CEO風(fēng)險承擔(dān)與公司風(fēng)險關(guān)系論文展示

1、CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies1243HypothesesDataEmpirical ResultsConclusion CONTENTS5RobustnessMain idea This study analyzes the relation between CEO personal risk-taking corporate risk-taking and total firm risk.主要分析了CEO個人的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)傾向和企業(yè)的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)承擔(dān)及企業(yè)整體風(fēng)險之間的關(guān)系.（用CEO是否有飛機(jī)駕駛資格作為風(fēng)險承擔(dān)的衡量）l Firm

2、s led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility.風(fēng)險容忍程度更高的CEO的企業(yè)的凈資產(chǎn)收益率的波動率更高l Pilot CEOs engage in elevated levels of acquisition activity.風(fēng)險容忍程度高的CEO會更頻繁的進(jìn)行并購活動l CEO risk aversion contains meaningful variation of economic relevance to shareholders, beyond that which is influenced directly

3、by shareholders through compensation structure. CEO的風(fēng)險容忍程度通過薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)對股東價值有一定的影響。1Hypothesis developmentuH1:Piloting small aircraft is consistent with elevated levels of health risk.駕駛小型飛機(jī)可以說明這個人對風(fēng)險的容忍程度較高 P.s: Pilots are engaging in risk-taking behavior and that our pilot variable is therefore a valid p

4、roxy for health risk preferences.uH2:Pilot CEOs will be positively associated with overall firm risk. CEO個人的風(fēng)險容忍傾向與公司整體風(fēng)險是相關(guān)的Sample selection and data The initial sample of CEOs from Compustat Executive Compensation database. If a given name does not produce a match in the FAAs database, then this o

5、bservation is coded as a non-pilot and no further validation is necessary. In total, the full panel covers 1016 CEO-pilot firm-years and 14611 CEO-non-pilot firm-years. 22Descriptive Statistics2Descriptive Statistics2Descriptive Statistics Only 8 firms that could be considered rural. Additionally, w

6、hether the CEO lives near the commercial airports does not make a sense. 只有極少數(shù)的企業(yè)是在偏遠(yuǎn)的地方，交通不便的影響可以忽略。 Most pilot CEOs could not drive for a typical business travel, so it is only their hobby. It does not appear that firms with pilot CEOs are disproportionately located in aviation-related industries

7、or that any single industry dominates that sample.CEO是否有飛機(jī)駕駛資格與行業(yè)并無關(guān)系。l Behavioral consistency in Risk Attitudes 風(fēng)險態(tài)度和行為的一致性l Corporate Policies 企業(yè)政策l M&A Activity and Firm Risk 并購活動與企業(yè)風(fēng)險l Personal Risk-Taking and Shareholder Value 個人風(fēng)險承擔(dān)與股東價值l Compensation Structure 薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)Empirical Results33-1Beh

8、avioral Consistency in Risk AttitudesDependent variable is the annualized standard deviation of firm-level monthly stock returnsCEOs who bear elevated levels of health risk in their personal lives are willing to bear elevated levels of overall firm risk inn their professional lives. 風(fēng)險容忍程度越大的CEO的企業(yè)對

9、風(fēng)險容忍程度也更大3-2Corporate PoliciesDependent variable is the book leverage( total debt over total assets, winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails)3-2Corporate PoliciesLogit model: the dependent variable equals 1 if the firm announces a successful merger bid in a given year CEOs are more likely to make acquisi

10、tions later during their tenure with the firm. CEO會在他們?nèi)温毜暮笃谶M(jìn)行一些并購Pilot CEOs are about 1.33 times more likely to complete an acquisition in any given year than are non-pilot CEOs.在固定的一年里，有飛行員資格的CEO更有可能去完成企業(yè)的并購。3-3M&A Activity and Firm RiskM&A_ACTIVITY: equals 1 if the firm completes an acquis

11、ition in the given yearIt appears that although M&A_ACITIVITY on average dose not increase firm risk, the types of transactions executed by risk-seeking CEOs do tend to increase the riskiness of their firms.并購活動本身可能并不會增加企業(yè)風(fēng)險，但風(fēng)險容忍程度大的CEO的選擇可能反而會增加企業(yè)風(fēng)險A substantial amount of the increase in firm

12、risk associated with pilot CEOs arises from the CEOs increased propensity for making acquisitions that increase risk for the acquiring firm3-4Personal Risk-Taking and Shareholder ValueDependent variable: bidder announcement returnsRisk-tolerant CEOs pursue value-increasing acquisitions at bidders wi

13、th few recognizable organic growth prospects. In certain firms types, pilot CEOs can create value by pursuing a policy of heightened M&A activity.風(fēng)險容忍的CEO 總是會去追求少數(shù)知名的有增長前景的標(biāo)的公司來增加收購價值，所以可以得到在某些企業(yè)，CEO可以通過一些并購活動創(chuàng)造價值。3-5Compensation StructureDependent variable: VEGA of CEO equity and option holding

14、Less risk-averse CEOs are associated with higher levels of compensation convexity.風(fēng)險容忍的CEO有更高水平的薪酬凸度。HIGH-PERFORMANCE_PAY takes a value of 1 if the CEOs performance-based compensation is in the top tercile of the sampleThe risk-taking proxy is not significantly related to the amount of compensation,

15、 only the structure. CEO的風(fēng)險承擔(dān)程度與薪酬總值無關(guān)，只與薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)有關(guān)。4.Robustnessl The first concern: the influence of some industries We purge all airline-related firms form the sample and recalculate all models, and the results remain qualitatively similar.排除了所有與航空相關(guān)的行業(yè)的企業(yè)進(jìn)行實驗，仍然得到相同的結(jié)論l The second concern: the influe

16、nce of overconfident CEOs Overconfident CEOs pursue value-decreasing strategies while pilot CEOs tend to pursue value-neutral or value-increasing growth opportunities.過分自信的CEO總是會追求價值下降的策略而冒險的CEO們會追求價值中性或價值上升的策略l The third concern: the wealth of the sample CEOs differs Financial constrains are not li

17、kely to be a meaningful deterrent in their choice to forego private piloting. Most of pilot CEOs only take flying as their hobby.經(jīng)濟(jì)制約并不會影響CEO們對飛行、冒險的追求。5.Conclusionl CEOs tolerance for risk in non-pecuniary contexts has explanatory power for corporate project selection and overall firm risk. CEO對非金錢的風(fēng)險容忍程度對企業(yè)項目的選擇和企業(yè)整體風(fēng)險都有一定的解釋度l Pilot CEOs engage in elevated levels of acquisition activity and the acquisition they lead leads to significantl