Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation The Graduate Institute 沖突與合作的動(dòng)學(xué)研究所

internationalpolitics:

dynamicsofconflictandcooperationobjectivesoftheclass,twogoals:first:givestudentsanoverviewofbasicconceptsandthemesthatareusedinthepoliticalanalysisofinternationalrelationsandoftheirrecenttheoreticaldevelopments.amongthoseconcepts:actor,sub-actorandsystemininternationalrelations,decision-makingbargaining,escalationandcrisis,deterrenceandstability.thecoursealsointendstocoverissuesininternationalcooperationsuchasalliancesandcoalitions,collectivegoods,andinternationalinstitutions.internationalsystemssecond,thecoursewantstoprovideepistemologicalandmethodologicalfoundationsfortheuseoftheseconceptsinarigorousway.inordertothatthecoursewillinsistontheclosenessofeconomicandpoliticalapproachesintheuseofrationalchoiceanalysisandgametheoryparticularlyintheirdynamicandevolutionaryaspects.theimportanceofproductiveprocessesandofbasicdemographicandresourcebasesfortheunderstandingofinternationalpoliticswillalsobeemphasized.fundamentalquestionsthepoliticalanalysisofinternationalrelationscanbesubsumedintwobasicquestions:whythepresentinternationalpowerstructurehowwillitevolve?thecoursewilltrytoanswerbyemphasizingfundamentals:resources,demographics,ecologicalconditions,technology,healthfactors:the"diamond"perspectivestrategicaspectsofpoliticalsystemsandbehaviorofpoliticalagents,institutionsexample:themongolempireworldconfigurationepistemologyandmethodologyepistemologicalandmethodologicalconsiderationsfundamentalquestion:whatispolitics?differentepistemologicalandmethodologicalapproacheswillgivedifferentanswers.iwillusehereascientific(popperian)epistemologycharacterizedbywhatiscalledmethodologicalindividualismandtherationalchoiceperspectivethisperspectivegivesauniqueanswerhere:namelypoliticsisthesolutiontocollectiveactionproblems(taylor)thisapproachhastwoadvantages:dynamicsofconflictandcooperation

itgivesrigorousandunambiguousdefinitionsofconceptswhereasalotofconceptsusedbysocialscientistsarefuzzyitclearlylinkspoliticswitheconomicsandotherscientificdisciplinessuchasbiology,anthropology,archeology,andevolutionarypsychology.politicsunderdifferentevolutionarysettingswhichlinksupwithatraditionstartedinthe19thcenturydynamicsofconflictandcooperationwhatisthescientificmethod?itisaccordingtopopperahypothetico-deductivemethodwhichincludesatleast4stepsdefinitionofaparadigm(unitsofanalysis)definitionofbasicassumptionsandhypotheseslogicalconclusionsfromtheseassumptionsempiricaltestingoftheseconclusionsthroughrigorousmethodsindependentfromtheassumptionsdynamicsofconflictandcooperationbasicexplanatorymechanismsinthesocialsciences

purely

causalapproaches

normativeapproaches:assumetheexistenceofnorms

approachesbasedonthemotivationsofactorsoragents:theyimplyactorsactstrategicallyorinstrumentallyandnotforotherreasons!!rationalchoiceapproaches:donotexcludenorms!<cognitiveapproachesrationalchoiceapproaches:decompositionofpreferencesanddecisions:present,future,uncertaintyrationalitymeanstransitivityifa>bandb>cthena>c.rationalityisalsorepresentedbythestandardexpectedutilitymodel:supposeatransitivepreferenceorutilityorder,thisordercanberepresentedbyafunctionu(x,y,z,...).thisfunctioncanthenbeassociatedwithagamble.hereu(x)takesonlythevaluesw(win),st(statusquo)andl(lose).wehavetheorderhereofw>st>l.thegambleorriskaspectisassociatedwithaprobabilityschemefordifferentevents.

