人口老齡化對(duì)日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響外文翻譯

1、人口老齡化對(duì)日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響外文翻譯 本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文原文: economic impacts of population aging in japan executive summary landis mackellar with tatiana ermolieva david horlacher leslie mayhew introduction the population of japan is now declining, and the ratio of persons in the prime working ages to persons who are elderly

2、 will inexorably rise over the next half century. thirty years ago, the view was widely held that rapid population growth and the resulting young age structure would prevent developing countries from ever rising above poverty. as that view gave way to a more nuanced interpretation of the effects of

3、population growth, paradoxically, the view took hold that the reverse demographic situation - population decline and an elderly population - implied catastrophe for rapidly aging developed countries such as japan. this report is an attempt to assess the economic impacts of foreseeable demographic tr

4、ends on japan. report summary the first chapter of the report, a general synthesis of the economics of population aging, emphasizes that aging does not hit a society as a meteorite hits an inert planet. even without taking into account institutional and social change, the traditional static neoclass

5、ical model of the economy suggests that there is a wealth of possibilities for adapting to the challenge of aging. just as a neoclassical view would hold that rapid population growth need not mire developing countries in poverty, so does it suggest that population aging need not, as some have sugges

6、ted, bankrupt the advanced industrial economies of the world. however, shifting factor prices as the working-age population declines and the rising cost of pension and health systems as the ranks of the elderly expand will give rise to intergenerational distributional pressures needing to be worked

7、out through the political process. the evidence suggests that young people in the u.s., europe and japan and eventually in china and the more rapidly aging developing countries will probably have to pay higher taxes and social contributions out of higher incomes, old people are going to have to work

8、 longer at better jobs, and retirees are going to have to get by on pensions lower than they expected. what are policy makers degrees of freedom? based on a general survey of industrial countries, policy makers can reduce the distortionary features of public pension systems that encourage workers to

9、 retire early. they often fail to do so because they are reluctant to forego redistribution, meaning that they cannot muster the necessary political support. in western europe, some have also fallen prey to the fallacy that excluding older workers from the labour force will increase the employment o

10、f younger workers. however, firm retirement provisions are much more important than public pension retirement provisions in determining age of exit from the labour force. and in japan, account must be taken of the fact that the labour force participation rate of elderly workers, while it has decline

11、d over time, is by far the highest among industrialised nations. there is relatively little that the state can do to mobilize savings except for engaging in the requisite saving itself. raising taxes worsens distortions and multiplies deadweight costs, so the only road to greater public savings, sho

12、rt of sustained rapid economic growth, is cutting public expenditure. voters appear to be unenthusiastic. perhaps it does not really matter: in an aging world, savings and investment may be overrated because labour force growth will be slow. others, however, would reply that the "new economy&qu

13、ot; places a greater premium than ever on investment in new technology. while demographic conditions indicate that there would be gains to a transition from pay as you go payg to capital reserve financing, the political chances of this occurring are slim. the best to be hoped for in most countries i

14、s the allocation of some small fraction of social security contributions to a capital reserve and modestly increased role of private savings. moreover, all pension systems are payg in the broad sense that goods must be transferred from young producers to elderly consumers. whatever the precise natur

15、e of the claim created for the elderly, it needs to be financed by reduced consumption of the non-elderly. the relevant question is whether the means of financing elderly persons claim on output, be this public pension entitlements, personal assets, etc., gives rise to distortions and inefficiencies

16、. superior global allocation of retirement saving portfolios can only add a few basis points to the risk-adjusted rate of return. moreover, the beneficiaries in industrial countries are those who are relatively well off; the poor who depend on labour income when young and public pensions when old ar

17、e unambiguous losers when capital is re-allocated from mature to emerging economies. given the pace at which beneficial new tests and treatments emerge, none of the proposed avenues for reducing health care expenditure appears particularly promising. governments can moderate expenditure growth, but

18、need to keep in mind that, in an aging society, health care is deservedly a priority sector. the sooner policy makers act to anticipate the adverse effects of aging with the means at their disposal, the better. however, population aging will have pervasive economic impacts regardless of the extent o

19、f government support for the elderly. policy reforms can mitigate the problems associated with population aging, but they are unable to eliminate them entirely. whatever steps policy makers take, and whatever the degree of government involvement in areas such as pensions and health, population aging

20、 will make its presence felt throughout the economy. the second chapter of the report focuses on japan, summarizing the demographic outlook and reviewing the results of major studies. the main conclusion from chapter 2 is that the japanese demographic prospect is indeed daunting. among the conclusio

21、ns that emerge from this chapter, three in particular stand out: although inefficiencies in the labor market can be reduced, labor force decline appears to be inevitable after 2025. moreover, this is a best-case scenario - in the absence of policies to encourage additional labor supply, shrinkage in

22、 the japanese workforce is beginning right now, at the turn of the century. in general, the labor force outlook is more sensitive to the participation of persons who would like to work but feel that they cannot because of their circumstances so-called “invisible workers,” mostly women who do not wor

23、k because they are caring for young children, etc. than to participation of the elderly. while great uncertainty must be attached to impacts of demographic change on saving rates, there is near unanimity among researchers that the availability of savings will decline, with implications not only for

