大二上財(cái)務(wù)管理課件

TypesofPreferredPreferredBankGuaranteedEuroPreferredWarrantConvertibleBondPreferred融資融資(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheoryMMpropositionIwithout（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論P(yáng)erfectcapitalTherearenotaxes,transaction costsassociatedwithsecuritytrading.Investorsandfirmscantradethesamesetsecuritiesatcompetitivemarket presentvalueoftheirfuturecashflows.

otheyrevealnewinformationtheyrevealnewinformationaboutMMpropositionIwithoutodiglianiandMertonMillerPropositionequalt hmrk fh hflVLInotherwords,financialmanagerscannotincreasevaluebychangingthemixsecuritiesusedtoVL((一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutMMandtheLawofOneIntheabsenceoftaxesorothertransactioncosts,thetotalcashflowpaidouttoallofafirm’ssecurityholdersisequaltothetotalcashflowgeneratedbythefirm’sassets.Therefore,bytheLawofOnePrice,thefirm’ssecuritiesanditsassetsmusthavethesametotalmarketvalue.M&MI Doesn’tExample-RiverCruises-AllEquityNumberof PriceperMarketValueof

$1 Stateofthe perReturnonsharesM&MI Doesn’t50%debt

NumberofPriceperMarketvalueof

$500,000Marketvalueof $ Stateofthee$75,000125,000175,00050,00050,000Equity $25,00075,000125,000per Returnonshares (一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutHoldingfixedthecashflowsgeneratedbythefirm’sassets,however,thechoiceofcapitalstructuredoesnotchangethevalueofthefirm.Itmerelydividesthevalueofthefirmintodifferentsecurities.LetEandDdenotethemarketvalueofequityanddebtifthfirmislevered.LetUbethemarketvalueofequityifthefirmisunlevered.AndletAbethemarketvalueoffirm’sassets.(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerIwithoutHomemadeLeverage:Investorsuseleverageintheirownportfoliostoadjusttheleverage madebythefirm.Aslongasinvestorscanborroworlendatthesameinterestrateasthefirm,homemadeleverageisaperfectsubstitutefortheuseofleveragebythefirm.M&MI Doesn’tExample-RiverCruises-AllEquity-Debtreplicatedby(marginloanandbuytwoassumedthattheinvestor'scostofborrowingmoneyisthesameasthatofthefirm StateoftheEarningsontwoLESS:Interest@Netearningson me i.e.,issueDebt+UnleveredFirm=LeveredeStateoftheM&MeStateoftheExample-RiverCruises–Firmdebtat-Investorcanunwrapdebt(oneshareandlendmoney)PLUS:Interest@ PLUS:Interest@ Netearningson Returnon$10 i.e.Leveredfirm+investDebt=UnleveredArbitrage， 理性投資者將杠桿，投資于無杠桿公(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerIwithoutAverageCostofCapital(NoForleveredfirm,weightedaveragecostofcapital(WACC)calculatesthecostofcapitalofthefirm’sassetsbycomputingtheweightedaverageofthefirm’sequityanddebtcostofcapital.Forunleveredfirminperfect(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutWithperfectcapitalmarkets,afirm’sWACCisindependentofitscapitalstructureandisequaltoitsequitycostofcapitalifitisunlevered,whichmatchesthecostofcapitalofitsassets.Therefore,iftheriskofaprojectmatchestheriskoftheassetsofafirm,wecanusethefirm’sWACCtoestimatetheappropriatecostofcapitalforthe Inaperfectcapitalmarket,theLawofOnePriceimpliesthatallfinancialtransactionshaveanNPVofzeroandneithercreatenordestroyvalue. Consequently,thechoiceofdebtversusequityfinancingdoesnotaffectthevalueofThefundsraisedfromissuin equalthepresentvalueofthefutureinterestandprincipalpaymentsthefirmwillmake.Thatis,inaperfectcapitalmarket,afirm’schoiceofcapitalstructureisunimportantHowever,thisstatementisatoddswiththeobservationthatfirmsinvestsignificantresources,bothintermsofmanagerialtimeandeffortandinvestmentbankingfees,inmanagingtheircapitalstructures.(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionIwithoutInmanyinstance,thechoiceofleverageisofcriticalimportancetoafirm’svalueandfuturesuccess.Therearelargeandsystematicvariationsinthetypicalcapitalstructuresfordifferentindustries.Atyear-end-2004,Amgen,abiotechnologyanddrugfirm,hasdebtof$5bil.andamarketcap.ofmorethan$81bil.,givingthefirmadebt-equityratioof0.06.Incontrast,NavistarInternational,anautoandtruckmanufacturer,hadadebt-equityratioof0.95.Truckmanufacturersingeneralhavehigherdebtratiosthanbiotechnologyanddrugcompanies.forSelectedIndustriesDebtlevelsaredeterminedbybookvalues,andequitybymarketvalues.TheaveragedebtfinancingforallU.S.stockswasabout36%,butnotethelargedifferencesby(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionIwithoutIfcapitaltructureis whydoweseesuchconsistentdifferencesincapitalstructuresacrossfirmsandindustries?whydomanagersdedicatesomuchtime,effort,andexpensetothecapitalstructureMMpropositionIwithout實(shí)證結(jié)果不支持無關(guān)LysandSivaramakrishnan(1988務(wù)杠桿與DhrymesandKurz(1967資決策與融資決(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory(二(二 roositionII:withoutThereturnofaportfolioisequaltotheweightedaverageofthereturnsofthesecuritiesinit,theequalityimpliesthefollowingrelationshipbetweenthereturnsofleveredequity,debt,andunleveredequityForlevered inperfect(二）(二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutMMPropositionThecostofcapitalofleveredequityisequaltothecostofcapitalofunleveredequityplusapremiumthatisproportionaltothemarketvaluedebt-equityCostofCapitalofLeveredGivenconstantrUandrD,rEincreaseswithdebtNextFigureillustratestheeffectofincreasingtheamountofleverage,whichismeasuredintermsofdebt-to-valueratio,D/(E+D),inafirm’scapital capital,itsdebtcostofcapital,anditswhererU;SE;BD;ksrE;kbMM’sPropositionII(w/riskyrIncludesBankruptcyIncludesBankruptcyAsthefirmborrows

