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GermanCouncilonForeign

RelationsNo.

22July2023POLICY

BRIEFZEITENWENDEEmissions

Mitigationasa

NationalSecurity

InvestmentGermany’s

?rst

National

Security

Strategy

identi?es

sustainabilityasa

pillarofpeace

and

stability.

However,

innavigating

therecentenergy

crisisresulting

from

Russia’s

invasion

of

Ukraine,

the

govern-ment

has

prioritizedshort-term

crisismanagementover

long-termclimategoals.

Ifthe

Zeitenwende

isto

bea

largerpolicy

shift,

Chan-cellor

OlafScholz

needs

to

drive

the

cabinet

to

re-prioritizerapiddecarbonizationto

meetclimate

obligations.Fostering

indepen-dence

fromfossil-fuel

autocracies

andaverting

thedisintegrationofthe

multilaterale?orts

to

protect

theglobal

commons

lay

the

basisfor

freedom

and

security.TimBoschProjectManager,CenterforClimateandForeignPolicy–

InlinewiththeNationalSecurityStrategy’sstressonapre-ventiveapproach,rapidemissionsreductionsarecrucialformaintainingthecountry’seconomicresilienceandcredibilityasaleaderonclimateaction.LoyleCampbellResearchFellow,

CenterforClimateandForeignPolicy–

Increasingecosystem

collapse

and

life-threatening

extremeevents

will

move

multilateral

andplurilateral

climateactionandthe

race

to

lead

ingreentechnologies

center

stage

ingeopolitics.–

Thegreentransitionnecessitatestheengagementofnotjustthestatebutofallstakeholders,includingbusinessandindivid-uals.

Theresponsesto

theCOVID-19pandemicandtheenergycrisisprovidevaluablelessonsfortherequiredshift.Dr.

KiraVinkeHeadoftheCenterforClimateandForeignPolicy–

Europeano?shorewindandcirculareconomyprojectswouldhave

climatemitigatione?ectsandprovideopportunitiestobolsterGermany’sgeopoliticalpositionandeconomicoutlook.2No.

22|

July2023EmissionsMitigationasa

NationalSecurityInvestmentPOLICY

BRIEFThe

Geopolitics

of

the

Zeitenwende

inbehavior,helpedavoidthe

moreseverepredictedim-pactsoftheenergycrisisoverthepastyear.the

EnergyCrisisRussia’sroleasthedominantoilandnaturalgassup-plier

for

Germany

placed

energy

policy

at

the

heart

Thegovernmentdescribesnaturalgasasashort-to-of

the

Zeitenwende.

While

many

actors

had

already

medium-term

bridging

technology

while

Germanyraised

concerns

about

these

import

dependencies,

scales

up

renewables

and

decarbonizes

industrialthe

full-scale

invasion

of

Ukraine

in

February

2022

activity.

However,

the

concern

is

that

itwill

be

usedforcedanacuterealizationofthedepthofGermany’s

for

longer

than

needed

and

that

LNG

infrastructurevulnerability.

The

situation

was

aggravatedby

thede-

and

contracts

may

lock

natural

gas

into

the

ener-1structionof

theNord

Streampipelines.In

hisFebru-

gy

mix.

For

instance,

the

country’s

import

capacityary

2022Zeitenwendespeech,ChancellorOlafScholz

mayexceeddemandfrom2030.

Companycontracts6stated

that

a

responsible

and

farsighted

energy

forLNGimportsstretchoveraperiodof

15years.

In7policy

would

improve

energysecurity.

Thisistobe

2022

theEUimported60percent

more

LNG

thanin2realized

by

scalingupthedeploymentof

renewables

2021,

and

two-thirds

of

this

new

supply

came

fromto

increase

autonomy

of

supply

and

by

diversifying

the

United

States.

While

the

transatlantic

alliance8energyimports.is

crucial,

new

asymmetrical

energy

relations

couldleaveEuropevulnerableifAmericanpolicychanges.Germany

subsequentlyleased

?oating

lique?ed

natu-ralgas(LNG)importcapacityoffitscoast,withthese

These

developments

are

part

of

an

internationalbecoming

operational

within

months.

It

facilitated

trend

of

expansion

of

gas

investments

that

under-this

through

a

quick

legislative

process

and

a

mobi-

mines

declared

ambitions

to

fulfill

the

goals

of

thelization

of

funding.

