針對一個公司的真正的核心競爭力外文翻譯（可編輯）

1、針對一個公司的真正的核心競爭力外文翻譯 外文翻譯 targeting a companys real core competenciesmaterial source: journal of business strategy, 1993 volume13 issue 6 author: amy v. snyder and h. william ebeling, jr. the twin concepts of core competence and business processes figure prominently in most discussions of corporate s

2、trategy. the core competence concept helps top managers answer the fundamental question what should we do? and the business processes perspective addresses the question how should we do it? both concepts are indispensable in guiding firms to achieve enduring competitive advantage and superior profit

3、ability, and both are founded on a simple notion: that the firm is a system of activities, not a portfolio of individual products or services. some activities are performed so much better than the competition and are so critical to end products or services that they can be described as core competen

4、cies. when a series of activities are organized into a system that works better than the sum of its parts, this business process can also create competitive advantage, even if component activities by themselves do not. while business process reengineers have achieved significant success in decreasin

5、g costs while simultaneously improving service levels, relatively few firms claim to have correctly identified and fully exploited their core competencies or key activities. throughout this article, we will use the terms core competency and key activity interchangeably. business process reengineers

6、have developed an analytically rigorous discipline that can be systematically applied and plainly communicated to others. for the core competency concept to achieve this same success, it must be linked to the underlying business economics that drive competitive advantage, and it must be applied in t

7、he same systematic manner as the business process concept. in the mid-1970s, corporate planners began to question whether the product-centered business unit was the most appropriate unit of strategic analysis. in work undertaken for a global chemical company in 1977, braxton associates redefined the

8、 unit of analysis from product-centered business units to activities and developed insights about how competitive advantage is created in the long run. in the course of our work with the chemical company, we demonstrated that gaining a strong relative share in key value-added activities is more rele

9、vant to competitive position than gaining share of the related product market. in the 1970s, we used the slicing knife schematic to demonstrate that assessing competitive advantage from a product perspective can lead to erroneous conclusions. the insight that underlies the activity perspective is th

10、at a firm can not be viewed only as a collection of individual products or services this merely describes the revenue-generating side of the firm. equally important, the firm is a system of activities that must be organized and managed to imize the value of its offerings while minimizing their cost

11、that is, to create competitive advantage. the slicing knife example makes an important point, but a key question remains. once it is determined that a firm enjoys a comparatively strong activity position, the next logical question is so what? achieving strong activity position is critical to competi

12、tiveness only when the particular activity adds significant value to the end product or service. in the 1980s, michael porter documented the concept of the value chain and used it to show how a series of activities could be viewed as a system designed to create competitive advantageporters work was

13、instrumental in popularizing the activity perspective and the importance of activity linkages however, the popular version of porters value chain does not consider the value-added concept in sufficient depth. this is unfortunate,because the value-added structure determines which activities are criti

14、cal to success and which are not. it is usually a mistake to invest heavily in activities that represent only a small fraction of the overall value of a firms products or services. the company that produced the page you are now reading would be better off with a competency in printing and page setup

15、 than in packaging, even though the printed journal was delivered in a protective package, because packaging does not represent a significant fraction of the overall value of the delivered journal. four imperatives of core competencies the ge and honda examples demonstrate the importance of organizi

16、ng around real core competencies or activities and the implications of failing to do so. once senior management develops the strategic intent to identify, nurture, and organize around activities that can be made unique and enduring, a few rules must be followed to transform this commitment into comp

17、etitive success. rule 1: avoid laundry lists if senior management settles on more than a handful of key activities or core competencies, it is probably over-reaching and certainly ignoring the intent of the word core. many successful companies have targeted either one or two key activities identifyi

18、ng key activities is one of the most important contributions senior management can make. in our view, proposed core competencies should: contribute significantly to the ultimate value of the end product or service. represent a unique capability that provides enduring competitive advantage have the p

19、otential to support multiple end products or services rule 2: achieve senior management consensus on core competencies what business are you really in? evaluating potential core competencies using the previously described screening approach is a necessary but insufficient step in building a competen

20、cy driven organization. if competencies are to be nurtured and shared widely throughout the firm, senior management must reach consensus on which these are and act on the results of their selection process in working to build senior management consensus on key activities, we have achieved good resul

