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GermanCouncilonForeign
RelationsNo.
22July2023POLICY
BRIEFZEITENWENDEEmissions
Mitigationasa
NationalSecurity
InvestmentGermany’s
?rst
National
Security
Strategy
identi?es
sustainabilityasa
pillarofpeace
and
stability.
However,
innavigating
therecentenergy
crisisresulting
from
Russia’s
invasion
of
Ukraine,
the
govern-ment
has
prioritizedshort-term
crisismanagementover
long-termclimategoals.
Ifthe
Zeitenwende
isto
bea
largerpolicy
shift,
Chan-cellor
OlafScholz
needs
to
drive
the
cabinet
to
re-prioritizerapiddecarbonizationto
meetclimate
obligations.Fostering
indepen-dence
fromfossil-fuel
autocracies
andaverting
thedisintegrationofthe
multilaterale?orts
to
protect
theglobal
commons
lay
the
basisfor
freedom
and
security.TimBoschProjectManager,CenterforClimateandForeignPolicy–
InlinewiththeNationalSecurityStrategy’sstressonapre-ventiveapproach,rapidemissionsreductionsarecrucialformaintainingthecountry’seconomicresilienceandcredibilityasaleaderonclimateaction.LoyleCampbellResearchFellow,
CenterforClimateandForeignPolicy–
Increasingecosystem
collapse
and
life-threatening
extremeevents
will
move
multilateral
andplurilateral
climateactionandthe
race
to
lead
ingreentechnologies
center
stage
ingeopolitics.–
Thegreentransitionnecessitatestheengagementofnotjustthestatebutofallstakeholders,includingbusinessandindivid-uals.
Theresponsesto
theCOVID-19pandemicandtheenergycrisisprovidevaluablelessonsfortherequiredshift.Dr.
KiraVinkeHeadoftheCenterforClimateandForeignPolicy–
Europeano?shorewindandcirculareconomyprojectswouldhave
climatemitigatione?ectsandprovideopportunitiestobolsterGermany’sgeopoliticalpositionandeconomicoutlook.2No.
22|
July2023EmissionsMitigationasa
NationalSecurityInvestmentPOLICY
BRIEFThe
Geopolitics
of
the
Zeitenwende
inbehavior,helpedavoidthe
moreseverepredictedim-pactsoftheenergycrisisoverthepastyear.the
EnergyCrisisRussia’sroleasthedominantoilandnaturalgassup-plier
for
Germany
placed
energy
policy
at
the
heart
Thegovernmentdescribesnaturalgasasashort-to-of
the
Zeitenwende.
While
many
actors
had
already
medium-term
bridging
technology
while
Germanyraised
concerns
about
these
import
dependencies,
scales
up
renewables
and
decarbonizes
industrialthe
full-scale
invasion
of
Ukraine
in
February
2022
activity.
However,
the
concern
is
that
itwill
be
usedforcedanacuterealizationofthedepthofGermany’s
for
longer
than
needed
and
that
LNG
infrastructurevulnerability.
The
situation
was
aggravatedby
thede-
and
contracts
may
lock
natural
gas
into
the
ener-1structionof
theNord
Streampipelines.In
hisFebru-
gy
mix.
For
instance,
the
country’s
import
capacityary
2022Zeitenwendespeech,ChancellorOlafScholz
mayexceeddemandfrom2030.
Companycontracts6stated
that
a
responsible
and
farsighted
energy
forLNGimportsstretchoveraperiodof
15years.
In7policy
would
improve
energysecurity.
Thisistobe
2022
theEUimported60percent
more
LNG
thanin2realized
by
scalingupthedeploymentof
renewables
2021,
and
two-thirds
of
this
new
supply
came
fromto
increase
autonomy
of
supply
and
by
diversifying
the
United
States.
While
the
transatlantic
alliance8energyimports.is
crucial,
new
asymmetrical
energy
relations
couldleaveEuropevulnerableifAmericanpolicychanges.Germany
subsequentlyleased
?oating
lique?ed
natu-ralgas(LNG)importcapacityoffitscoast,withthese
These
developments
are
part
of
an
internationalbecoming
operational
within
months.
It
facilitated
trend
of
expansion
of
gas
investments
that
under-this
through
a
quick
legislative
process
and
a
mobi-
mines
declared
ambitions
to
fulfill
the
goals
of
thelization
of
funding.
