ITIF-平臺(tái)是新的組織范式（英）-2023.3

Platforms

Are

the

NewOrganizational

ParadigmROBERTD.ATKINSONANDAURELIENPORTUESE

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MARCH2023Justastherewasoppositiontothecorporate

economyintheearly1900s,thereisoppositiontotheplatformeconomytoday.Butlimiting“platformization”wouldhaveconsiderablelong-lastingeconomiccostsforthenationandconsumers.KEY

TAKEAWAYS......Corporateformevolvesinresponsetoexternalforces,particularlytechnology.ThelatestevolutionistheIT-enabledplatform,whichmaymakesenseinawidevarietyofindustriesandfunctions,includingbanking,travel,

education,law,andmedicine.IT-basedplatformsnaturallytendtowardconcentration,withoneortwocompaniesholdingmostofthemarketshare.Throughthisscaleandefficiency,theyoftenprovidehigherqualityandlowercoststhanamoredispersedmarketwould.Aswiththelasttwomajortransitions—theriseofcorporationsintheearly1900s,then“managerialcorporations”afterWorldWarII—theriseoftheplatformeconomytodayisbeneficialforthe

economyandsociety,butithasstirreddiscontent.Criticismfrom“muckrakers,”smallbusinesses,andpoliticiansintheearly1900sproducedtheShermanandClaytonantitrustacts.Butcourtsinthaterafocusedmostlyonabusivecorporatebehavior,includingtrusts,notmarketshareitself.Thepost-WWIIpolicyresponseto“managerialcorporations”causedfarmoreharm,leadingtothedeclineorextinctionofamanytechnologically

advancedU.S.firms.Today’soppositiontoplatformsalsoposesaseverechallengetoAmerica’sfuture.Antitrustmustrecognizethatbelow-costpricingcanbebeneficialtoconsumers,developnewrulestobetteraccountforplatformmarketdynamics,andanalyzeallegationsofanticompetitivebehaviorbasedonconductratherthansize.CONTENTSKeyTakeaways1Introduction2BusinessFormAftertheCivilWar3OppositiontotheIndustrialCorporation4OrganizationalFormAfterWorldWarII7OppositiontotheManagerialcorporation9TheRiseofthePlatformEconomy?14OppositiontothePlatformEconomy

16AntitrustforthePlatformEconomy

18IsOverallSocialWelfareHigherorLowerWithMoreCompetitors?

18ThePotentialofSchumpeterianDisruption19TheNeedforEvidenceofAnyAnticompetitiveConduct

21Conclusion

21Endnotes22INTRODUCTIONBusinessorganizationscantakemanyforms,fromfounder-ledtomultidivisionalmultinationalstoemergingIT-enabledplatforms.Theprevailingorganizationalforminbusinessisneithersetinstonenordecidedupon

byfad.Itislargelyaresultofthetechnologicalandeconomicconditionsofthetime.TherewerenolargeU.S.corporationsbeforetheemergenceoftherailroadbecausetheproductionsystemneitherrequirednorenabledscale,whichcorporationsaredesignedtomanage.Whenrailandindustrialproductiontechnologies

evolvedaftertheCivilWar,largecorporationsbecamethenorm.JusticeLouisBrandeisandotheropponentsofthesenewcorporationssoughttosquelchthemintheirinfancy,preferringaprioreconomydominatedbyowner-led,smallandmid-sizedfirms.EvenwiththepassageoftheShermanAct,theiroppositionwaslargelystillborn;thebenefitsofthecorporationweresimplytoovast.However,hadtheBrandeisianssucceededintheirquesttoturnbacktimeAmericawouldnotbetheglobaleconomicleaderitistoday.Wearepotentiallyatasimilartransformativepointinhistory,withdigitaltechnologies

enablingtheriseofanewkindofproductiveorganization:theplatform.Digitalplatforms,notjustintheinformationsector,havethepotential

totransformmanyindustriesforthebetter:raisingproductivity,improvingqualityandconsumerchoice,andreducingprices.Butjustastherewassignificantoppositionagainstthetransitiontothecorporateeconomy,todaythereissignificantoppositiontotheplatformeconomy,althoughthistimenotamongthepopulacebutratheramongtheelites:activists,publicintellectualsandacademics,andelectedofficialsofbothparties.Iftheirattemptstorollbackthe“platformization”oftheU.S.economysucceed,theeconomiccoststothenationandtoconsumerswouldbeconsiderableandlong-lasting.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION

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MARCH2023PAGE2Thisreportassessesthepasttwomajorchangesincorporateform,andthepublicandgovernmentresponsestothem.Itthenexaminestheprospect

andpotentialbenefitsofthe“platformization”oftheeconomy,aswellascurrentopposition.Finally,itdiscussesthevarietyofpolicyapproachesproposedtoaddressplatformgovernanceandwhymostwillleadtomoreharmthangood.BUSINESS

FORM

AFTER

THE

CIVIL

WARLargecorporationsseemtobeaforceofnature.Infact,forthefirst100yearsoftheRepublic,theyplayedaminimalroleintheeconomy.Priortothe1880s–1890sindustrialrevolution,virtuallyallfirmsweresmall,local,orregional,andfamily-ownedandrun.Forexample,in1860,Pittsburghboasted17foundries,21rollingmills,76glassfactories,and47othermanufacturingestablishments,butnonewereincorporated

andalmostallweresmall.1

BeforetheCivilWar,therewerefewmanufacturingplantswithmorethan500workers,asthecorporation

hadnotyetbeenwidelyadoptedasthelegalformofbusiness.If

their

attempts

to

roll

back

the

“platformization”

of

the

U.S.

economy

succeed,

the

economic

costs

tothe

nation

and

to

consumers

would

be

considerable

and

long-lasting.Thereasonforthiswasthreefold.First,gettinggoodstomarketwasexpensive,soitmadelittlesenseforestablishmentstogetbiggerandproducelargequantities.Second,therewasextremelylimitedcommunication,whichmademanagingmulti-establishmententerprisesextremelydifficult.Finally,machinerywasquitelimited,makingithardtodomorethanonlylimitedcraftproduction.Withtheselimitations,thecorporateformwasnotneeded.Withthedevelopmentofsteamenginesandcheaperandbetterironandsteel,thetelegraph(andthenthetelephone)

andrailroadsemergedandbecauseofthecapitalcostsinvolvedandgeographicscaleneeded,

becamethefirstlargecorporations.

Railroadsthenenabledtheemergenceofbroaderregionalmarkets,lettingfewerandlargerfirmsgainscaleandexpandoutput.Asnewtechnologiesemerged,moreindustriesevolvedintomassproductionindustries(e.g.,ironandsteel,textiles,ceramics,agriculturalequipment,etc.)whichinturnenabledandrequiredlargerenterprisesthattookadvantageof

economiesofscale.Atthesametime,theemergenceofnewindustriesbasedonnewtechnologies(chemicals,sewingmachines,electricalequipment,machinetools,autos,etc.)meantthatscalewastheorderoftheday.AllthismeansthattheU.S.economyledtheworldbecauseofitsembraceofthelargecorporation.By1900,thecorporateform,especiallyintransportationandproduction,hadbecomedominant.Forexample,halftheworld’sglassandironandtwo-thirdsofthesteelcamefromPittsburgh’sfactories,mostofthemmedium-sizedtolargecorporations.Thelargestcompanyoftheday,USSteel,wasformedfromaplanhatchedbyJ.P.MorganandCarnegieSteel’spresidenttomergeCarnegieSteelwithMorgan’snumbertwo-sizedFederalSteeltomakeUSSteelthenation’sfirstbillion-dollarcompany.Duetotheunprecedentedsizeofthisnewcorporation,financiersonWallStreetgaveitthenickname“TheCorporation.”By1920,thereweremorethan10,000manufacturingplantswithmorethan500workers.Firmsdidnotgetbiggerbecausetheirownersacquiredanewtasteforwealthandpower.Rather,thenewtechnologylet—infact,required—establishmentstogrowtohithertounprecedentedINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION

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MARCH2023PAGE3size.Thelargerthefactoryorthecorporation,themoreefficientitcouldbecomeandthemoreitcoulddrivedowncostsandgrowevenmore.Thecostreductionsresultingfromfactoryoperationsandgeographicconcentrationofproductionoverwhelmedmade-to-orderandsmall-volumeproductioninindustryafterindustry.Untiltheemergenceofthefactoryeconomy,therewasnostraightforwardlegalformthatwasappropriatetosuchsize.Asthetechnologysystemmadeitpossibleforindustrytobecomelarger,companiesinitiallyturnedtotrustsasawaytobecomebig.Trustsweremadeupofstockholders

ofindividualsmallerfirmsthatgavetheirstocktoacentralboardintrust.Thoughtrustsweresometimesusedtoengageinanticompetitivebehavior,theyneverthelessreflectedanunderlyingrealitythatefficientproductionrequiredincreasedsizeandcoordination.However,lawcaughtuptotheeconomicsystem.Theenactmentin1889oftheNewJerseycorporationlawthatallowedcompaniestobuystockinothercorporations,alongwiththepassageoftheShermanActin1890thatoutlawedtrusts,gavewaytomergersbetweenseparatecorporations.By1904,oneortwogiantfirms,usuallyputtogetherbymerger,controlledatleasthalftheoutputin78differentindustries.In1896,therewerefewerthan12firmsworth$10million,butby1904thereweremorethan300.Bythelate19thandearly20thcenturies,theadvantagesoflargecorporationswerewidelyrecognized

byleadingAmericaneconomists.JohnBatesClarkobservedthatlargeindustrialcompanies

were:theresultofanevolution,andthehappyoutcomeofacompetitionsoabnormalthatthecontinuanceofitwouldhavemeantwidespreadruin.Asuccessfulattempttosuppressthembylawwouldinvolvethereversionofindustrialsystemstoacast-offtype,therenewalofabusesfromwhichsocietyhasescapedbyastepindevelopment.2TheeconomistandleaderoftheprogressivemovementRichardT.Elyagreedthat“owingtodiscoveriesandinventions,especiallytheapplicationofsteamtoindustryandtransportation,itbecamenecessarytoprosecuteenterprisesofgreatmagnitude.”3By

the

late

19th

and

early

20th

centuries,

the

advantages

of

large

corporations

were

widelyrecognized

by

leading

American

economists.OPPOSITION

TO

THE

INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATIONWhilemanyAmericans,especiallyeconomists,recognizedtheenormousbenefitsoflargecorporationstothenation,especiallyintermsofraisingwagesandlivingstandards,changeishardandsomemuckrakers,interestgroups(mostlysmallbusinesses),andpoliticalfiguresdecriedtheriseofthecorporation.MoreandmoreAmericansbegantodistrustthisnewandunprecedentedformofcorporateorganization.

Indeed,indocumentingtheemergenceofthelargecorporation,AlfredChandlerarguesthatbefore1940,thesechangeswerealmostcertainlyopposedbyamajorityoftheAmericanpeople.4

Inaddition,manysmallbusinessownerssawthecorporationasadistinctthreat.Asaresult,manyofthenewregulatoryinitiativesputinplacebetween1880and1920,INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION

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MARCH2023PAGE4includingtheShermanandClaytonantitrustacts,werespurredbysmall-businessleadersresistingthechangesbroughtonbythefactoryrevolution.5Oneofthemostprominentcriticsoftheshifttoacorporate,industrialeconomywasthephilosopherandsocialcriticWilliamJames.Hestatedhiscaseagainsttheemergentneweconomy:Asforme,mybedismade:Iamagainstbignessandgreatnessinallforms,andwiththeinvisiblemolecularmoralforcesthatworkfromindividualtoindividual,stealinginthroughthecranniesoftheworldlikesomanysoftrootlets,orlikethecapillaryoozingofwater,andyetrenderingthehardestmonumentsofman’spride,ifyougivethemtime.Thebiggertheunityoudealwith,thehollower,themorebrutal,themoremendaciousisthelifedisplayed.SoIamagainstallbigorganizationsassuch,nationalones

firstandforemost;againstallbigsuccessesandbigresults;andinfavoroftheeternalforcesoftruthwhichalwaysworkintheindividualandimmediatelyunsuccessfulway,underdogsalways,tillhistorycomes,aftertheyarelongdeadandputsthemontop.6IdaTarbell’smuckrakingexposéofStandardOilmadeAmericansawareoftheruthlesspracticesofJohnD.Rockefelleranddocumentedhisuseoflegalandillegalmeanstocrushhiscompetitors,evenifoverallproductivitymighthaverisenasaresult.Theemergenceoftheselargetrustsdominatedtheimaginationoffriendsandfoesalike.Tarbellstatedthattherapidlychangingeconomiclandscapeandtheriseofmonopolistictrustswas“disturbingandconfusingpeople.”7In

the

face

of

such

concerns,

Congress

was

aroused

to

pass

antitrust

laws.

But

far

from

breaking

uplarge

firms,

the

laws

in

some

ways

encouraged

mergers.

What

was

outlawed

were

trusts.Opponentsevenarguedthatnotonlydidtrustsandbigcorporationsunfairlydominatesmallbusinessandfarmers,buttheywereactuallynomoreefficientthanthesmallbusinessestheyputoutofbusiness.Beforehebecameasupremecourtjustice,LouisBrandiesarguedinafamousratecaseagainsttherailroadsthatbigrailroadswereeconomicallyinefficient.Infact,Brandiesarguedthatmedium-sizedcompaniesingeneral

weremostefficient.8

Heandhisalliesmadethisargumentbecausetheyknewthatthestrongestcasefortheindustrialcorporationwasthevastincreasesinefficiencytheyproduced.Indeed,Brandeiswenttogreatpainstotrytopaintsmallfirmsasbeingasefficientaslargeoneswere,declaringintestimonybeforetheU.S.Senatein1911,forexample,that“a

corporationmaywellbetoolargetobethemostefficientinstrumentofproductionandofdistribution.”9Inaddition,heandothersarguedthatcorporationsonlygotbigbycheating.AstheeconomichistorianThomasK.McGrawwrote,“Earlyinhiscareer,Brandeisdecidedthatbigbusinesscouldbecomebigonlythroughillegitimatemeans.Byhisfrequentreferencestothe‘curseofbigness,’hemeantthatbignessitselfwasthemarkofCain,asignofpriorsinning.”10Inthefaceofsuchconcerns,Congresswasarousedtopassantitrustlaws.

Butfarfrombreakinguplargefirms,thelawsinsomewaysencouragedmergers.Whatwasoutlawedweretrusts.Sincefirmscouldnolongergetthebenefitsofcoordinationfromtrusts,theysoughtthemoutthroughINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION

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MARCH2023PAGE5mergers.In1896,therewerefewerthan12firmsworth$10million,butby1904,thereweremorethan300,mostcreatedthroughmergers.UnlikeBrandeisandotherpopulists,manyAmericanpoliticalleaderssupportedlargefirmsandmergersbecausetheysawthemasthepathtoAmericangreatness.Forexample,today,TheodoreRooseveltisoftenrememberedonlyasatrustbuster.Butthisisadistortionofhistory,ashedistinguishedbetween“good”and“bad”trustsandpreferredfederallicensingandregulationofcorporationstotheadversarialmethodsofantitrustlitigation.Inhis1905AnnualMessagetoCongress,Rooseveltdeclared:Iaminnosensehostiletocorporations.Thisisanageofcombination,andanyefforttopreventcombinationwillnotbeuseless,butintheendvicious,becauseofthecontemptforlawwhichthefailuretoenforcelawinevitablyproduces.Weshould,moreover,recognizeincordialandamplefashiontheimmensegoodeffectedbycorporateagenciesinacountrysuchasours,andthewealthofintellect,energy,andfidelitydevotedtotheirservice,andthereforenormallytotheserviceofthepublic,bytheirofficersanddirectors.Thecorporation

