IMF：2023年10月亞太地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)展望：可持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)和降通脹面臨的挑戰(zhàn)（執(zhí)行摘要）

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

REGIONAL

ECONOMIC

OUTLOOK

ASIAANDPACIFIC

ChallengestoSustaining

GrowthandDisinflation

2023

OCT

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

REGIONAL

ECONOMIC

OUTLOOK

ASIAANDPACIFIC

ChallengestoSustaining

GrowthandDisinflation

2023

OCT

NAr

Copyright?2023InternationalMonetaryFund

Cataloging-in-PublicationData

IMFLibrary

Names:InternationalMonetaryFund,publisher.

Title:Regionaleconomicoutlook.AsiaandPacific:challengestosustaininggrowthanddisinflation.

Othertitles:AsiaandPacific:challengestosustaininggrowthanddisinflation.|Challengestosustaining

growthanddisinflation.|Worldeconomicandfinancialsurveys.|Regionaleconomicoutlook:AsiaandPacific.

Description:Washington,DC:InternationalMonetaryFund,2023.|Worldeconomicandfinancialsurveys.|Oct.2023.|Includesbibliographicalreferences.

Identifiers:ISBN:

9798400253591(paper)

9798400253720(ePub)

9798400253676(WebPDF)

Subjects:LCSH:Economicforecasting—Asia.|Economicforecasting—PacificArea.|Asia—Economicconditions.|PacificArea—Economicconditions.|Economicdevelopment—Asia.|Economicdevelopment—PacificArea.

Classification:LCCHC412.R442023

TheRegionalEconomicOutlook:AsiaandPacificispublishedtwiceayear,inthespringandfall,toreviewdevelopmentsintheAsiaandPacificregion.BothprojectionsandpolicyconsiderationsarethoseoftheIMFstaffanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFManagement.

Publicationordersmaybeplacedonline,byfax,orthroughthemail:InternationalMonetaryFund,PublicationServices

P.O.Box92780,Washington,DC20090(USA)

T.+(1)202.623.7430

F.+(1)202.623.7201

publications@IMF.org

www.IMF

www.elibrary.IMF.org

iii

Contents

Contents

Acknowledgments v

Definitions vi

ExecutiveSummary vii

1.OutlookforAsiaandthePacific:ChallengestoSustainingGrowthandDisinflation

1

1.1.RecentEconomicDevelopments 1

1.2.FactorsShapingtheOutlook

3

1.3.RiskstotheOutlookAreStillTiltedtotheDownside,albeitMoreBalanced 7

1.4.Policies 8

References

13

2.RecentInflationExperiencesinAsiaandthePacific 1

5

2.1.InflationFacts 15

2.2.InflationPressuresandTheirPropagation 17

2.3.TheRoleofMonetaryPolicy 21

2.4.Conclusions 21

References

22

3.HowWillTrendGrowthinChinaImpacttheRestofAsia?

24

3.1.China’sGrowingImportanceandtheRoleofGVCs 24

3.2.China’sBaseline,Catching-UpPotential,andFragmentationRisks 27

3.3.Model-BasedSpillovers 29

References 32

FIGURES

Figure1.1.GrowthOutturnsinFirstHalfof2023

1

Figure1.2.DevelopmentsinEconomicActivityin2023

2

Figure1.3.Inflation

3

Figure1.4.FinancialConditions

4

Figure1.5.RegionalImpactDuetoChangingUSandChinaGrowthOutlook

5

Figure1.6.OutputLossesinAsia

5

Figure1.7.InflationOutlook

6

Figure1.8.SpilloversfromChina’sGrowth,byDrivers

7

Figure1.9.ImpactofFinancialTightening

8

Figure1.10.Medium-TermRisks

9

Figure1.11.MonetaryTighteningCyclesandFinancialConditionsfromaHistoricalPerspective

