國(guó)際事務(wù)研究院-非盟-歐盟和平與安全關(guān)系（英）-2021.11-19正式版

POLICYBRIEF

October2021

AU–EURELATIONSONPEACEANDSECURITY

ABSTRACT

Peaceandsecurity(P&S)isakeycomponentoftherelationsbetweentheAfricanUnionandtheEuropeanUnion,andislikelytocontinuetoplayacentralroleinthefuture.Yet,somesignificantchangesarepossibleintheroleplayedbytheAfricanUnionduetothelaunchoftheEuropeanPeaceFund.Againstthisbackdrop,thispaperaimstoanalysethe“stateoftheart”ofAU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurityandtoconsideritsmaintrajectories.Inthisframework,itanalysessomekeylessonslearnedfromAU–EUcooperationonpeaceandsecurityfrom

thelastseventeenyears.Itthenconsidersthemainstructuralasymmetriesanddriversbetweenthetwocontinents.Theassumptionisthatasymmetriescontinuetoplayanindirectbutrelevantrole,eveniftheyarerarelyaddressedsystematicallyoronlyspecifically.Furthermore,thepaperanalysestheEuropeanPeaceFacilityandthecurrenttrajectoryinAU–EUrelationsonP&S.Finally,asetofpolicyrecommendationsareprovidedtotheAUandEU.

AUTHOR

BERNARDOVENTURI

DirectorandCo-FounderoftheAgencyforPeacebuilding(AP),IAIResearchAssociate

TABLEOFCONTENTS

1.Stateoftheart:TrendsandpracticesinAU–EUpeaceandsecurity

relations 3

2.Lessonslearned 4

3.Themainstructuralasymmetries 9

4.Thewayforward:theEuropeanPeaceFacilityandothertrends 10

5.Conclusionsandrecommendations 14

References 16

Abouttheauthor 18

THEFOUNDATIONFOREUROPEANPROGRESSIVESTUDIES(FEPS)

EuropeanPoliticalFoundation-No4BE896.230.213AvenuedesArts461000Brussels(Belgium)

www.feps-europe.eu

@FEPS_Europe

FONDATIONJEANJAURèS

12CitéMalesherbes,75009Paris

+33(0)140232400

/

@j_jaures

INPARTNERSHIPWITH

ISTITUTOAFFARIINTERNAZIONALIViadeiMontecatini,17,00186Roma+39066976831

www.iai.it/en

@IAIonline

2 AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity

1.Stateoftheart:TrendsandpracticesinAU–EUpeaceandsecurityrelations

Peaceandsecurity(P&S)isakeycomponentoftherelationsbetweentheAfricanUnion(AU)andtheEuropeanUnion(EU).TheEUistheAU’ssecondmostimportantfinancialpartneronpeaceandsecurityaftertheUnitedNations(UN).Comparedwithothertopics,suchasmigrationoreventrade,overallobjectivesonpeaceandsecuritylargelyconvergeonjointinterestsandpriorities.1AddisAbabaandBrusselscanbothbenefitfromacommonapproachtoaddressarmedconflictsandviolentextremism.Yet,themodusoperandi,mutualperceptionsandtheEU’snewfinancialarchitecturecouldincreasedivergenciesinthecomingyears.

Inthepast,relationsbetweenthetwocontinentsweremainlybasedontheeconomicanddevelopmentdimension,butissuesofpeaceandsecurityhaveprogressivelygrowninimportancesincetheearly-/mid-1990s.2P&SgainedrelevanceintheframeworkoftheJointAfrica–EUStrategy(JAES)adoptedattheLisbonSummitinDecember2007.TheJAESwasdesignedtoaddressissuesofcommonconcern,3andto“jointlypromoteandsustainasystemofeffectivemultilateralism”

–mentioning,inparticular,“thereformoftheUnitedNations(UN)systemandofotherkeyinternationalinstitutions”.4

VolkerHauckandLidetTadesseShiferaw,“ContinuityandChangeinEuropeanUnion-AfricaRelationsonPeaceandSecurity,”ACCORDAnalysis,March24,2021,

https://

.za/?p=32199

.

