一個投資者的成長.doc

此文檔收集于網(wǎng)絡(luò)，如有侵權(quán)，請聯(lián)系網(wǎng)站刪除一個投資者的成長讀巴菲特的信 最近正在讀巴菲特給股東的信，從1957開始。當(dāng)時巴菲特還只是一個27歲的青年投資者，僅有兩年正式的職業(yè)投資經(jīng)驗。1954-1956年，巴菲特曾經(jīng)在格雷厄姆的投資公司工作。在那之前，巴菲特提出免費給格雷厄姆工作，但遭到了拒絕。他給股東的信忠實的記錄了一個投資者成長的歷程。 在1957-1961年的信中，有幾段話吸引了我的注意： 基金的目標(biāo) “My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve along-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more orless parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.” “我管理合伙基金的一貫?zāi)繕?biāo)是取得優(yōu)于道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)的長期業(yè)績。我堅信這一平均指數(shù)在長期將與領(lǐng)先的投資公司的業(yè)績相類似。除非我們?nèi)〉眠@樣優(yōu)異的業(yè)績，否則我們的合伙基金沒有理由存在下去。” （1960年給合伙人的信） 巴菲特最初的目標(biāo)是長期業(yè)績超越指數(shù)。這個目標(biāo)至今沒有改變。 如何獲得超越市場的業(yè)績 “However,I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.”“但是，我曾經(jīng)指出，即使我們可能取得優(yōu)秀的業(yè)績，這也不能證明我們能保持相對穩(wěn)定的對道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)的優(yōu)勢。如果我們獲得優(yōu)勢，也是通過在平穩(wěn)或下跌市場中超出平均的業(yè)績，在上漲的市場中獲得平均業(yè)績，甚至有可能是遜于平均的業(yè)績而達(dá)到。”（1960年給合伙人的信）巴菲特告訴自己的合伙人，自己超越市場不是持續(xù)穩(wěn)定的超越，具有穩(wěn)定的優(yōu)勢，而是在市場不好時超越，在市場狂熱時表現(xiàn)一般，甚至遜色。換句話說，戰(zhàn)勝市場不是多贏，而是少輸。 衡量業(yè)績的標(biāo)準(zhǔn) “I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other. I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level. While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market.” “我堅信在行動前制定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。因為事后再看，幾乎任何事情，相對于某些其他事物，都能顯得很好。 我一直用道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)作為我們衡量的基準(zhǔn)。我感覺三年是檢驗業(yè)績的最短時間。最佳的檢驗至少要包括三年的時間，而道瓊斯指數(shù)的終值與初始值相當(dāng)接近。 雖然道瓊斯指數(shù)并不是衡量業(yè)績的完美指標(biāo)（任何事物都不是），但這個指數(shù)有著廣為人知，長期的連續(xù)性，以及相當(dāng)準(zhǔn)確的反映了市場投資者情況的優(yōu)勢?！?（1961年給合伙人的信） 巴菲特選取指數(shù)是為了有一個公平的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。而且，他認(rèn)為要評價投資業(yè)績最少要三年的時間，而且最好是在這段時間里市場持平。這樣才能體現(xiàn)出投資的真實業(yè)績，而不是短期運氣，或者隨著市場水漲船高。 保守的投資“Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power. Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.” “True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.” “多年前很多人認(rèn)為購買中期或者長期政府債券是最保守的做法。這種方式造成了大量的損失，而且肯定無法保持或者增加真實購買力。 由于意識到通脹，甚至過于擔(dān)心通脹，很多人認(rèn)為他們不顧市盈率、股息率等指標(biāo)購買大型藍(lán)籌股是保守的做法。即使不考慮過去債券的例子，我也認(rèn)為這種做法充滿危險。在我看來，投機毫無保守可言，投機只不過是猜想貪婪而變化無常的公眾能給盈利多高的倍數(shù)?！?“真正的保守惟有通過知識和理性才有可能?！?（1961年給合伙人的信） 50年前的忠告同樣適合今天的人們。不顧租售比，不考慮價格買房的人并不是在通脹條件下進(jìn)行保守的保值投資。預(yù)期房價不斷上漲，其實就是預(yù)期貪婪而變化無常的公眾將給房子支付更高的價格。