Russia and the European Union′s Northern dimension

1、russia and the european unionsnorthern dimension by pertti joenniemi & alexander sergounincopenhagen peace research dept. of history & cultural studies institute nizhny novgorod linguistic universityconference of the international peace research association (ipra),tampere, finland, 5-9 augus

2、t 2001. introductionthe northern dimension is applied, it appears, as a departure in outlining political space at the edges of the european union. the initiative pertains, as evidenced for example for the action plan approved at the eu summit in feira in july 2000, particularly to the unfolding of t

3、he eu/russia relationship in northernmost europe. it accentuates previous approaches by stating explicitly that the area calls, due to its particular nature, for special policies, and hence it also allows russia to be treated in differentiated terms.but to what extent are the relevant parties prepar

4、ed to make use of the marker northernness, i.e. a departure that contains a considerable dose of ambiguity? are they compelled to step outside the dominant and rather well defined co-ordinates of the east and the west in defining political space and to trade them for what has been sometimes called t

5、he blank spot of northernnes? and more specifically, can the northern dimension develop into a backdoor for a closer eu/russia relationship and how does russia feel about such a route? this is of importance as the significance of the initiative is quite dependent on russias reactions.the initiative

6、strengthens, no doubt, russias options to take part in europe-making. it confirms the existence of a partnership between the eu and russia, and provides the unfolding of the relationship with an additional forum. yet the question remains how far russia is prepared to go in using the new openness as

7、the differentiated nature, inherent in the northern departure, may also have significant consequences for russias own overall figure. in opening up for a europe that is somewhat less closed and predetermined, it would also call for a more flexible and diversified russia.this paper focuses on the bac

8、kground and appearance of eus the northern dimension, and it endeavours at evaluating the significance of such a move by singling out the russian reactions. the aim is to review some of the main developments in the sphere of economic questions, infrastructure, environment as well as soft security bu

9、t also to make, on a more general level, an effort to trace the position of the northern marker in the russian history of ideas. this is done in order to pass judgement on whether such a signifier may be comprehended as opening a window of opportunity or if it stands for something entirely different

10、, i.e. remains unable of facilitate the emergence of closer eu/russia relationship and function as a bridge to europe.2. the background and state of affairs of the northern dimensionthe northern part of europe seems to have been rather quick in injecting new arguments and representations into the di

11、scourse on the post-cold war europe. a debate on a baltic sea region started already during the end-1980s and the various notions concerning a hanseatic league, a baltic-scandic link, ostseeraum etc. also yielded results (cf. joenniemi and stålvant, 1995). an extensive network of various co-ope

12、rative vehicles developed, including cities, chambers of commerce, churches, universities, environmental organisations but also states in the form of the council of baltic sea states (cbss). the plurality of spatial images further increased in the beginning of the 1990s with the establishment of the

13、 barents euro-arctic region (bear) (cf. tunander and stokke, 1994). these various initiatives imply, taken together, that northern europe appears to have as argued by alison bailes (1998:183) - over the recent years turned into a veritable laboratory of innovative ways of dealing with the divisive n

14、ature of borders. the emerging political landscape is far less rigid than the previous one in being imbued with multilateral constellations and a considerable amount of regional formations. the european union has contributed to these developments by joining both the council of baltic sea states and

15、the barents euro-arctic council (beac). yet the eu has predominantly stayed in a passive role in the sense that the policies applied were mainly those of spatial planning and an utilisation of the structural funds. however, a more active role seems to be on its way with policies being designed speci

16、ally for europes north, and most particularly for an intermediate space at the edges of the union. the finnish initiative of a northern dimension, launched originally in 1997, yielded results in the sense that the european council noted in december 1998, in response to an interim report prepared by

17、the commission, that the region has needs that the eu will have to address. it was noted that the northern region is of special importance to the union. the region was depicted as being rich in natural resources and human potential. moreover, the report invited for a co-operation with russia. the co

18、uncil called for a coherent approach and effective policies towards the region in all eu issues and the bolstered position of northernness was given symbolical expression by enriching the vocabularies of the union with the concept of a 'northern dimension'.a foreign ministers conference on t

19、he northern dimension was convened in helsinki 11-12 november 1999. it was organised by the finnish presidency in partnership with the european commission. the conference created a common political platform between the eu members states and seven invited partner countries, estonia, iceland, latvia,

20、lithuania, poland and the russian federation with the aim of discussing the concept and to develop concrete ideas to advance it. the proceedings of the conference were summarised in the conclusions of the chair, noting among other things that “the commitment of the russian federation to the developm

