中小企業(yè)融資外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯

1、文獻(xiàn)信息：文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)題： Financing of SMEs （中小企業(yè)融資）國外作者： Jan Bartholdy, Cesario Mateus文獻(xiàn)出處： London business review,2007(9),pp43-45字?jǐn)?shù)統(tǒng)計： 英文 2124 單詞， 10802 字符；中文 3529 漢字外文文獻(xiàn)：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, lo

2、ng and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in term

3、s of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pec

4、king Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additionalEuro. An empirical analysis o

5、n a unique dataset of Portuguese SME s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type offinancing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME s the main sources of financing are equity (internally

6、generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costsof the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solvingthe asymmetricinformationproblem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt.Asymmetricinformation costs arise from

7、collecting and analysing informationtosupport thedecision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are fromcollecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs managand shareholders are often the same person, equity and internallygenerated fundshave no asymmetric informatio

8、n costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME s in Portugal are financedusing internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In thi

9、s section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financia

10、l intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called“ Meltzer ” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large

11、 well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the

12、 firm s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals tothe buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then the

13、se firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer haslittle information about the supplier, or the products are

14、complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable termsis the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price

15、 discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers withgood credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if a

16、ll buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial

17、 difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transacti

18、ons costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it ispossible to separatebetween delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transa

19、ctions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on “ hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric informati

20、on is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the b

21、ank and the firm and in the payment function. The financialinstitution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credi

22、t. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan 1997 briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visits the premises than a financial

23、 institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wai

24、t for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain informa

25、tion about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantagesin collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This

26、is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can

27、sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade

28、credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits ar

29、e in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the pr

30、oviders of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered

31、to the firm , firms cannot “ borrow ”for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits als

32、o have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral,

33、 also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk var

34、iables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. I

35、t is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any com

36、parative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining thebehaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. How

37、ever, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if

38、 there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables

39、determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structu

40、re The Pecking Order Theorywhere firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverseselection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the

41、amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are taxshields- and “ positive agencycosts ”and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “ negative agency costs” .In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of

42、the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of thedifferent types of debt used to fina

43、nce the firm, or that the use of the funds isimportant in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determinesthe relationship between the asset side and liabilityside of the balance sheet. Thetheory works reasonable well for Chea

44、p Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans butthe tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.中文譯文：中小企業(yè)融資摘要中小企業(yè)融資的主要來源有： 股權(quán)融資、按時兌現(xiàn)的貿(mào)易信貸融資、 中長期銀行信貸融資、 延遲兌現(xiàn)的貿(mào)易信貸融資以及其他債務(wù)融資， 每種融資方式的邊際成本取決于與其滯納金相關(guān)的信息不對稱成本和交易成本。 根據(jù)啄食理論， 企業(yè)在融資時， 會優(yōu)先選擇成本最低的融資方式； 而根據(jù)靜態(tài)權(quán)衡理論， 企業(yè)在進(jìn)行融資時，各種資金來源的邊際成本都是相同的；再者，根據(jù)優(yōu)序融資理論，企業(yè)進(jìn)行融資時要

45、結(jié)合企業(yè)自身具體情況， 是考慮多重因素下的優(yōu)序融資。 在本文中，我們認(rèn)為，以上這些理論都忽略了一點， 那就是邊際成本的確定主要依賴于融資資金的使用， 以及資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中資產(chǎn)方作為融資來源的重要影響作用。 一個來自葡萄牙中小企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù)分析證實， 企業(yè)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表資產(chǎn)方對于融資方式的選擇有著重要的影響，而這是靜態(tài)權(quán)衡理論和優(yōu)序融資理論所不能接受的。中小企業(yè)的融資主要來源于股權(quán)（內(nèi)部融資） ，商業(yè)信用，銀行信貸和其他債務(wù)。融資方式的選擇取決于資金成本， 而資金成本又是由信息不對稱成本和基于無債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)情況下的預(yù)期成本決定的。 信息不對稱成本主要是為了支持管理決策而收集和分析信息所產(chǎn)生的費用， 無債預(yù)期成本

46、主要產(chǎn)生于企業(yè)為收回債務(wù)而收集和出售抵押品時的費用。 由于中小企業(yè)的管理層和股東往往是同一個人， 股權(quán)和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的資金沒有信息不對稱成本，因此股權(quán)融資是成本最低的融資渠道。2 中小企業(yè)資產(chǎn)融資理論在前面的論述中， 我們曾建議， 葡萄牙的中小企業(yè)多采用內(nèi)部資金、廉價貿(mào)易信貸、中長期銀行信貸、高價貿(mào)易信貸和其他貸款進(jìn)行融資。接下來，我們將對以上各種類型的融資動機進(jìn)行討論。2.1廉價貿(mào)易信貸首先，我們將討論的是貿(mào)易信貸。 貿(mào)易信貸很有意思， 因為它們代表的非金融企業(yè)與金融中介機構(gòu)在提供金融服務(wù)方面的競爭。這一領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的早期研究關(guān)注于貿(mào)易信貸同的信貸渠道的作用（或所謂的“梅爾策”影響）之間的關(guān)系，以及同