一個投資者的成長讀巴菲特的信（2）分類：投資閱讀數(shù)：2741評論數(shù)：17推薦數(shù)：58 內(nèi)在價值的回歸與賣出時機 被低估股票的價格何時能回歸內(nèi)在價值？如何才能回歸內(nèi)在價值？在什么情況下要賣出所投資的股票？巴菲特的回答如下： “Some times these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.” “有時候很快就能實現(xiàn)。更多的時候，需要幾年。在買入的時候很難知道有哪一個具體的原因讓股票價格應(yīng)該上漲。但是，正是由于這種缺乏魅力或者沒有期待，才有可能創(chuàng)造出當(dāng)前有利的市場機會。這些股票可以用非常便宜的價格獲得。通過支付低價，我們能獲得很多價值。這種大量的超額價值在每個交易中創(chuàng)造出一個相當(dāng)大的安全邊際。這種個股的安全邊際加上投資的分散性，創(chuàng)造出了一個最有吸引力的組合，具有安全性和升值潛力。在過去幾年，我們買入的時間點一直遠(yuǎn)好于賣出的時機。我們買入這些股票時并沒有想獲得最后一分錢的利潤。我們往往滿足于在買入價和合理價位中間賣掉。我們認(rèn)為的合理價位是對私人業(yè)主來說公平的價格。” (1961年給合伙人的信) 價值投資的安全性 價值投資的安全性不是來自于高超的賣點選擇，而是來自于買入的低價。 By buying assets at a bargain price, we dont need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.” 通過低價買入資產(chǎn)，我們無需施展魔術(shù)才能得到非常好的百分比回報。我們投資哲學(xué)的基石是：“絕不指望好的賣出。而是讓購買價格如此之誘人，即使一個平庸的賣出也能帶來良好的回報。更好的賣出將會是錦上添花?！?(1962年給合伙人的信) 股市下跌的情況 價值投資，安全邊際，購買便宜的股票也不能避免下跌。市場漲跌左右短期表現(xiàn)。 The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market. 我們的股票傾向與市場表現(xiàn)一致。便宜并不意味著不會進(jìn)一步下跌。在市場突然下跌的時候，這些股票完全可能與道瓊斯指數(shù)一樣，下降同樣的百分比。從長期看，我相信這些股票將超過道瓊斯指數(shù)的表現(xiàn)。在1961年那樣猛烈上漲的市場，這部分股票在我們的投資組合中表現(xiàn)是最佳的。當(dāng)然，在一個下跌的市場，這部分也是最容易受到損失的。 (1961年給合伙人的信) 對投資人的承諾 結(jié)果無法保證，目標(biāo)可以承諾，投入全部身家，與合伙人利益保持高度一致。 I can not promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that: a.Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity; b.That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity ofcommitments;and c.My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership. 我無法對合伙人承諾結(jié)果。我能夠承諾而且確定承諾的是： a.我們投資的選擇是基于價值，而不是流行。 b.我們會試圖把資本永久損失（而不是短期賬面損失）的風(fēng)險降到絕對最低。而這是通過每個投資的大的安全邊際和投資的分散性達(dá)到的。 c.我的妻子，孩子和我將把我們幾乎全部的凈值都投資在合伙基金中。 (1962年給合伙人的信) 對投資業(yè)績的檢驗 市場下跌是對投資是否保守的客觀考驗。無需患得患失，少輸勝過多贏。 I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. 我認(rèn)為通過評估在下跌市場中的業(yè)績，我們可以得到最客觀的關(guān)于投資方式有多保守的檢驗。最好是道瓊斯指數(shù)下跌很多的時候。 (1962年給合伙人的信) Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. 我們的任務(wù)是積累年復(fù)一年超越道瓊斯指數(shù)的業(yè)績，而不是過度擔(dān)心某一年的絕對結(jié)果是正還是負(fù)。我認(rèn)為道指下跌25%而我們只下跌15%的一年要遠(yuǎn)好于道指和我們都上漲20%的一年。 (1962年給合伙人的信) 一個投資者的成長讀巴菲特的信（3）分類：投資閱讀數(shù)：2273評論數(shù)：17推薦數(shù)：52 復(fù)利的威力 在投資中，巴菲特逐漸體會到了復(fù)利的威力。實際上，巴菲特最終成為首富就是靠長期高速的復(fù)利增長。關(guān)于復(fù)利的威力這一點，巴菲特在32歲的時候就非常清楚。 I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatters rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (thats $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point. 