淺談家族企業(yè)文化的建設(shè) 外文參考文獻(xiàn)譯文及原文.doc

本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）外文參考文獻(xiàn)譯文及原文 學(xué) 院 經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院 專 業(yè) 工商管理 年級班別 學(xué) 號 學(xué)生姓名 指導(dǎo)教師 2007年 6月 15 日目 錄外文文獻(xiàn)譯文1外文文獻(xiàn)原文7 盡管董事會(huì)缺少獨(dú)立董事，小股東也缺少投票權(quán)，家族企業(yè)對全體股東來說仍然是較好的選擇只要家族企業(yè)的創(chuàng)始人擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官或者董事會(huì)主席。當(dāng)創(chuàng)始人的后代接手后，公司的價(jià)值就開始下跌了。以上是沃頓商學(xué)院教授拉夫阿密特（Raphael (Raffi) Amit）和哈佛商學(xué)院教授貝倫維拉倫格（Belen Villalonga）的一篇論文中的部分結(jié)論。這篇題為家族對公司的所有、控制和管理如何影響公司價(jià)值的論文認(rèn)為，當(dāng)創(chuàng)始人擔(dān)任家族企業(yè)的CEO ，或者當(dāng)創(chuàng)始人雇傭他人擔(dān)任CEO ，而自己擔(dān)任董事會(huì)主席時(shí)，家族企業(yè)要比非家族企業(yè)業(yè)績更佳。一旦創(chuàng)始人的后代擔(dān)任家族企業(yè)的CEO，就算創(chuàng)始人仍然擔(dān)任董事會(huì)主席，企業(yè)的市場價(jià)值就會(huì)下跌。 阿密特和維拉倫格分析了1994至2000年間財(cái)富500強(qiáng)企業(yè)的代理數(shù)據(jù)。出于研究目的需要，他們將家族企業(yè)定義為：創(chuàng)始人或因血緣或婚姻關(guān)系而成為家庭成員的人擔(dān)任高層執(zhí)行官、董事的公司或者是由一名或全體家族成員共同持有至少5%公司股份的公司。一些非常成功的美國公司就是家族企業(yè)，如沃尓瑪、家得寶、亨氏、魯伯梅、布萊克戴克。這些公司有一點(diǎn)是相同的都有一個(gè)有遠(yuǎn)見、有管理技巧，能凝聚員工的創(chuàng)始人。然而當(dāng)創(chuàng)始人的愿景被其后代沖淡時(shí)，公司業(yè)績就滑坡了，福特汽車和摩托羅拉便是如此。威廉福特二世是亨利福特的第四代子孫，三年前他擔(dān)起了復(fù)興福特汽車的使命，開始執(zhí)掌福特汽車。這家汽車巨頭最近報(bào)告說，9月份的銷售額比去年同期下降了7%，其中部分原因是日本汽車制造商帶來的激烈競爭。無線電話制造商摩托羅拉的首席執(zhí)行官克里斯托弗加文（Christopher Galvin）的曾祖父是摩托羅拉的創(chuàng)始人。面對強(qiáng)大的競爭對手諾基亞和三星，他在1月份正式將大權(quán)移交給前Sun公司的總裁愛德華贊德（Edward Zander）。從數(shù)字上來看，阿密特和維拉倫格研究樣本中家族企業(yè)比非家族企業(yè)年輕（家族企業(yè)平均歷史62.68歲；非家族企業(yè)平均歷史72.19歲），銷售額增長率更高（19.6%對13.8%），資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率也更高（11.6%對10.9%）。阿密特指出，家族企業(yè)的一些負(fù)面因素有：股東投票權(quán)的顯著差異、交叉持股、集團(tuán)投票（見注解）。這些制度的設(shè)計(jì)目的都是為了保證公司掌握在家族手中。 雖然有這些家族控制的問題存在，但是只要?jiǎng)?chuàng)始人仍然參與公司管理，家族企業(yè)仍然能為股東帶來更多的利益。對小股東來說，一家理想的家族企業(yè)應(yīng)該是由創(chuàng)始人擔(dān)任CEO或董事會(huì)主席，并且沒有任何像A、B級的超級投票股或非流通股的控制強(qiáng)化機(jī)制的公司。 創(chuàng)始人是關(guān)鍵阿密特和維拉倫格的研究目標(biāo)是家族企業(yè)是否為股東帶來更多的利益。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，家族企業(yè)勝過非家族企業(yè)似乎有兩個(gè)原因。許多非家族企業(yè)都有一個(gè)普遍存在的問題管理層與股東之間就回報(bào)、管理層的薪資、公司治理等問題發(fā)生的沖突。“任何股權(quán)分散的公司都存在著所有者與管理者之間的沖突，”阿密特說，“而在家族企業(yè)里，管理者就是所有者，因此不存在這種沖突?！贝_實(shí)，家族企業(yè)有大股東和小股東關(guān)系緊張這一問題。然而，股東仍然是劃算的。因?yàn)楣芾碚吆退姓咧g的沖突所消耗的成本要高于大、小股東爭吵的成本。這些爭論也許有助于營運(yùn)結(jié)果，也許有害于營運(yùn)結(jié)果，但家族企業(yè)能有效運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的真正原因在于其創(chuàng)始人?！拔覀儧]有對創(chuàng)始人的作用進(jìn)行特別研究，但他們的作用確實(shí)存在，”阿密特說，“創(chuàng)始人給整個(gè)員工隊(duì)伍注入了一種敬業(yè)奉獻(xiàn)的精神。這讓家族企業(yè)不斷進(jìn)步。非家族企業(yè)沒有這些?！边@就是為什么當(dāng)家族企業(yè)處境不妙的時(shí)候，就會(huì)讓創(chuàng)始人回來把準(zhǔn)航向。1997年，蘋果電腦合伙創(chuàng)始人史蒂夫錢伯斯（Steve Jobs）回到公司出任臨時(shí)CEO ，后又任永久CEO。他用iMac、iPod等新產(chǎn)品扭轉(zhuǎn)了大局。10月1日，仁科趕走了CEO克雷格康維（Craig Conway），迎回了創(chuàng)始人戴維杜夫（David Duff）。查爾斯施瓦（Charles Schwab）公司宣布該季度盈利下跌10%后，其創(chuàng)始人兼主席于7月重回公司出任CEO。阿密特和維拉倫格的發(fā)現(xiàn)說明了創(chuàng)始人的作用。這項(xiàng)研究顯示，由創(chuàng)始人兼CEO掌舵的公司市場價(jià)值對資產(chǎn)的平均比率，又稱“托賓Q值”，最高。