According
to
Scholz,
this
“new
ParisClimateAgreement.Itisestimatedthatifallthe3German
speed”
should
be
a
blueprint
for
economic
LNGinfrastructureplannedglobally
wasrealized,thetransformationasawhole.
Atthesametime,energy
capacityin2030wouldamountto235
percentcom-4companiessoughtLNGimportsontheglobalmarket
paredto2022levels.Internationally,thiswouldimplyto
supply
to
Germany.The
quantities
secured
thus
far
asurplusof1.9gigatonsofcarbondioxideequivalentaresigni?cant,althoughindividualcontractsaccount
compared
to
capacities
compatible
with
net-zeroonlyforasmallshareofthecurrentlevelofLNGde-
scenariosbymid-century.9mand.
Thesesteps,alongwithchangesinconsumer512Russiasupplied55percentofGermany’snaturalgasneedsin2021.
SeeBundesministeriumfürWirtschaftundKlimaschutz(FederalMinistryofEconomyandClimateProtection),“FAQ-Liste
LNG-TerminalinDeutschland,”March6,2022:https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/F/faq-liste-lng-terminal-in-deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8(accessedJune12,
2023).TheFederalGovernment,“PolicystatementbyOlafScholz,ChancelloroftheFederalRepublicofGermanyandMemberoftheGermanBundestag,27
February2022
inBerlin,”February22,
2022:
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378(accessedJune12,
2023).345EdwardDonelly,
“WashinterdemglobalenLNG-Boomsteckt,”Klimareporter,May2,
2023:https://www.klimareporter.de/?nanzen-wirtschaft/was-hinter-dem-globalen-lng-boom-steckt(accessedJune27,
2023).TheFederalGovernment,“FederalChancellorScholzaddressestheWorldEconomicForum:Itisnowcrystal-clearthatthefuturebelongssolelytorenewables,”January18,2023:
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/search/scholz-wef-2023-2158700
(accessedJune12,
2023).Inthefallof2022,
theGermangovernmentengageddiplomaticallytofacilitateadealforLNGdeliveriesfromQatar.
TheagreementwasenabledbyGermanMinisterofEconomyRobertHabeckandconcludedbetweenasubsidiaryoftheUScompanyConocoPhillipsandstate-ownedQatarEnergy.Startingfrom2026,
the15-yearsupplycontractsecuresamaximumquantityof2
milliontonsLNGannually(equivalentto2.7
billioncubicmeters(bcm))tobedeliveredbyshiptothenewGermanLNGterminalinBrunsbüttel.
To
putthequantitiesof2.7bcm
incontext,Germany’stotaldemandin2021
was90.5
bcm.At
theendof2022,
theGermanenergyutilityRWEalsosecureda15-yearcontractwiththeUScompanySempraInfrastructure,foravolumeof2.25
milliontonsofLNGannually.SeeKathrinWitschandKlausStratmann,“DeutschlandsGas-DealmitKatardecktnurBruchteildesLNG-Bedarfsab,”
Handelsblatt,November29,
2022:
/politik/international/?uessiggas-deutschlands-gas-deal-mit-katar-deckt-nur-bruchteil-des-lng-bedarfs-ab/28837006.html#:~:text=F%C3%BCr%20Deutschland%20ist%20der%2015,5%20Milliarden%20Kubikmeter%20Erdgas%20verbraucht(accessedJune27,
2023);
ConocoPhillips,?ConocoPhillipsandQatarEnergyAgreetoProvideReliableLNGSuppytoGermany“,November29,
2022:
/news-media/story/conocophillips-and-qatarenergy-agree-to-provide-reliable-lng-supply-to-germany(accessedJuly7,2023);
“RWEschlie?tLNG-VertragmitUS-Unternehmen,”
Tagesschau,December28,
2022:https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/lng-?uessigerdgas-rwe-usa-101.html(accessedJune27,
2023).67LoyleCampbellandLeonieOechtering,“TheGermanGreens’IdentityCrisis,”IPQuarterly,May2,
2023:
/en/german-greens-identity-crisis(accessedJune12,
2023).
ConcernsaboutapotentialoversupplyofLNGarenourishedbylong-termprojectplanning,suchasadditionalterminalsontheislandofRügen.See“BundestagstimmtfürBauvonLNG-TerminalsaufRügen“,ZeitOnline,July7,2023:
https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2023-07/?uessigerdgas-lng-terminal-ruegen-mukran-bundestag-zustimmung(accessedJuly10,
2023).RWEschlie?tLNG-VertragmitUS-Unternehmen,”
Tagesschau,December28,
2022:
https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/lng-?uessigerdgas-rwe-usa-101.htmlhttps://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/lng-?uessigerdgas-rwe-usa-101.html(accessedJune27,
2023).
