國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）：智利：2023年第四條磋商報(bào)告

February2024

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

IMFCountryReportNo.24/41

CHILE

2023ARTICLEIVCONSULTATION—PRESSRELEASE;STAFFREPORT;ANDSTATEMENTBYTHEEXECUTIVEDIRECTORFORCHILE

UnderArticleIVoftheIMF'sArticlesofAgreement,theIMFholdsbilateraldiscussionswithmembers,usuallyeveryyear.Inthecontextofthe2023ArticleIVconsultationwithChile,thefollowingdocumentshavebeenreleasedandareincludedinthispackage:

·APressReleasesummarizingtheviewsoftheExecutiveBoardasexpressedduringitsFebruary5,2024,considerationofthestaffreportthatconcludedtheArtideIV

consultationwithChile.

TheStaffReportpreparedbyastaffteamoftheIMFfortheExecutiveBoard's

considerationonFebruary5,2024,followingdiscussionsthatendedonNovember20,2023,withtheofficialsofChileoneconomicdevelopmentsandpolicies.Basedon

informationavailableatthetimeofthesediscussions,thestaffreportwascompletedonJanuary17,2024.

●AnInformationalAnnexpreparedbytheIMFstaff.

·AStaffSupplementupdatinginformationonrecentdevelopments.

·AStatementbytheExecutiveDirectorforChile.

TheIMF'stransparencypolicyallowsforthedeletionofmarket-sensitiveinformationandprematuredisclosureoftheauthorities'policyintentionsinpublishedstaffreportsandotherdocuments.

Copiesofthisreportareavailabletothepublicfrom

InternationalMonetaryFund·PublicationServicesPOBox92780·Washington,D.C.20090

Telephone:(202)623-7430·Fax:(202)623-7201

E-mail:publications@imforgWeb:

Price:$18.00perprintedcopy

InternationalMonetaryFund

Washington,D.C.

◎2024InternationalMonetaryFund

PRESSRELEASE

PR24/38

IMFExecutiveBoardConcludes2023ArticleIVConsultation

withChile

FORIMMEDIATERELEASE

Washington,DC-February6,2024:TheExecutiveBoardoftheInternationalMonetary

Fund(IMF)concludedonFebruary5,2024,theArticleIVconsultationtwithChile.

Macroeconomicimbalancesbuiltduringthepandemichavebeenlargelyresolved,supportedbytightermacroeconomicpoliciesdeployedduringlate2021-22.Asdomesticdemand

normalized,economicactivitystabilizedinthesecondhalfof2023,yieldinganestimatedzeropercentrealGDPgrowthfortheyear.Inflationandcurrentaccountdeficitshavesignificantlydeclinedin2023.Thefinancialsectorremainsresilientdespitetheeconomicslowdownandtightfinancialconditions.

Growthisexpectedtopickuptocloseto2percentin2024and2-2.5percentinthemediumterm.Inflationisprojectedtoconvergetothe3-percenttargetin2024.Keyexternalrisksare

theuncertaintiesaroundthepotentiallyhigher-for-longerinterestratesinadvanced

economies,agrowthslowdowninmajortradingpartners,andtheintensificationofregionalconflictsintheworld.Domestically,politicalpolarizationandfragmentationcouldleadto

continuedreformgridlock.Socialdiscontentoverinequalityandthesecuritysituationremainsprevalent.Uncertaintyrelatedtothesolvencyofprivatehealthinsurancecompaniesisalsoaconcern.Ontheupside,theclosureoftheconstitutionalreformprocessissettoreducenear-andmedium-termdomesticuncertainty.Moreover,Chilecanbenefitfromtheglobalgreen

transitiongivenitsrichendowmentwithcopper,lithium,andrenewableenergyforwhich

demandissettorise.

Policieshavesupportedmacroeconomicstability.Inthecontextofdisinflationacceleration,

theCentralBankofChileloweredthemonetarypolicyrateby400basispointssinceJuly

2023.Theheadlinefiscalbalanceisestimatedtodeclinetoabout-2.5percentofGDPin2023duetoweakertaxrevenuesamidaneconomicslowdown,lowercopperprices,andother

transitoryfactors.The2024budgetenvisionsamoderatedeficitreductionwithinamedium-termfiscalplantoabroadlybalancedfiscalpositionby2026.Theongoingimplementationofthecountercyclicalcapitalbufferwillstrengthenfinancialresilienceinperiodsofstress.