創(chuàng)始人任CEO兼主席的公司的平均“托賓Q值”達(dá)3.12。創(chuàng)始人任主席，雇傭外人擔(dān)任CEO的公司的“托賓Q值”有將近2.81。然而，當(dāng)創(chuàng)始人的后代參與管理事務(wù)時(shí)，創(chuàng)始人與公司績效之間的因果聯(lián)系似乎被打破了。當(dāng)后代接替創(chuàng)始人擔(dān)任主席時(shí)，“托賓Q值”整整跌了一個(gè)點(diǎn)，從2.81跌到1.81。當(dāng)CEO 也由創(chuàng)始人后代擔(dān)任時(shí)，市場價(jià)值對資產(chǎn)之比繼續(xù)下跌。教訓(xùn)：家族企業(yè)需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)始人的參與才能成功?！拔覀兊难芯拷Y(jié)果證明，創(chuàng)始人能給公司帶來寶貴的技能，”阿密特和維拉倫格寫道，“然而，當(dāng)我們對主席和CEO的職位進(jìn)行研究后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在創(chuàng)始人同時(shí)兼任主席和CEO二職與創(chuàng)始人任主席，另外雇傭一個(gè)CEO這兩種情況下，創(chuàng)始人的技能對公司來說幾乎是同樣寶貴的。對于這一現(xiàn)象，一種可能的解釋是創(chuàng)始人帶給公司的技能具有這樣的性質(zhì)：他們也許是能給人以靈感的領(lǐng)袖、偉大的夢想家或者是極具天賦的科學(xué)家。但他們也許不是，也不需要是，優(yōu)秀的經(jīng)理人?！惫咀遄V盡管上文已經(jīng)給出了“家族企業(yè)”的定義，到底是什么構(gòu)成了家族企業(yè)卻并不總是很清楚。有些公司類似惠普（HP）。惠普公司由比爾惠立特（Bill Hewlett）和戴維普卡德（David Packard）共同創(chuàng)立。這兩大家族現(xiàn)在控制著惠普大量股份。普卡德家族的股份是惠立特家族的兩倍。阿密特和維拉倫格認(rèn)為，普卡德家族在惠普掌握著控制權(quán)。谷類食品公司克羅格（Kellogg）由W.G.克羅格（W.G. Kellogg）基金會(huì)控制。時(shí)裝零售商諾德斯托（Nordstrom）也是一家家族企業(yè)。 但其他公司就沒那么明顯了。時(shí)代華納于1996年被特納廣播公司收購后成為一家家族企業(yè)。特納廣播公司的創(chuàng)始人泰德特納成為合并后新實(shí)體最大的股東。歐齊蘇貝格（Ochs-Sulzberger）和葛蘭漢（Graham）兩大家族通過破產(chǎn)收購分別接收了紐約時(shí)報(bào)和華盛頓郵報(bào)。阿密特綜合分析了全體家族成員及代表對企業(yè)的所有權(quán)以及基金會(huì)持有的企業(yè)股份。一旦家族對企業(yè)的所有權(quán)成立，公司即分屬以下各大類： 有控制機(jī)制、CEO為家族成員的家族企業(yè)。在這樣的企業(yè)，家族通過超級投票股等機(jī)制控制公司。超級投票股不能公開交易，家族成員所持有的每一股都擁有多于普通股幾倍的投票權(quán)。 有控制機(jī)制、CEO為非家族成員的家族企業(yè)。這樣的家族企業(yè)有一套機(jī)制保證家族的投票權(quán)，同時(shí)雇傭家族外的人士來管理公司。例如，20世紀(jì)90年代，福特雇傭杰克納斯（Jacques Nasser）任CEO，而在此之后，又把大權(quán)交回給福特后代。 CEO為家族成員、沒有控制增強(qiáng)機(jī)制的家族企業(yè)。在以上所有類型的家族企業(yè)，創(chuàng)始人是否參與公司管理似乎是公司成功與否的最大決定因素。良好的公司治理盡管家族企業(yè)往往缺少獨(dú)立董事，并且給家族內(nèi)部成員更多的投票權(quán)，家族企業(yè)在公司治理上仍然比非家族企業(yè)勝出一籌。對阿密特來說，這是更讓人感到驚訝的發(fā)現(xiàn)之一。家族企業(yè)的平均公司治理指數(shù)為9.05，而非家族企業(yè)為10.02（公司治理指數(shù)越低越好）?！凹易迤髽I(yè)往往比較簡潔，”阿密特說。他接著說，家族企業(yè)給高層管理人員的“金降落傘”（見注解）較少。發(fā)生收購時(shí)，也無需向高層管理人員支付大量遣散費(fèi)。 不過，這并不等于說家族企業(yè)就不存在公司治理上的問題，阿密特補(bǔ)充道。家族企業(yè)更有可能通過發(fā)行投票權(quán)不同的股票等措施來保證對公司的控制權(quán)。在名列財(cái)富500強(qiáng)的家族企業(yè)中，各大家族擁有全部股份的16%，但有50%的家族企業(yè)使用控制增強(qiáng)機(jī)制。與之形成對比的是，僅有13%的非家族企業(yè)使用控制增強(qiáng)機(jī)制。這些機(jī)制使家族股東可以擁有比他們的所有權(quán)股更多的投票權(quán)。阿密特和維拉倫格指出，家族企業(yè)還通過其他方式保證對公司的控制權(quán)。他們把非家族成員股東的比例保持在一個(gè)比較低的水平。此外，同非家族企業(yè)相比，家族企業(yè)中獨(dú)立董事所占的比重要低得多，阿密特說。但是，他補(bǔ)充道，就算把所有潛在的公司治理問題都考慮在內(nèi)，家族企業(yè)仍然勝出一籌。 以今天的公司治理觀點(diǎn)來看，成為一家缺少獨(dú)立董事、投票權(quán)掌控在一個(gè)家族手中的公司的股東似乎不是一個(gè)好主意。但關(guān)鍵在于家族企業(yè)是有價(jià)值的，尤其是在創(chuàng)始人擔(dān)任主席兼CEO，為員工創(chuàng)造了一種積極的企業(yè)文化的情況下！“總之，我們的研究結(jié)果說明，要知道家族企業(yè)與非家族企業(yè)相比價(jià)值是多還是少？什么時(shí)候多？什么時(shí)候少？你必須分清構(gòu)成“家族企業(yè)”這一定義的三個(gè)基本元素所有權(quán)、控制、管理，”阿密特和維拉倫格寫道，“雖然家族對企業(yè)控制過多會(huì)帶來負(fù)擔(dān)，但家族擁有企業(yè)這一點(diǎn)有諸多優(yōu)勢，對于小股東來說，在一家由創(chuàng)始人任CEO的家族企業(yè)能比在一家非家族企業(yè)得到更多回報(bào)?！弊ⅲ杭瘓F(tuán)投票：股東并非根據(jù)個(gè)人喜好，以個(gè)人名義進(jìn)行投票，而是聯(lián)合起來投票，以體現(xiàn)小集團(tuán)的意愿。