FernandaFaria,“CrisisManagementinSub-SaharanAfrica.TheRoleoftheEuropeanUnion,”EUISSOccasionalPapers,no.51(2004),

https://www.iss.europa.eu/

node/68

.

Including“peace,security,democraticgovernanceandhumanrights,fundamentalfreedoms,genderequality,sustainableeconomicdevelopment,includingindustrialisation,andregionalandcontinentalintegrationinAfrica”,asdetailedin:EU–AfricaSummit,TheAfrica-EUStrategicPartnership.AJointAfrica-EUStrategy,2ndEU–

FromtheEU’sperspective,since2016andtheintroductionoftheEUGlobalStrategy(EUGS),5Brusselshastriedtointegrateitsexternalprojectionthroughtwoapproaches–firstly,byenhancingtheintegratedapproach,includingmorespheresofinterventionandimprovingfieldcoordinationandpolicyconsistency;secondly,byapplyingthe“principled-pragmatism”approachwherebyEuropeaninterestsandvaluescoexistwithoneanother.TheEUGSstatesthattheunion“willinvestinAfricanpeaceanddevelopmentasaninvestmentin[its]ownsecurityandprosperity”.6

FromtheAU’sperspective,thepartnershiponpeaceandsecuritywithBrusselsisparamount.However,thereisaperceptionthatEU’sapproachesareincreasinglymoreinfluencedbydomesticneedsandperceivedthreatsrelatedtoextremismandirregularmigration.7Furthermore,manyAfricanleadersandinstitutionswanttodiversifytheirpartners–fromChinatoRussiaorTurkey–eventhoughthosepartnersstillhavelimitedengagementonP&S.

WhilethenextAU–EUSummitwillnotnowbehelduntilFebruary2022,somesignalscanbededucedfromthecommunication“Towardsa

AfricaSummit,Lisbon,December8-9,2007,point8(ii),

/sites/default/files/

documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf

.

Ibid.,point8(iii).

EuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS),SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy,June2016,

https://europa.eu/!Tr66qx

.

Ibid,p.36.

AlfonsoMedinillaandChloeTeevan,“BeyondGoodIntentions:TheNewEU-AfricaPartnership,”ECDPMDiscussionPapers,no.267(March2020),

https://ecdpm.

org/?p=38799

.

AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity 3

comprehensiveStrategywithAfrica”releasedbytheEuropeanCommissionandtheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)inMarch2020.8Sectionfourofthedocumentisdedicatedtopeace,security,governanceandresilience.TheEUindicatesthatpriorityshouldbegiventostrategiccooperationonthemaincrisisareaswhilemaintaininganintegratedapproachtotheentirecycleofconflicts(Actionno.6).Cooperationshouldalsofocusonimprovinggovernance(Action7)asapreconditionforsecurityanddevelopment,andonactionstoincreasetheresilienceofAfricancountries(Action8).Beyondtwogeneralpoliticalmessagesoncoordination(“EUinstrumentsandAfricancapacitiesshouldbefurtheraligned”)andfinances(“despiteprogressontheAUPeaceFund,thefinancingofAfrican-ledpeacesupportinitiatives,includingthroughUN-assessedcontributions,remainstobeaddressed”),9theimpressionisthatthisdocument–overall,ratherfocusedonEuropeanneedsandwithlittleattentionpaidtoreciprocity–willnotreceivemuchattentioninthefuture.ThismeansthatthenextAU–EUSummitwillgrounditsworkon

otherdocumentsandissues,aspresentedinthelastsectionofthispaper.However,officersoftheEEAShavedefineditas“comprehensive”and“stillthebaseofourthinking”.10Atthesametime,they“missaclearandsimilarresponsefromtheAfricancounterpartinordertodefinenewjointprioritiesforthefuture”.11

Againstthisbackdrop,thispaperaimstoanalysethestateoftheartofAU–EUrelationsonP&Sandtoconsideritsmaintrajectories.Inthisframework,thefollowingsectionwillanalysesomekeylessonslearnedfromAU–EUcooperationonP&Sfromthelastseventeenyears.Asubsequentsectionisdedicatedtothemainstructuralasymmetriesanddriversbetweenthetwocontinents.Theassumptionisthatasymmetriescontinuetoplayanindirectbutrelevantrole,eveniftheyarerarelyaddressedsystematicallyoronlyspecifically.ThepaperthenanalysestheEuropeanPeaceFacilityandthetrajectoryinAU–EUrelationsonP&S.Finally,asetofpolicyrecommendationsisprovidedtotheAUandEU.

