微觀經(jīng)濟學（四川大學）智慧樹知到課后章節(jié)答案2023年下四川大學

微觀經(jīng)濟學（四川大學）智慧樹知到課后章節(jié)答案2023年下四川大學四川大學

第一章測試

Microeconomicsstudiestheallocationof

A:models.B:unlimitedresources.C:decisionmakers.D:scarceresources.

答案:scarceresources.

Mostmicroeconomicmodelsassumethatdecisionmakerswishto

A:actselfishly.B:makeothersaswelloffaspossible.C:makethemselvesaswelloffaspossible.D:Noneoftheabove.

答案:makethemselvesaswelloffaspossible.

Whatlinksthedecisionsofconsumersandfirmsinamarket?

A:microeconomics.B:thegovernment.C:coordinationofficials.D:prices.

答案:prices.

Economicmodelsaremostoftentested

A:usingdatafromthedistantpast.B:usingcomputersimulations.C:usinglogicalone.D:usingdatafromtherealworld.

答案:usingdatafromtherealworld.

Whichofthestatementsbelowis/arenormative?

A:BandCB:Economistsneedtoincludemorerealityintheirmodels.C:Economistswilluseamodeluntilitisrefutedbysomeone.D:Microeconomistsstudyeconomicgrowth.

答案:Economistsneedtoincludemorerealityintheirmodels.

第二章測試

Anindifferencecurverepresentsbundlesofgoodsthataconsumer

A:ranksfrommostpreferredtoleastpreferred.B:viewsasequallydesirable.C:Alloftheabove.D:referstoanyotherbundleofgoods.

答案:viewsasequallydesirable.

Convexityofindifferencecurvesimpliesthatconsumersarewillingto

A:settleforlessofboth"x"and"y".B:giveupmore"y"togetanextra"x"theless"x"theyhave.C:giveupmore"y"togetanextra"x"themore"x"theyhave.D:acquiremore"x"onlyiftheydonothavetogiveupany"y".

答案:giveupmore"y"togetanextra"x"theless"x"theyhave.

Iftwobundlesareonthesameindifferencecurve,then

A:nocomparisoncanbemadebetweenthetwobundlessinceutilitycannotreallybemeasured.B:theconsumerderivesthesamelevelofutilityfromeach.C:theconsumerderivesthesamelevelofordinalutilityfromeachbutnotthesamelevelofcardinalutility.D:BandC.

答案:theconsumerderivesthesamelevelofutilityfromeach.

Iftheutilityfortwogoods"x"and"y"ismeasuredasU=x+y,thenitcanbeconcludedthat

A:"x"and"y"arebothbads.B:"x"and"y"areperfectsubstitutes.C:"x"and"y"areperfectcomplements.D:theindifferencecurvesonthex,ygraphwillbeupwardsloping.

答案:"x"and"y"areperfectsubstitutes.

Joe'sincomeis$500,thepriceoffood(F)is$2perunit,andthepriceofshelter(S)is$100.Whichofthefollowingrepresentshisbudgetconstraint?

A:F=250-50SB:500=2F+100SC:Alloftheabove.D:S=5-.02F

答案:Alloftheabove.

第三章測試

Theconsumerisinequilibriumwhen

A:thebudgetlineistangenttotheindifferencecurveatthebundlechosen.B:MRT=MRS.C:Alloftheabove.D:Px/Py.=MUx/MUy.

答案:Alloftheabove.

ByselectingabundlewhereMRS=MRT,theconsumerissaying

A:"Iwillequatetheamountsspentonallgoodsconsumed."B:"IamwillingtotradeonegoodfortheotheratthesameratethatIamrequiredtodoso."C:Alloftheabove.D:"Ivaluemylastunitofeachgoodequally."

答案:"IamwillingtotradeonegoodfortheotheratthesameratethatIamrequiredtodoso."

IfMRS>MRT,thentheconsumerisbetteroffthanatequilibrium.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯

Anindividual'sdemandcurveforagoodcanbederivedbymeasuringthequantitiesselectedas

A:thepriceofthegoodchanges.B:thepriceofsubstitutegoodschanges.C:incomechanges.D:Alloftheabove.

答案:thepriceofthegoodchanges.

Sandyderivesutilityfromconsuming"allothergoods,"g,andcleanair(measuredbyparticulatematterremovedperm3),a,asmeasuredbytheutilityfunctionU(g,a)=g0.6a0.4.Thepriceof"allothergoods"is$20andthepriceofcleanair(abatement)equals$10.Brianistheonlyotherconsumerinthemarketforcleanairanddemands10unitsofcleanair.Whatisthemarketdemandforcleanair?

A:Totalmarketdemandis12unitsofcleanair.B:Totalmarketdemandis14unitsofcleanair.C:Totalmarketdemandis16unitsofcleanair.D:Totalmarketdemandis10unitsofcleanair.

答案:Totalmarketdemandis14unitsofcleanair.

第四章測試

Efficientproductionoccursifafirm

A:Alloftheabove.B:maximizesprofit.C:cannotproduceitscurrentlevelofoutputwithfewerinputs.D:giventhequantityofinputs,cannotproducemoreoutput.

答案:Alloftheabove.

Firmsmaximizeprofitwhen

A:Alloftheabove.B:theadditionalbenefitfromproducingagoodequalstheadditionalcostofproducingthatgood.C:MR=MC.D:thederivativeoftheprofitfunctionwithrespecttooutputiszero.