21、ent of the northern dimension in the long run is very valuable“ (nissinen, 2000: 116).the helsinki european council, 10-11 december 1999, then invited - based on a suggestion put forward by the foreign ministers conference - the commission to prepare, in co-operation with the council and in consulta

22、tion with the partner countries, an action plan for the northern dimension. such a plan was to deal with the external and cross-border policies of the eu designed to derive maximum added value from community and member states programmes through better co-ordination and complementarity, thereby achie

23、ving a more coherent approach to addressing the specific problems and needs of the north and to developing its potential. the plan was then prepared and accepted at the eu summit in feira in june 2000.the action plan consists of two parts: a horizontal and an operational part. the first one recalls

24、the major challenges associated with northern europe, the priorities for action agreed by the partner countries and the legal, institutional and financial framework for activities relating to the northern dimension, and the second one set out the objectives and perspectives for action during 2000-20

25、03 in those sectors where expected added value is greater. it states, inter alia, that the northern dimension is an on-going process without specific budgetary appropriation. geographically the area is outlined as reaching from iceland on the west across to north-west russia, from the norwegian, bar

26、ents and kara seas in the north to the southern coast of the baltic sea.denmark organised in may 2000 a conference in copenhagen on the “northern dimension and kaliningrad: european and regional integration“. the conference provided for a comprehensive, yet informal discussions on key issues pertain

27、ing to the northern dimension and kaliningrad in that context, as well as concrete proposals for the way ahead. the conclusions of the chair presented at the conference form elements for consideration in further work on the eu initiative. sweden has pledged that it will organise another ministerial

28、conference on the northern dimension during its presidency during the first part of 2001.the approval of the northern dimension and the emplacement of it on the eus agenda implies, in more general terms, that what used to be, prior to the entrance of finland and sweden in 1995, a blank spot on the u

29、nion's mental map (jann, 1994:182) is increasingly getting contours of its own. the idea of dimensionalism, i.e. that there are at the edges of the eu areas which require special attention and which have particular characteristics, has been accepted. and turned into a forum of dialogue between m

30、embers of the eu and so-called partner countries.northernness has thus landed on the eus agenda, albeit the specific substantial aspects including the financial and institutional ones still tend to remain rather weak. the results appear more decisive if view from a constructivist perspective. the re

31、presentation utilised in outlining a site at the edges of the eu is not - as might have been expected on the basis of previous constellations - that of westernness or easternness. it is not conceptualised as being in focus of a contest between the east and west, consequently to turn more western. in

32、stead, a rather fluid, elusive and less-defined marker has been grasped and advanced by finland and consequently approved by the eu. europeanness has been linked and complemented with northernness, a marker rich in mythology and implied meanings. it is singled out, as observed by sergei medvedev (20

33、00, 1), as being at the outer fringe; it is much more external to the centre than the south, east or west. it has been less explored and assimilated by modern culture than west or east, and it has connotations of emptiness in contrast to the south which contains references to the overpopulated third

34、 world. the north is more often communicated than experienced, imagined rather than embodied“, medvedev argues. as there is some northernness in the eu, and as also russia may feel equally at home with such a marker, it may potentially serve as a bridge and a site where the parties meet on exception

35、ally equal terms.3. promoting stability through economic integrationthe marker of northernness does not just reside in the abstract; it has also spurred a debate on its content. many issues are non-contraversial, but there are also divergent views and differences in emphasis.both the eu member state

36、s and russia agree that economic co-operation should be the main stabilising factor in the region and, for this reason, the main content of the northern dimension. during the november 1999 helsinki conference on the northern dimension the russian foreign minister igor ivanov emphasised that we ought

37、 to use the chance given to us by history and pool our unique economic, scientific, intellectual and raw materials resources in the interests of harmonious development of our states, the improvement of the quality of our peoples life, the solution of urgent social, economic and ecological problems.