2.LessonsLearned

Since2004,theEUhasprovidedfundingtotheAU,toAfricanRegionalEconomicCommunities(RECs)andtoothercoalitionsthroughtheAfricanPeaceFacility(APF).TheAPFrepresentsoneofthepillarsunderpinningtheAU–EUrelationship;itsgoalisthreefold:enhanceddialogue,operationalisingtheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture(APSA)andunderpinningpeace-supportoperationsinAfrica.TheAPSAwasestablishedbytheAUasastructuraland

long-termresponsetoAfricanP&Schallenges,anditsoperationalisationhasalwaysbeenoneofthepriorityactionsfortheAfrica–EUpeaceandsecuritypartnership,asdiscussedbelow.Againstthisbackdrop,whatarethelessonslearnedfromAU–EUcooperationwithinthisframework?

Overall,P&Shasbeenakeypriorityareaforcooperationbetweenthetwocontinents.

8EuropeanCommissionandEEAS,Towardsa

9Ibid,p.11.

ComprehensiveStrategywithAfrica(JOIN/2020/4),

10

IAIinterview,EEAS(1),September2021.

March9,2020,

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/

11

Ibid.

en/TXT/?uri=celex:52020JC0004

.

4 AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity

Between2004and2019,theEUprovidedapproximately€2.9billioninfinancialassistancetotheAPSA–channelledthroughtheAPF.TheAPF,financedfromtheextra-budgetaryEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF),12hascontributedsignificantlytoenhancingdialogueandcooperationbetweentheEUandtheAU.ThefacilitywasaimedatbackingAfrican

institutionstoprogressinproviding“AfricansolutionstoAfricanproblems”bysupportingtheAU,theRECsandRegionalMechanisms(RMs)incarryingoutP&Soperations.Forinstance,thisfundenablestheAUtocarryoutPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs)decidedonbythePeaceandSecurityCounciltogetherwithinterventionsauthorisedbytheAU’sAssembly.

AU’s

Commission

Panelofthe AfricaPeace

Wise Fund

Peaceand

SecurityCouncil

African

Continental

Standy

EarlyWarning

Force

System

Figure1-AfricaPeaceandSecurityArchitecture(APSA).

TheEDFisthemaininstrumentforprovidingaidfordevelopmentcooperationtotheAfrican,Caribbeanand

Pacificstatesandtooverseascountriesandterritories.

EDFprogrammesarenotfundedbytheEUbudgetbutwereinitiallyestablishedbyanInternalAgreementof

theRepresentativesoftheMemberStates.From2021,EDFprogrammesareincludedintheEU’sMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF)andthusaresubjecttoEUfinancialregulationsinthesamewayasotherEUfundingprogrammes.

AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity 5

TheAPFhasalsobeenacontestedfinancialtoolduetoitsrootsinEuropeandevelopmentcooperation,theultimategoalofwhichistoreduceextremepoverty.TheEUhassupportedAfricanstatesandregionalorganisationsformanyyearsthrougharangeofcivilianP&Sactivities,withtheobjectiveofstrengtheningthelinkagesbetweensecurityanddevelopment.13Infact,EU–Africasecurityrelationshavebeendominatedbythe“security–developmentnexus”mantra.14AllthecurrentmainEUdocumentsonmigrationalsorefertodevelopment-andsecurity-relatedissues.15Inthe2014–17Roadmap,forinstance,peaceandsecuritycomprisethefirstpriorityoutofthefivelisted,while“humandevelopment”and“sustainableandinclusivedevelopment[togetherwith]growthandcontinentalintegration”occupytwootherslots.16