9

Figure1.12.MonetaryTransmissionamidEasedFinancialConditions

10

Figure1.13.FinancialStabilityinAsia

11

Figure1.14.FiscalPoliciesinAsia

12

Figure1.15.ClimateAdaptationNeeds

13

Figure2.1.InflationPatterns

16

Figure2.2.ContributionstoHeadlineInflation

17

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ivREGIONALECONOMICOUTLOOK—AsiaandPacific

Figure2.3.DriversofCoreCPIInflationinAsia

18

Figure2.4.EvolutionofLockdownStringency

19

Figure2.5.DriversofProducerPriceIndexInflation

20

Figure2.6.InflationExpectations

20

Figure2.7.SupplyandDemandDriversofDeflatorInflation

21

Figure3.1.China’sGrowingImportanceandtheRoleofGlobalValueChains

25

Figure3.2.China’sGrowingImportanceforAsia

26

Figure3.3.ImpactofGreaterLinkageswithChinaonGrowth

27

Figure3.4.China’sBaseline,Catching-UpPotential,andFragmentationRisks

28

Figure3.5.SpilloversfromUpsideScenarios:Long-TermSpilloversfromReignitingConvergenceinChina

29

Figure3.6.De-RiskingScenarios

31

TABLES

Table1.Asia:RealGDP

34

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND?October2023

Acknowledgmentsv

Acknowledgments

ThisRegionalEconomicOutlookwaspreparedbyateamledbyShanakaJ.PeirisandAlasdairScott,undertheoveralldirectionofKrishnaSrinivasanandThomasHelbling.Chapter1waspreparedbyTristanHennigandYizhiXu(lead),withcontributionsfromMelihFirat,JuliaEstefaniaFlores,PabloGonzalezDominguez,DanielJiménez,PauloMedas,andChrisRedl.Chapter2waspreparedbyPragyanDeb,JuliaEstefaniaFlores,MelihFirat,OtsoHao,DanielJimenéz,ShujaatKhan,SiddharthKothari,ChrisRedl,AlasdairScott(lead),andJohnSpray,withcontributionsfromYanCarrière-Swallow.Chapter3waspreparedbyDiegoA.Cerdeiro(co-lead),JuliaEstefania-Flores,ParisaKamali,SiddharthKothari(co-lead),DirkMuir,ChrisRedl,andWeiningXin,withcontributionsfromPabloGonzalezDominguez,DanielJimenez,andRuiC.Mano.TheonlineboxcontributorsareYizhiXuforBox1.1;YanCarrière-Swallow,PurvaKhera,andKaustubhChahandeforBox1.2;SiddharthKothariforBox2.1;DanielJimenezforBox2.2;ShujaatKhanforBox2.3;andDiegoCerdeiro,ParisaKamali,andSiddharthKothariforBox3.1.MaribelCherresandJudeeYanzonassistedinthepreparationofthereport.CherylToksozoftheIMF’sCommunicationsDepartmenteditedthevolumeandcoordinateditspublicationandrelease.

October2023?INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

viREGIONALECONOMICOUTLOOK—AsiaandPacific

Definitions

InthisRegionalEconomicOutlook:AsiaandPacific,thefollowinggroupingsareemployed:

.“ASEAN”referstoBruneiDarussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,LaoP.D.R.,Malaysia,Myanmar,thePhilippines,Singapore,Thailand,andVietnam,unlessotherwisespecified.

.“ASEAN-5”referstoIndonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,Singapore,andThailand.

.“AdvancedAsia”referstoAustralia,HongKongSAR,Japan,Korea,NewZealand,Singapore,andTaiwanProvinceofChina.

.“EmergingAsia”referstoChina,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,Thailand,andVietnam.

.“SouthAsia”referstoBangladesh,Bhutan,India,Maldives,Nepal,andSriLanka.

.“Asia”referstoASEAN,EastAsia,AdvancedAsia,SouthAsia,andotherAsianeconomies.

.“EU”referstotheEuropeanUnion.

Thefollowingabbreviationisused:

ASEANAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations

Thefollowingconventionsareused:

.Infiguresandtables,shadedareasshowIMFprojections.