Risky

moreofriskistransferredfromstockholderstoFig.WACCandLeveragewithPerfectCapitalMarketsAsthefractionofthefirmfinancedwithdebtincreases,boththeequityandthedebteriskierandtheircostofcapitalweightisputonthelower-costdebt,theweightedaveragecostofcapitalremainsFinancialDistress， 成本Legalandadministrativecosts(tendtobeasmallpercentageoffirmIndirectCosts（間接成本：在企業(yè) 往受到重大影響，企業(yè)價(jià)值大幅下降。）Impairedabilitytoconductbusiness(e.g.,lost無形資產(chǎn)的損AgencyCosts（公司管理者和股東會(huì)采取減少 MMpropositionII：without 企業(yè)不存在最優(yōu)CapitalStructureCapitalStructureFallacies(Doesdebtratioincreaseinshareprice?FigureEarningsperSharewithandwithoutThesensitivityofEPStoEBITishigherforaleveredfirmthanforanunleveredfirm.Thus,givenassetswiththesamerisk,theEPSofaleveredfirmismorevolatile.TheincreaseinexpectedEPSwillnotincreaseinshareprice.CapitalCapitalStructureFallacies(Willshareholdersgainfromnewequityissue?Ingeneral,aslongasthefirmsellsthenewsharesofequit atafairprice,therewillbeno ainorlosstoshareholdersassociatedwiththeequityissueitself.Themoneytakeninbythefirmasaresultoftheshareissueexactlyoffsetsthedilutionoftheshares.AnygainorlossassociatedwiththetransactionwillresultfromtheNPVoftheinvestmentsthefirmmakeswiththefundsraised.((二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutLeveredandUnleveredBetas:Theeffectofleverageontheriskofafirm’ssecuritiescanalsobeexpressedintermsofbeta.Letbethebetaoftheleveredequity,bethebetaofequitywithoutleverage,bethebetaofdebt.Wehavefollowingrelationship:sincetheyhavesameWerefertoasafirm’sunleveredbeta.Itmeasuresthemarketriskofthefirmwithoutleverage,whichisequivalenttothebetaofthefirm’sassets.(二）(二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutIfwearetryingtoestimatetheunleveredbetaforaninvestmentproject,weshouldbaseourestimateontheunleveredbetasoffirmswi leveredLet’ssolveleveredIfthefirm’sdebtisrisk ,thenitsbetaiszero(βD=0)es(Hamada’sHowtocalculatedebt-adjustedbeta(bottom-up(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory（三）Modigliani‐MillerpropositionIwith?公稅與負(fù)債比率會(huì)呈正向變動(dòng)。Assume:keepthedollaramountofAssume:keepthedollaramountofdebtcTaxbenefit=Taxbenefit=$10,000x(.06)x(.35)=

