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AlexisCrow?2023ObserverResearchFoundation.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,copied,archived,retainedortransmittedthroughprint,speechorelectronicmediawithoutpriorwrittenapprovalfromORF.2Amidstasomewhatunprecedentedamountofturmoilintheglobalmacroeconomicenvironmentandgeopoliticallandscape—fromthereturnofinterstatewarinEuropeAandtheassociatedenergyandcostoflivingcrisesunfurlingacrossadvancedandemergingmarketeconomies,totheensuingtensionsbetweentheUSandChinaandadeepeningofthetechnologicaldecouplingbetweenthetwocountries—Indiahasemergedasthenext“brightspot”1forglobalinvestors.Indeed,theWorldBankhasrecentlyhighlightedthatIndiaisbetterpositionedto“weatherglobalspillovers”,relativetomostotheremergingmarkets.2AsIndiaretainsitspositionasoneofthefastest-growingeconomiesintheworld,localbenchmarkshavehithistorichighs.AswecanseeinFigure1,onanemergingmarketbasis,IndianstockmarketshaveoutperformedtheirMSCIpeers,andrankamongthebestperformingequitymarketsonaglobalbasisin2022.33Figure1:MSCIIndiavsMSCIEmergingMarkets:CumulativeIndexPerformance-NetReturns(inEUR;November2007-November2022)0MSCIIndiaMSCIEmergingMarketsMSCIACWIIMIecForeigninvestorshaveplayedaroleinpropellingsuchmarketrallies,postingsteadyinflowsintoIndianequities.5Inpart,investorshaverespondedpositivelytoIndia’spositionasthepotentialnextgreatgrowthmiracle,astheeconomysteadilyemergesfromtheCOVID-19pandemic,witharelativelyresilientandrobustdomesticconsumerbase.a,6sumptionsupportssomepercentofGDPinIndiaprovidingapositivefeedbacklooptolongertermgrowth4Beyondthecompellingmacroeconomicstory,India’sgeostrategicpositionisalsoanalluringdrawforglobalpoolsofcapital—andindeedfor‘sticky’capital,intheformofforeigndirectinvestment(FDI).AswecanseeinFigure2,FDIintoIndiahassteadilyriseninrecentyears,partlyinresponsetotheescalationoftheUS-Chinatradetensionsin2018,andlikelyalsoincreasinglyasafactorofthe‘Chinaoffset’:amidstthesustainedzeroCOVIDpolicies,someforeigninvestorsandexecutiveshavedivertedcapitalallocationfrommainlandChinatoIndia,amongstotheremergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesandAsianeconomies.Figure2:ForeignDirectInvestmentintoIndiainvalueterms5Andyet,oneshouldask,isIndiabenefitingfromwhatmightbedescribedasachiaroscuromoment,andthusonlytemporarilytoutedasa‘brightspot’becausethecurrentglobalhorizonisotherwisesodark?Inshort,justhowdurableisthisgeographicalinvestingthemeofdeployinglong-termcapitaltoIndia?Asweshallsee,Indiaisnotwithoutitsownchallenges—atthemacroeconomicandfinanciallevel,andindeedwithinthegeopoliticallandscape.Nevertheless,despitebothshort-andmedium-termheadwinds,India’sshiningstarinvestmentstatusisveritablymerited.‘ThenextChina’,itisnot.ButasIndiacontinuesthemanufacturingmiracleandboostscompetitiveservicesexports,itgeneratesthegrowthforaconsumermarketthatisonlyatthecuspofblossoming.b,8And,inconsideringwhichsectorsarelikelyripeforcapitalallocation,theverysectorssubjecttoreforms—includingenergy,transport,andagriculturetechnology(AgTech)—providestellaropportunitiesforlong-termpatientcapitalinprivateequity,infrastructure,andventurecapital.Additionally,bothtraditionalandnon-traditionalformsoffinancecontinuetoprovidealluringsectorsforallocationamongstforeigninvestors.Finally,asweshallsee,inconsideringwhichcountries‘getitright’byinvestinginIndia,JapanprovidesanexcellentrolemodelforothercountriesastheyseektostrategicallyengageinIndia.bIndiasfastmovingconsumergoodsmarketexpandingbypercentinwithsustaineddoubledigitgrowthin22.6DespitetheextraordinarytwinhealthandeconomiccrisesstemmingfromCOVID-19,IndiaactuallypostedrecordGDPgrowthemergingfromthepandemic.9PolicymakersintheReserveBankofIndiawerealsosuccessfulinmaintainingsmoothlyrunningfinancialmarketsduringthewavesofthevirusandassociatedeconomicstops,takingmeasurestoprovideliquiditytomutualfunds,aswellastoprovidesufficientUSdollarliquidityacrossmarkets.10Morerecently,inconsideringtheexternaloutlook,centralbankersinIndiahavehadtocontendwiththeimpactsof‘geopoliticalspilloversintomonetarypolicy’.11InthewakeofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine,policymakershavehadtocontendwithimportedinflation,resultingbothfromanelevatedcommoditypriceenvironmentandfromadepreciatingIndianrupeevis-a-visastronggreenbackperformanceinthewakeofUSFederalReserve(Fed)tightening(whichisfurtherstrengthenedfromacrowdingintotheUSdollarasasafehavenassetduringsuchaperiodofheightenedvolatilityanduncertainty).Thiscurrentimbalanceislikelytomoderatein2023,asitseemsthattheFedandcentralbankersinotheradvancedeconomiesmighthavesuccessfullymanagedtorestorepricestability,andsotoachieveamoderately‘softlanding’,potentiallyavertingadeeporprolongedrecession.7Lookingoutoverthelonger-term,Indiaisforecastedtobecometheworld’sthird-largesteconomyby2030,surpassingbothGermanyandJapan.12IndianGDPissettodoublewithinthenextnineyears.13And,eveninthewakeofthesuddenstopsofCOVID-19,theIndianmiddleclassisexpectedtogrowby8.5percentperyearthroughto2030,atwhichtimeitisforecastedtoreach800millionpeople.14Lookingouttothestartofthenextcentury,Indiaissettoholdtheworld’slargestforeignnetforeignassetposition,cagain,effectivelyreplacingthepositionsofGermanyandJapan.Inachievingsuchpositions,trialsdoremain.OnesuchchallengeemanatesfromIndia’sstatusasa“democraticcacophony”15:asthecountry’scitizensspeak121languagesand270mothertongues,within28statesandeightunionterritories,asenseofpoliticalcohesionmaybesomewhatabsentamidstthese“millionnegotiationsofdemocracy.”16Thus,inconsideringtheprospectsforthefurtherimplementationofpro-businessreforms,daswellasforthepotentialforIndiatocreate“publicfacilitiestosupportprivateindividuals,”17India’sdemocraticpolitymustbetakenintoaccount.Toworkthroughthenextgenerationofreformstoland,labour,andintellectualproperty,anationalconsensusisrequiredthatmaynotbeentirelyvisibleatthispoint.Onebigquestionforthemediumtermishowsuchconsensus-buildingmightbeachievedinordertopaveafirmfoundationforthedevelopmentofopportunitiesfordomesticentrepreneurs.cDefinedasthevalueofforeignassetsheldbyacountry,lessthevalueofitsowndomesticassetsownedbyforeigners.dIncluding,butnotlimitedto,theimplementationoftheGoodsandServicesTax(GST)andthe‘MakeinIndia’manufacturingcampaign.8Lookingouttotheregionallevel—andinconsideringIndiawithinthecontextofotheremergingmarketpeers,ortogetherwithotherAsianeconomies—therelativelyautonomouspositionofthecountry—independentasitisfromChina—rendersitalluringtoforeigninvestorsandexecutivesincreasinglycontendingwithgeopoliticalrisksbetweentheUSandChina.Withinthecontextofourcurrentgeopoliticallandscape—onecharacterisedbyfragmentation,ratherthanthatdominatedbyonehegemonintheformoftheUS,ortwopowers,suchastheUSandChina—India’sstanceisinpartreminiscentofitsstrategyofnon-alignmentthroughouttheColdWar