21、ts using the following approaches among others: activity-based benchmarking. employee and asset distribution. what if scenario development. activity-based benchmarking is a technique that can steer debate away from subjective opinions and toward hard facts. for example, if the vice president of oper

22、ations claims that order processing and fulfillment is a core competency, he could develop a persuasive argument by demonstrating an enduring competitive advantage in order processing speed, cost, and customer satisfaction. a compelling argument can also be built by answering some simple questions a

23、bout an organizations internal configuration, for example: what do your employees do? where are your assets? if 80% of a companys employees are on the plant floor, the marketing vice-president must argue persuasively to convince his colleagues that marketing and sales is really a key activity. after

24、 all, people embody the collective learning so extolled today, and learning becomes a formidable competitive weapon when it is built up and shared among a large number of employees what if approaches are also useful in working with a group to select core competencies. a senior management deadlock ca

25、n often be broken by working out the implications of selecting a single core competency as a guide for future actions. in a deadlocked situation, one might ask what actions are implied by the adoption of core competency x? what products and markets are most attractive given this core competency? wha

26、t will the company look like five years from now if competency x guides our actions? these same questions should be answered for each proposed core competency. while this approach may seem simplistic, it can be combined with other, more analytical approaches to help the group reach consensus on a co

27、re competency or two that makes the most sense for the corporation. rule 3: leverage core competencies inside the organization once senior management identifies and agrees on the firms core competencies, it must work zealously to ensure that competencies are continually strengthened, shared widely t

28、hroughout the corporation, and managed in a way that best preserves the competitive advantages they create. the importance of this mandate cannot be stressed enough-if senior management fails to organize around key activities, they will disappear. recall the slicing knife example: while the electric

29、 motor manufacturing activity enjoys a strong relative activity share, motor costs will not necessarily be lower than that of the competition. only if this company organizes and conducts its operations so as to capture the collective learning taking place in the motor manufacturing activity will it

30、drive costs down as cumulative experience increases. actions that may be necessary to best exploit identified competencies run the spectrum from physically reconfiguring disparate manufacturing processes to simply communicating more effectively. consider the case of a leading international manufactu

31、rer of electrical products. division a developed expertise in the design and manufacture of surface-mounted printed circuit boards and used this skill to reduce the costs of its products. division b had an outmoded, expensive production process, in part because it was several generations behind in p

32、rinted circuit-board design. division b could have benefitted from division as surface-mount expertise and in return could have driven down costs for both divisions by increasing overall volume. instead, division a jealously guarded its capabilities, and division b continued to struggle. this behavi

33、or cannot be tolerated if key corporate skills are to be exploited to their fullest potential. new approaches to project coordination and interdepartmental communication can help to break down the barriers. today, corporate planners are applauding adaptive organizations, which retain some vestiges o

34、f the old hierarchy and maybe a few traditional departments but rely on a pattern of constantly changing teams, task forces, partnerships, and other informal structures. the goal of the adaptive organization is to ensure that the best core competencies, whether embodied in technologies, processes, o

35、r employees, are linked to the most promising market opportunities so that learning is imized and travels quickly throughout the corporation. rule 4: share core competencies outside the corporation as well sometimes sharing and nurturing core competencies within a corporation is not enough. as marke

36、ts evolve, new activities may be required. moreover, in todays global marketplace, even giant corporations blanch at the cost of launching new products and entering new markets. with product lifecycles shrinking and r&d costs skyrocketing, some companies find it easier to embrace their competitors r

37、ather than fight them. collins and doorley have studied multinational alliance behavior and observe that the corporation of the future will need to take a more dynamic view of its business. there is often insufficient time to switch from one mode of operation to another as markets evolve through the

38、ir product lifecycles. from the very start of a new business, companies must find ways of building competence in each area of competitive advantage even if they are not well placed to do so on their own. thinking about alliances from the perspective of key activities that can be shared adds clarity

39、to a complex and difficult partner identification process. as senior executives have begun to focus on imizing the value of the core competencies they identify, alliance activity has increased substantially. redefining core competencies identifying core competencies and inspiring the organization to

40、 nurture and organize around them is one of the most important contributions senior management can make. the reverse is also true: selecting the wrong competency or too many core competencies is one of the worst conceivable management errors. it is our experience that an effort like this should be u

41、ndertaken every three to five years, as part of a periodic review of corporate strategy. however, when an industry undergoes a fundamental change in its value-added structure, a reassessment is critical. often management cannot respond fast enough and heavy losses result western union could not make