金降落傘：反兼并的策略之一，指公司的最高管理階層在被聘用或續(xù)約時(shí)與公司簽下合約，約中規(guī)定：若公司被兼并而致使該高級經(jīng)理失業(yè)，控制公司的兼并者將支付該經(jīng)理龐大金額的遣散費(fèi)用、紅利及股票選擇權(quán)。這便是高級經(jīng)理的“金降落傘”。家族企業(yè)的文化建設(shè)是一個(gè)漸漸的完善過程。只有針對家族企業(yè)的文化建設(shè)方面的存在的現(xiàn)實(shí)問題適時(shí)地進(jìn)行改革和創(chuàng)新，才能使家族式企業(yè)有一個(gè)更好的發(fā)展，才能不斷提升家族企業(yè)的價(jià)值。如何衡量家族企業(yè)的價(jià)值呢? 我們可以用企業(yè)每年的凈利潤（為了分析簡單，這里撇開了其他非物質(zhì)要素對企業(yè)價(jià)值的影響）和企業(yè)壽命這兩個(gè)維度來衡量。隨企業(yè)規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大，作為企業(yè)所有者的企業(yè)主，應(yīng)該具備理性能力，積極地在適當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)候推進(jìn)家族企業(yè)的文化建設(shè)，把這種被動(dòng)的學(xué)習(xí)變成積極主動(dòng)的適應(yīng)?？v坐標(biāo)表示企業(yè)的凈利潤,即企業(yè)每年的收入總額扣除掉各類成本及正常開支的余額。橫坐標(biāo)表示企業(yè)的壽命。則企業(yè)的價(jià)值就是各年的企業(yè)凈利潤總和。由于通貨膨脹率等各因素的影響，不同年份即使獲得一樣的凈利潤，但它們對企業(yè)的影響是不一樣的。為了消除這個(gè)影響，需要給每一年所獲得的凈利潤賦權(quán)，然后再相加。因此，企業(yè)的價(jià)值可以用數(shù)學(xué)公式表示為y= ，i代表企業(yè)創(chuàng)建后的年份，n代表企業(yè)的壽命，X代表企業(yè)的年凈利潤， W代表年凈利潤的權(quán)重。適時(shí)積極推進(jìn)家族企業(yè)的文化建設(shè)可以作用于關(guān)系企業(yè)價(jià)值的這兩個(gè)維度，通過增加企業(yè)的每年凈利潤和延長企業(yè)壽命來提升企業(yè)價(jià)值。當(dāng)前，我國的許多家族企業(yè)都已經(jīng)具備了一定的規(guī)模，家族企業(yè)正在進(jìn)行品牌和文化建設(shè)，這種建設(shè)并不是學(xué)者教導(dǎo)的結(jié)果，而是企業(yè)自身演進(jìn)的自然產(chǎn)物。家族企業(yè)文化建設(shè)不僅要靠企業(yè)主和管理者的推動(dòng)和全體企業(yè)員工的參與，也需要政府。政府只有成為可靠的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)利的保護(hù)者和誠信原則的維護(hù)者等，為家族企業(yè)的文化建設(shè)創(chuàng)造良好的外部環(huán)境?？v上所述，企業(yè)特定的組織形態(tài)是一定條件下企業(yè)內(nèi)外環(huán)境的產(chǎn)物，家族企業(yè)產(chǎn)生和成長是市場選擇下的一種適應(yīng)性組織形態(tài)。企業(yè)文化是關(guān)系家族企業(yè)成敗興衰的關(guān)鍵，家族企業(yè)文化建設(shè)是家族企業(yè)演化到一定階段后的必然要求。家族企業(yè)文化建設(shè)應(yīng)該從家族企業(yè)存在的各種具體問題出發(fā),在企業(yè)主重視、全員參與下，適時(shí)積極推進(jìn)家族企業(yè)的文化建設(shè)。新的企業(yè)文化形成是一個(gè)漸漸的過程, 只有通過反復(fù)的宣傳和強(qiáng)化，將員工的感性認(rèn)識上升到理性認(rèn)識，將少數(shù)人的觀念逐漸變?yōu)榇蠖鄶?shù)員工的共識，才能真正發(fā)揮企業(yè)文化的導(dǎo)向、凝聚、激勵(lì)和約束功能，企業(yè)的價(jià)值才能得到大大的提升，家族企業(yè)才能實(shí)現(xiàn)可持續(xù)發(fā)展。當(dāng)前，我國私營企業(yè)的治理形式普遍存在家族化現(xiàn)象。從制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和演化經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的視角對當(dāng)前家族企業(yè)的文化建設(shè)問題進(jìn)行分析和評價(jià)，解決家族企業(yè)在文化建設(shè)過程中存在的各種現(xiàn)實(shí)問題，以促進(jìn)家族企業(yè)價(jià)值的提升。Despite the lack of independent directors on their boards and voting power for minority shareholders, family-run companies are still the better bet for all stakeholders as long as the founder of the firm is involved as chief executive officer or chairman. If the descendent of a founder runs the company, value is lost. Those are some of the conclusions of a paper by Wharton professor Raphael (Raffi) Amit and Harvard Business School professor Belen Villalonga. The paper - How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value? - suggests that family ownership of corporations performs better than non-family firms when the founder serves as the CEO of a family firm or as its chairman with a hired CEO. When a descendent serves as the CEO of a family-run company - even if the