InternationalEnergyAgency,“HowtoavoidgasshortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023,“
December2022:
/assets/96ce64c5-1061-4e0c-998d-fd679990653b/HowtoAvoidGasShortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023.pdf(accessedJuly7,2023).89InternationalEnergyAgency,“HowtoavoidgasshortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023,“
December2022:
/assets/96ce64c5-1061-4e0c-998d-fd679990653b/HowtoAvoidGasShortagesintheEuropeanUnionin2023.pdf(accessedJuly7,2023).ClimateAction
Tracker,
“Massivegasexpansionrisksovertakingpositiveclimatepolicies,”November10,
2022:/publications/massive-gas-expansion-risks-overtaking-positive-climate-policies(lastaccessedJune12,
2023).No.
22|
July20233POLICY
BRIEFEmissionsMitigationasa
NationalSecurityInvestmentGermany
also
increased
the
use
of
emissions-in-
frastructural
path
dependencies
hastily
created
aretensivecoalpowertomakeupfornear-termsupply
harminginternationalclimatecooperation.Inpartic-shortages.
In
2022,
the
share
of
coal
in
the
elec-
ular,countriesmarkedbysevere
energy
povertymaytricity
mix
increased
by
8.4
percent,
up
to
about
become
more
reluctant
to
adjust
their
developmentone-thirdofit,comparedtothepreviousyear.
Be-
pathwaytomeetclimatetargets.10sides
putting
emissions
reduction
targets
at
risk,Germany’s
different
measures
also
create
a
foreign
The
need
to
diversify
and
avoid
dependencies
ispolicy
dilemma
for
it.
The
country’s
continued
use
Germany’sguidingprincipleforaction.Thiscanalsoof
coal
and
other
fossil
fuels
signi?cantly
weakens
beobservedinotherpolicy?elds,suchasthesupplyits
legitimacy
when
calling
on
other
countries
to
of
critical
raw
materials
or
the
production
and
im-phaseoutfossil
fuels.port
of
high-tech
products.
Renewable
energy
andindustrial
transformation
toward
climate
neutrali-Beyond
thephasingoutof
fossilfuels,otherareasof
tyareinstrumentalforthecountry’senergysecuritythe
domestic
energy
transition
are
also
lagging.
For
and
independence,
for
strengthening
its
geopoliti-example,
the
buildup
of
renewable
energies
and
the
cal
resilience,
and
for
reducing
emissions.
However,electri?cation
of
key
sectors,
particularly
the
build-
an
approach
that
reconciles
short-term
geopoliti-ings
and
industry
sector,
are
not
proceeding
fast
cal
considerations
withlong-term
climate
goals
hasenough
to
meet
Germany’s
national
net-zero
goals
beenhardtorealizeinthefaceoftheenergycrisis.setfor2045.11Addressing
the
Planetary
CrisisWhilenewwarmingrecordsareset,withundeniable
A
larger
policy
shift
in
the
wake
of
the
release
ofhuman
security
implications,
all
factors
point
to
the
Germany’s
National
Security
Strategy
in
June
2023conclusion
that
policy
changes
are
too
slow
and
in-
should
take
geopolitical
and
climate
risks
alike
in-crementaltoavoidcatastrophicclimateimpacts.toaccounttobedecisive.Scienti?cevidenceshowsincreasing
climatic
threats
to
human
wellbeing,12Germany’s
nationally
incoherent
governance
of
the
prosperity,
and
security.
The
Intergovernmentalcommonsalsocreatesaforeignpolicydilemma:The
Panel
on
Climate
Change
(IPCC)
has
assessed
withcontinued
use
of
coal
and
other
fossil
fuels
signi?-
high
confidence
that
already
today
“(s)ome
trop-cantly
weakens
its
legitimacy
when
calling
on
other
ical,
coastal,
polar
and
mountain
ecosystems
havecountriestophaseoutfossilfuels.reached
hard
adaptation
limits.”
Global
risks
are13becoming
more
acute
as
tipping
points
near,
po-Thus,
the
Zeitenwende
currently
focuses
on
manag-
tentially
leading
to
rapid
and
increasingly
irrevers-ing
immediate
geopolitical
risks
and
does
not
fully
ible
changes.
