié)果。比如說，GrinblattandTitman發(fā)現(xiàn)部分的基金經(jīng)理能夠始終如一的正常收入和支出，而像他們倆這樣的就只能在基金異常的時(shí)候出現(xiàn)負(fù)收入。Gruber和鄭先生堅(jiān)持從消費(fèi)者的視角來檢查其投資在基金中的資金流向，然后發(fā)現(xiàn)這些投資者真的是非常的明智-那就是，資金流的不成比例現(xiàn)象造成了未來的巨大收益。然而，這些投資效果甚好的錢的來源仍然是一個(gè)謎，這些明智的投資基金真的能夠勝任那些能干的基金經(jīng)理嗎，還是僅僅只是基金收益的猛烈勢(shì)頭。最近，Carhar一直在堅(jiān)持監(jiān)測著共有基金的投資回報(bào)，目的就是為了維持價(jià)格的平衡。與之一起的人有FamaandFrenchJegadeeshandTitman(1993),DanielandTitman(1997),andMoskowitzandGrinblatt(1999)).卡哈爾發(fā)現(xiàn)了一點(diǎn)，更高級(jí)的資金的一直走在他們基準(zhǔn)風(fēng)格的前面，卡爾發(fā)現(xiàn)基金的最高回報(bào)率在一年當(dāng)中的最低收入也達(dá)到了總基金量的百分之3.5.在接下來的一年當(dāng)中，幾乎所有的整個(gè)年所記錄的的動(dòng)量效應(yīng)由SappandTiwari發(fā)現(xiàn)，在凈收益的水平上，金錢效應(yīng)是由基金動(dòng)量來顯示的而不是由于基金管理者的才能實(shí)現(xiàn)。因此，Teo和Woo發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)“傻錢效應(yīng)”，那就是在很多年當(dāng)中，高流入資金的的運(yùn)作比低資金的運(yùn)作要差。這樣一來，Carhart就認(rèn)為錢多并不是很明智。而且最近的一些報(bào)道也是說找到了比卡爾更有說服力的結(jié)果。Chen,Jegadeesh,andWermers也發(fā)現(xiàn)了，那些被基金積極購買的股票打擊到了那些每年賣掉百分之二的活躍分子，而Bollen和Busse也發(fā)現(xiàn)了關(guān)于基金季度性的持久性表現(xiàn)證據(jù)。IsMoneyReally“Smart”?NewEvidenceontheRelationBetweenMutualFundFlows,ManagerBehavior,andPerformancePersistence.RussWermers*DepartmentofFinanceRobertH.SmithSchoolofBusinessUniversityofMarylandCollegePark,MD20742-1815(301)405-0572November2003*AbstractMutualfundreturnsstronglypersistovermulti-yearperiods—thatisthecentralfindingofthispaper.Further,consumerandfundmanagerbehaviorbothplayalargeroleinexplainingtheselong-termcontinuationpatterns—consumersinvestHeavilyinlast-year’swinningfunds,andmanagersofthesewinnersinvesttheseinflowsinmomentumstockstocontinuetooutperformotherfundsforatleasttwoyearsfollowingtherankingyear.Bycontrast,managersoflosingfundsappearreluctanttoselltheirlosingstockstofinancethepurchaseofnewmomentumstocks,perhapsduetoadispositioneffect.Thus,momentumcontinuestoseparatewinningfromlosingmanagersforamuchlongerperiodthanindicatedbypriorstudies.Evenmoresurprisingisthatpersistenceinwinningfundreturnsisnotentirelyexplainedbymomentum—wefindstrongevidencethatflow-relatedbuying,especiallyamonggrowth-orientedfunds,pushesupstockprices.Specifically,stocksthatwinningfundspurchaseinresponsetopersistentflowshavereturnsthatbeattheirsize,book-to-market,andmomentumbenchmarksbytwotothreepercentperyearoverafour-yearperiod.Cross-sectionalregressionsindicatethattheseabnormalreturnsarestronglyrelatedtofundinflows,butnottothepastperformanceofthefunds—thus,castingsomedoubtonpriorfindingsofpersistentmanagertalentinpickingstocks.Finally,atthestyle-adjustednetreturnslevel,wefindnopersistence,consistentwiththeresultsofpriorstudies.Onbalance,weconfirmthatmoneyissmartinchasingwinningmanagers,butthata“copycat”strategyofmimickingwinningfundstocktradestotakeadvantageofflow-relatedreturnsappearstobethesmarteststrategy.Eighty-eightmillionindividualsnowholdinvestmentsinU.S.mutualfunds,withover90percentofthevalueoftheseinvestmentsbeingheldinactivelymanagedfunds.Further,activelymanagedequityfundsgainthelion’sshareofconsumerinflows—flowsofnetnewmoneytoequityfunds(inflowsminusoutflows)totalled$309billionin2000,pushingtheaggregatevalueofinvestmentsheldbythesefundstoalmost$4trillionatyear-end2000.Whilethemajorityofindividualinvestorsapparentlybelieveinthevirtuesofactivemanagementingeneral,manyappeartoholdevenstrongerbeliefsconcerningthetalentsofsubgroupsoffundmanagers—theyappeartobelievethat,amongthefieldofactivemanagers,superiormanagersexistthatcan“beatthemarket”forlongperiodsoftime.Inparticular,MorningstarandLippercompetevigorouslyfortheattentionofthesetruebelieversbyprovidingregularfundperformancerankings,whilepopularpublicationssuchasMoneyMagazineroutinelyprofile“star”mutualfundmanagers.Inaddition,investordollars,whilenotveryquicktoabandonpastlosingfunds,aggressivelychasepastwinners(see,forexample,SirriandTufano(1998)).Arethese“performance-chasers”wastingtheirmoneyandtime,orismoney“smart”?Severalpastpapershaveattemptedtotacklethisissue,withsomewhatdifferingresults.Forexample,GrinblattandTitman(1989a,1993)findthatsomemutualfundmanagersareabletoconsistentlyearnpositiveabnormalreturnsbeforefeesandexpenses,whileBrownandGoetzmann(1995;BG)attributepersistencetoinferiorfundsconsistentlyearningnegativeabnormalreturns.Gruber(1996)andZheng(1999)examinepersistencefromtheviewpointofconsumermoneyflowstofunds,andfindthatmoneyis“smart”—thatis,moneyflowsdisproportionatelytofundsexhibitingsuperiorfuturereturns.However,theexactsourceofthesmartmoneyeffectremainsapuzzle—doessmartmoneycapturemanagertalentor,perhaps,simplymomentuminstockreturns?Morerecently,Carhart(1997)examinesthepersistenceinnetreturnsofU.S.mutualfunds,controllingforthecontinuationattributabletopricedequitystyles(see,forexample,FamaandFrench(1992,1993,1996),JegadeeshandTitman(1993),DanielandTitman(1997),andMoskowitzandGrinblatt(1999)).Carhartfindslittleevidenceofsuperiorfundsthatconsistentlyoutperformtheirstylebenchmarks—specifically,Carhartfindsthatfundsinthehighestnetreturndecile(oftheCRSPmutualfunddatabase)duringoneyearbeatfundsinthelowestdecilebyabout3.5percentduringthefollowingyear,almostallduetotheone-yearmomentumeffectdocumented1SappandTiwari(2002)findevidencethat,atthenetreturnlevel,thesmart-moneyeffectcanbeexplainedbymomentumandnotbymanagertalent,whileTeoandWoo(2001)findevidenceofa“dumbmoney”effect—thatis,highinflowfundsunderperformlowinflowfundsovermulti-yeartimeperiods.1byJegadeeshandTitman(1993)andtotheunexplainedpoorperformanceoffundsinthelowestprior-yearreturndecile.Thus,Carhart(1997)suggeststhatmoneyisnotverysmart.RecentstudiesfindsomewhatmorepromisingresultsthanCarhart(1997).Chen,Jegadeesh,andWermers(1999)findthatstocksmostactivelypurchasedbyfundsbeatthosemostactivelysoldbyovertwopercentperyear,whileBollenandBusse(2002)findevidenceofpersistenceinquarterlyfundperformance.Bibliography[1]Badrinath,S.G.,andSunilWahal,2002,“MomentumTradingbyInstitutions,”JournalofFinance,57,pp.2449-2477.