.“Basispoints”refertohundredthsof1percentagepoint(forexample,25basispointsareequivalentto?of1percentagepoint).

.“Billion”meansathousandmillion;“trillion”meansathousandbillion.

Asusedinthisreport,theterm“country”doesnotinallcasesrefertoaterritorialentitythatisastateasunder-stoodbyinternationallawandpractice.Asusedhere,thetermalsocoverssometerritorialentitiesthatarenotstatesbutforwhichstatisticaldataaremaintainedonaseparateandindependentbasis.

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND?October2023

ExecutiveSummaryvii

ExecutiveSummary

EconomicactivityinAsiaandthePacificremainsontracktocontributearoundtwo-thirdsofglobalgrowthin2023,despiteachallengingenvironmentshapedbyaglobaldemandrotationfromgoodstoservicesandsynchronizedmonetarytightening.Upsidegrowthsurprisesinthefirsthalfof2023havebeendrivenbyrobustdomesticdemand,reflectinginpartadraw-downinexcesssavings,andbyChina’sreopeningafterthepandemic.However,growthmomentumisslowing,withChina’sreopeninglosingsteamandlacklusterinvest-ment,partlyrespondingtoweakerexternaldemand.Headlineinflationhasdeclinedfrompostpandemicpeaksasglobalcommoditypriceshavereceded.

Growthintheregionisprojectedat4.6percentin2023,anincreasefrom3.9percentin2022,andbroadlyasprojectedintheMay2023RegionalEconomicOutlook.Growthisprojectedtomoderateto4.2percentin2024.TheslowdowninChina’spropertysectorwillweighondemandthroughouttheregion.UpgradestogrowthintheUnitedStatesandJapanwilldolesstooffsetthedragfromChinathanhistoricalpatternssuggest,asglobaldemandisrotatingfromgoodstoservicesandfromforeignsourcestodomesticmanufacturers—bothfactorsthatprovidelessofaboosttotheAsiaandPacificregion.Medium-termgrowthisexpectedtomoderatefurther,to3.9percent,asChina’sstructuralslowdownandweakerproductivitygrowthinmanyothereconomiesweighontheregion—developmentsthatreflectinpartthespecterofglobalde-risking.Inflationisexpectedtofallin2024withincentralbanktargetrangesinmostcountries—afasterpaceofdisinflationthaninotherregions.

Riskstothenear-termoutlook—globallyandintheAsiaandPacificregion—remaintiltedtothedownsidebutaremorebalancedthansixmonthsago.Aweaker-than-expectedrecoveryinChinacouldtriggernegativespill-overstoitstradingpartners.AbruptfinancialtighteningintheUnitedStatesorwithintheregionwouldinhibitgrowth,especiallyinhighlyleveragedeconomiesandsectors.Ontheupside,asoftlanding—withabetteroutlookformanufacturingandcapitalexpenditures,anearlierturningpointofthetechnologycycle,andaccel-erateddisinflationinAsia—isbecomingmoreplausibleandwouldprovidescopeforeasingmonetarypolicyin2024.Medium-termprospectsarecloudedbyrisksfromgeoeconomicfragmentation,withde-riskingpoliciesofmajoreconomiescreatingapotentiallysignificantdragtogrowth.Ontheotherhand,acomprehensivesetofreformsinChinawouldboostmedium-termgrowthprospects,especiallyforsmallerandmoreopeneconomies.Severalemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesareinorclosetodebtdistressandfacerefinancingrisks.Temperaturesandnaturaldisastercostsarerising,particularlyforsomeofthemostvulnerablecountriesinAsia.

Centralbanksshouldcarrythroughwithpoliciestoensurethatinflationisanchoredattargetovertheforecasthorizon.Astightmonetaryconditionscanplacestrainsonfinancialstability,strengtheningfinancialsupervision,vigilantmonitoringofsystemicrisks,andmodernizingresolutionframeworksarecritical.Crediblemedium-termfiscalframeworksandconsolidationcouldsafeguardbudgetaryroomformaneuveranddebtsustainability.