Certain
natural
systems
such
as
the14address
longer-term
climate
considerations
andthe
Greenland
ice
sheet
may
be
reaching
their
tippingdiplomatic
setbacks
that
affect
relations
with
gov-
point
already
below
2°Cglobal
warming,
condemn-ernmentsindevelopingcountriesonwhichGermany
ing
future
generations
to
experience
several
me-depends
for
resource
imports
for
the
green
transi-
ters
of
sea-level
rise.
Climate
change
and
other15tion.AsGermany,
Europe’s
largest
emitterof
green-
anthropogenic
pressures
thus
put
at
risk
the
rel-housegases(GHG),
hasprioritizeditsenergysupply
ative
earth
system
stability
that
has
been
the
ba-and
maintaining
the
status
quo
over
its
commit-
sis
for
human
development
and
prosperity
over
thements
to
lower
the
burdenit
puts
on
impoverished
past
12,000
years.
A
recent
assessment
quantifiescommunities
at
the
forefront
of
the
climate
crisis.
the
earth
system
boundaries
with
regard
to
climateWhile
this
“Germany-?rst”policymaybe
deemedac-
andairpollution,fertilizers,biodiversity,andfresh-ceptable
in
an
acute
crisis,
the
contractual
and
in-
water,
andconcludesthatmultipleboundarieshave10
DESTATIS
StatistischesBundesamt,“Stromerzeugung2022:
EinDrittelausKohle,einViertelausWindkraft,”PressemitteilungNr.
090,
March9,2023:https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/03/PD23_090_43312.html
(accessedJune29,
2023).11
The
Transformation
Tracker,
atooloftheCopernicusProjectAriadne,providesastructuredassessmentofthestateofGermany’senergytransitioninvariouscategories.See
Transformation
Tracker,
Ariadne-Projekt:https://tracker.ariadneprojekt.de
(accessedJune29,
2023).12
ClimateR,ClimateChangeInstitute,UniversityofMaine,“Daily2-meterAir
Temperature,”lastupdatedJuly8,2023:/clim/t2_daily
(accessedJuly10,
2023).13
IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,“ClimateChange2023.
SynthesisReport.SummaryforPolicymakers,”March2023,
para.A.3.5:https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf
(accessedJune12,
2023).14
TimothyM.Lentonetal.,“Climatetippingpoints–tooriskytobetagainst,”Nature575,November28,
2019,pp.592–595:/articles/d41586-019-03595-0
(accessedJuly6,2022).15
DavidI.ArmstrongMcKayetal.,“Exceeding1.5°Cglobalwarmingmaytriggermultipleclimatetippingpoints,”Science377,
Issue6611,September9,2022:
/doi/10.1126/science.abn7950
(accessedJune12,
2023).4No.
22|
July2023EmissionsMitigationasa
NationalSecurityInvestmentPOLICY
BRIEFbeencrossed.
Thismeansthathumanity’slife-sup-
suf?cient
and
shifted
the
burden
of
climate
mitiga-16port
systems
are
in
danger.
Vulnerable
populations
tion
to
the
future,
thus
infringing
on
the
freedom
of(especially
in
the
Global
South)
are
already
acute-
future
generations.
The
revised
law
from
2021
tar-19ly
affected
by
climate
impacts
and
biodiversity
de-
getsemissionsreductionsof65percentby2030andcrease,
endangering
human
security,
and
leading
to
88
percent
by
2040
compared
to
1990
levels,
andlossesanddamages.
ImpactsinEuropearealsoin-
net-zeroemissionsby2045.17creasingly
putting
at
risk
the
population’s
securityand
health.
For
instance,
a
recent
study
estimates
Germany’s
track
record
onemissionsmitigationun-thatmorethan61,000heat-relateddeathsoccurred
dermines
the
credibility
of
these
targets.
It
onlyinEurope
duringthesummerof
2022.achieved
its
target
for
2020
due
to
the
economic18fallout
of
the
COVID-19
pandemic,
and
the
sub-20sequent
2021
target
was
missed
again.
The
FederalEnvironment
Agency
projects
that
Germanyisset
tomissitslong-termmitigationtargets.21Existing
governancestructures
providea
frameworkDelivering
on
emission
reductions
is
not
just
a
legalobligation;it
alsoservesGermany’sforeignpolicyin-terests.
First,
continued
and
accelerated
domesticemissions
mitigation
is
a
prerequisite
for
the
coun-try
to
be
able
to
promote
climate
protection
in-ternationally.