42、 the transition into the information age because it failed to recognize the growing importance of the transmission infrastructure; it eventually fell into bankruptcy. however, when the core check printing business of deluxe check printers became threatened by electronic funds transfer eft, deluxe co

43、rrectly perceived that it had to cultivate new skills to preserve its historical performance. senior management redefined its core competency from printing checks to facilitating financial transactions and built a successful eft and data processing business. in redefining its business, deluxe recogn

44、ized that its role in check clearing and processing and its financial institution marketing expertise might offer more enduring value to its customers than printing checks. deluxe combined these enduring skills with acquired skills in computer automation, and it moved successfully in a new direction

45、. companies with a widely shared understanding of their unique and enduring capabilities and the evolving value-added structure of their industries will rise above the competition, just as deluxe and honda did. by whatever name activities, core competencies, or value-chain elements, firms that defin

46、e their competitive advantage based on structural superiority in the discrete activities they perform are more often than not long-term winners; these companies turn their core competencies into competitive weapons, not competitive traps.譯文針對一個公司的真正的核心競爭力資料來源: journal of business strategy(商業(yè)策略期刊),19

47、93 volume13 issue 6作者:amy v. snyder and h. william ebeling, jr. 核心競爭力和業(yè)務(wù)流程的這兩個雙胞胎概念在多數(shù)關(guān)于公司策略的討論中被突出地計算。核心競爭力概念幫助高層管理者回答這個基本問題, “我們該怎么辦呢?”和業(yè)務(wù)流程的角度論述了問題,“我們該怎么做它呢?” 兩個概念都是必不可少的指導(dǎo)公司實現(xiàn)持久的競爭優(yōu)勢,超額利潤,兩者都是建立在一個簡單的觀念:我們是系統(tǒng)的一個公事包的活動,不是個人的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)。很多活動比競爭執(zhí)行的更好,那么重要終端產(chǎn)品或服務(wù),他們可以被描述為核心競爭力。當(dāng)一系列活動被組織成一個系統(tǒng)可以比各部分的相加運作得更

48、好,這個業(yè)務(wù)流程也可以創(chuàng)建競爭優(yōu)勢,即使組件本身是沒有活動。 當(dāng)業(yè)務(wù)流程重新建造時在降低成本方面取得了重大成功,同時,提高服務(wù)水平,相對的很少公司宣稱他們已經(jīng)正確地識別出和充分開發(fā)核心競爭力或關(guān)鍵活動。(在業(yè)務(wù)流程再設(shè)計已經(jīng)發(fā)展了一種分析嚴(yán)格的學(xué)科,因此可以被系統(tǒng)地應(yīng)用和清楚的與他人溝通交流。這篇文章中,我們將會交替地使用術(shù)語的核心競爭力和關(guān)鍵活動。)至于核心競爭力的概念要達(dá)到同樣的成功,要像業(yè)務(wù)流程的概念一樣,它必須被連接到潛在的商業(yè)經(jīng)濟學(xué),推動競爭優(yōu)勢,而且必須應(yīng)用相同的系統(tǒng)的方式。 在20世紀(jì)70年代中期,公司計劃者開始詢問是否產(chǎn)品被集中的營業(yè)單位是戰(zhàn)略分析最適當(dāng)?shù)膯挝弧?977年在為一

49、家全球性化工公司承擔(dān)工作時,braxton公司重新定義了分析單位從產(chǎn)品被集中的營業(yè)單位到活動單位,并且開發(fā)了關(guān)于怎樣最終創(chuàng)造競爭優(yōu)勢的深刻見解。 在我們的與化工公司的工作期間,我們表明在關(guān)鍵增值活動獲得強有力的相對分享中,競爭地位比獲取相關(guān)產(chǎn)品市場的份額更有關(guān)系。在20世紀(jì)70年代,我們用刀原理來證明從一個產(chǎn)品角度來評估競爭優(yōu)勢會導(dǎo)致錯誤的結(jié)論?；顒颖澈蟮亩床炝κ瞧髽I(yè)是不能被看作為收集個人的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù),這種僅僅描述稅收一方面。同樣重要的是,該公司是一個活動的系統(tǒng),必須被組織和被管理以達(dá)到在降低其成本時使產(chǎn)品價值最大化,最終創(chuàng)造競爭優(yōu)勢。 切片刀的例子提出了一個重要的觀點,但一個非常關(guān)鍵的問題依