gamble

sure-thingact

probability

lose

l

st

p

win

w

st

1-p

gamblepreferredtosurethingifeu(gble)>u(st),eu(gble)=u(w)(1-p)+u(l)pdynamicaspectsandriskpreferencethesurethingrealizationu(c(x))isalwayspreferredtothe(chancy)prospectu(c’(x))=[u(b(x)p(x)+u(a(x)(1-p(x))]theintervalt–c(x)istheamountofgainintermsofxanindividualispreparedtoforgofornottakingtherisklinkedtothechancyprospect

u(c’(x))=[u(b(x)p(x)+u(a(x)(1-p(x))]isalwayspreferredtothesurethingvaluec

dynamicaspectscanbeincludedviaadiscountrate:puretimepreferencedynamicaspectscognitiveapproaches:exampleofaschemeeventsearchforsimilareventinpastusematchestopasttodecidecourseofactionstakeactiondidactionyielddesiredoutcomenoyespasteventsmodifyeventbasetoavoidfuturematchreinforcematchedeventnow

suchapproacheshaveevolvedintoagentbasedmodelingormorphedwithrationalchoice

approachesagentbasedmodelingsymmetricindirectlyruledstatewithahierarchydepthofnsymmetricdirectlyruledstatewithnodepthrationalchoiceshowstheproblematicaspectofsolvingcollectiveactionproblemsandsocialchoiceandthusofthelinkagedomesticforeignpolicytwotheoreticalapproachesespeciallyinviewofinformationproblemscondorcet-arrowparadoxandtheoremthetheoryofcollectivegoodsinternationaldynamicsarelinkedtosuchquestionssocialchoice:condorcetarrow

socialchoiceandarrow’stheorem:

3voters:xyz

3issues:ab

cthecondorcetarrowparadox

preferences:

x:a>b>c

y:c>a>b

z:b>c>amajorityvote:a>b,b>c,butc>aarrowparadoxcontinued:singlepeakednessabcacbpreferenceabcabcabccollectivegoodtheorycollectivegoodsasopposedtoprivategoodsareproblematicwithrespecttoexclusionandrivalrytheyareneverthelessessentialfortheworkingofsocietytheyoriginatewithproductiveprocessesandpopulationconcentrationsthatarehigher:productionsecuritydilemmapropertyrightssolutioncollectivegoodtheorycontinuedtaxsolutioncollectivegoodtheoryleadstoatheoryofinterestgroups

freeriderproblemandselectiveincentives

asymmetryofinterestisimportant

collectivegoodsareusuallysuppliedbysmallgroups

collectivegoodsleadtotheprincipalagentproblempolitics,conflictandcooperationwhatispolitics?ifpoliticsconsistinsolvingcollectiveactionproblems,(foracollectivegood)thentheyconsistinorganizingcooperationbutalsoforconflictpoliticsstarttoemergewhentraditionalmethodsofconflictresolutionfail:avoidance,skirmishes,raidstheyrequireataxbasewhichcanonlyberealizedthroughasurplustheoriesclassical:hume,kant,cobdenwhereasclassicalapproachesarefocusingontheoriginsandnatureofstructuresthenewertheoriestakestructureforgranted:thisisnotsoseetheworksofpetersahlinsand,grahamrobbmorerecent:neo-realism,neo-liberalinstitutionalism,informationbasedconceptionssuchasepistemiccommunities.

constructivismtheoriesofinternationalrelationstheevolutionoftheoriesiscloselylinkedtothestructuralaspectofstatesystemshistoricallywenoticeasuccessionofdecentralizedstatesystemsfollowedbythecreationofempiresthisevolutionwasbrokeninwesterneuropearoundtheyear1000anddespiteattemptsanempirecoldnotberecreatedelsewherethestandardevolutioncontinued(china,theottomanempire,..)bythe18thcenturytheeuropeanspecificitybecamecleartoanalystsbythe19thcenturyeuropeanstatesbecameconsolidatedpoliticsandinternalstructures