hascometostay,justasthetradeunionhascometostay.Eachcanandhasdonegreatgood.Eachshouldbefavoredsolongasitdoesgood.Buteachshouldbesharplycheckedwhereitactsagainstlawandjustice.11Rooseveltinsistedthatbusiness“cannotbesuccessfullyconductedinaccordancewiththepracticesandtheoriesofsixtyyearsagounlessweabolishsteam,electricity,bigcities,and,inshort,notonlyallmodernbusinessandmodernindustrialconditions,butallthemodernconditionsofourcivilization.”12ThehistorianMartinJ.Skylarnotedthat“Roosevelt’spositionwasnotthatof‘Trust-Buster’butof‘Trust-Muster’—hewouldmusterthetrustsintothenationalservice.”13AsthelegalscholarDanielA.Cranenoted,“By1912,Rooseveltwasstakingapositionagainstanytrustbustingatall.Farfromhonoringhis‘trustbuster’moniker,Rooseveltarguedforjusttheopposite—thelegalityoflargecombinationsofcapital,nonethelesssubjecttopervasivegovernmentalregulation.”14Indeed,althoughhisadministrationhadbroughttheantitrustcaseagainstStandardOil,RooseveltprivatelyregrettedthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtin1911tobreakupthecompany:IdonotmyselfseewhatgoodcancomefromdissolvingtheStandardOilCompanyintofortyseparatecompanies,allofwhichwillstillremainreallyunderthesamecontrol.Whatweshouldhaveisamuchstrictergovernmentalsupervisionofthesegreatcompanies,butaccompanyingthissupervisionshouldbearecognitionofthefactthatgreatcombinationshavecometostayandthatwemustdothemscrupulousjusticejustasweexactscrupulousjusticefromthem.15TheShermanAntitrustActof1890declaredthat“everycontract,combinationintheformoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracyinrestraintoftradeamongtheseveralstates...wasillegal.”16Asaresult,thefocuswasmoreonanticompetitiveconductthanitwasonstructure(e.g.,INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION

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MARCH2023PAGE6breakingupfirms).WeseethisintheProgressivePartynationalplatformfrom1900whichstated:WefavorstrengtheningtheShermanLawbyprohibitingagreementtodivideterritoryorlimitoutput;refusingtoselltocustomerswhobuyfrombusinessrivals;tosellbelowcostincertainareaswhilemaintaininghigherpricesinotherplaces;usingthepoweroftransportationtoaidorinjurespecialbusinessconcerns;andotherunfairtradepractices.17Andthecourtsdidfocusmostlyonabusivebehaviortoattainorretainmarketshare,notpossessionofsignificantmarketshareitself.AstheSupremeCourtwroteintheAlcoacaseof1945,“Thesuccessfulcompetitor,havingbeenurgedtocompete,mustnotbeturneduponwhenhewins.”18

Indeed,asappliedbythecourts,antitrustlawenforcementintheearly20thcenturyfrequentlyfellheavilyonsmallbusinesses,manyofwhichwouldendupgettingchargedwithcollusion.ORGANIZATIONAL