.DuringthebipolarconfrontationbetweentheUSandRussia,Indiaadoptedapositionofforeignpolicyautonomy,ratherthanrelationallyorideologicallybecomingbeholdentoonecamp.18Eventoday,despitebeingapillaroftheso-called‘Quad’regionalrelationshipbetweenAustralia,Japan,andtheUS,19India’sstewardshipofa‘freeandopenIndo-Pacific’doesnotrenderitaservantoftheUS.Indeed,despiteitsactivediplomaticandcommercialdialoguewiththeUS,IndiacontinuestoimportrecordvolumesofRussiancrudeoil,20despitedemandsfromtheBidenadministrationtocurtailsuchimports.219Additionally,asIndiaissettoachieveextraordinarydynamismofwealthcreationandprosperityimbeddedintheeconomicforecastsnotedabove,itmayalsofacegeopoliticalchallengeswiththeUSoverthemedium-tolonger-term,assuchincomegenerationinIndiaislikelytobesetincontrastwiththecontinueddeclineoftheAmericanmiddleclass.Toputitsimply:bysomepoliticiansintheUS,economicsecurityisoftenmistakenlyviewedasazero-sumgame,accordingtowhichthegainsofonecountry(read:Japaninthe1980s,andChinainthe2000s)areoftencorrelatedwithacorrespondinglossoflivelihoodforsegmentsofthedomesticpopulationintheUS.Accordingly,totheextentthatcontinuingtradeandcross-bordereconomicactivitysupportsIndiangrowth,Indianpolicymakers,diplomats,andexecutivesshouldadroitlyengageindialoguewiththeirAmerican(andperhapsevenEuropean)counterpartsregardingthe“benefitsofinterdependence.”22Otherwise,anunintendedconsequenceofIndia’sincreasingprosperitymightbetorenderitasubjectofireinAmericanpolicycirclesoverthemediumtolongerterm. WhilemuchoftheattentiononIndia’sfavourablegeostrategicpositiontendstobediscussedinlightofitsrelationshipwiththeUSorChina,anothercountrypresentsanidealexampleforotherstofollowwithahorizonforlong-termvaluecreationinIndia—Japan.Indeed,afacetofthestrongrelationshipbetweenthelateJapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbeandIndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModi23hasbeenthatofafavourablepositionforJapanesecompaniesandinvestorscapitalisingonlong-termgrowthprospectsinIndia.JapanhasbeenanactiveinfrastructureinvestorinIndia;24whilesomeofitsmajorbankscontinuetodeepentheirstancewithintheIndianfinancialsector.25OneofitsleadingindustrialcompaniesiscurrentlyexpandingitsinvestmentsinIndiainordertoinstillgreatersupplychainflexibility,26aswellas—ostensibly—tobeclosertoagrowingcustomerbase.SuchactiveinvestmentbyJapan’sgovernmententities27—intocriticalsectorssuchasaffordablehousingandlowcarboninfrastructure28—anditsleadingcompaniesisrootedinthebenefitsofatruecollaborativerelationshipbetweenthetwocountries,oneofmutualbenefit.AlthoughmanyoftheseinvestmentsarecouchedinthelanguageoftheIndo-Pacificframework,partofJapanesecorporateinvestmentintoIndiacanalsobeseenasanunemotionalpursuitofgrowth(asopposedtoafraughtorchargedrepositioningawayfromChina).SuchcommercialtieswillhopefullybeaugmentedbyrenewedshuttlediplomacybetweencurrentPrimeMinisterFumioKishidaandModi,allinapursuitofa‘butteroverguns’mentality.I