Thesecurity–developmentnexusisconsolidatedbutatthesametimecontroversial

–especiallyfornon-governmentaldevelopmentactors.Forsomestakeholders,purelysecurity-relatedactionsbelongtothesphereoftheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP).Otherdecision-makersareinfavourofastrongcomponentofsecurityindevelopingcountries,embeddedindevelopment.Thedifferencebetween“security-relevant”and“securitytarget”

isparamountinthisregard.Security-relevantdevelopmentactivitiesareusuallyimplementedinaconflict-affectedarea,wheresecurityarrangementsandaconflict-sensitiveapproacharenecessary(workinginconflict).SecuritytargetreferstoscenariosinwhichP&Sisthedirecttargetoftheactivity(workingonconflict).Clearly,manydevelopmentmeasuresaresecurity-relevant,fromeducationtogovernance,butthisdoesnotmeanthattheworkisdirectlyintendedtoinfluencesecuritydynamics.Whileallpartiesagreeontheneedtoconnectthetwoareas,acleardistinctionbetweentheirrespectivemandatesandfinancialinstrumentsisparamount.

AnotherlessoncouldbelearnedfromtheweightofthethreecomponentsoftheAPF:AfricanPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs),theoperationalisationoftheAPSAandinitiativesundertheEarlyResponseMechanism(ERM).17ThebulkofAPFfunding(approximately93percent)isallocatedtoPSOs,around6percentisspentoncapacitybuildingandapproximately1percentgoestotheConflictEarlyResponseMechanism.Theselattertwocomponentsare,therefore,ratherweakanddeservemoreresourcesinthefuture.18

HauckandTadesseShiferaw,“ContinuityandChangeinEuropeanUnion-AfricaRelations.”

UeliStaegerandTshepoT.Gwatiwa,“PeaceandSecurityintheContextofEU-AfricaRelations,”inTheRoutledgeHandbookofEU-AfricaRelations,ed.ToniHaastrup,LuísMahandNiallDuggan(London/NewYork:Routledge,2021),175-187.

Forinstance,seethedocumentsoftheEuropeanCommission:AEuropeanAgendaonMigration(COM/2015/240),May13,2015,

https://eur-lex.europa.

eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52015DC0240

;TheGlobalApproachtoMigrationandMobility(COM/2011/743),November18,2011,

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52011DC0743

.

The2014–17Roadmapisthemainoutcomeofthe

2014fourthEU–AfricaSummit.SeeAfricanUnionandEuropeanUnion,Roadmap2014-2017,4thEU–AfricaSummit,Brussels,April3-4,2014,point6,

http://www.

/en/node/7911

.

17TheERMisaquick-reactionfundingmechanismprovidingtheAU,RECsandRMswithimmediatelyavailablefundstopreventandmanageviolentconflict.TheEUiscommittedtoapproveorrejectrequestsforERMsupportreceivedfromAfricanpartnerswithinjust10workingdays.

MoreinformationisavailableonthewebsiteoftheAfrica–EUPartnership:

/

en/financial-support-partnership-programme/african-

peace-facility

.

6 AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity

171.8 28

PeaceSupportOperations

Capacity-Building

EarlyResponseMechanism

2681.2

Figure2-APFcontractedamountspertypeofactivity,2004–2019(inmillioneuro).

Source:EuropeanCommission,AfricanPeaceFacility.AnnualReport2019(Luxembourg:PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,2020),10,

https://op.europa.eu/s/s5Vg

.

TheEUalsoconductsnineCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)missionsinAfrica(outofatotalofeighteen)–threeofthemintheSahelandthreeinSomalia.19TheCOVID-19crisishasreducedpersonnelonthegroundandthenumberofactions,butthemissionshavecontinuedtobeoperational.Furthermore,inJuly2021theEuropeanCounciladopted

adecisiontosetupanEUmilitary-trainingmissioninMozambique(EUTMMozambique),20alsowithstronginputfromthePortugueseEUPresidency.ManylessonscouldbelearnedfromCSDPdeploymentinAfrica.Akeyissuethatcouldbeparamountforfuturecooperationbetweenthetwocontinentsistoestablishstrongerconnectionsbetweenthetechnical