DxrDx =DxPVof210perpetuity=$210/.06= Shield c=$10,000x.35=*Tocomputetheincreaseinthefirm’stotalvalueassociatedwiththeinteresttaxshield,weneedtoforecasthowafirm’sdebt—andthereforeitsinterestpayments—willvaryovertime.((三MMpropositionI：withInterestTaxTheInterestTaxShieldandFirmLetVLandVUrepresentthevalueofthefirmwiandwithoutleverage,respectively.WehavethefollowingchangetotheMMPropositioninthepresenceoftaxes:Thetotalvalueoftheleveredfirmexceedsthevalueofthefirmwithoutleverageduetothepresentvalueofthetaxsavingsformdebt:=VU+D*

Thehigherdebt,themoreOptimalcapitalstructure:asmuchdebtasC.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.The hasnodebt.The’sannualcashflowis$10,000,beforeinterestandtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%.Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyour’equitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueShouldyoudothisandC.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.’hasnodebt.The sannualcashflowis$10,000,beforeinterest andtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%. Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyourequitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueof$50,000.’ShouldyoudothisandAllE E InterestPmt Taxes@35%NetCash

0

C.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.hasnodebt.The ’sannualcashflowis$10,00 ,beforeinterestandtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%. Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyourequitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueof$50,000.Shouldyoudothisand00InterestAll EquityAllEquity=TaxesTaxes@e*Equity+Debt=(4,550+NetCashNetCash*thevalueofafirmisthetotalamountitcanraisefromallinvestors,notjustequityholders.Fig.TheCashFlowsoftheUnleveredandLeveredFirmByincreasingthecashflowspaidtodebtholdersthroughinterestpayments,afirmreducestheamountpaidintaxes.Theincreaseintotalcashflowspaidtoinvestorsistheinteresttaxshield.(Assumea40%marginalcorporatetaxrateand$500mildebt.)(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory roositionII:withThecostofe r)D(1T whererUisthecostofcapitalthefirmwouldhaveifithadnodebtGivenconstantrUandrD,rEincreaseswithdebt在賦稅條件下，當(dāng)負(fù)債比率增加時(shí)，股東財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)所要求增加的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的程度小于無稅條件下風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的增加程度，即在ValuingtheInterestTaxShield Infact,itThus,thereductionintheWACCincreaseswiththeamountofdebtfinancing.Thehigherthefirm’sleverage,themorethefirmexploitsthetaxadvantageofdebt,andtheloweritsWACC.(See.NextFigure)whereU;SE;BD;ksrE;kbTheWACCwithandwithoutCorporateTaxesWecomputetheWACCasafunctionofleverage.WithouttaxestheWACCisconstant.Withtaxes,theWACCdeclinesasthefirmincreasesitsrelianceondebtfinancingandtheinteresttaxshieldgrows.Thefigureassumesamarginal etaxrateofc=35%.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheoryCostsofFinancialCostsofFinancialDistress-Costsarisingbankruptcyordistortedbusinessdecisionsbeforebankruptcy.(Baxter,1967) ValueifallEquity-PVCosts-PVCostsofFinancialThepresentvalueofthecostsoffinancialdistressincreaseswithincreasesthedebtratiobecausetheprobabilityofdefaultand/orbankruptcyisFinancialumvalueof