founder remains chairman - the firms market value declines. Amit and Villalonga analyzed proxy data on all Fortune 500 firms from 1994 to 2000. For the purposes of the study, a family firm was defined as a company where the founder or member of the family by either blood or marriage was an officer, a director or the owner of at least 5% of the firms equity either individually or in a group. Some of the most successful U.S. companies, including Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Heinz, Rubbermaid and Black & Decker, are family-run. The hallmark of each of these companies is a founder who had vision and the managerial skills to rally employees around a business.But performance slips when the founders vision is diluted by descendents, as shown by such firms as Ford Motor and Motorola. William Ford Jr., a fourth generation descendent of Henry Ford, now runs the giant auto manufacturer, which recently reported that September sales fell 7% from a year ago - in part a reflection of stiff competition from Japanese rivals. William Ford Jr. had been brought in three years ago to revive the company. Wireless phone maker Motorola, facing tough competition from Nokia and Samsung, saw CEO Christopher Galvin, whose great-grandfather founded the company, officially hand over the reins to former Sun Microsystems executive Edward Zander in January. By the numbers, family firms in Amit and Villalongas sample are younger (62.68 mean years vs. 72.19 for non-family firms), deliver better sales growth (19.6% for family firms vs. 13.8%) and have higher return on assets (11.6% vs. 10.9%). Amit points to some of the negatives of family businesses - notably different levels of voting rights among shareholders, cross-holdings and voting blocks, all of which are designed to keep company control in family hands. But even with those control issues, family-run companies still do better for shareholders if the founder remains involved. The ideal family company for minority shareholders is one where the founder is CEO or chairman of a firm that does not have any control-enhancing mechanisms such as Class A and Class B super voting and nontradable shares. Why Founders MatterThe goal of Amit and Villalongas project was to ask whether they perform better for shareholders. That said, family firms seem to outperform their non-family counterparts for two reasons. Many non-family companies suffer from the standard conflict between management and shareholders over such issues as returns, management pay and governance. This conflict between owner and manager is standard in widely-held firms says Amit. In a family-run company, the manager and owner are the same and so the conflict doesnt exist.Family firms do carry the baggage of tensions between majority and minority shareholders; however, stockholders are still better off because there is a higher cost to the shareholder-owner conflict compared to squabbles