微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（四川大學(xué)）知到智慧樹(shù)章節(jié)測(cè)試課后答案2024年秋四川大學(xué)

微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（四川大學(xué)）知到智慧樹(shù)章節(jié)測(cè)試課后答案2024年秋四川大學(xué)第一章單元測(cè)試

Microeconomicsstudiestheallocationof

A:unlimitedresources.B:scarceresources.C:models.D:decisionmakers.

答案:scarceresources.Mostmicroeconomicmodelsassumethatdecisionmakerswishto

A:actselfishly.B:makeothersaswelloffaspossible.C:makethemselvesaswelloffaspossible.D:Noneoftheabove.

答案:makethemselvesaswelloffaspossible.Whatlinksthedecisionsofconsumersandfirmsinamarket?

A:microeconomics.B:thegovernment.C:prices.D:coordinationofficials.

答案:prices.Economicmodelsaremostoftentested

A:usingdatafromthedistantpast.B:usingcomputersimulations.C:usingdatafromtherealworld.D:usinglogicalone.

答案:usingdatafromtherealworld.Whichofthestatementsbelowis/arenormative?

A:Economistswilluseamodeluntilitisrefutedbysomeone.B:Microeconomistsstudyeconomicgrowth.C:BandCD:Economistsneedtoincludemorerealityintheirmodels.

答案:Economistsneedtoincludemorerealityintheirmodels.

第二章單元測(cè)試

Anindifferencecurverepresentsbundlesofgoodsthataconsumer

A:Alloftheabove.B:referstoanyotherbundleofgoods.C:viewsasequallydesirable.D:ranksfrommostpreferredtoleastpreferred.

答案:viewsasequallydesirable.Convexityofindifferencecurvesimpliesthatconsumersarewillingto

A:giveupmore"y"togetanextra"x"theless"x"theyhave.B:acquiremore"x"onlyiftheydonothavetogiveupany"y".C:giveupmore"y"togetanextra"x"themore"x"theyhave.D:settleforlessofboth"x"and"y".

答案:giveupmore"y"togetanextra"x"theless"x"theyhave.Iftwobundlesareonthesameindifferencecurve,then

A:nocomparisoncanbemadebetweenthetwobundlessinceutilitycannotreallybemeasured.B:theconsumerderivesthesamelevelofordinalutilityfromeachbutnotthesamelevelofcardinalutility.C:BandC.D:theconsumerderivesthesamelevelofutilityfromeach.

答案:theconsumerderivesthesamelevelofutilityfromeach.Iftheutilityfortwogoods"x"and"y"ismeasuredasU=x+y,thenitcanbeconcludedthat

A:"x"and"y"arebothbads.B:"x"and"y"areperfectsubstitutes.C:"x"and"y"areperfectcomplements.D:theindifferencecurvesonthex,ygraphwillbeupwardsloping.

答案:"x"and"y"areperfectsubstitutes.Joe'sincomeis$500,thepriceoffood(F)is$2perunit,andthepriceofshelter(S)is$100.Whichofthefollowingrepresentshisbudgetconstraint?

A:Alloftheabove.B:S=5-.02FC:500=2F+100SD:F=250-50S

答案:Alloftheabove.

第三章單元測(cè)試

Theconsumerisinequilibriumwhen

A:thebudgetlineistangenttotheindifferencecurveatthebundlechosen.B:Alloftheabove.C:Px/Py.=MUx/MUy.D:MRT=MRS.

答案:Alloftheabove.ByselectingabundlewhereMRS=MRT,theconsumerissaying

A:Alloftheabove.B:"Ivaluemylastunitofeachgoodequally."C:"Iwillequatetheamountsspentonallgoodsconsumed."D:"IamwillingtotradeonegoodfortheotheratthesameratethatIamrequiredtodoso."

答案:"IamwillingtotradeonegoodfortheotheratthesameratethatIamrequiredtodoso."IfMRS>MRT,thentheconsumerisbetteroffthanatequilibrium.