Medium-termoutputlossesrelativetoprepandemictrendsaresizableandinequalityremainshigh,callingforamultiprongedregionalgrowthstrategy.StrengtheningmultilateralcooperationandmitigatingtheeffectsoffragmentationarevitalforAsia’smedium-termoutlook.Atthesametime,therisksposedbyde-riskingstrate-giesacrossallofAsiaonlyaddurgencytotheneedforstructuralpoliciestoboostproductivitygrowth,facilitatethegreentransition,andsecureinclusiveandsustainedgrowth.

October2023?INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

1.OutlookforAsiaandthePacific:ChallengestoSustainingGrowthandDisinflation

1

–15

1.OutlookforAsiaandthePacific:ChallengestoSustainingGrowthandDisinflation1

1.1.RecentEconomicDevelopments

TheglobaleconomicbackdrophasremainedchallengingforeconomiesintheAsiaandPacificregion.Centralbanksfurthertightenedmonetarypolicyacrosstheglobe,althoughthefallinglobalcommoditypricesfrom

their2022peaksupporteddisinflation.ForcefulpolicyactionlimitedcontagionfrombankfailuresintheUnitedStatesandSwitzerlandinthespring.AsAsia’seconomicreopeningfromCOVIDhealthrestrictionstookplacelaterthanelsewhere,theregionbenefitedfromtheassociateddomesticdemandbouncelater.Externaldemandhasbeenslowingnoticeably,however,reflectingtheglobaldemandrotationfromgoodstoservicesandastronger-than-ex-pectedtechnologycycledownturn.

Inthefirstquarteroftheyear,growthintheregiongenerallysurprisedtotheupside,whilesecond-quartersurprisesweretobothsides.Robustprivateconsumptionsupportedgrowth(Figure1.1),ashouseholdsinAsiadrewdownsomeexcesssavingsaccumulatedduringthepandemic(Figure1.2,panels1and2).TheboostfromChina’sreopeninginthefirsthalfoftheyearwasaboveexpectations.StrongprivatedemandyieldedpositivegrowthsurprisesinIndia.GrowthinJapanalsoexceededexpecta-tions,drivenfirstbystrongdomesticdemandandthenbyareboundinautomobileexportsasaresultofsupplychainnormalization.For

Figure1.1.GrowthOutturnsintheFirstHalfof2023

(Percentagepoints,quarter-over-quarter)

20

15

10

5

0

–5

–10

InvestmentPublicconsumption

NetexportsGrowth

Privateconsumption

Statisticaldiscrepancy

2023:23:

Q1Q2

EMAsia

(excl.China

andIndia)

2023:23:

Q1Q2

AEAsia

(excl.Japan)

2023:23:

Q1Q2Japan

ChinaIndia

2023:Q1

2023:Q1

23:Q2

23:Q2

Sources:HaverAnalytics;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:AEAsia(excl.Japan)includesAustralia,HongKongSAR,Korea,NewZealand,andSingapore.EMAsia(excl.ChinaandIndia)includesIndonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,andThailand.Indianumbersare

calculatedonayear-over-yearbasis.AE=advancedeconomy;EM=emergingmarket.

openeconomiesintheregionspecializinginmerchandiseexports—mostlyAssociationofSoutheastAsianNationseconomies,Korea,andTaiwanProvinceofChina—weakglobaldemandforgoodshasbeenadrag,whileservice-orientatedeconomieshaveperformedbetter.

However,morerecentdatasuggestslowinggrowthmomentumacrosstheregion.InChina,therecoveryislosingsteam,withmanufacturingpurchasingmanagers’indexesenteringcontractingterritoryfromApriltoAugustandconditionsintherealestatesectorweakeningfurther(Figure1.2,panels3and4).WhilesomeeconomiesintheregionhavebenefitedfromanincreaseinarrivalsofChinesetourists,China’soutboundtourismisstillfarfromafullrecovery.Fixedinvestmenthasweakened,likelyreflectingexternaldemandweaknessandthetechnologycycle.Therearenowclearsignsofeconomicscarringininvestment,withmarkeddeviationsfromprepandemictrends(Figure1.2,panels5and6).