between minority and majority shareholders. Although those conflicts may help or harm results, the real reason family companies seem to work is their link to founders. We dont go into the effects of founders specifically, but there is an effect, says Amit. Founders instill commitment into the entire employee base. That makes the company better. Non-family companies dont have that.Such reasoning is why struggling companies often bring back their founders to right the ship. Apple Computer co-founder Steve Jobs returned to the company in 1997 as interim and later permanent CEO, and turned the company around with new products such as the iMac and iPod. PeopleSoft ousted CEO Craig Conway Oct. 1 and brought back founder David Duff. Charles Schwabs founder and chairman stepped back in as CEO in July after the company announced a 10% drop in earnings for the quarter.Amits and Villalongs findings illustrate the founder effect. According to this research, firms with a founder-CEO at the helm have the best mean ratio of market value to assets, also known as Tobins q. Firms with a founder-CEO and chairman had a mean Tobins q of 3.12. Firms with a founder as chairman and an outside CEO scored almost as high (2.81). The founder-performance link, however, seems to break when descendents enter the picture. When the founder is succeeded by a descendent as chairman, Tobins q drops by a full point to 1.81. The ratio of market value to assets drops further when the CEO is also a descendent.The lesson: Family run companies need to have the founders involved to succeed. Our results confirm that founders bring valuable skills to their firms, write Amit and Villalonga. However, when we look at the chairmans position as well as the CEOs, we find that founders skills are almost as valuable when they bring them to the firm through their position as chairman but have a hired CEO in place. One likely explanation for this is the nature of the skills that founders bring to their firms: Founders may be inspiring leaders, great visionaries, or exceptionally talented scientists. But they may not-and need not-be good managers as well.The Corporate Family TreeDespite the definition of family firm offered earlier, it isnt always clear what constitutes a family-run company. There are companies such as Hewlett-Packard, founded by Bill Hewlett and David Packard, whose families now control large blocks of shares in H-P. The Packard family owns twice as many shares as the Hewlett family and is deemed the controlling family by Amit and Villalonga. Cereal maker Kellogg Company is controlled by the W.G. Kellogg foundation. Fashion retailer Nordstrom is another family-run firm. But other situations arent as obvious. Time Warner became a family firm in 1996 as the result of the acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System, whose founder, Ted Turner, became the largest shareholder in the merged entity. The