According

to

Scholz,

this

“new

ParisClimateAgreement.Itisestimatedthatifallthe3German

speed”

should

be

a

blueprint

for

economic

LNGinfrastructureplannedglobally

wasrealized,thetransformationasawhole.

Atthesametime,energy

capacityin2030wouldamountto235

percentcom-4companiessoughtLNGimportsontheglobalmarket

paredto2022levels.Internationally,thiswouldimplyto

supply

to

Germany.The

quantities

secured

thus

far

asurplusof1.9gigatonsofcarbondioxideequivalentaresigni?cant,althoughindividualcontractsaccount

compared

to

capacities

compatible

with

net-zeroonlyforasmallshareofthecurrentlevelofLNGde-

scenariosbymid-century.9mand.

Thesesteps,alongwithchangesinconsumer512Russiasupplied55percentofGermany’snaturalgasneedsin2021.

SeeBundesministeriumfürWirtschaftundKlimaschutz(FederalMinistryofEconomyandClimateProtection),“FAQ-Liste

LNG-TerminalinDeutschland,”March6,2022:https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/F/faq-liste-lng-terminal-in-deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8(accessedJune12,

2023).TheFederalGovernment,“PolicystatementbyOlafScholz,ChancelloroftheFederalRepublicofGermanyandMemberoftheGermanBundestag,27

February2022

inBerlin,”February22,

2022:

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378(accessedJune12,

2023).345EdwardDonelly,

“WashinterdemglobalenLNG-Boomsteckt,”Klimareporter,May2,

2023:https://www.klimareporter.de/?nanzen-wirtschaft/was-hinter-dem-globalen-lng-boom-steckt(accessedJune27,

2023).TheFederalGovernment,“FederalChancellorScholzaddressestheWorldEconomicForum:Itisnowcrystal-clearthatthefuturebelongssolelytorenewables,”January18,2023:

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/search/scholz-wef-2023-2158700

(accessedJune12,

2023).Inthefallof2022,

theGermangovernmentengageddiplomaticallytofacilitateadealforLNGdeliveriesfromQatar.

TheagreementwasenabledbyGermanMinisterofEconomyRobertHabeckandconcludedbetweenasubsidiaryoftheUScompanyConocoPhillipsandstate-ownedQatarEnergy.Startingfrom2026,

the15-yearsupplycontractsecuresamaximumquantityof2

milliontonsLNGannually(equivalentto2.7

billioncubicmeters(bcm))tobedeliveredbyshiptothenewGermanLNGterminalinBrunsbüttel.

To

putthequantitiesof2.7bcm

incontext,Germany’stotaldemandin2021

was90.5

bcm.At

theendof2022,

theGermanenergyutilityRWEalsosecureda15-yearcontractwiththeUScompanySempraInfrastructure,foravolumeof2.25

milliontonsofLNGannually.SeeKathrinWitschandKlausStratmann,“DeutschlandsGas-DealmitKatardecktnurBruchteildesLNG-Bedarfsab,”

Handelsblatt,November29,

2022:

/politik/international/?uessiggas-deutschlands-gas-deal-mit-katar-deckt-nur-bruchteil-des-lng-bedarfs-ab/28837006.html#:~:text=F%C3%BCr%20Deutschland%20ist%20der%2015,5%20Milliarden%20Kubikmeter%20Erdgas%20verbraucht(accessedJune27,

2023);

ConocoPhillips,?ConocoPhillipsandQatarEnergyAgreetoProvideReliableLNGSuppytoGermany“,November29,

2022:

/news-media/story/conocophillips-and-qatarenergy-agree-to-provide-reliable-lng-supply-to-germany(accessedJuly7,2023);

“RWEschlie?tLNG-VertragmitUS-Unternehmen,”

Tagesschau,December28,

2022:https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/lng-?uessigerdgas-rwe-usa-101.html(accessedJune27,

2023).67LoyleCampbellandLeonieOechtering,“TheGermanGreens’IdentityCrisis,”IPQuarterly,May2,

2023:

/en/german-greens-identity-crisis(accessedJune12,

2023).

ConcernsaboutapotentialoversupplyofLNGarenourishedbylong-termprojectplanning,suchasadditionalterminalsontheislandofRügen.See“BundestagstimmtfürBauvonLNG-TerminalsaufRügen“,ZeitOnline,July7,2023:

https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2023-07/?uessigerdgas-lng-terminal-ruegen-mukran-bundestag-zustimmung(accessedJuly10,

2023).RWEschlie?tLNG-VertragmitUS-Unternehmen,”

Tagesschau,December28,

2022:

https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/lng-?uessigerdgas-rwe-usa-101.htmlhttps://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/lng-?uessigerdgas-rwe-usa-101.html(accessedJune27,

2023).