whatcanbesaidhistorically?giventypesofpoliticalsystemsappear:chiefsorganizersofredistribution-providersofhighergoods,lords,kings,emperors,self-governmentfromtaxationtopropertyrights:egypt,incasthesehaveinternationalconnotations:thekonradskaperdasperspective:sizeofcoalitiontocreatecollectivegoodevolutionaryaspects:fromchiefstoself-governmentfundamentalquestion:whatconditionstheseevolutionssizeofpolities(johnson+earle)camporhamlet:25–30localgroup:150–500somewarfareoverresourcesandpeople(yanomamo:women)bigmancollectivity:350–1800morewarfarechiefdom:1000-max100000moreregularwarfarestate:several100000toseveralmillionssystematicorganizedwarfare:inkastate14mimportanceofwarfareforstateorganizationthekonrad-skaperdasmodelthekonrad-skaperdastheory:basedonhirshleiferindividualbasedutilityfunctionsofdifferentgroupsinsociety:peasants,bandits,soldiers,lords.basicassumptions:diminishingreturnsinproduction,trade-offsbetweenprivateandcollectivedefenseandbetweendefenseandproductiveactivities.4nashequilibriafromkonradskaperdas:anarchy,selfgovernance,leviathan,competinglordsalltheseconsiderationsleadtodifferentwaysofconsideringtheorieswhatisprimaryarerelationsamongindividualsorhouseholdsandhowtheysolvesubsistenceandsecurityquestionsandtheresultingcollectiveactionproblemsthesewillleadtobigorsmallcoalitionsandcentralizedordecentralizedpoliticalsystemswhatwilldeterminethosearecost,technologyandtaxationpossibilitiesthissuggestsadifferentlookattheoriestheinternationalactoranditsbargainingpowereventhoughweknowthattheinternationalactorisnotunitary,itisconvenienttorepresentitlikethatsometimessometimestheunitaryactorisevenjustifiedthereishowevernorelationbetweenunitaryactorandrationality:morecomplexrepresentationsarepossibleitisinparticulardesirabletorepresenttheactorlikethisintermsofbargainingandbargainingpowerwhatisbargainingpower:aheightenedabilitytoimposeasolutionontheotherside,thisgreater“probability”resultsfrombeingabletowalkawayfromnegotiations

possibleconflictdynamicsthebasicbargainingmodeltypeitypeiistacceptsgives

upinsistsqq1-qorpreferornotabargaintoconflictu(x)≥(1-p)w-c(conflict)wherexisanofferbythechallengercharacteristicsofthebasicbargainingmodelthebasicbargainingmodelemphasizestheimportanceof:sequenceandthustimepreferencesanddiscountinguncertaintyandthusattitudestowarduncertaintyandriskbasicsofbargainingprisoner’sdilemmaandchickenrowcolumn(3,3)

nash

equilibrium(4,1)(2,2)

nashequilibriumccccprisoner=sdilemma(1,4)(2,2)rowccrowcolumn(3,3)(4,2)nashequilibrium

(subgameperfect)(1,1)ccccchickenbargainingpower:ageneralconception

internationalactors,likedomesticonesinteractbyusingtheirbargainingpower:probabilitytodefectinabargainingsituation

thispowerisdeterminedby:domesticconstraintsleadingtothemetaphorandthenmodelsoftwo-levelgamesbythesymmetryorasymmetryofpreferencesor(expected)utilities(asalreadynoticedforcollectivegoods).thischaracteristicwasemphasizedbyjohnnashinhistheoryofbargaining.bargainingpower(continued)

thispowerisalsodeterminedbyinternational actors'propensitytowardrisk,bythepatienceorimpatienceofactorswithrespecttoabargainingoutcomeandthusbytheirdiscountrate(rubinsteintheoryofbargaining)incompleteinformationaboutthenatureofanotheractororaboutpropensitytowardriskwillalsoplayarole,particularlyinevaluatingthreatswhatroleforriskpreference?