FORM

AFTER

WORLD

WAR

IIManyseetheriseofindustrial-eracompaniesasonedevelopmentfromthe1880stothepresent.Therealityisthatwhilethepost-CivilWarcorporationsrepresentedasignificantevolutionfromthemerchant-erafamilyenterprise,theywerestillafarcryfromthelargemanagerial

corporationsthatbecamethestandardafterWorldWarII.Startinginthe1930s,corporateformonceagainchangedwiththeriseofwhatChandlertermedthe“managerialcorporation.”P(pán)re-WWII,mostdecisionscontinuedtobemadeininformalways,withownersandtopmanagersactingontheirownintuitionandlimitedinformation.Strictandclearlinesofauthoritywerenotlaidout,anddecisionsdependedonpersonalprioritiesanddiscretion.Unlikethecorporationofthe1950s,withitslargemassesofmiddlemanagersandsupervisors,asmallgroupofmanagersoversawthousandsofworkers.Chandlernotedthat“theCarnegieCorporationdidlittletocoordinateitsvariousmining,shippingandmanufacturingunits,whichremainedseparatecompaniesunderindependentmanagement.”19

Mostcorporationswereone-productcompaniesrunbytheirownersandasmallexecutivecadre.

Itwasnotuntiltheemergenceofthepost-WWIIeconomythatthepracticeofmanagementbecamethestandard.Asaresult,by1948,thecorporatesectorheldalmost60percentofnationalincome-producingwealth,andthe

largest200employersaccountedfor20percentofprivatenonagriculturalworkers.By1950,the200largestnonfinancialcorporationsaccountedfor40.3percentofvalueadded.In1901,onlyonecorporation,

USSteel,hadover$1billioninassets.By1960,638corporations

hadmorethan$1billioninassets(inconstantdollars).Bignesswastheorderoftheday.20Starting

in

the

1930s,

corporate

form

once

again

changed

with

the

rise

of

what

Chandler

termed

the“managerial

corporation.”Thereweretwootherkeychanges.First,corporateformbeforeWWIIwaslargelyinfinanceandmanufacturing.AfterWWII,itextendedtomanyothersectors,suchasretail,hospitality,construction,andbusinessservices.AshistorianRobertGriffithstated,“Bythemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,corporatereorganizationoftheeconomyhadtakenplace.”21INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION

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MARCH2023PAGE7Inthe1960s,Galbraithcapturedthechange:Seventyyearsagothecorporationwasconfinedtothoseindustries—railroading,steamboating,steelmaking,petroleumrecoveryandrefining,somemining—where,itseemedproductionhadtobeonalargescale.Nowitalsosellsgroceries,millsgrain,publishesnewspapersandprovidespublicentertainment,allactivitiesthatwereoncetheprovinceoftheindividualproprietorortheinsignificantfirm.22Second,scientificandengineeringdiscoverybecamemoreimportantforcompetitiveadvantage,asmanycorporationsafterthe1920sdeveloped

dedicatedresearchanddevelopment(R&D)labs.Thesourcesofinnovationchangedfrombeingbasedlargelyontechnicaltinkeringandtrialanderrorbymechanicsandinventorsworkingintheirgarages

toascience-basedoneincorporatelaboratorieswhereinnovationwasderivedfromamorefundamentalunderstandingofunderlyingprocesses.23

AsJosephSchumpeterargued,“Technologicalprogressisincreasinglybecomingthebusinessofteamsoftrainedspecialistswhoturnoutwhatisrequiredandmakeitworkinpredictableways.”24

Asaresult,R&Dexpendituresskyrocketedby400percent

between1953and1964.Forexample,Dupont’sR&Dexpendituresincreasedfromaround$1millionperyearin1921toover$60millionbythemid-1950s.25

R&Dlaboratoriesincreasedfromaround1,000in1927—withfewdoingbasicresearch—toalmost5,000in1956,withmany,suchasBellLabsconductingextensivebasicresearch.26

