股票期權(quán)激勵外文翻譯文獻

股票期權(quán)激勵外文翻譯文獻股票期權(quán)激勵外文翻譯文獻(文檔含中英文對照即英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：SOEExecs:GetReadyForStockIncentivesTANWEIStockoptionincentiveplanwillsoonbeavailabletostate-ownedenterpriseexecutives,butwillitleadtogreaterprosperityornewproblems?Atrailblazingnewschemetoinfusestate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)withincentivestockoptionsisunderway.It’saplanthatmaybolstercompanyperformance,butit’snotwithoutrisks.OnAugust15,LiRongrong,MinisteroftheState-ownedAssetsSupervisionandAdministrationCommission(SASAC),disclosedthataftercarefulstudy,astockoptionincentivetrialplanwillbecarriedoutinthelistedSOEs.Accordingtothetrialplan,about102A-sharelistedSOEsareexpectedtobethetrialcompanies.Theshortlistofsomeofthoseexpectingtoparticipateincludes:ChinaUnicom,CiticGroup,KweichowMoutai,ChinaMerchantsBankandBeijingFinancialStreetHoldingCo.Stockoptionincentiveplanisdesignedtoenticeexecutivestoworkhardforthelong-termdevelopmentoftheircompanies.Asstocksrisebasedoncompanyperformance,theytoogainthroughthisprofitsharingarrangement.Thiskindofincentiveplanispopularinforeigncountries,especiallyintheUnitedStates,wherestockoptionscanaccountforashighas70percentofaCEO’sincome.Further,manyeconomistsbelievethestockoptionincentiveplanoptimizescorporategovernancestructure,improvemanagementefficiencyandenhancecorporatecompetitiveness.Ontheotherhand,aftertheMeasuresontheAdministrationofStockIncentivePlansofListedCompanieswasissuedearlythisyear,someofthecompaniesturnedouttohavemisusedtheincentivestockoptions.Theresultwasinsiderdealings,performancemanipulationaswellasamanipulationofthecompanystockprice.“Althoughthestockoptionincentiveschemeisafrequentlyusedtooltoencouragetopmanagement,itcouldalsobeadouble-edgedswordespeciallyinanimmaturemarketeconomy,”Lisaid.TheSASACisthereforetakingacautiousapproach,placingexplicitrequirementsoncorporategovernance,thetargetandextentoftheincentivemeasures,Liadded.Listatedthattheoverseas-listedSOEswouldbethefirstfewcompaniesthatwillimplementthemechanismbecauseoftheirsoundmanagementstructureandlaw-abidingnature.ThenthedomesticlistedSOEswillhavethechancetoembraceincentivestockoptions,whichwouldbepromotedifthetrialresultsweregood.Executiveface-liftAsformorethan900listedSOEs,thepersonnelstructureoftheboardsofdirectorswillprobablyfacesubstantialchange.That’sbecausetheplanstatesthatifthestockoptionincentivemechanismisgoingtobeimplementedinlistedSOEs,externaldirectorsshouldaccountforhalfoftheboardofdirectors.Thetrialplanintroducedtheconceptofexternaldirectorsforthefirsttime.TheexternaldirectorshouldbelegallyrecommendedbydirectorsoflistedSOEs,andshouldnotbeworkinginthelistedSOEsorinaholdingcompany,saidtheplan.However,currently,mostofboardsofdirectorsoflistedSOEsarenotincompliancewiththerequirement.Theyhavetoreadjustthestructureofboardofdirectorstofitinwiththenewmechanism.