nconsideringthebrightestsectorsforlong-terminvestmentinIndia,asnotedabove,someoftheindustriescurrentlybeckoninglargereformspresentsubstantialopportunities.AstheoutlookforgrainproductionincreasesinIndia,29sodotheprospectsforinvestingupanddownthefoodsystem,particularlyinfoodstorageandAgTech.30AsIndiaassumesthepresidencyoftheG20,itsavowedfocusondecarbonisation31willalsonaturallyspuropportunitiesacrosstheenergyandinfrastructurespace,bothininstillinggreaterefficienciesintraditionalformsofenergyandintheelectrificationoftransport.Infact,inamarriageofthepromisingoutlookforprivateconsumptionandlowcarbontransport,onelocalelectricmotorbikecompanyhasrecentlyattractedinvestmentfromaprominentUSventurecapitalarm32—anindustrylikelysettoblossomasIndiahasagoalofreaching30percentofelectrificationoftransportby2030.33Suchreformsaresetwithinthewiderglobaltrendofthereturnofindustrialpolicy:intheemergencefromthepandemic—andamidstthebackdropoftheenergycrisis,andongoingtradetensionsbetweentheUSandChina—politicianshaveprioritisedgrowth,investment,andjobcreationincriticalsectorsincludingadvancedmanufacturing,AIandcloudcomputing,andinnovationintheenergytransition.AsIndiaprogressesalongthetechmanufacturingspectrum,andostensiblyattractssupplychainactivitydivertedfromChina,34investorswilldowelltofollowsuchsignals,whicharelikelytobesupportedbygovernmentsoverthemediumtolongerterm.I nsum,theinvestorspotlightshiningonIndiaisindeedmerited.Insecularterms,asIndia’seconomyandemploymentbasegrowfromagrarianactivitytomanufacturingandtoservices,likelyso,too,willthedomesticconsumptionbasesteadilygrowandexpand.ThepotentialforthisconsumptionstoryhasbeentestedduringthetwinnedhealthandeconomiccrisesofCOVID-19,aswellasfromthegeopoliticalspilloversfromtheRussia-Ukraineconflict(resultinginhigherinflation,andthusdiminishedpurchasingpower).AlthoughIndianpolicymakersconfrontahostofchallengesinboththeshortandmediumterm,theverysectorsripeforreforms—includingagriculture,energy,andtransport—correspondtodirectopportunitiesforlong-term,patientcapitalfromprivateequity,venturecapital,andinstitutionalinvestors.India’srobustmacroeconomicpositionisfurtheraugmentedbyitsgeographicalposition,andstanceofrelativeautonomyamidstafragmentedworld.InconsideringthedeploymentofcapitaltoAsia,andsetagainstthebackdropofwhatmaylikelybetheunfurlingtechnologicaldecouplingbetweentheUSandChina,Indiacontinuestomagnetiseforeigncapitalforthelongduration,andincreasinglyinthetechmanufacturingspace.Andyet,whiletheworldoftenfocusesontheUS,itisactuallyJapanthathassetanexampleasamodelwayofcommercialanddiplomaticengagementinIndia,intermsofmutualbenefit,andprioritisingthevaluecreation—ratherthandefencecharacteristics—ofminilateralism.Insuchaway,investmentsbytheJapanesegovernmentandbyitsleadingcorporationshavethepotentialtospurapositivefeedbackloop,furthercementingtheconditionsforsustainableeconomicgrowth,aswellasservingasarolemodelforothercountriesseekingtocreatelongtermvalueinIndia.1InternationalMonetaryFund,“TranscriptofOctober2022MDKristalinaGeorgievaPressBriefingonGPA,”O(jiān)ctober13,2022,IMF,/en/News/Articles/2022/10/13/tr101322-transcript-of-md-press-briefing-annual-meetings2TheWorldBank,/en/news/press-release/2022/12/05/india-better-positioned-to-navigate-global-headwinds-than-other-major-emerging-economies-new-world-bank-report3ShuoXu,“Performance-LeadershipChangeandMarketFundamentals,”MSCI,/research-and-insights/insights-gallery/emerging-markets4“MSCIIndiaIndex,”MSCI,/documents/10199/aa8a6c1a-923a-4b4c-95c8-907832427aeb5AshutoshJoshiandAkshayChinchalkar,“ForeignInvestorBetsShowIndianStocksRallyHasMoreLegs,”Bloomberg,November28,2022,/news/articles/2022-11-28/foreign-investor-bets-show-indian-stocks-rally-has-more-legs6MichaelDebabrataPatra,“GeopoliticalspilloversandtheIndianeconomy”(speech,NewDelhi,June24,2022),BankforInternationalSettlements,/review/r