Ochs-Sulzberger and Graham families took over the New York Times Co. and Washington Post Co., respectively, by acquiring bankrupt companies. Amit aggregated family ownership across all family members and representatives as well as share held in trusts. Once family ownership is established, firms fall into the following broad categories:Family firms with controlling mechanisms and a family CEO. In these companies, families control the company through mechanisms such as super-voting shares, which may not trade publicly and give the family a certain number of shares of voting power for every share they own. Family firms with controlling mechanisms but no family CEO. These firms have a structure that keeps family voting power, but hire outsiders to run the company. Ford hired Jacques Nasser as CEO in the 1990s, for example, before handing the reins back to a Ford descendent. Family firms with a family CEO but no control-enhancing mechanisms. In all those cases, whether the founder is involved in the company seems to be the biggest differentiator behind its success.Good GovernanceAlthough family companies often lack independent directors and give insiders more voting power, they still managed to score higher on corporate governance than non-family companies. To Amit, this finding is one of the more surprising conclusions. On the corporate governance index, family-run companies had a mean score of 9.05 compared to a non-family firm score of 10.02. A lower score is better. The family firm is often cleaner, says Amit, who adds that family firms have fewer golden parachutes for executives and dont have change-of-control provisions to line executive pockets in the event of an acquisition. Nevertheless, thats not to say there are no governance issues, Amit adds. Family companies are more likely to employ measures to keep control of the company by issuing shares differentiated by voting power. Families own 16% of the equity of the Fortune 500 firms they represent, but 50% of them use control-enhancement mechanisms. In contrast, 13% of the non-family firms use control-enhancing techniques. These methods allow family shareholders to have more voting power than their ownership stake would suggest. According to Amit and Villalonga, family firms also maintain control in another way: They keep the percentage of non-family shareholders low. In addition, family firms have a significantly lower proportion of independent directors compared to non-family companies, says Amit. But even when all the potential governance issues are weighed, he adds, family firms still come out ahead. Being a shareholder of a company that lacks independent directors and keeps voting power with one family may seem counterintuitive given todays focus on corporate governance. But the bottom line is family-run companies are valuable - especially when the founder serves as chairman and CEO and creates a positive corporate culture for the