我從不太可靠的消息來源得知，當(dāng)年西班牙女王伊薩貝拉資助哥倫布遠(yuǎn)航的成本大約是3萬美金。這被認(rèn)為至少是一個相當(dāng)成功的運用風(fēng)險資本的例子。不考慮發(fā)現(xiàn)一個新半球的精神上的收獲，即使算上強占的土地的權(quán)利，這個投資也比不上IBM的例子。簡單估算，3萬美金投入4%復(fù)利增長，到了1962年將會是2萬億美元。同情曼哈頓島的印第安人的人們也會找到類似的計算。這種奇異的幾何級數(shù)增長揭示了兩種事物的價值：長壽或者讓你的金錢以相當(dāng)好的速度復(fù)利增長。我對前一個事情沒什么可講的。 The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over adecade or two. 下面的表格顯示的是10萬美元以5%，10%和15%的速度復(fù)利增長10，20和30年。讓人吃驚的是，相對較小的速度差別，經(jīng)過多年的積累，逐漸變?yōu)榫薮蟮臄?shù)字差異。這就是為什么雖然我們的目標(biāo)是更高的增長，但我們感覺，對于道指的幾個點的優(yōu)勢是非常有價值的成就。假以時日，10年或20年，這意味著很多錢。 （1962年給合伙人的信） Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vincis Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000. 由于復(fù)利這個話題牽扯的范圍很廣，我就試著把這個討論轉(zhuǎn)向藝術(shù)世界，來引入一門小課程。1540年，法國的弗蘭西斯一世花了4000克朗把達(dá)芬奇的蒙娜麗莎買下。你們可能沒關(guān)注克朗的波動，這4000克朗相當(dāng)于今天的2萬美金。 If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. Thats $1 quadrillionor over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase of paintings qualifying as an investment. 如果弗蘭西斯還活著，他（和他的受托人）當(dāng)時能夠找到一個稅后6%的投資，這筆財產(chǎn)現(xiàn)在會價值超過1000萬億。這是目前國債的3000倍，都是從這6%而來。我相信這將結(jié)束所有家庭中關(guān)于購買畫作算不算投資的討論。 （1963年給合伙人的信） 基金無法戰(zhàn)勝市場 巴菲特發(fā)現(xiàn)即使是領(lǐng)先的大基金也無法戰(zhàn)勝市場指數(shù)。他認(rèn)為這源于這些投資機構(gòu)的機制。 The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality,etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market. 這些結(jié)果繼續(xù)顯示，那些獲得最高額收入和最受尊敬的投資建議也很難比得上一個無人管理的藍(lán)籌股指數(shù)的業(yè)績。這并不是指責(zé)這些機構(gòu)或投資顧問，以及與這些投資公司有著大體上類似的方法、推理，和結(jié)果的信托部門。這些機構(gòu)給成百萬的投資者起到了重要的服務(wù)作用，以獲得足夠的分散投資，提供便利，讓人感到踏實，避免質(zhì)量低下的問題等。但是，他們的服務(wù)不包括（在大部分情況下也不聲稱包括）以高于市場的速度復(fù)利增長金錢。 Our partnerships fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly can not represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we dont achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation. 我們的合伙基金存在的根本原因就是要以高于平均水平的速度復(fù)利增長基金，而且與上面所說的投資公司相比，我們要有更少的長期資本損失的風(fēng)險。我們當(dāng)然無法聲稱會達(dá)到這一目標(biāo)。我們能說的而且是確實說的是，除了在長時間的投機性牛市中，如果我們在相當(dāng)長的一段時期內(nèi)，達(dá)不到這一目標(biāo)，我們將停止運營。 （1963年上半年給合伙人的信） The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4)literally centuries of aggregate investment experience? (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one years experience -twenty times.”) 這些重復(fù)出現(xiàn)的表格讓一些合伙人不禁問道：“這些聰明的投資經(jīng)理究竟怎么了？他們有（1）聰明而精力充沛的手下（2）幾乎無限的資源（3）最廣泛的商業(yè)聯(lián)系（4）加在一起幾個世紀(jì)的投資經(jīng)驗?！保ㄟ@最后一點讓我想起一個家伙在求職時聲稱有20年的經(jīng)驗。