47、貨幣政策的效率之間的關(guān)系。其基本思想是， 企業(yè)尤其是大型知名企業(yè)，同的面臨財務(wù)困境小企業(yè)，直接在金融市場達(dá)成貿(mào)易信貸的交易。在最近的研究中，將對貿(mào)易信貸的利用分為戰(zhàn)略動機和財務(wù)動機。戰(zhàn)略動機第一種理論是關(guān)于公司產(chǎn)品的信息不對稱。 貿(mào)易信貸是由賣方提供， 使買方可以在付款前確認(rèn)產(chǎn)品的數(shù)量和質(zhì)量。通過提供貿(mào)易融資，供應(yīng)商想證明的是，他們可以為買家提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的產(chǎn)品。 由于中小企業(yè)在一般情況下信譽不高， 因此這些企業(yè)迫于無奈， 往往使用貿(mào)易信貸的方式以證明其產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量。 由于產(chǎn)品的信息不對稱，買方對供應(yīng)商的資料很少， 或者供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)品的情況復(fù)雜， 質(zhì)量難以鑒定，因此貿(mào)易信貸被中小企業(yè)廣泛使用。第二個戰(zhàn)略動機

48、是定價。 以優(yōu)惠條件提供貿(mào)易融資， 其作用同商品降價類似。因此，企業(yè)可以利用貿(mào)易信貸， 間接的降低產(chǎn)品價格或作為不同買家之間的價格歧視工具，以促進(jìn)銷售。相比于風(fēng)險借款而言，貿(mào)易信貸是有利的，因為這種替代性融資的有著一個更為優(yōu)惠的融資利率。 因此，貿(mào)易信貸可以被用來作為直接的價格歧視的工具， 或者作為低信譽借款人的間接工具 （如果所有的買家提供相同的條件）。貿(mào)易信貸也可以幫助供應(yīng)商發(fā)展與買家的長期合作關(guān)系。 這往往體現(xiàn)在買方出現(xiàn)暫時財務(wù)困難的情況下， 供應(yīng)商要允許其延長付款期。 同金融機構(gòu)相比， 供應(yīng)商具有更好的的行業(yè)知識， 因此能夠更好地判斷買方是面臨暫時的困難還是存在一個長期性的問題。沒有嚴(yán)

49、格意義上的戰(zhàn)略動機， 最終動機都是基于交易成本。 貿(mào)易信貸作為進(jìn)行交易有效方式， 可以明確地區(qū)分貨物交割和帳款支付。 從最基本的方面講， 卡車司機運送貨物， 不必再四處找相關(guān)負(fù)責(zé)人支付帳單， 買方還可以節(jié)約交易成本所需的現(xiàn)金。融資動機這種觀點的基本內(nèi)容是， 企業(yè)與金融機構(gòu)在為其他公司提供信貸業(yè)務(wù)上進(jìn)行競爭。金融機構(gòu)的傳統(tǒng)觀點是， 他們在向企業(yè)提供信用時的主要問題是信息不對稱。金融機構(gòu)在收集和分析來自企業(yè)， 特別是受制與信息不對稱影響的中小型企業(yè)的信息時， 具有一定優(yōu)勢。 這種優(yōu)勢的確立， 關(guān)鍵在于銀行與目標(biāo)企業(yè)之間存在支付功能的密切關(guān)系， 金融機構(gòu)可以通過監(jiān)測目標(biāo)企業(yè)的帳目現(xiàn)金流入和流出來獲取

50、相關(guān)信息。但隨著貿(mào)易信貸逐漸流行， 非金融企業(yè)同金融機構(gòu)在解決這些問題及拓展信貸渠道方面，展開了激烈的競爭。 非金融機構(gòu)如何能夠在這個市場進(jìn)行競爭？彼得森和拉詹（1997）就此簡要討論幾種方式， 并提出供應(yīng)商對金融機構(gòu)可能存在的優(yōu)勢。相比于金融機構(gòu)， 供應(yīng)商同借款人之間有著更加密切的工作關(guān)系和更加頻繁的溝通交流。 供應(yīng)商和貸款人之間所達(dá)成訂單的時間及規(guī)模， 提供借款人有關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)情況的信息， 需要注意的是， 此信息是先提供給供應(yīng)商的， 金融機構(gòu)必須等待與訂單相關(guān)的現(xiàn)金流產(chǎn)生后， 才能獲取相關(guān)的業(yè)務(wù)信息。 還有早期付款折扣的提供，使供應(yīng)商及早的同借款人達(dá)成了一種信用關(guān)系， 因此供應(yīng)商能夠比金融機構(gòu)更