firms employees. Altogether, our findings suggest that in order to understand whether and when family firms are more or less valuable than non-family firms, one must distinguish among three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms: ownership, control, and management,” write Amit and Villalonga. “Despite the costs associated with the familys excess control,” they add, “the benefits of family ownership make minority shareholders of founder CEO family firms better off than they would have been in a non-family firm. Family firms cultural reconstruction is a gradually perfect process. Only at the right moment carries on the reform and the innovation in view of family firms cultural reconstruction aspect existence realistic question, can enable the family type enterprise to have a better development, can unceasingly promote the family firm the value. How weighs the family firm the value? We may use enterprise every year only the profit (in order to analyze simply, here has put aside other non- matter essential factor to enterprise value influence) and the enterprise life these two dimensions weighs. Along with the enterprise scale expansion, took the enterprise owners business owner, should have the rational ability, positively in the suitable time advancement family firms cultural reconstruction, turns this kind of passive study the positive initiative adaption. The y-coordinate expressed the enterprise only the profit, namely the enterprise every year total income deducts each kind of cost and the normal expenditure remaining sum. The x-coordinate expresses enterprises life. Then enterprises value is each year enterprise only profit sum total. As a result of inflation rate and so on various factors influence, different year even if obtains the same only profit, but they to the enterprise the influence are dissimilar. In order to eliminate this influence, needs to give each year institute to obtain only the profit to bestow on the power, then adds together again. Therefore, enterprises value may use the mathematical formula expression is y=, i founds after on behalf of the enterprise the year, n represents the enterprise the life, X represents the enterprise the year only profit, W represents the year only profit the weight. At the right moment positively advances the family firm the cultural reconstruction to be allowed to affect to the relational enterprise value these two dimensions, and lengthens the enterprise life through the increase enterprises every year only profit to promote the enterprise value. Presently, our country many family firm all already had the certain scale, the family firm has been carrying on the brand and the cultural reconstruction, this construction certainly was not the result which the scholar taught, but was the enterprise own evolution natural product. The family firm cultural reconstruction not only must depend on the enterprise to advocate p