CostsfinancialMarketValueofTheMarketValueofThe

Valueoflevered

Fig.OptimalLeveragewithTaxesandFinancialAsthelevelofdebt,D,increases,thetaxbenefitsofdebtincreaseby*Duntilinterestexpenseexceedsthefirm’s ofdefault,andhencethe resentvalueoffinancialdistresscosts,alsoincreasewithD.Theoptimallevelofdebt,D*,occurswhentheseeffectsbalanceoutandVLis ized.D*willbelowerforfirmswithhighercostsoffinancialdistress.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory?al alTaxesintheInterestTaxTheamountofmoneyaninvestorwillpayforasecurity ydependsonthebenefitstheinvestorwillreceive—namely,thecashflowstheinvestorwillreceive,afteralltaxeshavebeenpaid.Thus, altaxesreducethecashflowstoinvestorsanddiminishfirmvalue. Asaresult,theactualinteresttaxshielddependsonthereductioninthetotaltaxes(bothcorporateand thatarepaid.Todeterminethetruetaxbenefitofleverage,weneedtoevaluatethecombinedeffectofbothtaxes.TopFederalTaxRatesintheUnitedStates,1971-2005alAfter-TaxInvestorCashFlowsResultingfrom$1inEBIT eistaxedatrateifortheinvestor.Dividendorcapitalgain istaxedatratecforthecorporation,andagainatrateefortheinvestor.alTaxes ageofalTaxes ValuingtheInterestTaxShield alAslongas*0,thendespiteanytaxdisadvantageofat allevel,anettaxadvantageforleverageIncaseofpermanentdebt,thevalueofthefirmwithleverageBecausetheimlies

altaxdisadvantageofdebtgenerallyweseethatthebenefitofleveraeis (referp.關(guān)于Miller模型的討 只要Tei 如果的利息抵稅效應(yīng)不能完全被抵消，則Miller模型預(yù)示企業(yè)價(jià)值隨著/權(quán)益比Miller

(1Tc)(1Te)

1 VL= VL<VU+TCDwhenTe< VL VL< DebtwherepBr0interestrateforattracting

1

)interestrateforattractinginvestorswithtaxrate(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory(七 理JensenandMeckling(1976):公司會(huì)發(fā)生兩 (a)管理者經(jīng)營(yíng)的利得需與股東 消費(fèi)perk）。 股東會(huì)考慮這樣的可能性，而產(chǎn)生權(quán) 成本者間的利 Keiretsuin v

Next2.supermajority(1/2,2/3,

(七 理 ， 債融資,以賺取超額 (七 理B.債權(quán)人與股東間的負(fù) 問公 負(fù)債會(huì)發(fā)生負(fù) 成本,公司 會(huì)發(fā)生權(quán) 成本, 成(負(fù) 成