38、the task of qualitative improving of trade, investment, sectoral and interregional co-operation is a realistic one. we do not at all link these processes to alienation of the north and north-west of the continent from the rest of europe or russia. the scale of the projects to be implemented is such

39、that all the europeans will get a real feedback from them. the transport and energy arteries being created will serve the interests of the entire continent“ (ivanov, 2000: 7-8).the german minister of state christoph zopel echoed the ivanovs speech by saying that since the time of the hanseatic leagu

40、e trade and economic co-operation were the most efficient instruments for promoting the regions development and prosperity. “now, within the framework of the northern dimension of the european union, we have the chance to revitalise this successful form of co-operation with the aid of modern technol

41、ogy and the incomparably greater opportunities that it brings. this would be a major step towards the goal of preventing any new lines of division appearing in europe” (zopel, 2000: 23-24). however, there is a difference of opinion as regards the priorities of economic co-operation. while the eu com

42、mission, austria, estonia, finland, france, latvia, norway, and poland are in favour of the energy sector, belgium, germany, and iceland opt for the environment protection and nuclear safety programmes (nissinen, 2000: 4, 11, 19, 22, 24, 32, 34, 36, 41, 43, 53). the european bank for reconstruction

43、& development (ebrd) singles out environment and municipal infrastructure (jahnke, 2000: 27-28). the world bank is interested in the human development (linn, 2000: 30). russia supports the above priorities but suggests to focus first and foremost on the industrial and scientific co-operation. mo

44、scow fears that by overemphasising the energy sector the northern dimension could secure the russian status of a backward country providing the world market with raw materials. as ivanov put it, “apart from our huge reserves of raw materials, wood, oil and gas, we have many other things to offer ran

45、ging from industrial and scientific potential to skilled labour force and advanced technologies. we would like to get down to modernisation of our industry, agriculture and social and cultural spheres, to conversion of our defence industries and facilities (ivanov, 2000: 7-8).some eu member states n

46、ote that economic integration does not follow solely from better market access or the creation of networks of infrastructure. they admit that many mistakes were made by the western countries in the administration of the transition phase in central europe and russia, ignoring stages of development an

47、d trying to follow the markets as a sole guide of conduct. they emphasise the need to define a regulatory and institutional framework so as to be favourable for investment and entrepreneurial activities in the transitional countries (hennekinne, 2000: 32).according to diplomatic documents and sugges

48、tions made by politicians, businessmen, academics and ngos, the following priorities of the economic co-operation within the northern dimension can be identified:energythe eu commissioner chris patten noted that energy is a key sector for the northern dimension. according to patten, there are three

49、priorities of the eus energy policy in northern europe:· technical assistance to strengthen co-operation with russia;· improving programme management to increase co-ordination of existing eu programmes and instruments;· joint activities with international financial institutions and co

50、-operation with industry to optimise the impact of financial instruments in the energy sector (patten, 2000: 12).the pca with russia (art. 65) for the first time identified the energy sector as an important area for co-operation and established a legal framework for such a co-operation. particularly

51、, the co-operation in the energy sector shall take place within the context of the market and the european energy charter (commission of the european communities, 2000: 7). the northern dimension continued this effort. one of the early positive results of the northern dimension was the creation of t

52、he eu commission of the baltic energy task force charged with the energy projects in the region and in which russia is also actively involved (zopel, 2000: 25). in october 1999, the conference of ministers of energy in the baltic sea region was held under the auspices of the cbss in helsinki. the en

53、ergy ministers identified two areas which are essential for future energy co-operation: (a) organisation and integration of the electricity and gas markets, including the basis for infrastructure investments; and (b) climate change policies, work on renewables and energy efficiency (vollebaek, 2000a

54、: 20). in addition, the eu action plan on the northern dimension defines two strategic objectives to be achieved with regard to the energy sector:(a) creation of conditions for trading energy across borders on the basis of national treatment of companies (non-discrimination on basis of nationality)

55、and development of energy networks aiming at gradual integration of the energy markets, including the production and distribution of natural gas.(b) promoting efficient use, preference for renewable resources, and environmentally sound production (commission of the european communities, 2000: 7).the

56、 action plan sets up a number of concrete tasks before the regional actors, including:· the maintenance of an inventory of regionally relevant energy projects and financial sources in order to co-ordinate various activities and avoid duplication.· promotion of mutual transparency of strate

57、gic objectives and the availability of financial support for the region.· eus active participation in the activities of the group of senior energy officials created by the energy ministers of the region to define and manage the regional energy co-operation programme.· monitoring energy inv

58、estments and structural changes in the sector.· development of management capacity in the regional energy companies.· development and transfer of new technologies to north-western russia (commission of the european communities, 2000: 8).gas and oil. europes future energy management will be

59、 greatly dependent on gas that comes from russia, and one important route will go through northern europe. according to some data, the russian gas will made up 40-70 per cent of the total eu gas consumption by the year 2020 (leshukov, 2000: 31; piskulov, 1999: 27). on the other hand, europe will be the m