A:錯(cuò)B:對(duì)

答案:錯(cuò)Anindividual'sdemandcurveforagoodcanbederivedbymeasuringthequantitiesselectedas

A:thepriceofsubstitutegoodschanges.B:Alloftheabove.C:incomechanges.D:thepriceofthegoodchanges.

答案:thepriceofthegoodchanges.Sandyderivesutilityfromconsuming"allothergoods,"g,andcleanair(measuredbyparticulatematterremovedperm3),a,asmeasuredbytheutilityfunctionU(g,a)=g0.6a0.4.Thepriceof"allothergoods"is$20andthepriceofcleanair(abatement)equals$10.Brianistheonlyotherconsumerinthemarketforcleanairanddemands10unitsofcleanair.Whatisthemarketdemandforcleanair?

A:Totalmarketdemandis16unitsofcleanair.B:Totalmarketdemandis12unitsofcleanair.C:Totalmarketdemandis10unitsofcleanair.D:Totalmarketdemandis14unitsofcleanair.

答案:Totalmarketdemandis14unitsofcleanair.

第四章單元測(cè)試

Efficientproductionoccursifafirm

A:maximizesprofit.B:giventhequantityofinputs,cannotproducemoreoutput.C:Alloftheabove.D:cannotproduceitscurrentlevelofoutputwithfewerinputs.

答案:Alloftheabove.Firmsmaximizeprofitwhen

A:MR=MC.B:thederivativeoftheprofitfunctionwithrespecttooutputiszero.C:theadditionalbenefitfromproducingagoodequalstheadditionalcostofproducingthatgood.D:Alloftheabove.

答案:Alloftheabove.Withrespecttoproduction,theshortrunisbestdefinedasatimeperiod

A:lastingaboutsixmonths.B:inwhichallinputsarefixed.C:inwhichatleastoneinputisfixed.D:lastingabouttwoyears.

答案:inwhichatleastoneinputisfixed.Inthelongrun,allfactorsofproductionare

A:fixed.B:materials.C:rented.D:variable.

答案:variable.Aproductionfunctiontellsthefirm

A:theminimumitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.B:theaverageitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.C:theaveragelevelofproductionforotherfirmsintheindustry.D:themaximumitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.

答案:themaximumitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.

第五章單元測(cè)試

WhichofthefollowingstatementsisNOTtrue?

A:C=F+VCB:AFC=AC-AVCC:AVC=wage/MPLD:AC=AFC+AVC

答案:AVC=wage/MPLSupposethetotalcostofproducingT-shirtscanberepresentedasTC=50+2q.Themarginalcostofthe5thT-shirtis

A:2B:60C:10D:12

答案:2Ifaveragecostisdecreasing,

A:marginalcostislessthanaveragecost.B:marginalcostexceedsaveragecost.C:marginalcostequalsaveragecost.D:Notenoughinformationisgiven.

答案:marginalcostislessthanaveragecost.Variablecostsare

A:aproductionexpensethatchangeswiththequantityofoutputproduced.B:equaltototalcostdividedbytheunitsofoutputproduced.C:aproductionexpensethatdoesnotvarywithoutput.D:theamountbywhichafirm'scostchangesifthefirmproducesonemoreunitofoutput.

答案:aproductionexpensethatchangeswiththequantityofoutputproduced.

第六章單元測(cè)試

TheCanadianmetalchairmanufacturingmarkethasn=78firms.Theestimatedelasticityofsupplyisηo=3.1,andtheestimatedelasticityofdemandisε=-1.1.Assumingthatthefirmsareidentical,calculatetheelasticityofdemandfacingasinglefirm.

A:324.5B:-275.5C:-324.5D:275.5

答案:-324.5Iftheinversedemandfunctionfortoastersisp=60-Q,whatistheconsumersurplusifpriceis30?