成本)極小化時(shí),AT(R)=AD(R)+RR Myers(1977):當(dāng)公司 Jensen(1986)舒緩管理者與股東間的利益，也因此成為負(fù)。A costsandFig.OptimalLeveragewithTaxes,FinancialandAgencyAsthelevelofdebt,D,increases,thevalueofthefirmincreasesfromtheinteresttaxshieldaswellasimprovementsinmanagerialincentives.Ifleverageistoohigh,however,thepresentvalueoffinancialdistresscosts,aswellastheagencycostsfromdebtholder–equity ucesfirmvalue. optimallevelofdebt,D*,balancesthesebenefitsandcostsofleverage.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個(gè)人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgency(八) MyersandMajluf(1984):當(dāng)管理者的私有信息為新投資方案 時(shí),因信息不對(duì)稱問題,公司的權(quán)益可能被錯(cuò)誤的評(píng)價(jià)。即使公司新的投資計(jì)劃NPV為正，若股價(jià)被低權(quán)益的價(jià)值被高估時(shí),管理者才會(huì) 股為壞消息,債券融資優(yōu)于權(quán)益融資。由于內(nèi)部 因此內(nèi)部權(quán)益是最受喜愛的來源，其次為一般債券及Myers(1984):依據(jù)MyersandMajluf 見融資優(yōu)序Fig.StockReturnsBeforeandAfteranEquityStockstendtorise(relativetothemarket)beforeanequityissueisannounced.Uponannouncement,stockpricesfallonaverage.ThisfigureshowstheaveragereturnrelativetothemarketbeforeandafterannouncementsusingdatafromDeborahLucasandRobertMcDonald,“EquityIssuesandStockPriceDynamics,”JournalofFinance45(1990):1019–1043.融資融資融資決策之因素(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)(Trade-off(二)融資優(yōu)序MarketTiming(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)理(Trade-off假設(shè):投資人與管理者對(duì)未來成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)有相同的由于市場(chǎng)不完善與成本極小化的持一目標(biāo)的比率,以追求公司價(jià)值極大化.KrausandLitzenberger1973Scott1976),與Kim1978):負(fù)債帶來的租稅利益與成本間的決定了公Miller1977DeAngeloandMasulis1980人所得稅與非負(fù)債稅盾(non-debttaxshields)也該.(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)理(Trade-offRoss(1977):公司與投資人間有信息不對(duì)稱,投資人不知道公司的質(zhì)量,高質(zhì)量的公司由于 較低,因而會(huì) 較多的債券,以使自己與低質(zhì)量,JensenandMeckling(1976):（參 SmithandWarner(1979):為使 (一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)理(Trade-offAghionandBolton(1986): 控制權(quán)的喪失,卻也可能因財(cái)務(wù)杠桿而獲致較高的報(bào)酬.有效的融資形式乃是使 在某些經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下,同時(shí)以負(fù)債及權(quán)益融資是最適決AghionandBoltn1988):增發(fā)會(huì)有股權(quán)稀釋的邊際成本,新發(fā)負(fù)債會(huì)有負(fù)債的邊際成本,權(quán)衡兩邊際成本后,即可適當(dāng)分配控制權(quán),決定公司的最適資本結(jié)構(gòu). Debt-to-ValueRatio[D/(E+D)]ofU.S.Firms,1975–2005Althoughfirmshaveprimarilyissueddebtratherthanequity,theaverageproportionofdebtintheircapitalstructureshasnotincreased(variedinarangefrom30%-45%fortheaveragefirm)duetothegrowthinvalueofexistingequity.Source:CompustatandFederalReserve,FlowofFundsAccountsoftheUnitedStates,PatternsofCorporate(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)(二)融資優(yōu)(PeckingOrderTheory:啄食順MarketTiming(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先順部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrderThispeckingordermayupsetthetrade-off ofcaitalstructurebecausefirmsmabereluctanttoadddebttocapitalstructureevenifthereisadditionalvaluefromtheinteresttaxshield.Thus,firmsmayoperatewithlessthanthe"otimal"amountofdebtintheircaitalstructureaslongastheycanfundprojectswithretainedearnings.(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先順部權(quán)益券部權(quán) 而言,債券有固定的收益,因此價(jià)值較易被估計(jì),也較為穩(wěn)定,較不會(huì)被低估. MyersandMajluf(1984)（參見發(fā)布訊號(hào)理論的介NetExternalFinancingandExenditures U.S.CororationsInaggregate,firmshaveraisedexternalcapitalprimarilybyissuingdebt.Thesefundshavebeenusedtoretireequityandfundinvestment,butthevastmajorityofcapitalexpendituresareinternallyfunded.Source:FederalReserve,FlowofFundsAccountsoftheUnitedStates,Fig.AggregateSourcesofFundingforExpenditures,U.S.Inaggregate,firmstendtorepurchaseequityandissuedebt.Butmorethan70%capitalexpendituresarefu Source:FederalReserveFlowof(PeckingOrderC.CornellandShapiro(1987):一企業(yè)與其客戶,經(jīng)銷商、契約關(guān)系外，尚有隱藏的請(qǐng)求權(quán)(implicitclaim、(organizationalcapital)， 保證、工作安定本扣除組織負(fù)債后即為該企業(yè)的凈組織資本(net.