后來前任雇主糾正說是“1年的經(jīng)驗，20次”。） This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attacking this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States. 這個問題極其重要。你可能會認(rèn)為投資經(jīng)理和大投資者們對這個議題有著很多的研究。畢竟300億美元的百分之一就是一年3億美元。令人好奇的是，實際上在華爾街沒有任何文章探討這個問題。在證券分析師會議和講座等活動中也幾乎沒有討論。我的想法是，任何一個投資管理機構(gòu)的首要任務(wù)都是分析自己的技術(shù)和結(jié)果，而不是判斷整個美國的主要投資機構(gòu)的管理能力和業(yè)績。 In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations;(3) an institutional framework whereby average is safe and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational;and finally and importantly, (5) inertia. 在大多數(shù)情況下，投資機構(gòu)缺乏超越無人管理的指數(shù)的業(yè)績，甚至連與指數(shù)一致的業(yè)績都少見。這絕不是由于缺少智慧或者誠信。我認(rèn)為這主要是以下幾個原因的結(jié)果：（1）集體決策-我的可能有些偏頗的看法是：如果所有成員都真正參與決策，出色的投資管理幾乎不可能從任何大小的集體中產(chǎn)生。（2）希望與其它備受尊重的大型投資機構(gòu)的投資政策保持一致，甚至在某種程度上與其投資組合保持一致。（3）機構(gòu)的體制讓平均成為“安全”。對個人的回報與激勵無法補償獨立行動所帶來的全面風(fēng)險。（4）拘于某些不合理的分散投資做法。最后，也是最重要的是（5）惰性。 （1964年給合伙人的信） 關(guān)于保守的問題 那些著名的大型投資公司，號稱保守，以傳統(tǒng)的方式行事。但巴菲特認(rèn)為真正的保守來自于事實和邏輯，而不是投資方式。 In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but arent those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership? If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it. 閱讀那些投資公司的業(yè)績表格，有人可能會問：“確實，你的業(yè)績更好。但是那些投資公司難道不比你的合伙基金運營的更保守嗎？”如果你對那些投資公司的經(jīng)理問這個問題，他們絕對會誠實的回答他們更保守。如果你問你所碰到的前100個分析師，我確信他們當(dāng)中的很大一部分也都會認(rèn)為那些投資公司更保守。但我不同意。我把我自己超過90%的凈值放在巴菲特合伙基金中。我大部分的家庭成員也差不多把90%的凈值投入了合伙基金。當(dāng)然，這只表明了我看法的真誠度，而不是證明我的看法的正確性。 It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative. 的確，那些投資公司比我們投資的方式更加傳統(tǒng)。對許多人來說傳統(tǒng)與保守沒有區(qū)別。但在我看來，這是錯誤的思維。無論是傳統(tǒng)的還是非傳統(tǒng)的方式，在本質(zhì)上都不能說是保守的。 Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts,but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society. 真正保守的行為來自于聰明的假設(shè)，正確的事實和合理的推理。這些特點有可能導(dǎo)致傳統(tǒng)的投資行為，但在很多時候也會指向非正統(tǒng)的方式。在世界的某個角落有些人可能仍然堅持曾經(jīng)的“正統(tǒng)”理念，認(rèn)為地球是平的，并定期開會。 We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they dont. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether conventional or unconventional whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner. 僅僅因為重要人物，評論家，或者非常多的人贊同我們，這并不能讓我們感到安心。反之，如果他們都不同意我們的做法，也并不能讓我們感到安心。民意測驗無法替代思考。只有當(dāng)我們能理解我們的形勢，事實清晰確定，行動方案顯而易見的時候，我們才能真正放松，面帶笑容。這時候，無論傳統(tǒng)與否，無論他人同意與否，我們都認(rèn)為自己是以一種保守的方式取得進(jìn)展。 （1964年給合伙人的信） 耐心與保密 投資需要耐心與保密。 (1)Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy. It is to our advantage to have securities do