1UnderArticleIVoftheIMF'sArticlesofAgreement,theIMFholdsbilateraldiscussionswithmembers,usuallyevery

year.Astaffteamvisitsthecountry,collectseconomicandfinancialnformation,anddiscusseswithofficialsthe

countryseconomicdevelopmentsandpolicies.Onreturntoheadquarters,thestaffpreparesareport,whichforms

thebasisfordiscussionbytheExecutiveBoard.

70019thStreetNW

Washington,DC20431

USA

IMF.org

2

ExecutiveBoardAssessment2

ExecutiveDirectorsexpressedcondolencesaboutthetragiclossoflifeanddevastation

causedbythemassiveforestfires.Directorswelcomedtheauthorities’verystrongpoliciesandpolicyframeworks,supportedbytheprecautionaryFCLarrangement,whichwere

instrumentalinresolvingimbalancesandsteeringtheeconomytowardpotentialgrowthandtargetedinflationinachallengingexternalenvironment.Theycommendedtheauthorities’

reformplanstoraiseinvestmentandproductivity,increasefiscalrevenuesforpriority

spending,reduceinequality,improvepensionadequacy,andtransitiontoagreenereconomy.

Directorswelcomedtheauthorities’commitmenttoreachabroadlybalancedfiscalpositionby2026andkeepdebtbelowtheprudentdebtceilingof45percentofGDP.Theywelcomedthe

proposedreformstostrengthentaxcomplianceandenhancespendingefficiency,and

stressedthatadditionalmeasureswillbeneededtoachievetheauthorities’medium-termfiscalplanandfinancesocialneedsandsecuritypriorities.Directorsnotedtheimprovedpensionadequacyforlow-incomepensionersfollowingthehigherminimumpensionandemphasizedthatraisingpensioncontributionratesiscriticaltoensuretheadequacyof

self-financedpensionsandthesustainabilityofthepensionsystem.Theyalsoencouragedtheauthoritiestocontinuetorefinefurthertheiralreadystrongfiscalframework.

Directorscommendedthecentralbank’srobustpoliciesthatledtoadecisivedeclinein

inflationtowarditstarget,emphasizingthatthepaceoffurthermonetaryeasingshouldremaindatadependent.Theystressedthattheflexibleexchangerateremainsparamountfor

absorbingshocksandcalledforresumingtheinternationalreserveaccumulation,when

marketconditionsareconducive,anddevelopingalong-termreservestrategytofurther

strengthenresilienceagainstexternalshocks,whileafewcalledforanearlierresumptionoftheaccumulationstrategy.

Directorsagreedthatthefinancialsectorremainsresilient.TheywelcomedtheongoingimplementationofBaselIIIcapitalandliquidityrequirements,theactivationofthe

countercyclicalbuffer,andeffortstoestablishanindustry-fundeddepositinsuranceandanewbankresolutionframework,whilecallingforcontinuedmonitoringofthevulnerabilitiesin

constructionandrealestatesectors.Directorsstressedtheimportanceofcontinuingtoadaptfinancialregulationandsupervisiontothechangingfinancialsectorlandscape.

Directorssupportedtheauthorities’reformplansforamoredynamic,greener,andinclusiveeconomy.Theyunderscoredtheneedtofosterinvestmentandwelcomedtheeffortsto

streamlinepermittingprocesses.DirectorscommendedChile’sprogressandambitionsin

developingrenewableenergy.TheynotedthatthehigherglobaldemandforlithiumandothercriticalmineralsoffersneweconomicopportunitiesforChileandstressedtheimportanceof

swiftlyimplementingaclearandbalancedinstitutionalframework.Directorswelcomedtheimprovementsingenderequalityandencouragedadditionaleffortstofurthernarrowlabormarketgendergaps.

2Attheconclusionofthediscussion,theManagingDirector,asChairmanoftheBoard,summarizestheviewsof

ExecutiveDirectors,andthissummaryistransmittedtothecountry'sauthorities.Anexplanationofanyqualifiersusedinsummingsupcanbefoundhere:

http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

3

Table1.Chile:SelectedEconomicIndicators,2022-26

GDP(2022),inbillionsofpesos

GDP(2022),inbillionsofU.S.dollarsPercapita(2022),U.S.dollars

Population(2022),inmillions

Mainproductsandexports

Keyexportmarkets

263

301

15,166

19.8

Copper

China,Euroarea,U.S.