Germany’s
decision
to
prolong
andexpand
its
fossil
fuel
use
because
of
the
energy
cri-sis
may
have
weakened
itslong-term
credibilityandchallenged
its
often-claimed
role
as
a
leader
on
theenergytransition.for
swift
emissionsmitigationThese
recent
risk
assessments
reaffirm
the
im-portance
of
the
targets
of
the
2015
Paris
Agree-
Second,
climate
change
should
be
seen
as
a
cross-ment,
which
obliges
states
to
limit
global
warming
cutting
risk
factor
that
increasingly
affects
securityto
well
below
2°C,
and
ideally
to
below
1.5°C.
Exist-
policy,
geopolitics,
and
economic
security.
Accord-ing
governance
structures
provide
a
framework
for
ingtotheIPCC,“Roughlyhalfof
theworld’s
popula-swiftemissionsmitigationby
Germany.
First,theEU
tion
currently
experience
severe
water
scarcity
forGreen
Deal
legislation
sets
clear
steps
that
mem-
at
least
part
of
the
year
due
to
a
combination
of
cli-ber
states
should
take
to
reduce
emissions.
Second,
matic
and
non-climatic
drivers.”
Food
insecurity22Germany
is
legally
obliged
to
swiftly
phase
out
fos-
is
also
exacerbated
by
climate
impacts
in
many
re-silfuels.TheFederal
ClimateProtection
Lawof
2019
gions,includingEurope,andisidenti?edasa?eldoforiginally
mandated
annual
emissions
reductions
action
in
Germany’s
National
Security
Strategy.
Cli-and
monitoring
until
2030.
It
became
more
strin-
mate-related
changes
in
weather
patterns
ampli-gent
after
the
Federal
Constitutional
Court
ruled
in
fy
the
risk
of
heat
and
drought
conditions
that
may2021thatitwas
partiallyunconstitutional.Thecourt
lead
to
crop
failures
in
major
breadbasket
regions.23found
that
the
law’s
medium-term
targets
were
in-
Such
events
will
increasingly
occur
simultaneously16
JohanRockstr?metal.,“SafeandjustEarthsystemboundaries,”Nature,May31,
2023:/articles/s41586-023-06083-8
(accessedJune29,
2023).17
For
acloserexaminationofthesesecuritydimensionsofclimatechangeundertheterms“planetarysecurity”and“climateimpacts,”seeTimBoschandKiraVinke,“IntegratingClimateinGermany’sNationalSecurityStrategy,”DGAPPolicyBriefNo.
27/2022,
September2022,
pp.
2-4:/system/?les/article_pdfs/DGAP-Policy-Brief-2022-27-EN_3.pdf
(accessedJune27,
2023).18
JoanBallesteretal.,“Heat-relatedmortalityinEuropeduringthesummerof2022,”
NatureMedicine,July10,
2023:/articles/s41591-023-02419-z
(accessedJuly11,2023).19
DanaSchirwon,“TheGermanFederalConstitutionalCourt’sRevolutionaryClimateRuling,”DGAPOnlineCommentary,April20,2022:/en/research/publications/german-federal-constitutional-courts-revolutionary-climate-ruling
(accessedJune12,
2023).20
BundesministeriumfürUmwelt,Naturschutz,nukleareSicherheitundVerbraucherschutz,“Treibhausgasemissionensinken2020
um8,7Prozent,”March16,2021:
https://www.bmuv.de/pressemitteilung/treibhausgasemissionen-sinken-2020-um-87-prozent
(accessedJune12,
2023).21
Umweltbundesamt,“Projektionsberichte(integrierteEnergie-und
THG-Projektionen,”December22,
2022:https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz-energiepolitik-in-deutschland/szenarien-fuer-die-klimaschutz-energiepolitik/integrierte-energie-treibhausgasprojektionen#Berichterstattung
(accessedJune12,
2023).22
IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,“ClimateChange2023.
SynthesisReport.SummaryforPolicymakers,”March2023,
para.A.2.4:https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf
(accessedJune12,
2023).23
SeealsoKaiKornhuberetal.,“Ampli?edRossbywavesenhanceriskofconcurrentheatwavesinmajorbreadbasketregions,”NatureClimateChange10,December9,2019,pp.48-53:
/articles/s41558-019-0637-z
(accessedJune12,
2023).No.