InternationalEnergyAgency,“HowtoavoidgasshortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023,“

December2022:

/assets/96ce64c5-1061-4e0c-998d-fd679990653b/HowtoAvoidGasShortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023.pdf(accessedJuly7,2023).89InternationalEnergyAgency,“HowtoavoidgasshortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023,“

December2022:

/assets/96ce64c5-1061-4e0c-998d-fd679990653b/HowtoAvoidGasShortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023.pdf(accessedJuly7,2023).ClimateAction

Tracker,

“Massivegasexpansionrisksovertakingpositiveclimatepolicies,”November10,

2022:/publications/massive-gas-expansion-risks-overtaking-positive-climate-policies(lastaccessedJune12,

2023).No.

22|

July20233POLICY

BRIEFEmissionsMitigationasa

NationalSecurityInvestmentGermany

also

increased

the

use

of

emissions-in-

frastructural

path

dependencies

hastily

created

aretensivecoalpowertomakeupfornear-termsupply

harminginternationalclimatecooperation.Inpartic-shortages.

In

2022,

the

share

of

coal

in

the

elec-

ular,countriesmarkedbysevere

energy

povertymaytricity

mix

increased

by

8.4

percent,

up

to

about

become

more

reluctant

to

adjust

their

developmentone-thirdofit,comparedtothepreviousyear.

Be-

pathwaytomeetclimatetargets.10sides

putting

emissions

reduction

targets

at

risk,Germany’s

different

measures

also

create

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foreign

The

need

to

diversify

and

avoid

dependencies

ispolicy

dilemma

for

it.

The

country’s

continued

use

Germany’sguidingprincipleforaction.Thiscanalsoof

coal

and

other

fossil

fuels

signi?cantly

weakens

beobservedinotherpolicy?elds,suchasthesupplyits

legitimacy

when

calling

on

other

countries

to

of

critical

raw

materials

or

the

production

and

im-phaseoutfossil

fuels.port

of

high-tech

products.

Renewable

energy

andindustrial

transformation

toward

climate

neutrali-Beyond

thephasingoutof

fossilfuels,otherareasof

tyareinstrumentalforthecountry’senergysecuritythe

domestic

energy

transition

are

also

lagging.

For

and

independence,

for

strengthening

its

geopoliti-example,

the

buildup

of

renewable

energies

and

the

cal

resilience,

and

for

reducing

emissions.

However,electri?cation

of

key

sectors,

particularly

the

build-

an

approach

that

reconciles

short-term

geopoliti-ings

and

industry

sector,

are

not

proceeding

fast

cal

considerations

withlong-term

climate

goals

hasenough

to

meet

Germany’s

national

net-zero

goals

beenhardtorealizeinthefaceoftheenergycrisis.setfor2045.11Addressing

the

Planetary

CrisisWhilenewwarmingrecordsareset,withundeniable

A

larger

policy

shift

in

the

wake

of

the

release

ofhuman

security

implications,

all

factors

point

to

the

Germany’s

National

Security

Strategy

in

June

2023conclusion

that

policy

changes

are

too

slow

and

in-

should

take

geopolitical

and

climate

risks

alike

in-crementaltoavoidcatastrophicclimateimpacts.toaccounttobedecisive.Scienti?cevidenceshowsincreasing

climatic

threats

to

human

wellbeing,12Germany’s

nationally

incoherent

governance

of

the

prosperity,

and

security.

The

Intergovernmentalcommonsalsocreatesaforeignpolicydilemma:The

Panel

on

Climate

Change

(IPCC)

has

assessed

withcontinued

use

of

coal

and

other

fossil

fuels

signi?-

high

confidence

that

already

today

“(s)ome

trop-cantly

weakens

its

legitimacy

when

calling

on

other

ical,

coastal,

polar

and

mountain

ecosystems

havecountriestophaseoutfossilfuels.reached

hard

adaptation

limits.”

Global

risks

are13becoming

more

acute

as

tipping

points

near,

po-Thus,

the

Zeitenwende

currently

focuses

on

manag-

tentially

leading

to

rapid

and

increasingly

irrevers-ing

immediate

geopolitical

risks

and

does

not

fully

ible

changes.