1TheauthorsofthischapterareTristanHennigandYizhiXu(lead),withcontributionsfromMelihFirat,JuliaEstefaniaFlores,PabloGonzalezDominguez,DanielJiménez,PauloMedas,andChrisRedl.

October2023?INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

2REGIONALECONOMICOUTLOOK—AsiaandPacific

July2022

Aug.22

Sep.22

Oct.22

Nov.22

Dec.22

Jan.23

Feb.23

Mar.23

Apr.23

May23

June23

July23

Aug.23

Sep.23

Dec.2019

Feb.20

Apr.20

June20

Aug.20

Oct.20

Dec.20

Feb.21

Apr.21

June21

Aug.21

Oct.21

Dec.21

Feb.22

Apr.22

June22

Aug.22

Oct.22

Dec.22

Feb.23

Apr.23

June23

Figure1.2.DevelopmentsinEconomicActivityin2023

Privateconsumptionheldup...

1.RetailSales

(Percent,year-over-yearchange)

352515 5–5

–15

China

AsiaEMDE(excl.China)AsiaAE(excl.Japan)

Japan

Aug.2021

Oct.21

Dec.21

Feb.22

Apr.22

June22

Aug.22

Oct.22

Dec.22

Feb.23

Apr.23

June23

Aug.23

Source:HaverAnalytics.

Note:AsiaAEincludesAustralia,HongKongSAR,Japan,Korea,New

Zealand,Singapore,andTaiwanProvinceofChina.AsiaEMDE

includesChina,Indonesia,andVietnam.AE=advancedeconomies;

EMDE=emergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.

China’sreopeningprovidedaboosttoservicesandretailsales,butmanufacturingactivitycontractedfromApriltoAugust...

3.China:ManufacturingandServicesIndexes

(PMIIndexesaresubstractedby50;retailsalesyear-over-yeargrowth)

1510

5

0 –5–10

–15

PMI:Manufacturingactivity

PMI:Servicesbusinessactivity

Retailsales(rightscale)

40

30

20

10

0

–10–20–30–40

Source:HaverAnalytics.

Note:PMI=purchasingmanagers’index.

Weakexternaldemandoverthepastyearhasdraggeddowndomesticinvestment...

5.InvestmentandExportGrowth

(Percent,year-over-yearchange)

AEexportsEMexports

AEinvestment

EMinvestment

30

20

10

0

–10

–20

–30

Dec.

June

Dec.

June

Dec.

June

Dec.

June

Dec.

June

2018181919202021212222

Sources:HaverAnalytics;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:AE=advancedeconomies;EM=emergingmarkets.

Japan

China

...supportedbyhouseholds’excesssavings.

2.CumulativeExcessSaving

(PercentofGDP;cumulativechangesinceendof2019)

AE(excl.Japan)EM(excl.China)

UnitedStates

121086420–2–4

Sources:HaverAnalytics;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:Excesssavingisde?nedasthedifferencebetweenactual

householdsavingandprepandemicprojectedhouseholdsaving.AE(excl.Japan)includesAustralia,HongKongSAR,Korea,New

Zealand,andSingapore.EM(excl.China)includesIndia,Indonesia,Philippines,andThailand.AE=advancedeconomies;EMDE=

emergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.

...andthepropertysectorisshowingrenewedweakness.

4.RealEstateSectorIndicators

(Percent;12-monthmovingaverage,year-over-yearchange)

RealestateinvestmentStartsSales

40

20

0

–20–40

–60

2013:M615:M617:M619:M621:M623:M6

Sources:NBS;andIMFstaffcalculations.

...providinganothersetbacktotheinvestmentrecoveryinAsia’semergingmarkets.

AEcounterfactual

EMcounterfactual

6.RealGrossFixedCapitalFormation

(Relativeto2019:Q4)

EM

AE

July21

July22

July20

Jan.