Quota

inmillionsofSDRsin%oftotal

1,744

0.37

Proj.

20222023202420252026

Output(Annualpercentagechange)

RealGDP

Outputgap(inpercent)

Employment

Unemploymentrate(annualaverage)

2.4

2.7

7.9

0.0

0.2

8.8

1.9

-0.3

(Inpercent)8.9

2.5

-0.1

8.4

2.4

0.0

7.7

Prices

GDPdeflator

ChangeofCPI(endofperiod)

ChangeofCPI(periodaverage)

PublicSectorFinances

Centralgovernmentrevenue

Centralgovernmentexpenditure

Centralgovernmentfiscalbalance

Centralgovernmentgrossdebt

Publicsectorgrossdebt1/

MoneyandCredit

M2

Credittotheprivatesector

BalanceofPayments

Currentaccountbalance(%ofGDP)2/

Foreigndirectinvestmentnetflows(%ofGDP)2/Grossexternaldebt(%ofGDP)3/

6.6

12.8

11.6

26.1

25.0

1.1

38.0

67.3

4.0

10.0

-9.0

-2.7

77.6

(Annual6.53.9

7.6

(In23.125.6-2.539.2

68.5

(Annual5.3

2.8

(In-3.2

-1.8

73.1

percentagechange)

3.93.63.03.0

3.33.0

3.4

3.0

3.0

24.0

24.5

-0.5

41.1

70.4

5.8

6.7

-3.2

-2.1

74.2

percentofGDP)23.8

25.9

-2.1

40.5

69.8

24.0

25.4

-1.4

40.7

70.0

percentagechange)

4.86.2

5.07.1

percentofGDP)-3.4

-2.2

74.4

-3.3

-2.2

74.1

Sources:CentralBankofChile,MinistryofFinance,HaverAnalytics,andIMFstaffcalculationsandprojections.

1/Includesliabilitiesofthecentralgovernment,theCentralBankofChileandpublicenterprises.ExcludesRecognitionBonds.

2/CalculatedasashareofUS$GDP.

3/DatafromDipresforthegovernmentandfromBCChforallothersectors.CalculatedasashareofUS$GDP.

January17,2024

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

CHILE

STAFFREPORTFORTHE2023ARTICLEIVCONSULTATION

KEYISSUES

Context.Macroeconomicimbalancesbuiltduringthepandemichavebeenlargely

resolved,supportedbystrongpolicyresponses.Inequalityhasdeclinedsomewhatbut

remainshigh.Weakinvestmentandpotentialgrowthareconstrainingincome

convergencetoadvancedeconomies.Policyprioritieshaveshiftedtowardmakingtheeconomymoredynamic,inclusive,andgreener,butthegovernmentisstrugglingto

passreformsinafragmentedparliament.TheDecemberreferendumwhichrejectedthedraftconstitutionhasreducedlingeringuncertaintybybringingtheprocesstoacloseforthecomingyears

Outlookandrisks.Theeconomyistransitioningtotrendgrowthandtargeted

inflation.However,theoutlookiscloudedwithrisks.Keyexternalrisksareuncertaintiesaroundthepotentiallyhigher-for-longerinterestratesinadvancedeconomies,a

growthslowdowninmajortradingpartners,andtheintensificationofregionalconflictsintheworld.Domestically,politicalpolarizationandfragmentationcouldleadto

continuedreformgridlock.Socialdiscontentoverinequalityandsecurityremainsprevalent.Moreover,uncertaintyrelatedtothesolvencyofprivatehealthinsurancecompaniesisaconcern.Ontheupside,Chilecanbenefitfromtheglobalgreen

transitiongivenitsrichendowmentwithcopper,lithium,andrenewableenergyforwhichdemandissettorise.

Keypolicyrecommendations.

Monetaryandexchangeratepolicy.Followingthestartoftheeasingcycleinthe

contextofdisinflationacceleration,thepaceoffurthermonetaryeasingshould

continuetobedata-dependentandrealrateswilllikelyneedtoremainabovetheirneutrallevelsforthenearfuture.Thecentralbankshouldresumetheaccumulationofinternationalreserves,whenmarketconditionsareconducive,tostrengthenexternalbuffersanddevelopalonger-terminternationalreservestrategy.