Thecurrentmissionsare:EUBorderAssistanceMission(EUBAM)inLibya;EUCAPSomalia,assistingthatcountryindevelopingself-sustainingcapacityfortheenhancementofmaritimesecurity;EUCAPSahelMaliandEUCAPSahelNiger,supportingtheinternalsecurityforcesinthosecountries;EUNAVFORAtalanta,counteringpiracyoffthecoastofSomalia;EUTMMali,atrainingmissionfortheMalianarmedforces;EUTMRCAintheCentralAfricanRepublic,tocontributetothecountry’sdefence-sector

reform;andEUTMSomalia,amilitarytrainingmissioninSomalia;andEUTMMozambique.

TheaimofthemissionistotrainandsupporttheMozambicanarmedforcesinprotectingthecivilianpopulationandrestoringsafetyandsecurityinCaboDelgadoProvince.CounciloftheEU,“Mozambique:EUSetsUpaMilitaryTrainingMissiontoHelpAddresstheCrisisinCaboDelgado,”PressReleases,July12,2021,

https://europa.eu/!VJ4fuw

.

AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity 7

workofthemissionandthebroaderpoliticalvision.Governance,forinstance,ismentionedrelativelyofteninCSDPpolicydocumentsbutreceiveslimitedconsiderationinallitscomponents.Thisrecognitionoftheimportanceofgovernancereformtopeaceandstabilisationisstillinitsearlystages.Forexample,EUCAPSahelMalihassupportedthegovernment’ssecurity-sectorreform(SSR)–despitethefactthatMalihasyettoundertakecomprehensiveSSR21–byofferingtrainingtothecountry’sjudicialpoliceandinintelligencegatheringandcounterterrorism.22

Anotherdimensionthatdeservestobementionedhereisthefactthatpolicydialogueonsecurityandotherissueshasbeenjeopardisedbyinsufficientcommunicationandcoordinationatalllevels–technical,seniorofficialandpolitical.Asaconsequence,itsimpactisstillverylimited.23Forinstance,thisisthecasefortheannualjointmeetingsbetweentheEU’sPoliticalandSecurityCommitteeandtheAU’sPeaceandSecurityCouncil,whichhavebeenorganisedeveryyear(alternativelyinBrusselsandAddisAbaba,butvirtuallyinthelastcoupleofyears)sinceOctober2008.ThesemeetingshavefocusedonP&Sissuesofcommonconcern–especiallyEUsupportforAUPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs),asduringthelastone:the12thAnnualJointConsultativeMeetinginOctober2020.24Inpractice,they

havefunctionedwellasconsultativeforumsmainlytodiscusstheongoingconflictandcrisissituationsinAfrica,aswellastheEU’ssupportfortheAUonP&Smatters.

Finally,theEUCouncilhasadoptedregionalstrategiesfortheHornofAfrica,theGulfofGuineaandtheSahel;andtheEUhasabilateraltradepactwithSouthAfrica.ThetendencyoftheseframeworkshasbeentogiveconsiderableattentiontotheEU’ssecurityconcernsdespitemanyreferencestoanintegratedapproach.ThisisquiteevidentintheSahel,wheretheEUsupportstwokeyregionalinitiatives:theG5SahelitselfandtheAlliancefortheSahel.ThesupportfortheG5Sahelremainspredominantlyinthefieldsofsecurityanddefence.EstablishedinFebruary2014andoriginallypresentedasavehicleforstrengtheningthebondbetweeneconomicdevelopmentandsecurity,theG5soonbecameheavilyfocusedonsecurityconcerns.Alltheselessonsarealsotiedtostructuralasymmetriesanddriversthatarestillheavilypresent–butoftenneglected–intheAU–EUPartnership.

BernardoVenturi,“AnEUIntegratedApproachintheSahel:TheRoleforGovernance,”IAIPapers,no.19|03(2019),

https://www.iai.it/en/node/9957

.

AndrewLebovich,“HaltingAmbition:EUMigrationandSecurityPolicyintheSahel,”ECFRPolicyBriefs,September25,2018,

https://ecfr.eu/?p=4211

.