(PeckingOrder 加其內(nèi)部;成功的企業(yè)由于擁有較多的組織資本,故其負(fù)債比(PeckingOrderD.Baskin(1989):由留存收益提供的內(nèi)部不必承 成本,也避免了因放股利的個(gè)人所得稅,因此內(nèi)部權(quán)益優(yōu)融資可因利息而減少公司稅的課征,且 成本較低,更不會(huì)造成控制權(quán)的稀釋.因此公司的融資決策會(huì)依循融(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外 Narayanan(1988):舉債增加需要支付的利息就更 (PeckingOrderDonaldson(1985):由于 在及不可預(yù)測(cè)的因素,而動(dòng)用留存收益融資 較小,因此除非是緊急防御或是采取攻勢(shì),否則不應(yīng)依賴 管理者為了增加自主權(quán),常謀求減輕外在利益團(tuán)體對(duì)公司運(yùn)作的潛在干預(yù),而運(yùn)用內(nèi)部正可避免投資大眾的注目,故內(nèi)優(yōu)于外 (PeckingOrder (PeckingOrderDBartonandGordon(1987持決策的控制權(quán)及彈性,將會(huì)較喜歡內(nèi),(PeckingOrderEMillerandRock(1985于任何的壞消息,因此內(nèi)部 采用何種外部融資方式均無差異。(亦即,，序理(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder Scott(1977):公司有抵押擔(dān)保的新負(fù)債,會(huì)剝 擔(dān)保的債權(quán)人之,而提高公司權(quán)益的價(jià)值.因此如果管理者追求的是股東 GrossmanandHart(1982):舉債會(huì)增加 潤(rùn),而非要享受 (PeckingOrderLeland&Pyle(1977）：當(dāng)企業(yè)投資可以使其價(jià)值提高時(shí)，將不會(huì)新股而降低原HotromandTirole(1989果管理以融。(亦即，不支融序理論的順(PeckingOrder. (PeckingOrderNarayanan(1988)：負(fù)債具有優(yōu)先求償因此舉債造成股價(jià)下跌的幅度較新股為(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder故公司價(jià)值應(yīng)會(huì)隨銀行借款增加而上 經(jīng)濟(jì)效果，故多選擇發(fā)債籌Yosha1995來成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)愈高的公司，為避免信(二HoustonandJames(1996):未來成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)較高的公 Cole(1998):企業(yè)若與銀行已有財(cái)務(wù)往來,則銀行會(huì) 予該企業(yè),主因是銀行能藉由財(cái)務(wù)往來4 Krishnaswamietal1999利的信息但卻高度信息不對(duì)稱時(shí)，為避免公BootandThakor(2000),HoustonandJames(2001):(PeckingOrder4Hoshietal.(1991),Billettetal.(1995):實(shí)證發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行具有正面價(jià)值,支持銀行 。 SebouhandGordon(2000):銀行融資 ,而私募負(fù),(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權(quán)益券部權(quán)內(nèi) 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負(fù)債短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)(PeckingOrder短期負(fù)債及可轉(zhuǎn)Myers(1977):短期負(fù)債到期期間短,每次舉成本.JensenandMeckling(1976人或股東的,因此可轉(zhuǎn)債可降低成本.(一)最適資本結(jié)構(gòu)(二)融資優(yōu)序MarketTimingCapitalStructureThestaticfirmsweighthetaxbenefitsofdebtagainstcostswithfinancialdistressandThedynamictrade-off:(HennessyandWhited(2005,JF)Thepeckingassourcesoffinancing,firmspreferinternalfunds,thenande asalast#informationasymmetry.(MyersandMajluf(1984,Themarkettimingfirmspreferequitywhentheyperceivetherelativecostequityislow,andpreferdebt#managerstimesecurityofferingstoexploitmarketinefficiency.(BakerandWurgler(2002,JF))EvidenceEvidencefavorstheMarketTimingFirmstendtoissuewhenFirmstendtoissuewheninvestorsarerathertooenthusiasticaboutearningsPost-issuestockreturnstendtobe“theamountbywhichourstockisundervaluedorovervaluedwasanimportantconsideration”inissuingeuit. GrahamandHarve 2001)Seasonedequityofferings,markettiming,andthecorporatelifecyclebyDeAngelo,DeAngeloandStulz(2010,Asimplelife-cycleyoungwithhighmrkt-to-book(M/B)ratiosandlowoperatingcashsellstocktofundwhereasma