Fiscalpolicy.WhileChilehassomefiscalspacetosupportthereactivationofthe

economyandsocialneeds,abitmorefrontloadingofthedeficitreductionwould

facilitatemeetingitsmedium-termfiscaltarget.Permanentspendingmeasuresshouldbeconditionedonstructuralrevenueperformancetopreservefiscalsustainability.

CHILE

2

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

RefinementstoChile’salreadystrongfiscalframeworkwouldenhancetheresilienceoffiscalpolicy,includinginthecontextofproposedgradualdecentralization.

Financialsectorpolicies.Thefinancialsystemremainsresilient,butvulnerabilitiesinsomesectorswarrantcontinuedclosemonitoringasdoesbanks’implementationofBaselIIIrequirementsand

theirpreparationfortheunwindingofpandemicliquiditymeasures.Calibratingtheneutrallevelofthecountercyclicalcapitalbufferswiftlyisimportanttoprovidebankswithplanningcertainty.

Progresswiththeimplementationofkey2021FSAPrecommendationsaswellaskeepingpacewithfinancialregulationandsupervisionrelatedtothedigitalizationofthefinancialsectorwillenhanceresilience.

Structuralreforms.Promotinginvestmentisapriorityandongoingeffortstotacklelong

permittingprocessesarecritical.Developingrenewableenergyandlithiumindustries,inthecontextofclearandbalancedinstitutionalframeworks,willallowChiletobenefitfromnewgrowth

opportunitiesduringtheglobalgreentransition.Taxreformsareneededtosustainablyfinance

socialneeds,securitypriorities,andgreeninfrastructure.Raisingpensioncontributionratesremainscriticaltoensureadequateself-financedpensionsandthesustainabilityofthepensionsystem.

CHILE

3

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

ApprovedBy

PatriciaAlonso-Gamo(WHD)andBergljot

Barkbu(SPR)

DiscussionstookplaceinSantiagoduringNovember7–20,2023.The

teamcomprisedAndreaSchaechter(Head),LuizaAntoundeAlmeida

andSiGuo(allWHD),EduardoCameroGodinez(FAD),MartinaHengge(SPR),andTatsushiOkuda(MCM).LuisOscarHerreraandAndrea

Mostajo(OED)alsoparticipatedinthediscussions.Themissionmet

withCentralBankofChilePresidentRosannaCosta,MinisterofFinanceMarioMarcel,MinisterofEconomy,DevelopmentandTourismNicolásGrau,MinisterofLaborandSocialSecurityJeannetteJara,Ministerof

SocialDevelopmentandFamilyJavieraToro,MinisterofEducation

NicolásCataldo,Chairsofregulatoryandsupervisorybodiesandotherseniorofficials,privatesectorrepresentatives,industry,labor

organizations,thinktanks,academics,andparliamentarians.Natalia

Martinez-CameloandNomuunTuvaan(bothWHD)providedresearchandadministrativesupport.