Thereareanumberoftechnicaldifficulties,suchastheissueofchanginginterlocutors–themembershipoftheAU’sPeaceandSecurityCouncilisrotating,whereasallEUmemberstatesarealwayspartoftheEU’sPoliticalandSecurityCommittee–aswellasthedifferentapproaches

oftherespectivepresidencies.Somecommentatorsalsopointoutthattheagendasofthesemeetingsaretoolongandveryambitious,and,asaconsequence,meetingsarerushedastheyonlylastaday.Consequently,therecanbenoin‐depthdiscussionorcommonanalysis–asituationexacerbatedbypoliticalsensitivitiesoncertainissues.

CounciloftheEU,“EU-AfricanUnionRelations:JointCommuniquéoftheAUPeaceandSecurityCouncilandtheEUPoliticalandSecurityCommittee,”PressReleases,October26,2020,

https://europa.eu/!kY77Td

.

8 AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity

3.Themainstructuralasymmetries

Despitethenarrativeon“Africarising”anda“partnershipamongequals”,EU–AfricarelationsremainasymmetricalandtheEUanditsmemberstatescontinuetoimposeformsandformatsofrelationsonitsAfricanpeers.TheseasymmetriesplayacentralroleinP&S.

Africanpartners’dependencyonforeignfundshasbeenconsideredoneofthekeyfactorsjeopardisingthecontinent’saspirationstoprovide“AfricansolutionstoAfricanproblems”.25TheAU’sinstitutionshaveshownalimitedcapacityforabsorbingexternalfunding,whichisalsoconnectedwiththeproliferationoffundingsourcesandreportingrules.Onaverage,theAUcollects67percentofassessedcontributionannuallyfromitsmemberstates.However,eachyearonaveragearound30memberstatesdefaulteitherpartiallyorcompletely.AsrecognisedbytheAU,thiscreatesasignificantgapbetweenplannedbudgetandactualfunding,whichhinderstheeffectivedeliveryofitsagenda.26ThisfinancialasymmetryclearlyplaysaheavyroleinP&S–allthemoresobecauseoftheAU’sstruggletofindsignificantco-fundstomatchEUresources.AddisAbabahasbeenprogressivelygatheringAfricanresourcesfortheAUPeaceFund,27andistryingtomobiliseUN-assessedcontributions

forAUoperations,butthishasthusfarbeenhinderedbytheUnitedStates.28

Tiedtofinanciallimitation,anotherasymmetryisrepresentedbytheAU’slimitationsinsufficientlybargainingforitspreferences.Forinstance,in2011theAfricansunsuccessfullylobbiedforanAfricansolutioninLibyabutmetresistancefromtheEUdelegationtotheAUandBrussels.ThiswasperceivedbymanyAUdiplomatsandpolicy-makersasanaffronttotheiragencyinAfrica.AsimilarsituationofbypassingtheAUandeventheRECscanbecomemorefrequentwiththenewEuropeanPeaceFacility(EPF),aspresentedinthenextsection.

Furthermore,thetendencyonthepartoftheEUinrecentyearstosecuritiseandexternalisethemigrationagendahasfurtherreinforcedtheAfricanperceptionofaone-waydialogue–ultimatelyaimedatimposingtheEU’sagendaonitscounterpart.SincetheVallettaSummit(11–12November2015),29dominatedbytheEU’smigrationagendawithitsstrongfocusonsecurityaspects,migrationhasbecomenotjustapriority30butalsosomethingofanobsessionfortheEU.31ThisasymmetricalrelationshipcanalsobedetectedintheEU’sintentiontomoderniseAfricansecurity,and

NicolettaPirozzi,NicolòSartoriandBernardoVenturi,TheJointAfrica–EUStrategy(Brussels:EuropeanParliament,2017),

https://op.europa.eu/s/s5VS

.

AfricanUnionwebsite:WhyIntroduceaLevy?,

https://

/web/en/introduce-levy

.

ThePeaceFund–establishedbytheAU’sAssemblyinJuly2016–isanintegralpartoftheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,establishedtoprovidethenecessaryresourcesforpeace-supportmissionsandotheroperationalactivitiesrelatedtoP&S.TheresourcesofthePeaceFundaretobemadeupoffinancialappropriationsfromtheregularbudget,voluntarycontributionsfrommemberstatesandothersources.