21

Jan.

22

Jan.

23

Jan.

2020

1.31.21.11.00.9

0.8

Sources:HaverAnalytics;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:Counterfactualassumesaverage2014–19growthrate.

AEsincludeAustralia,Japan,Korea,NewZealand,andSingapore.EMsincludeChina,India,Malaysia,thePhilippines,Thailand,andVietnam.AE=advancedeconomies;EM=emergingmarkets.

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND?October2023

1.OutlookforAsiaandthePacific:ChallengestoSustainingGrowthandDisinflation

3

Figure1.3.In?ation

1.HeadlineIn?ation

(Percentagepointsdeviationfromtarget;year-over-year)

4

AsiaAEsexcl.Japan

Japan

3

2

1

0

–1

–2

–3AsiaEMDEsexcl.China

China

–4

Aug.Nov.Feb.MayAug.Nov.Feb.MayAug.20212122222222232323

Sources:HaverAnalytics;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:AsiaAEincludesAustralia,HongKongSAR,Japan,Korea,

MacaoSAR,NewZealand,Singapore,andTaiwanProvinceofChina.AsiaEMDEincludesBangladesh,China,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Thailand,andVietnam.AEs=advancedeconomies;

EMDE=emergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.

2.CoreIn?ation

(Percent)

Latestcorein?ation(year-over-year)Latestsequentialcorein?ation

(threemonthoverthreemonth)

7

6

5

4

3

2

AUS

PHL

NZL

IND

VNM

KOR

SGP

JPN

IDN

TWN

MYS

HKG

THA

CHN

1

0

Sources:ConsensusForecasts;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:DataasofSeptember7,2023.Countryabbreviationsare

InternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)countrycodes.

Withfallingfoodandenergypricesandrestrictivemonetarystances,headlineinflationinAsiaandthePacifichasgenerallybeendeclining,albeitwithrenewedpricepressuresemergingrecently(Figure1.3,panel1).Coreinflationhasbeeneasingmoregradually,asintherestoftheworld(Figure1.3,panel2).InJapan,inflationhasrisentolevelsnotseenindecadesonpent-updomesticdemand,still-accommodativepolicies,andrisingtouristarrivals.China’sinflationremainslowandwell-belowtarget,reflectingfallingfoodandfuelpricesandstillsizableeconomicslack.HeadlineinflationinIndiaroseinthethirdquarterduetoaweather-relatedvegetablepriceshock.InAustraliaandNewZealand,coreinflationpressuresaremoderatingslowly,withstilltightlabormarketsandpositiveoutputgaps.

TheimpactofmonetarypolicytighteninghasdifferedbetweenadvancedandemergingAsia.Financialcondi-tionsinadvancedeconomiesintheregionexceptforJapanhavetightenedsubstantially(Figure1.4,panel1),asinmostotheradvancedeconomies(October2023GlobalFinancialStabilityReport,Chapter1;Borracciaandothers2023).However,inAsia’semergingmarkets,financialconditionsremainrelativelyaccommodative,assovereignyieldshavenotincreasedmuchsincethetighteningcyclebegan(Figure1.4,panel2;

OnlineBox1.1)

.Reasonsincludestrongdemandfromthedomesticinvestorbase(bothfinancialsectorandcentralbanks)andacompressionintermpremiums.Additionally,AsiancurrencieshaveregainedvalueagainsttheUSdollarandtheChineseyuanthisyear,whilebanklendingconditionshaveremainedfavorable.