“FormostoftheSOEswhicharelistedintheA-sharemarket,theirboardsofdirectorsaremadeupofnon-externaldirectorsandindependentdirectors,whichmeansthatapartfromindependentdirectors,membersofboardofdirectorsareallworkingforthelistedcompanyorforthelargeshareholder,”saidZhuYongmin,aneconomistwiththeCentralUniversityofFinanceandEconomics.“Ifthestockoptionincentivemechanismistobecarriedoutinthosecompanies,alarge-scalerestructuringofboardofdirectorsisunavoidableandexternaldirectorsmustbeintroducedintotheboard.”ChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission(CSRC)stipulatesthatanindependentdirectorisonewhodoesn’tholdanotherofficebeyondhisjobasadirector,andhasnosuchrelationswithmajorshareholderthatwouldinterferewiththeexerciseofindependentandobjectivejudgment.“Currently,theindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniescanbecategorizedasexternaldirectors,”Zhusaid.“However,thedefinitionofexternaldirectorismuchbroaderthanindependentdirector.Thosewhoworkforacompanywhichhasbusinesstieswithalistedcompany,thoughtheydonotmeettherequirementsofbeinganindependentdirector,butcanbeconsideredanexternaldirector.”Additionally,thetrialplanalsostipulatesthatthesalarycommitteeoflistedSOEsthatexercisethestockoptionincentivemechanismshouldbecomposedofexternaldirectors.However,formostofthelistedcompanies,therearestillnon-externaldirectors.Asaresult,aconsiderablenumberoflistedSOEsneedtotransformtheirsalarycommitteetofulfilltheprerequisitesofthestockoptionincentivemechanism.Avoidingover-compensationOver-compensationissomethingthatthetrialstockplanistryingtoavoidaswell.Therefore,thetrialplanstatesthatdomesticlistedSOEs’executivesshouldreceivenomorethan30percentoftheirtotalsalary(includingoptionsanddividends).Butasfortheoverseas-listedSOEs,themaximumincentiveis40percentofthetargetsalary.Thetrialplanalsofixesthevolumeofincentivestockoptions.Thetrialplanstatesthatthevolumeofincentivestockoptionsshouldbefixedinaccordancewiththescaleofthelistedcompanyandthenumberofincentiveobjectives.Thenumberofshareallocatedmaynotexceed10percentofthecompany’stotalsharecapitalandnolessthan0.1percent.Infact,BeijingReviewwasinformedbytheCSRCthatsome20listedSOEsalsobeganexploringstockoptionincentiveschemesinthefirsthalfofthisyear.ButnoneofthemreceivedapprovalfromtheCSRCbecausetheirschemesrevealedsharpcontrastwiththetrialplanintermsofthescaleofincentivestockoptionsoffered.Results-orientedUnderthetrialplan,betterperformanceisamusttoobtainstockprivileges.ThenumberofincentivestockoptionsthatseniorexecutivesinlistedSOEscangetdependsontheirannualperformance.Iftheycannotfulfillthetargetedobjectives,thelistedcompanymayhavetherighttotakebacktheincentivethestockoptionsorpurchasethembackatthepriceatwhichtheyweresoldtotheexecutives.ZhuYongminnotedthatthestockoptionincentiveplanisnotinvariable.Thedirectorsoflistedcompanies,seniorexecutives,andcoretechnologicalandmanagementpersonnelmaynotgetthetargetstockoptionsiftheyfailtoachieveasatisfactoryperformance.NofreebiesForsure,statestockswon’tbegiventoexecutivesforfree,underthetrialplan.