答案:Alloftheabove.

Withrespecttoproduction,theshortrunisbestdefinedasatimeperiod

A:inwhichallinputsarefixed.B:lastingabouttwoyears.C:lastingaboutsixmonths.D:inwhichatleastoneinputisfixed.

答案:inwhichatleastoneinputisfixed.

Inthelongrun,allfactorsofproductionare

A:variable.B:materials.C:fixed.D:rented.

答案:variable.

Aproductionfunctiontellsthefirm

A:themaximumitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.B:theaveragelevelofproductionforotherfirmsintheindustry.C:theaverageitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.D:theminimumitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.

答案:themaximumitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.

第五章測試

WhichofthefollowingstatementsisNOTtrue?

A:AVC=wage/MPLB:C=F+VCC:AC=AFC+AVCD:AFC=AC-AVC

答案:AVC=wage/MPL

SupposethetotalcostofproducingT-shirtscanberepresentedasTC=50+2q.Themarginalcostofthe5thT-shirtis

A:60B:2C:12D:10

答案:2

Ifaveragecostisdecreasing,

A:marginalcostislessthanaveragecost.B:marginalcostexceedsaveragecost.C:Notenoughinformationisgiven.D:marginalcostequalsaveragecost.

答案:marginalcostislessthanaveragecost.

第六章測試

TheCanadianmetalchairmanufacturingmarkethasn=78firms.Theestimatedelasticityofsupplyisηo=3.1,andtheestimatedelasticityofdemandisε=-1.1.Assumingthatthefirmsareidentical,calculatetheelasticityofdemandfacingasinglefirm.

A:-275.5B:324.5C:-324.5D:275.5

答案:-324.5

Iftheinversedemandfunctionfortoastersisp=60-Q,whatistheconsumersurplusifpriceis30?

A:450B:900C:150D:300

答案:450

Ifacompetitivefirmmaximizesshort-runprofitsbyproducingsomequantityofoutput,whichofthefollowingmustbetrueatthatlevelofoutput?

A:p>MCB:MR>MCC:p≥AVCD:Alloftheabove

答案:p≥AVC

Assumeaconsumerhasahorizontaldemandcurveforaproduct.Hisconsumersurplusfrombuyingtheproduct

A:equalszeroB:cannotbecalculatedC:ismaximizedD:Needmoreinformation

答案:equalszero

第七章測試

Thedeadweightlossgeneratedbyaperfect-price-discriminatingmonopoly

A:equalszero.B:isgreaterthanthedeadweightlossofasingle-pricemonopoly.C:equalsthesumofalllostconsumersurplus.D:equalsthedeadweightlossofasingle-pricemonopoly.

答案:equalszero.

Monopolisticallycompetitivefirms

A:havenomarketpowerbecausetheyearnzeroeconomicprofit.B:havenomarketpowerbecausepriceequalsmarginalcost.C:havenomarketpowerbecauseoffreeentry.D:havemarketpowerbecausetheycansetpriceabovemarginalcost.

答案:havemarketpowerbecausetheycansetpriceabovemarginalcost.

AmonopolistfacestheinversedemandcurveP=60-Q.IthasvariablecostsofQ^2sothatitsmarginalcostsare2Q,andithasfixedcostsof30.Themonopoly'smaximumprofitis

A:510B:420C:220D:370

答案:420

AmonopolistfacestheinversedemandcurveP=60-Q.IthasvariablecostsofQ2sothatitsmarginalcostsare2Q,andithasfixedcostsof30.Atitsprofitmaximizingoutputlevel,themonopoly'saveragecostis

A:17B:15C:13D:11

答案:17

Ifthedemandcurveamonopolistfacesisperfectlyelastic,thentheratioofthefirm'spricetothemarginalcostis

A:0B:1C:Noneoftheabove—theanswercannotbedetermined.D:2

答案:1

第八章測試

dependonfollowingthree-playergame,whereplayer1choosesrows,player2columnsandplayer3matricesWhichstrategyofplayer1isstrictlydominated?

A:strategiesTandBB:strategyMC:strategyBD:strategiesTandM

答案:strategiesTandB

dependonfollowingthree-playergame,whereplayer1choosesrows,player2columnsandplayer3matricesWhat’sNashequilibriumofthisgame?

A:

(B,L,r)

B:

(T,R,r)C:(M,R,r)

D:

(T,L,l)

答案:(M,R,r)

(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice'soldcar,whileCharles'svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon'tknoweachother'sbid(socalled"sealedbid").AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.

Inthisgame,Bobhas8000strategiesandCharleshas10000strategies.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯

(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice'soldcar,whileCharles'svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon'tknoweachother'sbid(socalled"sealedbid").AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.InthisgameBobbids8000andCharlesbids8000isaNashequilibrium.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯

(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice'soldcar,whileCharles'svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon'tknoweachother'sbid(socalled"sealedbid").AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.

InthisgameBobbids7999andCharlesbids8000isaNashequilibrium.

A:對B:錯

答案:對

第九章測試

Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-p

Howmanystrategiesplayer1has?

A:8B:2

C:4D:6

答案:4

Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-p

Howmanystrategiesplayer2has?

A:6B:4C:8D:2

答案:8

Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-pWhatisthereducedgameafteriteratedeliminationofstrictlydominatedstrategiesofeachtype?

A:B:C:D:

答案:

Player1chooseseitherUorM;player2chooseseitherLorC.Bothplayerkn