22|
July20235POLICY
BRIEFEmissionsMitigationasa
NationalSecurityInvestmentFigure
1
–
Humanity’s
Most
Pressing
Common
Security
Risk
–Surpassing
of
Earth
System
BoundariesSAFE
&
JUST
SPACEAERO
SO
LPO
LLUTANTS*DANGER
ZONELESSERGREATERCLIM
ATESAFE
&
JUST
BOUNDARYSAFE
BOUNDARYJUST
BOUNDARYPHO
SPHO
RUSNATURALECO
SYSTEM
SFertilizersBiodiversityWO
RKINGLANDSCAPES**NITRO
GENGRO
UNDWATERSURFACEWATERFreshwaterThis
graph
shows
partsof
the
EarthSystem
that
are
vital
for
the
resilience
and
stability
of
our
planet
as
well
as
the
life
of
humansthat
depend
on
it
(Rockstr?met
al.
2022,
102).
Building
on
prior
work(see
Ste?enet
al.
2015),
scientistsidenti?ed
boundaries
tothesesystems,thetransgressionofwhichwouldputtheplanet’sresilienceatriskandexposehumansto
signi?cantharm.
Theframeworkdistinguishesbetween“safe”and“just”
boundaries.“Safe”boundariespertain
tothepreservation
ofthefunctioningoftheEarth
Sys-tem
and
the
extent
to
which
it
supportsthe
survivalof
humans
and
other
living
organisms.
“Just”
boundaries
consider
the
circum-stances
required
to
avert
signi?cant
harm
to
people.
The
justice
assessment
includes
considerations
of
1)
interspecies
justice
andEarthSystemstability,
2)intergenerationaljustice,and3)intragenerationaljustice(Rockstr?metal.2022,103).
Whileinmostcasesthesafeandjustboundariesarealigned,justiceconsiderationsputadditionalconstraintsontheclimateandaerosolpollutantsdi-mensions.Overall,sevenoutoftheeightEarthSystemboundarieshavebeentransgressed(Ibid.).*The
just
boundary
has
been
breached
in
many
places
locally,
but
is
still
to
be
assessed
at
the
global
level
|
**
Urban,
forest,
andagriculturalareas
|
Sources:GlobalCommonsAlliance,“SafeandJustEarthSystemBoundariespublishedinNature,”May3
1,
2023:/news/earth-commission/safe-and-just-earth-system-boundaries-published-in-nature/(accessedJuly11,
2023);WillSte?enet.al.“Planetaryboundaries:Guidinghumandevelopmentonachangingplanet.”Science347,Issue6223,January15
,2015:
/doi/10.1126/science.1259855
(accessedJuly10
,2023).JohanRockstr?metal.,“SafeandjustEarth
systemboundaries,”Nature,May31,
2023:/articles/s41586-023-06083-8(accessedJune29,
2023).6No.
22|
July2023EmissionsMitigationasa
NationalSecurityInvestmentPOLICY
BRIEFwithgeopoliticalcrises.Globalfood
supply
shortag-
dosoare?xed.29
Threelargersocietalshiftswillneedescausedby
thewar
inUkraine–animportantpro-
toberealizedtodeliveronambitious
climate
targets:ducer
for
countries
beyond
Europe
–
demonstratesthedangerof
climaticandnon-climaticcrisesinter-
First,
recognizing
the
disruptive
implications
of
thesecting.
Climate-induced
extreme
conditions
pose
Zeitenwenderequiresrequireslearningfromthepastsevere
risks
to
supply
chains
and
have
the
potential
andrethinkinghowGermanyapproachestheclimateto
undermine
infrastructure,
including
those
instal-
emergency.
TheCOVID-19
pandemicandtheenergylationsthatarecriticalforthegreentransition.24crisis
demonstrated
that
countries
are
able
to
makequick,
transformative
responses
to
emergencies
inIn
this
context,
national
and
international
efforts
to
terms
of
technological
innovation,
speed
of
policyavert
accelerated
climate
change
should
be
seen
as
implementation,
as
well
as
societal
and
behavioralaninvestment
withbene?tsacrossmultiplesectors.
change.
A
mix
of
regulatory
measures
and
respon-Germany’s
National
Security
Strategy
is
broadly
in
sible
behavioral
change
helped
avoid
the
worst
im-line
with
this
conception
as
it
reiterates
the
role
of
pacts
of
COVID-19
in
Germany.
Similarly,
when
theinternational
processes
as
well
as
European
and
na-
energy
crisis
hit
last
winter,
Germans
quickly
savedtional
climate
and
environmental
goals
for
the
pro-
relatively
large
quantities
of
natura
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