1.2.FactorsShapingtheOutlook

AsiaandPacificwillremainthemostdynamicregionthisyear,withgrowthexpectedtorisefrom3.9percentin2022to4.6percentin2023.ChinaandIndiaareprojectedtocontributejointlyabouthalfofworldgrowthinboth2023and2024.IMFstaffestimatethatAsia’sgrowthwillslowto4.2percentin2024andto3.9percentinthemediumterm—thelowestinthepasttwodecadesexceptfor2020.InAsia’sadvancedeconomies,tightfinancialconditionswillholdbackdemand,whiletheoutlookforexportswilldependonpricemovementsofglobal

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4REGIONALECONOMICOUTLOOK—AsiaandPacific

100

70

40

10

–20

–50

–80

–110

Figure1.4.FinancialConditions

1.FinancialConditionIndex

(Standarddeviationsfromhistoricalaverages)

2.52.0 1.5 1.00.5 0–0.5–1.0–1.5–2.0

July2019

Oct.19

Jan.20

Apr.20

July20

Oct.20

Jan.21

Apr.21

July21

Oct.21

Jan.22

Apr.22

July22

Oct.22

Jan.23

Apr.23

UnitedStates

AEAsia(excl.Japan)

EMAsia(excl.China)

Sources:BankforInternationalSettlements;BloombergFinanceL.P.;HaverAnalytics;ThomsonReutersDatastream;andIMFstaff

calculations.

Note:AE=advancedeconomy;EM=emergingmarket.

2.Changesin10-YearLCYSovereignYields

(Basispoints)

Jan.2023to

April2023WEO

April2023WEO

todate

Cumulative

USA

LATAM

E.Europe

NZL

HKG

KOR

JPN

SGP

AUS

THA

PHL

MYS

IND

CHN

IDN

Other

AdvancedAsia

EmergingAsia

Sources:BloombergFinanceL.P.;HaverAnalytics;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:LATAMincludesBrazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,andPeru.

EasternEuropeincludesCroatia,CzechRepublic,Hungary,Poland,

andSlovakia.AprilWEOde?nedasdateofWEOpressrelease(April

11,2023).CountryabbreviationsareInternationalOrganizationfor

Standardization(ISO)countrycodes.LCY=localcurrency;

WEO=WorldEconomicOutlook.

commodities(Australia,NewZealand)andthetechnologycycle(Korea,Singapore,TaiwanProvinceofChina).InAsia’semergingmarkets,relativelyaccommodativefinancialconditionswillsupportdomesticdemanddespitemonetarypolicytightening,butexternaldemandandlacklusterinvestmentwillbeheadwindstogrowth.

China’sweakernear-termgrowthoutlookwillweighonregionalgrowth.TheChineseeconomyisexpectedtoexpandby5percentin2023andby4.2percentin2024.ComparedtotheApril2023WorldEconomicOutlook,thisisadownwardrevisionof0.2and0.3percentagepoints,respectively.Itreflectsmainlyrenewedweaknessinthepropertysector,asdiscussedearlier,despitemorepolicysupportthanpreviouslyassumed.

Theglobaldemandrotationtowardserviceswillbeaheadwindfortheregionforsometime,despiteastrongerUSgrowthoutlook.Owingtostrongbusinessinvestmentandresilientconsumptiongrowth,USgrowthfor2023and2024wasupgradedintheOctober2023WorldEconomicOutlookby0.5and0.4percentagepoints,respectively,comparedtoApril.WhilethelargeupgradetoUSgrowthcomparedtoasmallerdowngradeforChinawouldnormallybeanetpositivefortheregion,thecompositionofUSdemandmaymeanthatAsiawillbenefitlessthistime,forthreereasons:first,therotationindemandfromgoodstoserviceshasbeenreflectedinlacklusterglobalgoodsimportsbutrisingglobalservicesimports(Figure1.5,panel1).Second,thedemandforelectronicgoodshasalsomoderated—astill-lowbook-to-billratiosuggestsadelayedturningofthetechnologycycle.Third,de-riskingpoliciesbymajoreconomiesarereorientingdemandforgoodstowarddomesticinsteadofimportsupplies.EmpiricalanalysisthataccountsforthesecontrastingchangesinthedemandforgoodsandservicesintheUnitedStatesandChinashowsthattheneteffectisstillpositivefortherestofAsia,butwitharelativelysmallandshort-livedimpact(Figure1.5,panel2).

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2020:Q1

20:Q2

20:Q3

20:Q4

21:Q1

21:Q2

21:Q3

21:Q