Onereflection

ofthisisthefactthatin1901therewere20,896

patentsissuedtoindividuals,withonly4,650goingtocorporations.Thesebalancedoutbythe1930s,butbythemid-1950s,thecorporateratehadtakenoff.By1980,corporationshadobtainedaboutfivetimesmorepatentsthanindividuals.Bythe1950s,bigcorporationshadbecomeawayoflifeandAmericanshadgrownusedtothem.Professionalmanagersnowrancorporations,somuchsothattheperiodbecameknownasthe“eraofmanagerial

capitalism.”Here,ownershipandmanagementbecameseparated,inlargepartbecause,ascompaniesbecamemuchlargerandmoretechnologicallysophisticated,therewasaneedforlargeranksofprofessionalmanagerstorunthem.Yet,ascorporationsgrew,becameevermorecomplex,andhadavastlyincreasedneedformanagementandadministration,theybecamecontrolledbyanewclassofprofessionalmanagers.Thecompletionofthecontinentalrailsystem,telephony,airtravel,andtheinterstateenabledatrulyintegratednationalmarketthatinturnenabledscale.Atthesametime,awidearrayofnewprocesstechnologies(technologiesinvolvedinmakingproducts)enabledandrequiredlargerandmoresophisticatedcompanies.Finally,theriseofcomputing(initiallymainframes)andtelecommunications

allowedcompaniestomuchmoreeasilymanagelargeamountsofcomplexdata.Indeed,thatpostwar“mixedeconomy”wassodifferentfromtheonethatprecededitthatanissueof

FortunemagazineinOctober1955wasdevotedtothe“NewEconomy”anddealtwiththe“Americanbreakthrough”andthe“newmanagement.”27Finally,asChandlernoted:Inthefirstdecadeofthetwentiethcentury,thecontrolofthelargecorporationwas,infact,theparamountpoliticalquestionoftheday.Theprotestagainstthenewtypeofbusinessenterprisewasledbymerchants,smallmanufacturers,andotherbusinessmen,includingcommercialfarmers,whofelttheireconomicINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION

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MARCH2023PAGE8intereststhreatened

bythenewinstitution.Bybasingtheirargumentsontraditionalideologyandtraditionaleconomicbeliefs,theywonwidespreadsupportfortheirviews.Yetintheend,theprotests,thepoliticalcampaigns,andtheresultinglegislationdidlittletoretardthecontinuinggrowthofthenewinstitutionandthenewclassthatmanagedit.Thesamecannotbesaidofthenexttransition.OPPOSITION

TO

THE

MANAGERIAL

CORPORATIONLikeintheearlyperiodofcorporateindustrialization,inthepostwarperiod,manyopposedtheriseandspreadofthemanagerialcorporation.WhiletheRightrejected

thegrowingpowerofgovernment,theLeftrejectedthegrowingconcentrationofpowerinbusinessandtheperniciouseffectsofamasssocietyondemocracyandindividualism.ThemostvociferouscriticontheleftwassociologistC.WrightMills.Inhislandmarkbook,WhiteCollar,MillsattackedthenewcorporateeconomyasathreattofundamentalAmericanvaluesofindependenceanddecentralization.ToMills,thetransitiontothecorporateeconomyhaddestroyedtheAmericantraditionofindependence,craftsmanship,andentrepreneurshipandhadgivenwaytoalienationandexploitation.Startingatraditionofneo-Marxistcritique,Millsarguedthatworkerswereexploitedas

theirformerlyskilledcraftjobswerebeingtransformedintounskilledassemblylinejobs.Millsalsorejectedthenewsocialorder.InThePowerElite,whichbecameabibleofthe1960sNewLeftmovement,Millsdefinedthenewsocialclassesasconsistingofthebluecollar,whitecollar,andrulingclasspowerelite.Andinanationaleconomyinwhichcorporationsrunthings,“insofarasnationaleventsaredecided,thepowerelitearethosewhodecidethem.”28Inthe1950s,theLeftcomplainedthatamasssociety,dominatedbybiginstitutions,wasforcingpeopleintodehumanizing,bureaucratic

structures.Manhadbecomeacoginthefacelessmachinewithlarge-sca