50、然存在。一旦確定了公司具有較強的活動的位置,接下來的邏輯問題是“那又怎么樣?” 對競爭力而言實現(xiàn)活性較強的位置是關(guān)鍵,只有當(dāng)詳細(xì)的活動時增加了顯著的價值到最終產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)。 在20世紀(jì)80年代,邁克爾?波特記錄了價值鏈的概念,并且用它來顯示可能被視為一個設(shè)計系統(tǒng)的一系列活動怎樣來創(chuàng)造競爭優(yōu)勢。波特的工作是普及活動的角度和活動聯(lián)系的重要性。 然而,普遍版的波特的價值鏈概念沒有深刻考慮到增值概念。這是不幸的,因為增值結(jié)構(gòu)決定著哪些活動對成功至關(guān)重要,而哪些不是。 它通常是一個差錯,代表著在活動中投資巨大,而公司只有一小部分的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的整體價值。公司產(chǎn)生的頁面,你現(xiàn)在讀起來比包裝領(lǐng)域的印刷能和頁面設(shè)

51、置更舒適,即使印刷雜志交付了緩沖包裝,因為包裝并不代表總體價值交付的雜志的很大一部份的。 關(guān)于核心競爭力的四句祈使句 ge和本田的實例驗證,這樣圍繞“真正的”核心競爭力或活動以及有關(guān)的失敗做的重要性。一旦高級管理開發(fā)了戰(zhàn)略意圖去鑒定、培養(yǎng)、組織活動,那么可以創(chuàng)造獨特而持久的,一些規(guī)則必須遵循著改變承諾為競爭成功的原則。 規(guī)則1:避免詳細(xì)的清單 如果高層管理停留在超出少許關(guān)鍵活動或核心競爭力,那可能就是超越或者當(dāng)然忽略了核心這個詞的意圖。有許多成功的公司瞄準(zhǔn)的是其中一或兩種關(guān)鍵活動。 辨認(rèn)關(guān)鍵活動是高級管理能做的最重要的貢獻(xiàn)之一。在我們看來,提出了核心競爭力要: 重要貢獻(xiàn)是使最終產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)價值最

52、大化。 代表一種獨特的能夠提供持久的競爭優(yōu)勢的能力。 有潛力支持多種最終產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)。 規(guī)則二:獲得高級管理人員關(guān)于核心競爭力的共識(什么生意你真正在做?) 評估潛在的核心競爭力使用以前被描述的篩選方法是十分有必要的,但不足的是要建立被動能力的組織。如果企業(yè)廣泛培植和分享能力,高級管理必須達(dá)成它們是那些和按照他們的選擇過程的結(jié)果來行事的共識。 在建立高級管理層關(guān)于關(guān)鍵活動的共識,我們使用以下途徑與其他人一起取得了良好的效果: 作業(yè)標(biāo)桿管理。 員工和資產(chǎn)分配。 “如果”的設(shè)想的發(fā)展。 作業(yè)標(biāo)桿管理是一種可以控制爭論遠(yuǎn)離主觀的看法和朝著不容懷疑的事實發(fā)展的技巧。例如,如果操作副總聲稱實現(xiàn)訂單加工是一種核心競爭力,他可以開發(fā)一個有說服力的論據(jù),通過證明在一筆訂單處理速度、成本、及客戶的滿意上具有持久的競爭優(yōu)勢。 一個引人注目的論據(jù)還可以通過關(guān)于回答組織的配置的一些簡單的問題來建立,例如:“你的員工做什么?你的資產(chǎn)在哪里?” 如果一個公司80%的員工在工廠車間里,營銷副總必須有效的說服他的同事們,市場營銷和銷售是一個真正的關(guān)鍵活動。畢竟,今天人們體現(xiàn)著集體學(xué)習(xí)很受歡迎,當(dāng)學(xué)習(xí)被建立和在大量的雇員共享時,它成為了一項具有強大的競爭力的武器。 “如果”的模式在團(tuán)隊工作選擇核心競爭力方面同樣有用的。高級管理層的僵局經(jīng)常被打破,通過制定出選擇的單一的核心競爭力的影響,來指導(dǎo)未來的行動