Certain

natural

systems

such

as

the14address

longer-term

climate

considerations

andthe

Greenland

ice

sheet

may

be

reaching

their

tippingdiplomatic

setbacks

that

affect

relations

with

gov-

point

already

below

2°Cglobal

warming,

condemn-ernmentsindevelopingcountriesonwhichGermany

ing

future

generations

to

experience

several

me-depends

for

resource

imports

for

the

green

transi-

ters

of

sea-level

rise.

Climate

change

and

other15tion.AsGermany,

Europe’s

largest

emitterof

green-

anthropogenic

pressures

thus

put

at

risk

the

rel-housegases(GHG),

hasprioritizeditsenergysupply

ative

earth

system

stability

that

has

been

the

ba-and

maintaining

the

status

quo

over

its

commit-

sis

for

human

development

and

prosperity

over

thements

to

lower

the

burdenit

puts

on

impoverished

past

12,000

years.

A

recent

assessment

quantifiescommunities

at

the

forefront

of

the

climate

crisis.

the

earth

system

boundaries

with

regard

to

climateWhile

this

“Germany-?rst”policymaybe

deemedac-

andairpollution,fertilizers,biodiversity,andfresh-ceptable

in

an

acute

crisis,

the

contractual

and

in-

water,

andconcludesthatmultipleboundarieshave10

DESTATIS

StatistischesBundesamt,“Stromerzeugung2022:

EinDrittelausKohle,einViertelausWindkraft,”PressemitteilungNr.

090,

March9,2023:https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/03/PD23_090_43312.html

(accessedJune29,

2023).11

The

Transformation

Tracker,

atooloftheCopernicusProjectAriadne,providesastructuredassessmentofthestateofGermany’senergytransitioninvariouscategories.See

Transformation

Tracker,

Ariadne-Projekt:https://tracker.ariadneprojekt.de

(accessedJune29,

2023).12

ClimateR,ClimateChangeInstitute,UniversityofMaine,“Daily2-meterAir

Temperature,”lastupdatedJuly8,2023:/clim/t2_daily

(accessedJuly10,

2023).13

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,“ClimateChange2023.

SynthesisReport.SummaryforPolicymakers,”March2023,

para.A.3.5:https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf

(accessedJune12,

2023).14

TimothyM.Lentonetal.,“Climatetippingpoints–tooriskytobetagainst,”Nature575,November28,

2019,pp.592–595:/articles/d41586-019-03595-0

(accessedJuly6,2022).15

DavidI.ArmstrongMcKayetal.,“Exceeding1.5°Cglobalwarmingmaytriggermultipleclimatetippingpoints,”Science377,

Issue6611,September9,2022:

/doi/10.1126/science.abn7950

(accessedJune12,

2023).4No.

22|

July2023EmissionsMitigationasa

NationalSecurityInvestmentPOLICY

BRIEFbeencrossed.

Thismeansthathumanity’slife-sup-

suf?cient

and

shifted

the

burden

of

climate

mitiga-16port

systems

are

in

danger.

Vulnerable

populations

tion

to

the

future,

thus

infringing

on

the

freedom

of(especially

in

the

Global

South)

are

already

acute-

future

generations.

The

revised

law

from

2021

tar-19ly

affected

by

climate

impacts

and

biodiversity

de-

getsemissionsreductionsof65percentby2030andcrease,

endangering

human

security,

and

leading

to

88

percent

by

2040

compared

to

1990

levels,

andlossesanddamages.

ImpactsinEuropearealsoin-

net-zeroemissionsby2045.17creasingly

putting

at

risk

the

population’s

securityand

health.

For

instance,

a

recent

study

estimates

Germany’s

track

record

onemissionsmitigationun-thatmorethan61,000heat-relateddeathsoccurred

dermines

the

credibility

of

these

targets.

It

onlyinEurope

duringthesummerof

2022.achieved

its

target

for

2020

due

to

the

economic18fallout

of

the

COVID-19

pandemic,

and

the

sub-20sequent

2021

target

was

missed

again.

The

FederalEnvironment

Agency

projects

that

Germanyisset

tomissitslong-termmitigationtargets.21Existing

governancestructures

providea

frameworkDelivering

on

emission

reductions

is

not

just

a

legalobligation;it

alsoservesGermany’sforeignpolicyin-terests.

First,

continued

and

accelerated

domesticemissions

mitigation

is

a

prerequisite

for

the

coun-try

to

be

able

to

promote

climate

protection

in-ternationally.