[2]Berk,JonathanB.,andRichardC.Green,“MutualFundFlowsandPerformanceinRationalMarkets,”WorkingPaper.[3]Bollen,NicolasandJeffreyBusse,2002,“Short-TermPersistenceinMutualFundPerformance,”WorkingPaper.[4]Brown,StephenJ.andWilliamN.Goetzmann,1995,“PerformancePersistence,”JournalofFinance,50,pp.679-698.[5]Brown,StephenJ.,WilliamN.Goetzmann,RogerG.Ibbotson,andStephenA.Ross,1992,“SurvivorshipBiasinPerformanceStudies,”ReviewofFinancialStudies,5,pp.553-580.[6]Carhart,Mark,1997,“OnPersistenceinMutualFundPerformance,”JournalofFinance,52,pp.57-82.[7]Chen,Hsiu-Lang,NarasimhanJegadeesh,andRussWermers,1999,“TheValueofActiveMutualFundManagement:AnExaminationoftheStockholdingsandTradesofFundManagers,”JournalofFinancialandQuantitativeAnalysis,forthcoming.[8]Clements,Jonathan,2001,“ResistingtheLureofManagedFunds,”WallStreetJournal,February27,pageC1.[9]Cohen,RandolphB.andChristopherK.Polk,1998,“TheImpactofIndustryFactorsinAsset-PricingTests,”WorkingPaper.[10]Daniel,Kent,MarkGrinblatt,SheridanTitman,andRussWermers,1997,“MeasuringMutualFundPerformancewithCharacteristic-BasedBenchmarks,”JournalofFinance,52,pp.1035-1058.[11]Daniel,KentandSheridanTitman,1997,“EvidenceontheCharacteristicsofCross-SectionalVariationinCommonStockReturns,”JournalofFinance,52,pp.1-33.[12]Edelen,Roger,1999,“InvestorFlowsandtheAssessedPerformanceofOpen-EndMutualFunds,”JournalofFinancialEconomics,53,pp.439-466.[13]Fama,EugeneF.andKennethR.French,1992,“TheCross-SectionofExpectedStockReturns,”JournalofFinance,47,pp.427-465.[14]Fama,EugeneF.andKennethR.French,1993,“CommonRiskFactorsintheReturnsonStocksAndBonds,”JournalofFinancialEconomics,33,pp.3-56.[15]Fama,EugeneF.andKennethR.French,1996,“MultifactorExplanationsofAssetPricingAnomalies,”JournalofFinance,51,pp.55-84.[16]Fama,EugeneF.andJamesD.MacBeth,1973,“Risk,Return,andEquilibrium:EmpiricalTests,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy,81,pp.607-636.[17]Ferson,WayneE.andKennethKhang,2000,“ConditionalPerformanceMeasurementUsingPortfolioWeights:EvidenceforPensionFunds,”WorkingPaper.[18]Ferson,WayneE.andRudiW.Schadt,1996,“MeasuringFundStrategyAndPerformanceInChangingEconomicConditions,”JournalofFinance,51,pp.425-461.[19]Grinblatt,MarkandBingHan,2002,“TheDispositionEffectandMomentum,”WorkingPaper.[20]Grinblatt,MarkandSheridanTitman,1989,“MutualFundPerformance:AnAnalysisofQuarterlyPortfolioHoldings,”JournalofBusiness,62,pp.394-415.[21]Grinblatt,MarkandSheridanTitman,1992,“ThePersistenceofMutualFundPerformance,”JournalofFinance,47,pp.1977-1984.[22]Grinblatt,MarkandSheridanTitman,1993,“PerformanceMeasurementwithoutBenchmarks:AnExaminationofMutualFundReturns,”JournalofBusiness,66,pp.47-68.[23]Grinblatt,Mark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