24、japan, but for the world economy as well. financing problems in the japanese public pension system are already beginning to surface, in the form of increasing contribution rates, and will be exacerbated by projected demographic developments in the future. the same holds for the health system. a gene

25、ral impression is that policy makers have coped with controlling health costs more effectively than they have coped with pension-system problems. what are the demographic sources of these pressures? while rapidly declining mortality at older ages is one important factor, the key factor driving popul

26、ation aging in japan is the sustained decline in fertility. available evidence gives no reason to believe that fertility will increase anytime soon, indeed, if experience is a guide, current official forecasts for fertility are probably too high. reinforcing the problem, current forecasts for longev

27、ity are probably too low.本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文題目:economic impacts of population aging in japan出處: /0>. 作者:landis mackellar with tatiana ermolieva 、david horlacher 、 leslie mayhew譯文: 人口老齡化對(duì)日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響摘要: 日本的人口正在下降,以及在未來(lái)半個(gè)世紀(jì),黃金工作年齡的人將減少以及老人將不可阻擋地上升。三十年前,人們普遍認(rèn)為,人口的迅速增長(zhǎng)和由此產(chǎn)生的年輕的年齡結(jié)構(gòu)將比往任何時(shí)候都能更有效地防止發(fā)展中國(guó)家貧困狀況日益嚴(yán)重。由于

28、這種觀點(diǎn)讓位于對(duì)人口增長(zhǎng)的解釋效果更為細(xì)致入微,自相矛盾的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為,扭轉(zhuǎn)了人口狀況?人口下降和老年人口?暗示迅速老齡化對(duì)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的災(zāi)難,例如日本。這份報(bào)告是為了評(píng)估在可預(yù)見(jiàn)的人口趨勢(shì)日本的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響。 報(bào)告主體 文章的摘要報(bào)告,對(duì)人口老齡化的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的一般合成,第一章強(qiáng)調(diào),老化并不觸及社會(huì)的惰性,如隕石擊中地球。即使不考慮體制和社會(huì)變革,傳統(tǒng)的靜態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì)新古典模型表明,有一個(gè)適應(yīng)老齡化挑戰(zhàn)的可能性財(cái)富。正如新古典主義觀點(diǎn)將認(rèn)為,人口迅速增長(zhǎng)的需要不泥潭發(fā)展中國(guó)家貧困的國(guó)家,所以它表明,人口老齡化的需要,并非如一些人所認(rèn)為,破產(chǎn)了世界先進(jìn)的工業(yè)國(guó)。然而,轉(zhuǎn)移作為工作年齡人口的下降和上升的養(yǎng)老金和衛(wèi)生系

29、統(tǒng)擴(kuò)大為老人會(huì)產(chǎn)生代際工作需要被通過(guò)政治進(jìn)程之外的分配壓力的行列成本因素的價(jià)格。有證據(jù)表明,在美國(guó),歐洲和日本年輕人(并最終在中國(guó)和更迅速老齡化的發(fā)展中國(guó)家)將可能要支付更高的稅收和社會(huì)貢獻(xiàn)(出較高的收入),老人們將不得不延長(zhǎng)工作(在更好的工作),以及退休人員將不得不得到退休金低于預(yù)期。 基于對(duì)工業(yè)國(guó)家的普遍調(diào)查,什么是自由的政策制定者的度? 1、決策者可以減少公共養(yǎng)老金制度,鼓勵(lì)工人提早退休的扭曲功能。他們往往不這樣做,因?yàn)樗麄儾辉敢夥艞壷匦路峙?這意味著他們不能拿出必要的政治支持。在西歐,也有一些受騙的謬論,不包括老年工人的勞動(dòng)人口將增加年輕工人的就業(yè)。然而,企業(yè)退休的規(guī)定遠(yuǎn)比公共養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)

30、在確定的退出勞動(dòng)力歲退休的規(guī)定十分重要。在日本,必須考慮的一個(gè)事實(shí),即工人的勞動(dòng)人口參與率的老人,雖然隨著時(shí)間的推移下降,到目前為止,在工業(yè)化國(guó)家中最高的。 2、有相對(duì)較少的國(guó)家可以做動(dòng)員,除了在必要的從事節(jié)能本身的儲(chǔ)蓄。提高稅收的扭曲和惡化乘載重量成本,因此,唯一的道路,提高公眾的儲(chǔ)蓄,經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)高速增長(zhǎng)的簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng),是削減公共開(kāi)支。選民們似乎并不熱心。或許它并沒(méi)有真正的問(wèn)題:在一個(gè)老齡化的世界里,儲(chǔ)蓄和投資可能被高估,因?yàn)閯趧?dòng)人口的增長(zhǎng)將是緩慢的。然而,其他人會(huì)回答說(shuō),“新經(jīng)濟(jì)”的地方比以往任何時(shí)候都對(duì)新技術(shù)投資的更大的溢價(jià)。 3、雖然人口狀況表明,會(huì)有漲幅,從現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付(現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付),以資本公積融資過(guò)渡,這種情況發(fā)生的政治可能性很小。希望最好是在大多數(shù)國(guó)家是一定的社會(huì)保障貢獻(xiàn)一小部分資本公積分配和適當(dāng)增加私人儲(chǔ)蓄的作用。此外,所有現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付養(yǎng)老金制度是在廣泛意義上的商品必須從年輕生產(chǎn)者