A:900B:300C:150D:450

答案:450marketwherenosinglebuyerorsellercaninfluencethepriceis

A:acompetitivemarketB:AmericanmarketC:abuyer'smarketD:aseller'smarket

答案:acompetitivemarketIfacompetitivefirmmaximizesshort-runprofitsbyproducingsomequantityofoutput,whichofthefollowingmustbetrueatthatlevelofoutput?

A:p≥AVCB:AlloftheaboveC:MR>MCD:p>MC

答案:p≥AVCAssumeaconsumerhasahorizontaldemandcurveforaproduct.Hisconsumersurplusfrombuyingtheproduct

A:equalszeroB:ismaximizedC:cannotbecalculatedD:Needmoreinformation

答案:equalszero

第七章單元測(cè)試

Thedeadweightlossgeneratedbyaperfect-price-discriminatingmonopoly

A:isgreaterthanthedeadweightlossofasingle-pricemonopoly.B:equalszero.C:equalsthesumofalllostconsumersurplus.D:equalsthedeadweightlossofasingle-pricemonopoly.

答案:equalszero.Monopolisticallycompetitivefirms

A:havenomarketpowerbecauseoffreeentry.B:havenomarketpowerbecausepriceequalsmarginalcost.C:havenomarketpowerbecausetheyearnzeroeconomicprofit.D:havemarketpowerbecausetheycansetpriceabovemarginalcost.

答案:havemarketpowerbecausetheycansetpriceabovemarginalcost.AmonopolistfacestheinversedemandcurveP=60-Q.IthasvariablecostsofQ^2sothatitsmarginalcostsare2Q,andithasfixedcostsof30.Themonopoly'smaximumprofitis

A:220B:510C:370D:420

答案:420AmonopolistfacestheinversedemandcurveP=60-Q.IthasvariablecostsofQ2sothatitsmarginalcostsare2Q,andithasfixedcostsof30.Atitsprofitmaximizingoutputlevel,themonopoly'saveragecostis

A:13B:11C:15D:17

答案:17Ifthedemandcurveamonopolistfacesisperfectlyelastic,thentheratioofthefirm'spricetothemarginalcostis

A:0B:1C:Noneoftheabove—theanswercannotbedetermined.D:2

答案:1

第八章單元測(cè)試

dependonfollowingthree-playergame,whereplayer1choosesrows,player2columnsandplayer3matricesWhichstrategyofplayer1isstrictlydominated?

A:strategiesTandMB:strategyMC:strategiesTandBD:strategyB

答案:strategiesTandB

dependonfollowingthree-playergame,whereplayer1choosesrows,player2columnsandplayer3matricesWhat’sNashequilibriumofthisgame?

A:(M,R,r)

B:

(B,L,r)

C:

(T,L,l)D:

(T,R,r)

答案:(M,R,r)

(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice'soldcar,whileCharles'svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon'tknoweachother'sbid(socalled"sealedbid").AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.

Inthisgame,Bobhas8000strategiesandCharleshas10000strategies.

A:對(duì)B:錯(cuò)

答案:錯(cuò)(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice'soldcar,whileCharles'svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon'tknoweachother'sbid(socalled"sealedbid").AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.InthisgameBobbids8000andCharlesbids8000isaNashequilibrium.

A:對(duì)B:錯(cuò)

答案:錯(cuò)(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice'soldcar,whileCharles'svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon'tknoweachother'sbid(socalled"sealedbid").AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.

InthisgameBobbids7999andCharlesbids8000isaNashequilibrium.

A:錯(cuò)B:對(duì)

答案:對(duì)

第九章單元測(cè)試

Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-p

Howmanystrategiesplayer1has?

A:6B:2

C:8D:4

答案:4Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-p

Howmanystrategiesplayer2has?

A:6B:8C:2D:4

答案:8Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-pWhatisthereducedgameafteriteratedeliminationofstrictlydominatedstrategiesofeachtype?

A:B:C:D:

答案:Player1choosese