CONTENTS

CONTEXT

5

RECENTECONOMICDEVELOPMENTS

5

OUTLOOKANDRISKS

9

POLICYDISCUSSIONS

10

A.BringingInflationBacktoTarget

10

B.CreatingRoomforNewSpendingNeedsWhilePreservingFiscalSustainability

11

C.StrengtheningFinancialSectorResilience

14

D.PoliciesforaMoreDynamic,Inclusive,andGreenerEconomy

17

STAFFAPPRAISAL

21

BOXES

1.PactforEconomicGrowth,SocialProgressandFiscalResponsibility

12

2.SelectedRecentEnhancementstoChile’sFiscalFramework,2019-23

15

FIGURES

1.EconomicActivity

24

2.ExternalSector

25

3.InflationandMonetaryPolicy

26

4.FinancialMarkets

27

5.FinancialSector

28

6.RealEstateSector

29

CHILE

4

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

TABLES

1.SelectedSocialandEconomicIndicators

30

2.SummaryOperationsoftheCentralGovernment

31

3.BalanceofPayments

32

4.MonetarySurvey

33

5.Medium-TermMacroeconomicFramework

34

6.FinancialSoundnessIndicators

35

7.IndicatorsofExternalVulnerabilities

36

ANNEXES

I.Recommendationsof2022ArticleIVConsultationandAuthorities’Actions

37

II.RiskAssessmentMatrix

38

III.ExternalSectorAssessment

40

IV.2022FXIntervention:RoleoftheNDFMarket

43

V.NationalLithiumStrategy

46

VI.GenderPayGap

48

VII.TheImpactofIncreasedHouseholdBenefitsonPoverty

52

VIII.SovereignRiskandPublicDebtSustainabilityAnalysis

58

IX.ImplementationStatusof2021FSAPKeyRecommendation

67

CHILE

5

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

CONTEXT

1.Policyprioritieshaveshiftedtowardmakingtheeconomymoredynamic,inclusive,and

greener,astheeconomyisapproachingtheendofitsadjustmentcycle.Macroeconomicimbalancesbuiltduringthepandemichavebeenlargelyresolved,supportedbytightened

macroeconomicpoliciessince2022,consistentwithpastFundadvice(AnnexI).Thetwo-yearFlexibleCreditLine(FCL)arrangementapprovedinAugust2022hassubstantiallyaugmentedprecautionarybuffersandprovidedinsuranceagainsttailrisks.Weakinvestmentandtimidpotentialgrowthare

constrainingincomeconvergencetoadvancedeconomies.Inequalityhasdeclinedbutremainshigh.FacingstrongresistanceinapolarizedCongress,thegovernmentistakingamorepragmatic

approachtoitsambitiouspolicyagendaformoreequityandinclusionbyadvancinginitiativesfor

investment,anti-taxevasion,spendingefficiency,climatechangeandfinancialsystemresiliencethatcouldgarnerbroad-basedsupport.

2.Theclosureoftheconstitutionalprocessissettoreducenear-andmedium-term

uncertainty.InDecember2023,over55.7percentofvotersrejectedanewdraftconstitution.Givenwidespreadfatigueaboutthelongconstitutionalreformprocessthatwaslaunchedinresponsetothe2019socialprotestsandincludedtworeferendums,allpoliticalpartiesannouncedtoputthe

processonholdforseveralyears.However,proposalsforamendmentsmayresurfaceinthelongerterm.

RECENTECONOMICDEVELOPMENTS

3.Economicactivitystabilizedin2023H2.Threeconsecutivequartersofnegativegrowth(yoy)since2022Q4,amidtightenedmonetaryandfiscalpolicyin2022,havelargelycorrectedtheimbalancesfromanoverheatedeconomyin2021.GDPgrowthdeceleratedto2.4percent(yoy)in2022and-0.7percent(yoy)in2023H1,ledbythenormalizationofprivateconsumptionand

investment(Figure1).Economicactivityresumedexpansionin2023Q3by0.6percent(yoy),ledbyminingandutilitysectors.Annualgrowthin2023isexpectedtobearoundzeropercent.The3-

monthaverageunemploymentrate(seasonallyadjusted)edgedhigherto9.0percentinNovemberfrom8.2percentayearago,withtheemploymentratestillabout2.5percentagepointsbelowits

pre-pandemiclevel.

4.InflationisfallingrapidlyandtheBCChstarteditseasingcycleinJuly.Disinflation

acceleratedsinceAprilwithheadlineinflationdecliningto3.9percent(yoy)inDecember2023,fromapeakof14.1percentinAugust2022,ledbyfood,energy,andothergoodsitems.Coreinflation

(excludingvolatileitems)hascomedownmoreslowlyto5.4percent(yoy).Theslowerconvergenceofcoreinflationiscomparabletopreviousdisinflationepisodes(textchart).Itcanbelargely

attributedtoservicepriceindexationandthecatching-upofrealwagestocompensateforthedeclineinthelaborshareduringthehigh-inflationepisode(Figure3).TheBCChloweredits

monetarypolicyratefrom11.25percentto8.25percentbetweenJulyandDecember,inlinewiththedeclineininflationexpectations(textchart).