example1rll’r’l’r’5112210022conflictescalationtheanalysisofnegotiationamongactorsindicatesanirrationalityofconflictescalation

thisirrationalitycanbeexplainedthroughthenotionofincompleteinformationorpoorriskpreference:fearonmodel

thedollarauctiongameisagoodmetaphorforconflictescalationandthecostsassociatedtoit.deterrenceandstabilitydeterrencecanbeexplainedviatheanalysisofcompellentordeterrentthreats.

ifcrediblethreatsareabsentdeterrenceorcompellencemaynotwork

ifdeterrentpoweriswellspreadstabilityismaintained.theevolutionofwarfareandcombatandarmsraces

theevolutionofmilitarytechnologyinfluencesinternationalrelationsbecauseitmodifiesthecostsofusingarmedforces.thereareoftencomplementaritiesbetweenmilitaryforceandproductionandexchangesystems.phoenicianandathenianfleetsprotectedtradeandcommerce,romanarmieswereguardingtheempirebutalsoconductingraidsforslaves,vikingshipscouldbothbeusedforpiracyandtrade.someanalystagree:theevolutionofcombatcombatischaracterizedbytwoparameters,concentrationanddispersionthesetwonotionswerestudiedbythebritishengineerlanchesterduringworldwariintermsofdynamicequations,oneforfrontalattacks,oneforblanketinganarea(suchasnavalbattlesorartilleryfire)forconcentration:dx1/dt=-ax2aquadraticlawobtainstoexplainsuccess:x12/x22>a/bpfordispersion,alinearlawobtains:dx1/dt=-ax1x2x1/x2>a/bhowdoestechnologicalevolutionworkout?itemnapoleonicwarscivilwarworldwariworldwariiarea:100thousandmen(mil2)8.0510.3dens:4700140dens:9301727dens:72aver.(mil)frontage

5.76.41138.4aver.diagonal5.96.61759leth.index5.514.3232.81280.5timeacrossdiagonal2.9combatstrategies

goodstrategistslikehannibalhavealwaysbeenabletouseacombinationofconcentrationanddispersion.inthebattleofcannaehannibalwasabletodestroythroughcleveruseofconcentrationanddispersionanumericallysuperiorromanarmyletslookatthisexample

theromanempireat100bcchangeseffectedbysecondpunicwar:

conquestofsyracuse,completecontrolofsicily-211bc

conquestofcarthaginianspain-206bc

creationofhispaniaciterior(nearerspain)-197bc

creationofhispaniaulterior(furtherspain)-197bc

conquestofmacedonia-148bcconquestofgreece,incorporatedintomacedonia-146bc

conquestofcarthage,creationofprovinceofafrica-146bc

inheritanceofthekingdomofpergamum(provinceofasia)-133bc(129bc)

conquestofillyricum(possiblyincorporatedintomacedoniaatfirst)-129bc

conquestofbalearicislands,incorporatedintohispaniaciterior-123bc

conquestofgalliatransalpina(narbonensis)-121bc

conquestofcilicia-102bchannibal

battleofcannae

216bcromangenerals:

luciusaemiliuspaullus&gaiusterentiusvarroforces:48000infantry;6000cavalrycarthaginiangeneral:hannibalforces:

35000infantry;10000cavalryurs/source340.html/aw/post/238837historicalevolutionofcombatandmilitarytechnologyhistoricallycombattendstodispersemoreandmore(cf.theanalysismadebyt.dupuy)theseevolutionsinfluencemilitarypreparednessandproducearmsracesthedynamicsofarmsracesareimportantinthemselvesarmsracedynamicsarmsracestendtofollowanadaptivelogic:evolutionofarmsa=f(armsb)-armsawheref(armsb)isadesiredlevelofarmamentsforaandarmsaitsexistingstockeachdecisionmakerwilltrytoadaptdesiredleveltoactuallevelarmsraces:desiredlevelreactionfunctionsmorerecentdevelopmentsdeitschmann(1962)proposedanasymmetriclanchestermodelappliedtoguerrillawarfaregovernmentoroccupyingforceswouldhavetofightinadispersedwayguerrillaforceswouldfightinaconcentratedwaythroughambusheswhichmakesthemrelativelyeffectiveanaturalextensionofthedeitchmannperspectivewouldbetopayattentiontoapopulationfromwhichguerrillaforcesrecruitandtotrywhatinfluencesitssizegovernmentandoccupationforcesarealsodeterminedtoshrinkthesizeofthispopulationtheexampleofrwandatherwandasituationcanbedescribedasatypicaldeitchmanmodelwheretutsirebelsaredispersedbutfightthegovernmenttroopsinaconcentratedfashionthroughambushes.theyrecruitfromabout10%ofthetotalrwandantutsipopulation(estimatedatabout650000in1990asopposedto6800000hutus).theirinitialsizeisestimatedat5000inthebeginningof1990.governmenttroops(mostlyhutus)areestimatedat40000andrecruitmentpossibilitiesforthematabout100menperweek.tutsirebelscaninflictmuchheavierlossesongovernmenttroopsthanthesecanonthemthefollowingscenariomaybeenvisagedfrom1990on:theresourcecrisisduetotheoverallpopulationexpansionleadsthe(hutubased)governmentofpresidentjuvenalhabyrimanatoputmorepressureontutsicontrolledland.thisleadstoanincreaseinrecruitsforthetutsirebelarmywhichgrowsrapidlyinsize.giventheheavylossesthisforcecaninflictupongovernmenttroops,paritywiththehutuforcesisreachedattheendof1992andtutsifighterscontinuetodepletethemandachievesuperiority.maximumsuperiorityisachievedfortutsiforcesinthespringof1994.thiscanbeconsideredinawayasatriggeringeventforthegenocideofthetutsisandmoderatehutuswhichbeginsinapril1994.thefollowinglanchestertyperelationscanbesetupresults:sizesofarmedforcesresults:genocidedomesticinternationallinkageandconflictasmentionedbefore,statesaremoreorlesstightlyknitcoalitions(eg.exyugoslavia)themetaphoroftwo-levelgamesapplyopponentstateshavestrategiesofdivisions:e.g.iraqiranwarethnicgroupingsareoftenatthebasisofdivisionstrategies:illustratesstrategiesofexclusion,complementaritiesalliancesandcoalitionsarationalanalysisofcoalitionformationisdifficult:e.g.gameofthedivisionofa$between3actorsatamajorityvote

theanalysisofcoalitionsandalliancesonlymakessenseonceoneconsidersmultidimensionalaspectsoftheirformationsimilartothenotionof

comparativeadvantageineconomics:e.gcaplow'smodel:

3actorsa,b,c,a>b>cbuta<b+c

inthiscasetheabcoalitionisunlikelytableofgainsinthecaplowtriadgameplayersabca-22b1-2c11-theanalysisofcaplow’striadgamerevealsimportantaspects:

therearefundamentaldifferencesbetweenbalancingandbandwagonningbehaviorinallianceformation.

internalandexternalgainsfromcoalitionshavetobedistinguished

suchgainscanbeeithersubstitutesorcomplements

thesetwoaspectsleadtoverydifferentformsofcooperationattheinternationallevel:securityalliance,economicsecuritycommunitygeneralstabilityproblemsattheinternationallevelthereviewoftraditionaltheorieshasemphasizedtheimportanceofstructuralcharacteristics:alliances,powerhierarchies:invisiblehandperspective,roleofinformationcaplow'sanalysisshowsthelimitationsofthestructuralapproaches:fundamentalambiguitythekantianperspectivehasalsodrawnattentiontointernalfactors,institutionalelementsandgeneralcooperativelinksbetweenstatesstability,continuedinternalfactorsareclearlyveryimportantmanyinternationalconflictshaveinternaloriginsthisistruenowandusedtobethecaseinthe20thaswellasinthe19thcenturyoftenmajorconflictsfollowmajorregimechangeschangesinmajorcountrieschangethestructure!why?historicallytheterritorialnationalstateisarecentphenomenon(19th)whichmightbedisappearinginitsclassicalformthereisno"diplomatic"bargaininggamebeforethe19th19thcenturyconf