Germany’s

decision

to

prolong

andexpand

its

fossil

fuel

use

because

of

the

energy

cri-sis

may

have

weakened

itslong-term

credibilityandchallenged

its

often-claimed

role

as

a

leader

on

theenergytransition.for

swift

emissionsmitigationThese

recent

risk

assessments

reaffirm

the

im-portance

of

the

targets

of

the

2015

Paris

Agree-

Second,

climate

change

should

be

seen

as

a

cross-ment,

which

obliges

states

to

limit

global

warming

cutting

risk

factor

that

increasingly

affects

securityto

well

below

2°C,

and

ideally

to

below

1.5°C.

Exist-

policy,

geopolitics,

and

economic

security.

Accord-ing

governance

structures

provide

a

framework

for

ingtotheIPCC,“Roughlyhalfof

theworld’s

popula-swiftemissionsmitigationby

Germany.

First,theEU

tion

currently

experience

severe

water

scarcity

forGreen

Deal

legislation

sets

clear

steps

that

mem-

at

least

part

of

the

year

due

to

a

combination

of

cli-ber

states

should

take

to

reduce

emissions.

Second,

matic

and

non-climatic

drivers.”

Food

insecurity22Germany

is

legally

obliged

to

swiftly

phase

out

fos-

is

also

exacerbated

by

climate

impacts

in

many

re-silfuels.TheFederal

ClimateProtection

Lawof

2019

gions,includingEurope,andisidenti?edasa?eldoforiginally

mandated

annual

emissions

reductions

action

in

Germany’s

National

Security

Strategy.

Cli-and

monitoring

until

2030.

It

became

more

strin-

mate-related

changes

in

weather

patterns

ampli-gent

after

the

Federal

Constitutional

Court

ruled

in

fy

the

risk

of

heat

and

drought

conditions

that

may2021thatitwas

partiallyunconstitutional.Thecourt

lead

to

crop

failures

in

major

breadbasket

regions.23found

that

the

law’s

medium-term

targets

were

in-

Such

events

will

increasingly

occur

simultaneously16

JohanRockstr?metal.,“SafeandjustEarthsystemboundaries,”Nature,May31,

2023:/articles/s41586-023-06083-8

(accessedJune29,

2023).17

For

acloserexaminationofthesesecuritydimensionsofclimatechangeundertheterms“planetarysecurity”and“climateimpacts,”seeTimBoschandKiraVinke,“IntegratingClimateinGermany’sNationalSecurityStrategy,”DGAPPolicyBriefNo.

27/2022,

September2022,

pp.

2-4:/system/?les/article_pdfs/DGAP-Policy-Brief-2022-27-EN_3.pdf

(accessedJune27,

2023).18

JoanBallesteretal.,“Heat-relatedmortalityinEuropeduringthesummerof2022,”

NatureMedicine,July10,

2023:/articles/s41591-023-02419-z

(accessedJuly11,2023).19

DanaSchirwon,“TheGermanFederalConstitutionalCourt’sRevolutionaryClimateRuling,”DGAPOnlineCommentary,April20,2022:/en/research/publications/german-federal-constitutional-courts-revolutionary-climate-ruling

(accessedJune12,

2023).20

BundesministeriumfürUmwelt,Naturschutz,nukleareSicherheitundVerbraucherschutz,“Treibhausgasemissionensinken2020

um8,7Prozent,”March16,2021:

https://www.bmuv.de/pressemitteilung/treibhausgasemissionen-sinken-2020-um-87-prozent

(accessedJune12,

2023).21

Umweltbundesamt,“Projektionsberichte(integrierteEnergie-und

THG-Projektionen,”December22,

2022:https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz-energiepolitik-in-deutschland/szenarien-fuer-die-klimaschutz-energiepolitik/integrierte-energie-treibhausgasprojektionen#Berichterstattung

(accessedJune12,

2023).22

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,“ClimateChange2023.

SynthesisReport.SummaryforPolicymakers,”March2023,

para.A.2.4:https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf

(accessedJune12,

2023).23

SeealsoKaiKornhuberetal.,“Ampli?edRossbywavesenhanceriskofconcurrentheatwavesinmajorbreadbasketregions,”NatureClimateChange10,December9,2019,pp.48-53:

/articles/s41558-019-0637-z

(accessedJune12,

2023).No.