CHILE

5.Highinequality,oneofthemaindrivingforcesbehindthe2019socialunrest,hascomedownslightlybutnotonallfronts.Thepovertyratefellsignificantlyontheheelsofhousehold

subsidiesandthenewminimumguaranteedpension(PGU)(AnnexVIl.However,incomeinequality,measuredbytheGinicoefficients,remainssubstantiallyhigherthantheOECDaverage(texttable).Whileeducationspendinghasincreased,publicsatisfactionwitheducationservicesdeclined.Gendergapsinemploymentandrepresentationinparliamenthavenarrowed,theshareoffemalesenior

executivesinthepublicsectorhasincreasedfrom30to41percentoverthepasttwoyearsand

genderinequalitytargetsareincludedinthesovereignsustainability-linkedbondswhileasizeablegenderpaygappersists(AnnexVI).

Chile:InequalityandIndusivenessIndicators

200620172022

OECD

Average(2022)

ncomeinequalityandpoverty

Ginicoefficient(incomebeforetaxandsubsidy)

Ginicoefficient(incomeaftertaxandsubsidy)

Povertyrate(%,basedonnationalpovertyline)

Genderinequality

Genderunemploymentrategap(%)

Genderlaborforceparticipationrategap(%)

Proportionofparlimamentseatsheldbyfemale(%

Youthwell-being

Youth(aged15-24)unemploymentrate(%)

Youth(aged15-29)notineducation,employmentortraining(%)

Healthandeducation

Publiceducationspendingasshareoftotaleducationspending(%)

Healthspendingfinancedbyvoluntaryschemeorout-of-pocketpayment(%GDP)

Perceptionofpublicservices1/

Citizenssatisfactionwithhealthcaresystem(%

Citizenssatisfactionwitheducationsystem(%)

Citizenssatisfactionwiththejudicialsystem(%)

0.509

0.498

28.7

4.3

32.0

15.0

22.1

23.63/

50.45/

2.8

0.495

0.484

8.5

0.9

20.5

15.8

16.8

18.4

60.8

3.6

43

61

20

0.480.476.5

1.0

18.6

35.5

17.8

-4/

63.63.4

486/506/236/

0.472/

0.312/

0.7

10.4

13.8

12.7

82.52

2.2

68

67

56

SourcesOECD,CASEN2022andUNSDG.

/Theaccuracyofperception-basedindicatorscouldbebiasedbyrespondents'viewsratherthanfacts.

2/Datarefersto2019

3/Datarefersto2009

4/LatestavailabledatafromtheOECDforChileis2020(23.4percent)withtheincreaselikelyreflectingthepandemicimpact.TheLaborForceStatisticsdatasetcompiled

bytheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO)showsthatChile'syouthNEET(aged15-24)changedfrom17.5percentin2016to19.2percentin2020and14.4percentin

2022.

5/Datarefersto2005

6/Datarefersto2021

6.Theheadlinefiscalbalanceisexpectedtodeterioratetoadeficitof2.5percentofGDP

in2023,slightlybetterthanthe2.7percentofGDPtargetedinthebudget.Thesharp

turnaroundfromasurplusof1.1percentofGDPin2022mainlyreflectsweakertaxrevenuesamid

6INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

CHILE

theeconomicslowdown,lowercopperprices,andthefadingofone-offeffects.Higherspending

relatedtohealthcare,forestfiresandfloods,aswellasthePanAmericanGamesalsocontributedatthemargin

7.Thecurrentaccountdeficitnarrowedsharplyin2023andtheBCChaccumulated

internationalreservesbetweenJuneandOctober.Aftertemporarilywideningto9percentofGDPin2022,thefour-quartermovingaveragecurrentaccountdeficitnarrowedto3.4percentofGDPin2023Q3(textchart),drivenbyabroad-baseddeclineofgoodsimportsinlinewiththeadjustmentofdomesticdemand(Figure2).Onanannualbasis,thecurrentaccountdeficitisexpectedtohave

revertedto3.2percentofGDP.TheChileanpeso(CLP)weakenedbyabout10percentagainsttheU.S.dollarbetweenJulyandDecember2023amidthenarrowinginterestdifferentialwiththeU.S.anduncertaintysurroundingtheoutlookforkeytradingpartners,includingChina(textchart).1ThebehavioroftheCLPwascharacterizedbyheightenedsensitivitytonewsandgreatervolatility.In

April,theBCChbegantograduallyunwindtheFXforwardoperationsfromthe2022interventionprogram(AnnexIV,andinJune,startedatwelve-monthreserveaccumulationprogramthataimedatincreasingitsFXreservesbyUS$10billion.BothprogramsweresuspendedinOctoberinthe

contextofheightenedt