MedinillaandTeevan,“BeyondGoodIntentions.”

TheVallettaSummitproducedapoliticaldeclarationandanactionplan,includingtheestablishmentofanEmergencyTrustFundforstabilityandaddressingtherootcausesofirregularmigrationanddisplacedpersonsinAfrica,madeupof€1.8billionfromtheEUbudgetandEuropeanDevelopmentFund,combinedwithcontributionsfromEUmemberstatesandotherdonors.SeeAfrica–EUPartnership,2015VallettaSummitonMigration,November18,2015,

http://www.africa-eu-

/en/node/8325

.

TheframeworkdocumentfortheEUis:EuropeanCommission,AEuropeanAgendaonMigration.

AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity 9

isencapsulatedinthenotionofasecurity–developmentnexusasdefinedbytheEUGlobalStrategyandoperationalisedthroughtheAfricanPeaceFacilityInstrument.32TheEUhasfailedtoincorporatecontextandlocalneedsintothedevelopmentofitsAfricansecurityagenda,pursuingunrealisticlong-termgoals.IfitwantstoremainarelevantpartnerinAfricansecuritymatters,ithastofindanewbalanceinitsagenda-settingandcreatespacefor“Africanagency”withinitssecuritysystem.33

Finally,asymmetriesinaccountabilityandstructurehaveasignificantimpactonP&S.34Intermsofaccountability,forinstance,whiletheAUhasofferedtheEUaseatontheBoardoftheAU-managedAfricanPeaceFund,togetherwiththeUNtheAUhasnocomparableinstitutional

mechanismtosignalitsconcerns.35Thisstructuralasymmetrycouldthereforeaffectthebroaderpartnershipincludingintheareaofpeaceandsecurity.TheEUalsolamentsthefactthattheAUmissesaspecificstrategybecauseAgenda2063andthedocument“SilencingtheGuns”are“gooddocuments,buttoogeneric”.36

Overall,theseasymmetriesarelikelytopersistinthenextfewyears.Movingforwardwithanabstractrhetoricofequalpartnership,theEUrisksunderestimatingthisrisk.Instead,makingthemexplicitcouldhelptoovercomesomeofthesedifficulties.ThisapproachcouldbedecisivefortheEuropeanPeaceFacility,especiallyintermsofAfricanagency,aselaboratedinthenextsection.

4.Thewayforward:theEuropeanPeaceFacilityandothertrends

P&Swillremain“oneofthestrongestdriversofinstitutionalcooperationandanareacarryingagreatpotential”37toachievecommonobjectivesanddeliverables.38Yet,howcanAU–EUcooperationpromoteajointandsustainableapproachtopeaceandsecurityoverthecomingyears?

Certainly,theframeworkoftheEU’sMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF)for2021–27–the“ceiling”andbudgetarysystemthatdetermines

economiccommitmentsforeachpolicyarea–willimpactontheEU’scooperationwithAfrica.Intermsofdevelopmentfunding,theresourcesallocatedthroughthenewNeighbourhood,DevelopmentandInternationalCooperationInstrument(NDICI)willbesimilartothepreviousMFF(over€70billionforsevenyears).Approximately€900millionoftheNDICIisdedicatedto“globalstabilityandpeace”and€2.8billionisspecificallyfor“‘rapidresponseactions’,torespondtocrisesworld-wide”.39

31MahamadouDanda,“TheSecurity–Migration–DevelopmentNexusintheSahel:AViewfromNiger,”inTheSecurity-Migration-DevelopmentNexusRevised:APerspectivefromtheSahel,ed.BernardoVenturi(BrusselsandRome:FoundationforEuropeanProgressiveStudiesandIstitutoAffariInternazionali,2017):52,

https://www.

iai.it/en/node/8764

.

BernardoVenturi,“TheEUandtheSahel:ALaboratoryof

ExperimentationfortheSecurity–Migration–DevelopmentNexus,”inTheSecurity-Migration-DevelopmentNexusRevised