“Thestatestockshaveprices,”Zhengsaid.“Iftheywerepaidtoseniorexecutivesforfreeinthenameofincentivestocks,itisequaltoalossofstateassets.Toelaborate,theincentivestocksshouldbetheincrementofstocksthatareearnedbytheexecutivesforlistedSOEsaftertheimplementationofthetrialplan,andshouldnotbepreviousstockinventory.Inshort,thepastispast.Onlyfuturestockincreasescanbeusedasincentivestocks.”Further,“TheincentivestocksshouldnotbepaidonlybytheSASAC,whichisthelargestshareholderofallthecentralSOEs,”saidZhengPeimin,ChairmanofShanghaiRealizeInvestmentConsultingCo.,whotookpartindraftingthetrialplan,.“Theincentiveplanshouldbeajointactionofallshareholdersofacompanyandtheyshouldshoulderthesameresponsibilityandenjoyequalbenefit.”Already,shareholderspayforsalariesofdirectors,seniorexecutivesandtechnologymanagementstaff.“Theincentivestocksshouldalsobepaidbyallshareholders.”Zhengsaid.“Forinstance,ifthegovernment,orastateownedenterprise,holds60percentofalistedSOE,theyshouldonlypay60percentoftheincentivestocksand40percentshouldbepaidbyothershareholders.”譯文：國有企業(yè)高管：準備迎接股權(quán)激勵計劃譚衛(wèi)股票期權(quán)激勵計劃將很快應(yīng)用于國有企業(yè)管理人員，但這會帶來更大的繁榮，還是新的問題？一個開創(chuàng)性的計劃正被引入——國有企業(yè)正在實施股票期權(quán)激勵計劃，它可能會增強公司業(yè)績，但它并非沒有風險。8月15日，國資委部長李蓉蓉透露，經(jīng)過仔細研究，股票期權(quán)激勵計劃將要在上市國有企業(yè)試行。根據(jù)計劃，約有102家A股上市國有企業(yè)將要參與此計劃，包括：中國聯(lián)通，中信集團，貴州茅臺，中國招商銀行和北京金融街控股股份有限公司。期權(quán)激勵計劃致力于吸引企業(yè)管理人員專注于他們公司的長遠發(fā)展。由于股票價格是在公司業(yè)績提高的基礎(chǔ)上上升的，他們也通過此來做工作安排。這種激勵計劃在國外很受歡迎，特別是在美國，那里的股票期權(quán)可以占到首席執(zhí)行官的收入的高達百分之七十之多。此外，許多經(jīng)濟學家認為，股??票期權(quán)激勵計劃有助于優(yōu)化公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，提高管理效率，增強公司的競爭力。另一方面，在實施上市公司股權(quán)激勵計劃管理的初期，竟然發(fā)現(xiàn)一些公司誤用激勵股票期權(quán)。其結(jié)果導致內(nèi)幕交易，惡意操縱該公司的股票價格。“雖然股票期權(quán)激勵計劃是一個經(jīng)常使用的工具，但是它亦可以被稱為一把雙刃劍，尤其是在一個不成熟的市場經(jīng)濟體制之下。”李蓉蓉說。因此，國資委采取謹慎的態(tài)度，對于實施股權(quán)激勵計劃的企業(yè)，在企業(yè)管治，目標和獎懲措施的范圍等方面提出了明確的要求，李蓉蓉補充說。李指出，因為海外上市的國有企業(yè)有可靠的管理體制和健全的法律機制，所以他們將是為數(shù)不多的幾家將實現(xiàn)此股權(quán)激勵機制的公司，這一現(xiàn)象也遵從了自然規(guī)律。其后，如果他們的試行被證明是有效地，在國內(nèi)上市的國有企業(yè)將有機會實施期權(quán)激勵。整頓管理層對于上市的900多個國有企業(yè)，董事局的人員結(jié)構(gòu)可能將要面臨實質(zhì)的變化。這是因為該計劃規(guī)定，如果上市公司預期實施期權(quán)激勵機制，外部董事應(yīng)當占上市國有企業(yè)董事會全部董事人數(shù)的一半。在該次計劃的試行中，首次引入了外部董事這一概念。該計劃規(guī)定，外部董事應(yīng)當由上市國有企業(yè)的董事通過合法程序推薦，而不應(yīng)在上市國有企業(yè)或控股公司工作。但是目前，大多數(shù)上市國有企業(yè)的董事會并不符合規(guī)定。他們必須重新調(diào)整董事會結(jié)構(gòu)，以適應(yīng)新的機制要求?！皩τ诖蠖鄶?shù)在A股市場上市的國有企業(yè)，其董事會都是由非外部董事和獨立董事組成，這意味著，除了獨立董事，董事會成員都為上市公司工作，并且持股比例很大。”中央財經(jīng)大學的經(jīng)濟學家朱永敏說。“如果股票期權(quán)激勵機制在這些公司中實施，大規(guī)模改組董事會是不可避免的，外部董事必須加入其中。”中國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會（證監(jiān)會）規(guī)定，獨立董事是指，不在上市公司擔任除董事外的其他職務(wù)，并與其所受聘的上市公司及其主要股東不存在可能妨礙其進行獨立客觀判斷關(guān)系的董事?！澳壳?，上市公司的獨立董事可歸類為外部董事，”朱永敏說，“然而，外部董事的定義比獨立董事更廣泛。有些董事為某其他公司工作，而且此公司與上市公司存在業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)系，雖然他們不符合