22|

July20235POLICY

BRIEFEmissionsMitigationasa

NationalSecurityInvestmentFigure

1

Humanity’s

Most

Pressing

Common

Security

Risk

–Surpassing

of

Earth

System

BoundariesSAFE

&

JUST

SPACEAERO

SO

LPO

LLUTANTS*DANGER

ZONELESSERGREATERCLIM

ATESAFE

&

JUST

BOUNDARYSAFE

BOUNDARYJUST

BOUNDARYPHO

SPHO

RUSNATURALECO

SYSTEM

SFertilizersBiodiversityWO

RKINGLANDSCAPES**NITRO

GENGRO

UNDWATERSURFACEWATERFreshwaterThis

graph

shows

partsof

the

EarthSystem

that

are

vital

for

the

resilience

and

stability

of

our

planet

as

well

as

the

life

of

humansthat

depend

on

it

(Rockstr?met

al.

2022,

102).

Building

on

prior

work(see

Ste?enet

al.

2015),

scientistsidenti?ed

boundaries

tothesesystems,thetransgressionofwhichwouldputtheplanet’sresilienceatriskandexposehumansto

signi?cantharm.

Theframeworkdistinguishesbetween“safe”and“just”

boundaries.“Safe”boundariespertain

tothepreservation

ofthefunctioningoftheEarth

Sys-tem

and

the

extent

to

which

it

supportsthe

survivalof

humans

and

other

living

organisms.

“Just”

boundaries

consider

the

circum-stances

required

to

avert

signi?cant

harm

to

people.

The

justice

assessment

includes

considerations

of

1)

interspecies

justice

andEarthSystemstability,

2)intergenerationaljustice,and3)intragenerationaljustice(Rockstr?metal.2022,103).

Whileinmostcasesthesafeandjustboundariesarealigned,justiceconsiderationsputadditionalconstraintsontheclimateandaerosolpollutantsdi-mensions.Overall,sevenoutoftheeightEarthSystemboundarieshavebeentransgressed(Ibid.).*The

just

boundary

has

been

breached

in

many

places

locally,

but

is

still

to

be

assessed

at

the

global

level

|

**

Urban,

forest,

andagriculturalareas

|

Sources:GlobalCommonsAlliance,“SafeandJustEarthSystemBoundariespublishedinNature,”May3

1,

2023:/news/earth-commission/safe-and-just-earth-system-boundaries-published-in-nature/(accessedJuly11,

2023);WillSte?enet.al.“Planetaryboundaries:Guidinghumandevelopmentonachangingplanet.”Science347,Issue6223,January15

,2015:

/doi/10.1126/science.1259855

(accessedJuly10

,2023).JohanRockstr?metal.,“SafeandjustEarth

systemboundaries,”Nature,May31,

2023:/articles/s41586-023-06083-8(accessedJune29,

2023).6No.

22|

July2023EmissionsMitigationasa

NationalSecurityInvestmentPOLICY

BRIEFwithgeopoliticalcrises.Globalfood

supply

shortag-

dosoare?xed.29

Threelargersocietalshiftswillneedescausedby

thewar

inUkraine–animportantpro-

toberealizedtodeliveronambitious

climate

targets:ducer

for

countries

beyond

Europe

demonstratesthedangerof

climaticandnon-climaticcrisesinter-

First,

recognizing

the

disruptive

implications

of

thesecting.

Climate-induced

extreme

conditions

pose

Zeitenwenderequiresrequireslearningfromthepastsevere

risks

to

supply

chains

and

have

the

potential

andrethinkinghowGermanyapproachestheclimateto

undermine

infrastructure,

including

those

instal-

emergency.

TheCOVID-19

pandemicandtheenergylationsthatarecriticalforthegreentransition.24crisis

demonstrated

that

countries

are

able

to

makequick,

transformative

responses

to

emergencies

inIn

this

context,

national

and

international

efforts

to

terms

of

technological

innovation,

speed

of

policyavert

accelerated

climate

change

should

be

seen

as

implementation,

as

well

as

societal

and

behavioralaninvestment

withbene?tsacrossmultiplesectors.

change.

A

mix

of

regulatory

measures

and

respon-Germany’s

National

Security

Strategy

is

broadly

in

sible

behavioral

change

helped

avoid

the

worst

im-line

with

this

conception

as

it

reiterates

the

role

of

pacts

of

COVID-19

in

Germany.

Similarly,

when

theinternational

processes

as

well

as

European

and

na-

energy

crisis

hit

last

winter,

Germans

quickly

savedtional

climate

and

environmental

goals

for

the

pro-

relatively

large

quantities

of

natura

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