220624e.pdf7WorldBank,Foreigndirectinvestment,netflows(BoP,currentUS$),WorldBankGroup,/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?view=map8NalinPatel,MeghnaJainandAntrikchRastogi,“India’sConsumerGoodsMarketDrivesGrowthInthePost-COVIDEra,”SiteSelection,November2022,/issues/2022/nov/india-s-consumer-goods-market-drives-growth-in-the-post-covid-era.cfm;“FMCGinIndiacontinuestorecoverwithdouble-digitgrowthinQ22022,”NielsenIQ,September1,2022,/global/en/insights/analysis/2022/fmcg-in-india-continues-to-recover-with-double-digit-growth-in-q2-2022/9“IndiaGDPAnnualGrowthRate,”TradingEconomics,/india/gdp-growth-annual10CarlosCantú,PaoloCavallino,FiorellaDeFioreandJamesYetman,“Aglobaldatabaseoncentralbanks’monetaryresponsestoCovid-19,”BISWorkingPapersNo.934,March2021,/publ/work934.pdf11IMF,“TranscriptofOctober2022MDKristalinaGeorgievaPressBriefingonGPA”12LeeYingShan,“Indiamaybecomethethirdlargesteconomyby2030,overtakingJapanandGermany,”CNBC,December1,2022,/2022/12/01/india-to-leapfrog-to-third-largest-economy-by-2030.html13Shan,“Indiamaybecomethethirdlargesteconomyby2030,overtakingJapanandGermany”14“Chinavs.India–Whereisthemomentuminconsumerspending?,”WorldDataLab,April16,2021,https://worlddata.io/blog/china-vs-india-where-is-the-momentum-in-consumer-spending15“Ademocraticcacophony,”UniversityofCambridge,October23,2015,https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/features/a-democratic-cacophony16GurcharanDas,IndiaUnbound(NewDelhi:PenguinRandomHouseIndia,2015)17MihirSharma,Restart:TheLastChancefortheIndianEconomy(NewDelhi:PenguinRandomHouseIndia,2015)18KantiBajpai,“India:ModifiedStructuralism,”inAsianSecurityPractice:MaterialandIdeationalInfluences,edMuthiahAlagappa,(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1998)19DepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade,AustralianGovernment,Quad,.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad20JamesCockayneandMeganByrne,“IndiaCrudeImports:RussiaVolumesSurgeToNewRecord,”Mees,December2,2022,/2022/12/2/selected-data/india-crude-imports-russia-volumes-surge-to-new-record/a90f0190-724d-11ed-b79e-d1679546641c21SteveHollandandTrevorHunnicutt,“BidentoModi:BuyingmoreRussianoilisnotinIndia’sinterest,”Reuters,April12,2022,/world/indian-pm-modi-suggests-direct-talks-between-putin-zelenskiy-2022-04-11/22KenMoriyasu,MarikoKodaki,andShigesaburoOkumura,“InsidetheTrilateralCommission:PowerelitesgrapplewithChina’srise,”NikkeiAsia,November23,2022,/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Inside-the-Trilateral-Commission-Power-elites-grapple-with-China-s-rise23ManjariChatterjeeMiller,“India’sSpecialRelationshipWithAbeShinzo,”July14,2022,/blog/indias-special-relationship-abe-shinzo24RupakjyotiBorah,“Japan’sInfrastructureInvestmentinNortheastIndia,”TheDiplomat,February8,2022,https:///2022/02/japans-infrastructure-investment-in-northeast-india/25/Business/Finance/Japan-s-Sumitomo-Mitsui-to-buy-major-Indian-lender-for-2bn26“Japan’sSumitomoMitsuitobuymajorIndianlenderfor$2bn,”NikkeiAsia,July6,2021,/Business/Electronics/Daikin-pours-710m-into-boosting-output-in-India-Southeast-Asia27SubhashNarayan&ShashankMattoo,“Japan’sJICAlookstostepupinvestmentsinprivatesectorprojectsinIndia,”Mint,October19,2022,/industry/infrastructure/japans-jica-looks-to-step-up-investments-in-private-HYPERLINK"/industry/in

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